supremacy beyond the inhabited world. After twice crossing over to the island from the opposite coast of Gaul, and worsting the enemy in many battles rather than advantaging his own men, for there was nothing worth taking from men who lived so wretched a life and were so poor, he brought the war to a close not such as he wished, but taking hostages from the king and imposing a tribute, he retired from the island. On his return he found letters which were just going to cross over to him from his friends in Rome, informing him of his daughter's death, who died in child-birth in the house of her husband Pompeius.
Great was the grief of Pompeius, and great was the grief of Cæsar; and their friends were also troubled, as the relationship was now dissolved which maintained peace and concord in the State, which but for this alliance was threatened with disturbance. The child also died after surviving the mother only a few days. Now the people, in spite of the tribunes, carried Julia[499] to the Field of Mars, where her obsequies were celebrated; and there she lies.
XXIV. As the force of Cæsar was now large, he was obliged to distribute it in many winter encampments. But while he was on his road to Italy, according to his custom, there was another general rising of the Gauls, and powerful armies scouring the country attempted to destroy the winter camps, and attacked the Roman entrenchments. The most numerous and bravest of the revolted Gauls under Abriorix destroyed Cotta[500] and Titurius with their army; and the legion under Cicero[501] they surrounded with sixty thousand men and blockaded, and they came very near taking the camp by storm, for all the Romans had been wounded and were courageously defending themselves above their strength. When this intelligence reached Cæsar, who was at a distance, he quickly turned about, and getting together seven thousand men in all, he hurried to release Cicero from the blockade.
The besiegers were aware of his approach and met him with the intention of cutting him off at once, for they despised the fewness of his numbers. But Cæsar, deceiving the enemy, avoided them continually, and having occupied a position which was advantageous to one who had to contend against many with a small force, he fortified his camp, and kept his men altogether from fighting; and he made them increase the height of the ramparts and build up the gates as if they were afraid, his manœuvre being to make the enemy despise him, till at last when they made their assault in scattered bodies, urged by self-confidence, sallying out he put them to flight and killed many of them.
XXV.[502] The frequent defections of the Gauls in those parts were thus quieted, and also by Cæsar during the winter moving about in all directions and carefully watching disturbances. For there had come to him from Italy three legions to replace those that had perished, Pompeius having lent him two of those which were under his command, and one legion having been newly raised in Gaul upon the Padus. But in the course of time there showed themselves, what had long in secret been planted and spread abroad by the most powerful men among the most warlike tribes, the elements of the greatest and the most dangerous of all the wars in Gaul, strengthened by a numerous body of young men armed and collected from all quarters, and by great stores brought together, and fortified cities, and countries difficult of access. And at that time, during the winter, frozen rivers and forests buried in snow, and plains overflowed by winter torrents, and in some parts paths that could not be discovered for the depth of the snow, and in other parts the great uncertainty of a march through marshes and streams diverted from their course, seemed to place the proceedings of the insurgents altogether beyond any attempt on the part of Cæsar.
Accordingly many tribes had revolted, but the leaders of the revolt were the Arvenni and the Carnuntini; Vergentorix was elected to the supreme direction of the war, he whose father the Gauls had put to death on the ground of aiming at a tyranny.
XXVI. Vergentorix,[503] dividing his force into many parts, and placing over them many commanders, began to gain over all the surrounding country as far as those who bordered on the Arar, it being his design, as Cæsar's enemies in Rome were combining against him, to rouse all Gaul to war. If he had attempted this a little later, when Cæsar was engaged in the civil war, alarms no less than those from the invasion of the Cimbri would have seized on Italy. But now Cæsar, who appears to have had the talent for making the best use of all opportunities in war, and particularly critical seasons, as soon as he heard of the rising, set out on his march, by the very roads[504] that he traversed, and the impetuosity and rapidity of his march in so severe a winter letting the barbarians see that an invincible and unvanquished army was coming against them. For where no one believed that a messenger or a letter-carrier from him could make his way in a long time, there was Cæsar seen with all his army, at once ravaging their lands, and destroying the forts, taking cities, and receiving those who changed sides and came over to him, till at last even the nation of the Edui[505] declared against him, who up to this time had called themselves brothers of the Romans, and had received signal distinction, but now by joining the insurgents they greatly dispirited Cæsar's troops. In consequence of this, Cæsar moved from those parts, and passed over the territory of the Lingones,[506] wishing to join the Sequani, who were friends, and formed a bulwark in front of Italy against the rest of Gaul. There the enemy fell upon him and hemmed him in with many ten thousands, upon which Cæsar resolved to fight a decisive battle against the combined forces, and after a great contest, he gained a victory at last, and with great slaughter, routed the barbarians; but at first it appears that he sustained some loss, and the Aruveni show a dagger[507] suspended in a temple, which they say was taken from Cæsar. Cæsar himself afterwards saw it, and smiled; and when his friends urged him to take it down, he would not, because he considered it consecrated.
XXVII. However, the chief part of those who then escaped, fled with the king to the city of Alesia.[508] And while Cæsar was besieging this city, which was considered to be impregnable by reason of the strength of the walls and the number of the defenders, there fell upon him from without a danger great beyond all expectation. For the strength of all the nations in Gaul assembling in arms came against Alesia, to the number of three hundred thousand; and the fighting men in the city were not fewer than one hundred and seventy thousand; so that Cæsar being caught between two such forces and blockaded, was compelled to form two walls for his protection, the one towards the city, and the other opposite those who had come upon him, since, if these forces should unite, his affairs would be entirely ruined. On many accounts then, and with good reason, the hazard before the walls of Alesia was famed abroad, as having produced deeds of daring and skill such as no other struggle had done; but it is most worthy of admiration that Cæsar engaged with so many thousands outside of the town and defeated them without it being known to those in the city; and still more admirable, that this was also unknown to the Romans who were guarding the wall towards the city. For they knew nothing of the victory till they heard the weeping of the men in Alesia and the wailing of the women, when they saw on the other side many shields adorned with silver and gold, and many breastplates smeared with blood, and also cups and Gallic tents conveyed by the Romans to their camp. So quickly did so mighty a force, like a phantom or a dream, vanish out of sight and disperse, the greater part of the men having fallen in battle. But those who held Alesia, after giving no small trouble to themselves and to Cæsar, at last surrendered; and the leader of the whole war, Vergentorix, putting on his best armour, and equipping his horse, came out through the gates, and riding round Cæsar who was seated, and then leaping down from his horse, he threw off his complete armour, and seating himself at Cæsar's feet, he remained there till he was delivered up to be kept for the triumph.
XXVIII.[509] Cæsar had long ago resolved to put down Pompeius, as Pompeius also had fully resolved to do towards him. For now that Crassus had lost his life among the Parthians, who kept a watch over both of them, it remained for one of them, in order to be the chief, to put down him who was, and to him who was the chief, to take off the man whom he feared, in order that this might not befall him. But it had only recently occurred to Pompeius to take alarm, and hitherto he had despised Cæsar, thinking it would be no difficult thing for the man whom he had elevated to be again depressed by him; but Cæsar, who had formed his design from the beginning, like an athlete, removed himself to a distance from his antagonists, and exercised himself in the Celtic wars, and thus disciplined his troops and increased his reputation, being elevated by his exploits to an equality with the victories of Pompeius; also laying hold of pretexts, some furnished by the conduct of Pompeius himself, and others by the times and the disordered state of the administration at Rome, owing to which, those who were candidates for magistracies placed tables in public and shamelessly bribed the masses, and the people being hired went down to show their partisanship not with votes on behalf of their briber, but with bows and swords and slings. And after polluting the Rostra with blood and dead bodies, they separated, leaving the city to anarchy, like a ship carried along without a pilot, so that sensible men were well content if matters should result in nothing worse than a monarchy after such madness and such tempest. And there were many who even ventured to say publicly that the state of affairs could only be remedied by a monarchy, and that they ought to submit to this remedy when applied by the mildest of physicians, hinting at Pompeius. But when Pompeius in what he said affected to decline the honour, though in fact he was more than anything else labouring to bring about his appointment as dictator, Cato, who saw through his intention, persuaded the Senate to appoint him sole consul, that he might not by violent means get himself made dictator, and might be contented with a mere constitutional monarchy. They also decreed an additional period for his provinces: and he had two, Iberia[510] and all Libya, which he administered by sending Legati and maintaining armies, for which he received out of the public treasury a thousand talents every year.
XXIX. Upon this, Cæsar began to canvass for a consulship by sending persons to Rome, and also for a prorogation of the government of his provinces. At first Pompeius kept silent, but Marcellus[511] and Lentulus opposed his claim, for they hated Cæsar on other grounds, and they added to what was necessary what was not necessary, to dishonour and insult him. For they deprived of the citizenship the inhabitants of Novum Comum[512] a colony lately settled by Cæsar in Gaul; and Marcellus, who was consul, punished with stripes one of the Senators of Novum Comum who had come to Rome, and added too this insult, "That he put these marks upon him to show that he was not a Roman," and he told him to go and show them to Cæsar. After the consulship of Marcellus, when Cæsar had now profusely poured forth his Gallic wealth for all those engaged in public life to draw from, and had released Curio[513] the tribune from many debts, and given to Paulus the consul fifteen hundred talents, out of which he decorated the Forum with the Basilica, a famous monument which he built in place of the old one called Fulvia;--under these circumstances, Pompeius, fearing cabal, both openly himself and by means of his friends exerted himself to have a successor[514] appointed to Cæsar in his government, and he sent and demanded back of him the soldiers[515] which he had lent to Cæsar for the Gallic wars. Cæsar sent the men back after giving each of them a present of two hundred and fifty drachmæ. The officers who led these troops to Pompeius, spread abroad among the people reports about Cæsar which were neither decent nor honest; and they misled Pompeius by ill-founded hopes, telling him that the army of Cæsar longed to see him, and that while he with difficulty directed affairs at Rome owing to the odium produced by secret intrigues, the force with Cæsar was all ready for him, and that if Cæsar's soldiers should only cross over to Italy, they would forthwith be on his side: so hateful, they said, had Cæsar become to them on account of his numerous campaigns, and so suspected owing to their fear of monarchy.
With all this Pompeius was inflated, and he neglected to get soldiers in readiness, as if he were under no apprehension; but by words and resolution he was overpowering Cæsar, as he supposed, by carrying decrees against him, which Cæsar cared not for at all. It is even said that one of the centurions who had been sent by him to Rome, while standing in front of the Senate-house, on hearing that the Senate would not give Cæsar a longer term in his government. "But this," he said, "shall give it," striking the hilt of his sword with his hand.
XXX. However, the claim of Cæsar at least had a striking show of equity. For he proposed that he should lay down his arms and that when Pompeius had done the same and both had become private persons, they should get what favours they could from the citizens; and he argued that if they took from him his power and confirmed to Pompeius what he had, they would be stigmatizing one as a tyrant and making the other a tyrant in fact. When Curio made this proposal before the people on behalf of Cæsar, he was loudly applauded; and some even threw chaplets of flowers upon him as on a victorious athlete. Antonius, who was tribune, produced to the people a letter[516] of Cæsar's on this subject which he had received, and he read it in spite of the consuls. But in the Senate, Scipio, the father-in-law of Pompeius, made a motion, that if Cæsar did not lay down his arms on a certain day, he should be declared an enemy. Upon the consuls putting the question, whether they were of opinion that Pompeius should dismiss his troops, and again, whether Cæsar should, very few voted in favour of the former question, and all but a few voted in favour of the latter; but when Antonius[517] on his side moved that both should dismiss their troops, all unanimously were in favour of that opinion.
Scipio made a violent opposition, and Lentulus, the consul, called out that they needed arms to oppose a robber, and not votes, on which the Senate broke up and the Senators changed their dress as a sign of lamentation on account of the dissension.
XXXI. But when letters had come from Cæsar by which he appeared to moderate his demands, for he proposed to surrender everything else except Gaul within the Alps and Illyricum with two legions, which should be given to him to hold till he was a candidate for a second consulship, and Cicero the orator, who had just returned from Cilicia and was labouring at a reconciliation, was inducing Pompeius to relent, and Pompeius was ready to yield in everything else except as to the soldiers, whom he still insisted on taking from Cæsar, Cicero urged the friends of Cæsar to give in and to come to a settlement on the terms of the above-mentioned provinces and the allowance of six thousand soldiers, only to Cæsar. Pompeius was ready to yield and to give way; but the consul Lentulus would not let him, and he went so far as to insult and drive with dishonour from the Senate both Curio and Antonius, thus himself contriving for Cæsar the most specious of all pretexts, by the aid of which indeed Cæsar mainly excited the passions of his men, pointing out to them that men of distinction and magistrates had made their escape in hired vehicles in the dress of slaves. For, putting on this guise through fear, they had stolen out of Rome.
XXXII. Now Cæsar had about him no more than three hundred horse and five thousand legionary soldiers; for the rest of his army, which had been left beyond the Alps, was to be conducted by those whom he sent for that purpose. Seeing that the commencement of his undertaking and the onset did not so much require a large force at the present, but were to be effected by the alarm which a bold stroke would create and by quickly seizing his opportunity, for he concluded that he should strike terror by his unexpected movement more easily than he could overpower his enemies by attacking them with all his force, he ordered his superior officers and centurions with their swords alone and without any other weapons to take Ariminum, a large city of Gaul, avoiding all bloodshed and confusion as much as possible; and he intrusted the force to Hortensius.[518] Cæsar himself passed the day in public, standing by some gladiators who were exercising, and looking on; and a little before evening after attending to his person and going into the mess-room and staying awhile with those who were invited to supper, just as it was growing dark he rose, and courteously addressing the guests, told them to wait for his return, but he had previously given notice to a few of his friends to follow him, not all by the same route, but by different directions. Mounting one of the hired vehicles, he drove at first along another road, and then turning towards Ariminium, when he came to the stream which divides Gaul within the Alps from the rest of Italy (it is called Rubico[519], and he began to calculate as he approached nearer to the danger, and was agitated by the magnitude of the hazard, he checked his speed; and halting he considered about many things with himself in silence, his mind moving from one side to the other, and his will then underwent many changes; and he also discussed at length with his friends who were present, of whom Pollio Asinius[520] was one, all the difficulties, and enumerated the evils which would ensue to all mankind from his passage of the river, and how great a report of it they would leave to posterity. At last, with a kind of passion, as if he were throwing himself out of reflection into the future, and uttering what is the usual expression with which men preface their entry upon desperate enterprises and daring, "Let the die be cast," he hurried to cross the river; and thence advancing at full speed, he attacked Ariminum before daybreak and took it. It is said that on the night before the passage of the river, he had an impure dream,[521] for he dreamed that he was in unlawful commerce with his mother.
XXXIII. But when Ariminum was taken, as if the war had been let loose through wide gates over all the earth and sea at once, and the laws of the state were confounded together with the limits of the province, one would not have supposed that men and women only, as on other occasions, in alarm were hurrying through Italy, but that the cities themselves, rising from their foundations, were rushing in flight one through another; and Rome herself, as if she were deluged by torrents, owing to the crowding of the people from the neighbouring towns and their removal, could neither easily be pacified by magistrate nor kept in order by words, and in the midst of the mighty swell and the tossing of the tempest, narrowly escaped being overturned by her own agitation. For contending emotions and violent movements occupied every place. Neither did those who rejoiced keep quiet, but in many places, as one might expect in a large city, coming into collision with those who were alarmed and sorrowing, and being full of confidence as to the future, they fell to wrangling with them; and people from various quarters assailed Pompeius, who was terror-struck and had to endure the censure of one party for strengthening Cæsar against himself and the supremacy of Rome, while others charged him with inciting Lentulus to insult Cæsar who was ready to give way and was proposing fair terms of accommodation. Favonius bade him stamp on the ground with his foot; for Pompeius on one occasion in an arrogant address to the Senate, told them not to be concerned or trouble themselves about preparations for war; when Cæsar advanced, he would stamp upon the earth with his foot and fill Italy with armies.
However, even then Pompeius had the advantage over Cæsar in amount of forces: but nobody would let the man follow his own judgment: and giving way to the many false reports and alarms, that the war was now close at hand and the enemy in possession of everything, and carried away by the general movement, he declared by an edict that he saw there was tumult, and he left the city after giving his commands to the Senate to follow, and that no one should stay who preferred his country and freedom to tyranny.
XXXIV.[522] Accordingly the consuls fled without even making the sacrifices which it was usual to make before quitting the city; and most of the senators also took to flight, in a manner as if they were robbing, each snatching of his own what first came to hand as if it belonged to another. There were some also who, though they had hitherto vehemently supported the party of Cæsar, through alarm at that time lost their presence of mind, and without any necessity for it were carried along with the current of that great movement. A most piteous sight was the city, when so great a storm was coming on, left like a ship whose helmsman had given her up, to be carried along and dashed against anything that lay in her way. But though this desertion of the city was so piteous a thing, men for the sake of Pompeius considered the flight to be their country, and they were quitting Rome as if it were the camp of Cæsar; for even Labienus,[523] one of Cæsar's greatest friends, who had been his legatus and had fought with him most gallantly in all the Gallic wars, then fled away from Cæsar and came to Pompeius. But Cæsar sent to Labienus both his property and his baggage; and advancing he pitched his camp close by Domitius, who with thirty cohorts held Corfinium.[524] Domitius despairing of himself asked his physician, who was a slave, for poison, and taking what was given, he drank it, intending to die. Shortly after, hearing that Cæsar showed wonderful clemency towards his prisoners, he bewailed his fate and blamed the rashness of his resolution. But on the physician assuring him that what he had taken was only a sleeping potion and not deadly, he sprung up overjoyed, and going to Cæsar, received his right hand, and yet he afterwards went over again to Pompeius. This intelligence being carried to Rome made people more tranquil, and some who had fled, returned.
XXXV. Cæsar took the troops of Domitius into his service, as well as the soldiers that were raising for Pompeius whom he surprised in the cities; and having now got a numerous and formidable army, he advanced against Pompeius. Pompeius did not await his approach, but fled to Brundisium, and sending the consuls over before him with a force to Dyrrachium,[525] himself shortly after sailed from Brundisium upon the approach of Cæsar, as will be told more particularly in the Life of Pompeius.[526] Though Cæsar wished to pursue immediately, he was prevented by want of ships, and he turned back to Rome, having in sixty days without bloodshed become master of Italy. Finding the city more tranquil than he expected and many of the Senators in it, he addressed them in moderate and constitutional language,[527] urging them to send persons to Pompeius with suitable terms of accommodation; but no one listened to his proposal, either because they feared Pompeius, whom they had deserted, or supposed that Cæsar did not really mean what he said, and merely used specious words. When the tribune Metellus[528] attempted to prevent him from taking money from the reserved treasure[529] and alleged certain laws, Cæsar replied, "That the same circumstances did not suit arms and laws: but do you, if you don't like what is doing, get out of the way, for war needs not bold words; when we have laid down our arms after coming to terms, then you may come forward and make your speeches to the people." "And in saying this," he continued, "I waive part of my rights, for you are mine, and all are mine, who have combined against me, now that I have caught them." Having thus spoken to Metellus he walked to the doors of the treasury; but as the keys were not found, he sent for smiths and ordered them to break the locks. Metellus again opposed him, and some commended him for it, but Cæsar, raising his voice, threatened to kill him, if he did not stop his opposition, "And this," said he, "young man, you well know, is more painful for me to have said than to do."
These words alarmed Metellus and made him retire, and also caused everything else to be supplied to Cæsar for the war without further trouble, and with speed.
XXXVI. He marched against Iberia,[530] having first determined to drive out Afranius and Varro, the legati of Pompeius, and having got into his power the forces and the provinces in those parts, then to advance against Pompeius without leaving any enemy in his rear. After having often been exposed to risk in his own person from ambuscades, and with his army chiefly from want of provisions, he never gave up pursuing, challenging to battle and hemming in the enemy with his lines, till he had made himself master of their camps and forces. The generals escaped to Pompeius.
XXXVII. On his return to Rome, Piso, the father-in-law of Cæsar, advised that they should send commissioners to Pompeius to treat of terms, but Isauricus opposed the measure to please Cæsar. Being chosen Dictator by the Senate, he restored the exiles, and the children of those who had suffered in the times of Sulla,[531] he reinstated in their civil rights, and he relieved the debtors by a certain abatement of the interest, and took in hand other measures of the like kind, not many in number; but in eleven days, he abdicated the monarchy, and declaring himself and Servilius Isauricus consuls[532] set out on his expedition. The rest of his forces he passed by on his hurried march, and with six hundred picked horsemen and five legions, the time being the winter solstice and the commencement of January (and this pretty nearly corresponds to the Poseideon of the Athenians), he put to sea, and crossing the Ionian gulf he took Oricum and Apollonia; but he sent back his ships to Brundisium for the soldiers whom he had left behind on his march. But while the men were still on the road, as they were already passed the vigour of their age and worn out by the number of their campaigns, they murmured against Cæsar, "Whither now will he lead us and where will this man at last carry us to, hurrying us about and treating us as if we could never be worn out and as if we were inanimate things? even the sword is at last exhausted by blows, and shield and breastplate need to be spared a little after so long use. Even our wounds do not make Cæsar consider that he commands perishable bodies, and that we are but mortal towards endurance and pain; and the winter season and the storms of the sea even a god cannot command; but this man runs all risks, as if he were not pursuing his enemies, but flying from them." With such words as these they marched slowly towards Brundisium. But when they found that Cæsar had embarked, then quickly changing their temper, they reproached themselves as traitors to their Imperator; and they abused their officers also for not hastening the march. Sitting on the heights, they looked towards the sea and towards Epirus for the ships which were to carry them over to their commander.
XXXVIII. At Apollonia, as Cæsar had not a force sufficient to oppose the enemy, and the delay of the troops from Italy put him in perplexity and much uneasiness, he formed a desperate design, without communicating it to any one, to embark in a twelve-oared boat and go over to Brundisium, though the sea was commanded by so many ships of the enemy.[533] Accordingly, disguising himself in a slave's dress, he went on board by night, and throwing himself down as a person of no importance, he lay quiet. While the river Anius[534] was carrying down the boat towards the sea, the morning breeze, which at that time generally made the water smooth at the outlet of the river by driving the waves before it, was beaten down by a strong wind which blew all night over the sea; and the river, chafing at the swell of the sea and the opposition of the waves, was becoming rough, being driven back by the huge blows and violent eddies, so that it was impossible for the master of the boat to make head against it; on which he ordered the men to change about, intending to turn the boat round. Cæsar perceiving this, discovered himself, and taking the master by the hand, who was alarmed at the sight of him, said, "Come, my good man, have courage and fear nothing; you carry Cæsar and the fortune of Cæsar in your boat." The sailors now forgot the storm, and sticking to their oars, worked with all their force to get out of the river. But as it was impossible to get on, after taking in much water and running great risk at the mouth of the river, Cæsar very unwillingly consented that the master should put back. On his return, the soldiers met him in crowds, and blamed him much and complained that he did not feel confident of victory even with them alone, but was vexed and exposed himself to risk on account of the absent, as if he distrusted those who were present.
XXXIX. Shortly after Antonius arrived from Brundisium with the troops; and Cæsar, being now confident, offered battle to Pompeius, who was well posted and had sufficient supplies both from land and sea, while Cæsar at first had no abundance, and afterwards was hard pressed for want of provisions: but the soldiers cut up a certain root[535] and mixing it with milk, ate it. And once, having made loaves of it, they ran up to the enemies' outposts, threw the bread into the camp, and pitched it about, adding, that so long as the earth produces such roots, they will never stop besieging Pompeius. Pompeius, however, would not let either the matter of the loaves or these words be made known to the mass of the army; for his soldiers were dispirited and dreaded the savage temper and endurance of the enemy as if they were wild beasts. There were continually skirmishes about the fortifications of Pompeius, and Cæsar had the advantage in all except one, in which there was a great rout of his troops and he was in danger of losing his camp. For when Pompeius made an onset, no one stood the attack, but the trenches were filled with the dying, and Cæsar's men were falling about their own ramparts and bulwarks, being driven in disorderly flight. Though Cæsar met the fugitives and endeavoured to turn them, he had no success, and when he laid hold of the colours, those who were carrying them threw them down, so that the enemy took two and thirty, and Cæsar himself had a narrow escape with his life. A tall, strong man was running away past by Cæsar, who putting his hand upon him, ordered him to stand and face the enemy; but the man, who was completely confounded by the danger, raised his sword to strike him, on which Cæsar's shield-bearer struck the man first and cut off his shoulder. Cæsar had so completely given up his cause as lost, that when Pompeius either through caution or from some accident did not put the finishing stroke to his great success, but retreated after shutting up the fugitives within their ramparts, Cæsar said to his friends as he was retiring, To-day the victory would be with the enemy, if they had a commander who knew how to conquer. Going into his tent and lying down, Cæsar spent that night of all nights in the greatest agony and perplexity, considering that his generalship had been bad, in that while a fertile country lay near him and the rich cities of Macedonia and Thessaly, he had neglected to carry the war thither, and was now stationed on the sea which the enemy commanded with his ships, and that he was rather held in siege by want of supplies than holding the enemy in siege by his arms. Accordingly, after passing a restless night, full of uneasiness at the difficulty and danger of his present position, he broke up his camp with the determination of leading his troops into Macedonia to oppose Scipio, for he concluded that either he should draw Pompeius after him to a country where he would fight without the advantage of having the same supplies from the sea, or that he would defeat Scipio if he were left to himself.
XL. This encouraged the army of Pompeius and the officers about him to stick close to Cæsar, whom they considered to have been defeated and to be making his escape; though Pompeius himself was cautious about hazarding a battle for so great a stake, and, as he was excellently furnished with everything for prolonging the war, he thought it best to wear out and weaken the vigour of the enemy, which could not be long sustained. For the best fighting men in Cæsar's army possessed experience and irresistible courage in battle; but in marchings and making encampments and assaulting fortifications and watching by night, they gave way by reason of their age, and their bodies were unwieldy for labour, and owing to weakness, had lost their alacrity. It was also reported that a pestilential disease was prevalent in Cæsar's army, which had originated in the want of proper food; and, what was chief of all, as Cæsar was neither well supplied with money nor provisions, it might be expected that in a short time his army would be broken up of itself.
XLI. For these reasons Pompeius did not wish to fight, and Cato alone commended his design, because he wished to spare the citizens; for after seeing those who had fallen in the battle to the number of a thousand, he wrapped up his face and went away with tears in his eyes.
But all the rest abused Pompeius for avoiding a battle, and tried to urge him on by calling him Agamemnon and King of Kings, by which they implied that he was unwilling to lay down the sole command, and was proud at having so many officers under his orders and coming to his tent, Favonius, who aped Cato's freedom of speech, raved because they should not be able even that year to enjoy the figs of Tusculum owing to Pompeius being so fond of command; and Afranius (for he had just arrived from Iberia, where he had shown himself a bad general), being charged with betraying his army for a bribe, asked why they did not