through an immortal, or through a mortal progression. | One centre, likewise, is above, but the other beneath the earth; and the one is eastern, but the other western.
Thus, too, some parts of the world are situated on the left, but others on the right hand: and night is opposed to day. On this account, also, harmony consists of, and — proceeds» through contraries. Plato also says, that there are two openings*, one of which affords a passage ‘to souls ascending to the heavens, but the other to souls descending to the earth.. And, according to theologists, the Sun and Moon are the gates of souls, which ascend through the Sun, and descend through the Moon. _ With Homer, likewise, there are two tubs, From which the lot of every one he fills, Blessings to these, to those distributes ills ἃ, 5. Hence, the southern have always been more favourable to genius, than the northern parts of the earth.
> In the original, τοξευει; but instead of it, I read sopeuts, ¢ ‘See my translation of the 10th book of hig Republic.
OM THE CAVE OF THE NYMPHS. 195 But Plato, in the Gorgias, by tubs intends to signify souls, some of which are malefic, but others beneficent, aud some of which are rational, but others irrational®.
* The. passage in the Gorgias of Plato, to which Porphyry here alludes, is as follows: —“ Soc. But, indeed, as you also say, life is a grievous thing, For I should not wonder if Euripides spoke the truth when he says: ‘ Who knows whether to live is not to die, and to die is not to live?’ And we, perhaps, are in reality dead. For I have heard from one of the wise, that we are now dead; and that the body is our sepulchre; but that the part of the soul in which the desires are con- tained, is of such a nature that it can be persuaded, and hurled upwards and downwards. Hence a certain elegant man, perhaps a Sicilian, or an Italian, denominated, mythologizing, this part of the soul a tub, by a derivation from the probable and the persuasive; and, likewise, he called those that are stupid, or deprived of intellect, uninitiated. He farther said, that the intemperate and uncovered nature of that part of the soul in which the desires are contained, was like a pierced tub, through its insatiable greediness.”
What is here said by Plato is beautifully unfolded by Olympiodorus, in his MS. Commentary on the Gorgias, as follows: —“ Euripides (in Phryxo) says, that to live is to die, and to die to live. For the sou coming hither, as she imparts life to the body, so she partakes [through this] of a certain privation of life; but this is qn evil. When separated, therefore, from the body, she lives in reality: for she dies here, through participating a privation of life, because the body becomes the source of evils. And hence it is necessary to subdue the body.
‘* But the meaning of the Pythagoric fable, which is here introduced by Plato, is ‘this: We are said to be dead, because, as we have before observed, we partake of a privation of life. The sepulchre which we carry about with us is, as Plato himself explains it, the body. But Hades is the unapparent, because we are situated in obscurity, the soul being in a state of servitude to the body. The tubs are the desires; whether they are so called from our hastening to fill them, as if they were tubs, or from desire persuading us that it is beautiful. The initiated, therefore, 4. ¢. those that haye a perfect knowledge, pour into the entire tab: for these have their tub full; or, in other words, have perfect virtue. But.the uninitiated, vjz. those that possess nothing perfect, have perforated tubs. For those that are in a state of servitude to desire always wish to fill it, and are more inflamed; and on this accopnt they haye perforated. tubs, as being never full. But the sieve is the rational soul mingled with the irrational. For the [rational] soul is called ὁ circle, becayse it seeks itself, and is itself sought; finds jtself, and is itself found. But-the-isrational soul. ipitetes a right Jine, since. it dogs - 196 ΟΝ THE-CAVE OF. ΤΗΕ ΝΥ ΜΡΗΒ.
Souls, however, are [analogous to] tubs, because they contain in themselves energies and habits, as in a vessel. In Hesiod too, we find one tub closed, but the other. opened by Pleasure, who scatters its contents every where, Hope alone remaining behind. For in those things in which a depraved soul, being dispersed about matter, deserts the proper order of its essence; in all these, it is accustomed to feed itself with [the pleasing prospects of ] auspicious hope.
14. Since, therefore, every twofold entrance is a synibol of nature, this Homeric cavern has, very properly, not one portal only, but two gates, which differ from each other conformably to things themselves; of which one pertains to Gods and good [demons ‘J, but the other to mortals, and depraved natures. Hence, Plato took occasion to speak of bowls, and assumes tubs instead of amphore, and two openings, as we have already observed, instead of two gates: Pherecydes Syrus also mentions recesses and trenches, caverns, doors, and gates; and through these obscurely indicates the generations οὔ. souls, and their separation from these material realms. And thus much for an explanation of the Homeric cave, which we think we have sufficiently unfolded without. adducing any farther testimonies from ancient philo- sophers and theologists, which would give a needless extent to our discourse.
16. One particular, however, remains to be explained, not revert to itself like a circle. So far, therefore, as the sieve.is circular, it is an image of the rational soul; but, as it is placed under the right ‘lines formed from the holes, it is assumed for the irrational soul.. Right lines, therefore, are in the middle of the cavities. Hence, by the sieve, — Plato signifies the rational in subjection to the irrational soul.. But the _ water is the flux of nature: for, as Heraclitus says, moisture is the death — of the soul.”
In this extract the intelligent reader will easily perceive that the occult signification of the éubs is more scientifically unfolded by Olympio- ᾿ς dorus than by Porphyry.
In the original, was rag μεν, Seog τε καὶ τοις ἀγαϑοις προσεμωσας,. Bat. ᾿ after ayaSoc, I have no doubt we- ‘should: insert ϑαιμοσι..
-ON ‘THE.CAVE OF THE NYMPHS. 197 and that is the symbol of the olive planted at the top’ of the cavern; since Homer appears to indicate something very admirable by giving it such a position. For he does not merely say that an olive grows in this place, but that it flourishes on the summit of the cavern.
‘“¢ High at the head a branching olive grows, Beneath, a gloomy grotto’s cool recess.”
But the growth of the olive in such a situation, is not fortuitous, as some one may suspect, but contains the enigma of the cavern. For since the world was not pro- duced rashly and casually, but is the work of divine wis- dom and an intellectual nature, hence an olive, the symbol of this wisdom, flourishes near the present cavern, which is an image of the world. For the olive is the ‘plant of Minerva; and Minerva is wisdom. But this Goddess being produced from the head of, Jupiter, the theologist has discovered an appropriate place for the olive, by consecrating it at the summit of the port; signi- fying by this, that the universe is not the effect of a casual event, and the work of irrational fortune, but that it is the offspring of an intellectual nature and divine wisdom, which is separated, indeed, from it [by a differ- ence of essence], but yet is near to it, through being established on the summit of the whole port; [i.e. from the dignity and excellence of its nature governing the whole with consummate wisdom]. Since, however, an olive is ever-flourishing, it possesses a certain peculiarity in the highest degree adapted to the revolutions of souls in the world; for to such souls this cave [as we have 5814] is sacred. For in summer, the white leaves of the olive tend upward, but in winter, the whiter leaves are bent downward. On this account, also, in prayers and supplications, men extend the branches of an olive, ominating from this, that they shall exchange the sorrowful darkness of danger for the fair light of security and peace. The olive, therefore, being naturally ever-flou- rishing, bears fruit which is the auxiliary of labour [by 108 ON THE CAVE OF THE NYMPHS.
being its reward]; it is also sacred to Minerva; supplies the victors in athletic labours with crowns; and affords a friendly branch to the suppliant petitioner. Thus, too, the world is governed by an intellectual nature, and is conducted by a wisdom eternal and ever-flourishing 5 by which the rewards of victory are conferred on the conquerors in’ the athletic race of life, as the reward of severe toil and patient perseverance. And the Demiurgus, who connects and contains the world [in ineffable comprehensions], invigorates miserable and sup- pliant souls.
16. In this cave, therefore, says Homer, all external possessions must be deposited. Here, naked, and assum- ing a suppliant habit, afflicted in body, casting aside every thing superfluous, and being averse to the energies of sense, it is requisite to sit at the foot of the olive, and consult with Minerva by what means we may most effec- tually destroy that hostile rout of passions which insidi- ously lurk in the secret recesses of the soul. Indeed, as it appears to me, it was not without reason that Numenius and his followers thought the person of Ulysses in the Odyssey represented to us a man, who passes in a regular manner over the dark and stormy sea of generation, and thus at length arrives at that region where tempests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation “ Who ne’er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.”
17. Again, according to Plato, the deep, the sea, and ἃ tempest, are images of a material nature. And on this account, I think, the poet called the port by the name of Phorcys. For he says, “ It is the port of the ancient matine Phorcys®.” The daughter, likewise, of this God is men- & Phorcys is one among the ennead of Gods who, according to Plato in the Timzus, fabricate generation. Of this deity, Proclus observes, “ that as the Jupiter in this ennead causes the unapparent divisions and separation of forms made by Saturn to beconie apparertt, and as Rhea calls them forth into motion and generation; so-Phoicys inserts them in matter, produces sensible natures, and.adoms the visible ΟΝ THE CAVE OF THE NYMPHS. 199 tioned in the beginning of the Odyssey. But from Thoosa the Cyclops was born, whom Ulysses deprived of sight. And this deed of Ulysses became the occasion of reminding him of his errors, till he was safely landed in his native country. On this account, too, a seat under the olive is proper to Ulysses, as to one who implores divinity, and would appease his natal demon with a sup- pliant branch. For it will not be simply, and in a concise way, possible for any one to be liberated from this sensible life, who blinds this demon, and renders his energies inefficacious; but he who dares to do this, will be pursued by the anger" of the marine and material Gods, whom it is first requisite to appease by sacrifices, labours, and patient endurance; at one time, indeed, con- tending with the passions, and at another employmg enchantments and deceptions, and by these, transforming himself in an all-various manner; in order that, being at length divested of the torn garments [by which his true person was concealed], he may recover the ruined empire of his soul. Nor will he even then be liberated from labours; but this will be effected when he has entirely passed over the raging sea, and, though still living, becomes so ignorant of marine and material works {through deep attention to intelligible concerns], as to mistake an oar for a corn-van.
18. It must not, however, be thought, that interpreta- tions of this kind are forced, and nothing more than the conjectures of ingenious men; but when we consider the great wisdom of antiquity, and how much Homer excelled in intellectual prudence, and in an accurate knowledge of every virtue, it must not be denied that he has obscurely essence, in order that there may not only be divisions of productive principles [or forms} in natures and in souls, and in intellectual essences prior to these; but likewise in sensibles. For this is the pecu- liarity of fabrication.”
« “The anger of the Gods,” says Proclus, “ is not‘an indication of any passion in them, but demonstrates our inaptitude to participate of their illuminations.”
200 ON THE CAVE OF THE NYMPHS.
indicated the images of things of a more divine nature in the fiction of a fable. For it would not have been. possible to devise the whole of this hypothesis, unless the figment had been transferred [to an appropriate meaning | from certain established truths. But reserving the discussion of this for another treatise, we shall here finish our explanation of the present Cave of the Nymphs.
~~ - AUXILIARIES- TO THE PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. " SECTION I.
1. Every body is in place; but nothing essentially in- corporeal, or any thing of this kind, has any locality.
2. Things essentially incorporeal, because they are more excellent than all body and place, are every where, not with interval, but impartibly.
3. Things essentially incorporeal, are not locally pre-. sent with bodies, but are present with them when they please; by verging towards them so far as they. are naturally adapted so to verge. They are not, however, present with them locally, but through habitude, proxi- mity, and alliance.
4. Things essentially incorporeal, are not present with bodies, by hypostasis and essence; for they are not mingled with bodies. But they impart a certain power which is proximate to bodies, through verging towards them. For tendency constitutes a certain secondary power proximate to bodies.
5. Soul, indeed, is a certain medium between an im- partible essence, and an essence which is divisible about bodies. But intellect is an impartible essence alone. And qualities and material forms are divisible about bodies.
6. Not every thing* which acts on another, effects * In the original, Ov τὸ πριοὺν εἰς «λλο, πέλασει και adn Weill, ἃ WOE’ TD, But it is evident, from the sense of the whole passage, that, for Ov te. soe, we should read, Ov way τὸ ποιοῦν, x. 7. A, 202 AUXILIARIES το THE that which it does effect by approximation and contact; but those natures which effect any thing by approxi- mation and contact, use approximation accidentally.
7. The soul is bound to the body by a conversion to the corporeal passions; and is again liberated by becoming impassive to the body.
8. That which nature binds, nature also dissolves: and that which the soul binds, the soul likewise dis- solves. Nature, indeed, bound the body to the soul; but the soul binds herself to the body. Nature, there- fore, liberates the body from the soul; but the soul liberates herself from the body.
9. Hence there is a twofold death; the one, indeed, universally known, in which the body is liberated from the soul; but the other peculiar to philosophers, in — which the soul is liberated from the body. Nor does the one” entirely follow the other.
10. We do not understand similarly in all things, but in a manner adapted to the essence of each. For intel- lectual objects we understand intellectually; but those that pertain to soul rationally. We apprehend plants spermatically; but bodies idolically [¢. e. as images]; and that which is above all these, super-intellectually and super-essentially°.
» The article o is wanting here in the original before Ἕτερος.
© Knowledge subsists conformably to the nature by which it is pos- sessed, and not conformably to the thing known. Hence it is either better than, or co-ordinate with, or inferior to the object of knowledge. Thus the rational soul has a knowledge of sensibles, which is superior to sensibles; but it knows itself with a co-ordinate knowledge; and its knowledge of divinity is inferior to the object of knowledge. Porphyry, therefore, is not correct in what he here says. This dogma respecting the conformity of knowledge to that which knows, rather than to the thing known, originated from the divine Iamblichus, as we are informed by Ammonius in his commentary on Aristotle’s treatise De Interpre- tatione, and is adopted by Proclus (in Parmenid.). Boetius likewise employs it in his reasoning in lib. v. gboyt the prescience of divinity. None of his commentators, however, have noticed the source sad whence it was derived.
PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 203 11. Incorporeal hypostases, in descending, are dis- tributed into parts, and multiplied about individuals with a diminution of power; but when they ascend by their energies beyond bodies, they become united, and proceed into a simultaneous subsistence, through exuberance of power. ᾿ 12. The homonymous is not in bodies only, but life also is among the number of things which have a multi- farious subsistence. For the life of a plant is different from that of an animated being; the life of an intel- lectual essence differs from that of the nature which is beyond intellect; and the psychical differs from the intellectual life. For. these natures live, though nothing | which proceeds from, possesses a life similar to them.
13. Every thing which generates by its very essence, generates that which is inferior to itself*; and every thing generated, is naturally converted to its generator. Of generating natures, however, some are not at all con- verted to the beings which they generate; but others are partly converted to them, and partly not; and others are only converted to their progeny, but are not converted to themselves. | 14, Every thing generated, possesses from that which is different from itself the cause of its generation, since nothing is produced without a cause. Such generated natures, however, as have their existence through compo- sition, these are on this account corraptible. But such as, being simple and incomposite, possess their existence in a simplicity of hypostasis, these being indissoluble, are, indeed, incorruptible; yet they are said to be gene- rated, not as if they were composites, but as being suspended from a certain cause. Bodies, therefore, are in a twofold respect generated; as being suspended from a certain producing cause; and as being composites. But soul and intellect are only generated as being suspended ὁ Becanse here the generator is that primarily which the thing genorated is secondarily. See my translation of Proclus’s Theological Elements, — 204...AUXILIARIES.TO THE...:...
from a cause, and not as composites. Hence bodies are- generated, dissoluble and corruptible; but soul and intel- lect are unbegotten, as being without composition, and on this. account indissoluble and incorruptible; yet they are generated so far as they are suspended from a cause.:: 15. Intellect is not the principle of all things; for intellect is many things; but, prior to the many, it is necessary that there should be the one. It is evident, however, that intellect is many things. For it always understands its conceptions, which are not one, but many; and which are not any thing else than itself. If, there- fore, it is the same with its conceptions, but they are many, intellect also will be many things. But that it is the same with intelligibles [or the objects of its intel- lection], may be thus demonstrated. For, if there is any thing which intellect surveys, it will either survey thie thing as contained in itself, or as placed in something else. And that intellect, indeed, contemplates or sur- veys, is evident. For, in conjunction with intellection, or intellectual perception, it will be intellect; but 1f you deprive it of intellection, you will destroy its essence. Fe is necessary, therefore, that, directing our attention to the properties: of knowledge, we should investigate the per- ception of intellect. All the gnostic powers, then, which we: contain, are universally sense, imagination, and intel. lect®. The-power, however, which employs sense, surveys by projecting itself to externals, not being united to the objects which it surveys, but only receiving an- impres- sion of, by exerting its energies upon them. When . Porphyry here summarily comprehends the rational gnostic powers of the soul in intellect, because, being rational, they are expansions of intellect properly so called. But these powers, beginning from the lowest, are opinion, dianoia, and the summit of dianoia, which summit is ‘the intellect of the human‘soul, and is that power, by the-light of which we* perceive the truth of axioms, it being intuitive perception. Dsanoia ig: the discursive energy of reason; or it is that power which reasons scien— tifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intelléct. And opinion is that power. which knows that a thing is, but is ignorant 6 of the cause of it, or why it is.. - PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE:NATURES. 208: therefore, the. eye -sees a:visible object, it is impossible’ that τὸ should become the same with that which it per-*’ ceives: for it would. not see if there was not an interval: between.it.and the object of its perception. And, after: the.same manner, that which is touched, if it.was the same with that. by which it is touched,. would. perish. From which.it is. evident that. sense, and that which employs sense, must always tend to:an external object, in ‘order. to. apprehend something. sensible. In like- manner. also, the phantasy, or imagination, always tends ‘to something external, and by this extension of itself, gives subsistence. to, or prepates an image; its extension to:what is external, indicating that the object of its perception.is a resemblance of something external. And. such, indeed, is. the: apprehension of these two powers; neither of. which verging to, and being collected ᾿ into itself, perceives either a sensible or insensible form. ~ ~ In intellect, however, the apprehension of-its objects does not subsist after this manner, but is effected by converging to, and surveying itself. ‘For;by departing - from itself,.in order. to survey its own: energies, and become the eye of them, and the sight of essences, it.will not-.understand anything. Hence, (88 sense is to that which is sensible, so is intellect to that which is intel- - ligible. Sense, however, by extending itself to externals, - finds that which is sensible situated in matter; but intel-" lect surveys the intelligible, by being collected into itself,. and not extended outwardly‘. On this account some are of opinion, that the hypostasis of intellect differs from, that of the phantasy only in name. For the phantasy, in the’ rational animal, appeared to, them to be intelligence. As these men, however, suspended all things from matter and.a corporeal -nature, it. follows that they should also | suspend ‘from these intellect. - But-our -intelléct surveys ' f In the original, εἰ δὲ pan she, ἐκτεινομενος; but for δι δὲ μη, If appears ¢ to me to be obviously necessary to read οὐδὲ μή. | 206 AUX(LIARIES TO THE both bodies and other essences. Hence it apprehends them situated somewhere. But as the proper objects of intellect have a subsistence out of matter, they will be no where® [locallyj. it is evident, therefore, that intel- lectual natures are to be conjoined with intelligence. But 1 intellectual natures are in intellect, it follows that intel- lect, when it understands intelligibles, surveys both the intelligible and itself; and that proceeding into itself, it perceives intellectually, because it proceeds into inted- ligibles. Jf, however, intellect understands. many things, and not.one thing only, intellect also will necessarily be many. But-the one subsists prior to the many; so that it is necessary ‘that the one should be prior to intellect. | 16. Memory is not the conservation of imaginations, but the power of.calling forth de novo those concep- tions which had previously oocupied the attention of the mind®, 17. Soul, mdeed, contains the reasons [or forms] of all things, ‘but energizes according to them, either bamg called forth to this energy by ‘something else, or con- verting ‘itself to them inwardly. And when called forth by something else, ‘it introduces,.as it were, the senses to externals, but when it enters into itself, it becomes occu~ pied with intellectual conceptions. Hence some one may say, that neither the senses, nor-intellectual perceptions, are without the phantasy; so that, as in the animal, the genses are ‘not without the passive affection of the sen- 8 In the. original, ἐξω δὲ ovrey vaug, οὐδαμοῦ ay sux ταῦτα s which Holste- nius, wholly mistaking the meaning, most erroneously translates, “ At ¢i extra materiam sint, neutiquam id fierl poterit.” Farther on, Porphyry asserts, that God, intellect, and soul, are.no where, according to cor~ poreal: locality. bh In the original, = -pavopee: ue ἔστι darraciny cures, ade Ten μέλγαι- DSevrev προδαλλεσθαι ἐκ mac προβληματα. But for σπροβληματα, 1 read φρολυρρ- ματα. This power, by which Porphyry characterizes memory, is of a stable nature. And hence memory is stability of knowledge, i in the same manner as immortality is stability of life, and eternity stability of being.
ῬΕΒΟΣΡΤΙΟΝ OF INTELINGIBLE NATURES, 407 sitive ‘organs, in hike manner intellections are net without ‘the phantasy. Perhaps, however, 1t may be said, in answer to this, ithat, as an impression in the sensitive organ is the concomitant of the sensitive animal, θ0 888» logously a phantasm 1 is the concemitant of the: intelleotion of the soul in man, considered as an anmal’, 18. Soul is an‘essence without magmitude, imniatertal, incorruptible, possessing its existence in life, and having life from ‘itself.
19. The passivity of bodies is different from that of incorporeal natures. For the passivity of ‘bodies is attended with mutation; but the adaptations and passions of the soul are energies; yet they are by-no meens similar to the calefactions and frigefactions:of-bodies. Hence, if the passivity of bodies is accompanied by mutation, it must be said that all incorporeal natures are impassive. For ‘the essences which are septrated from matter. and bodies, are whut ‘they are in energy. ‘But those things which approximate ‘to matter ‘and ‘bodies, are themselves, indeed, impassive’; but the natares ‘in which they-are sur veyed are passive. -For when the ‘animal perceives sen- sibly, the soul fi.¢. the rational soul] appears to'be-similag to separate'harniony*,of itself moving the shords adapted 1 See the ‘notes ‘on the Sd book ‘of my ‘translation of Aristotle's treatise on'the ‘Soul, and also my ‘translation of Plétinus on’ Félicity. “ The phantasy,” says Olynpiodorus (in Platonis Phd.) “is an impedi- ment to our intellectual conceptions; and hence, when we are agitated by the inspiring influence of Divinity, if the phantasy intervenes, the enthusiastic energy ceases: for enthusiasm and the phantasy are con- trary to each other. Should it be asked, whether the soul is able to energize without the phantasy? we reply, that its perception of universals proves that it is able. It has perceptions, therefore, independent ef the phantasy; at: the same time, however, the phantasy attends ittin its energies, just as a storm pursues him who sails on the sea.”
k The analogy of the soul to harmony, is more accurately uafolded ‘as follows, by Olympiodorus, in his Commentary on the Phado of. Plate, ‘than it 15 in this place ‘by Porphyry: “ Harmony has a triple subsistence, ‘For it is dither harmony iteelf, or it-is that which is first harmonized, and which is such according to the whole:.of itself; or it -is- that αἰδοῖ 208 ᾿ AUXILTARIES TO THE to harmony;; but the body is similar to the inseparable harmony in the chords, [{. 6. to the harmony which cannot exist separate from the chords]. But the animal is the cause of the motion, because it is an animated being. It 1s, however, analogous to a musician, because it is har- monic; but the bodies which are struck through sensitive passion, are analogous to the harmonized chords ef a musical instrument. For in this instance, also, separate harmony is not passively affected, but the chords. And the musician, indeed, moves according to the harmony which is in him; yet the chords would not be musically’ mioved, even though the musician wished that they should, unless harmony ordered this to take place.
20. Incorporeal natures are not denominated like bodies, according to a participation in common of one and the same genus; but they derive their appellation from.a mere privation with respect to bodies. Hence, ° nothing hinders some of them from having a subsistence as beings, but others as non-beings; some of them, from being prior to, and others posterior to bodies; some, from - being separate, and others inseparable from bodies; some, from ‘having a subsistence by themselves, but others from. being indigent of things different from themselves, to their existence; some, from being the same through energies and self-motive lives, but others from subsisting together with lives, and energies of a certain quality. For they subsist according to a negation of the things which they are not, and not according to the affirmation of the things which they are.
21. The properties of matter, according to the anis is setondarily harmonized, and which partially participates of harmony. The'first of these must be assigned to intellect, the second to soul, and ᾿ the third to body. This last, too, is corruptible, because it subsists in a ‘subject; but the other two are incorruptible, because they are neither _ ‘Composites, nor dependent on 8᾽ subject. Hence, the rational soul is analogous to a musician, but the animated‘ body to harmonized | chords; for the former has a subsistence separate, but the latter ἃ inse- paritile from tlie musical instrument. ” \ \ PERCEPIION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 209° cients, are the following: It is incorporeal; for it is dif- ferent from bodies. It is without life; for it is neither intellect nor soul, nor vital from itself [7.e. essentially]. It is also formless, variable, infinite, and powerless. Hence, it is neither being, nor yet non-being. Not that it is non- being like motion, but it is true non-being, the image and phantasm of bulk, because it is that which bulk primarily contains. It is likewise powerless, and the desire of subsistence, has stability, but not in permanency, and always appears in itself to be contrary. Hence, it is both small and great, more and less, deficient and exceed- ing. It is always becoming to be, or rising into exist ence; abides not, and yet is unable to fly away; and is the defect of all being. Hence, in whatever it an- nounces itself to be, it deceives; and though it should appear to be great, it is nevertheless small. For it resembles a‘ flying mockery, eluding all pursuit, and vanishing into non-entity. For its flight is not in place, but is effected. by its desertion of real being. Hence, also, the images which are in it, are in an image more unreal than themselves; just as in a mirror, where the thing represented is in one place, and the representation of it in another. It likewise appears to be full, yet contains nothing, though it seems to possess all things!.
22. All passions subsist about the same thing as that about which corruption subsists; for the reception of passion is the path to corruption. And the thing that is the subject of passivity, is also the subject of corruption. Nothing incorporeal, however, is corrupted. But some of them either exist, or do not exist; so that they are not at all passive. For that which is passive, ought not to be a thing of this kind, but such as may be changed in quality, and corrupted by the properties of the things ' What Porphyry here says about matter, is derived from the treatise of Plotinus, On the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures, to my translation of which I refer the reader.
P 210 AUXILIARIES TO THE