it multitudinonsly impart itself to multitude; but it is wholly present with the parts of that which is extended into bulk, and with each individual of the multitude, and all the bulk impartibly, and without plurality, and as numerically one. But it pertains to those natures to enjoy it partibly, and in a distributed manner, whose power is dissipated into different parts. And to these it frequently happens, that through a defect of their own nature, they counterfeit an intelligible essence; so that doubts arise respecting that essence, which appears to have passed from its own nature into theirs.
36. Truly-existing being is neither great nor small, PERCEPTION. ΟΕ INTELEIGIBLE:- NATURES. 220 for magnitude and parvitude are properly the peculiarities of bulk. But true being transcends both magnitude and parvitude; and is above the greatest, and above the least; and is numerically one and the same, though it is found to be simultaneously participated by every thing that is greatest, and every thing that is least. You must not, therefore, conceive of it as something which is greatest; as you will then be dubious how, being: that which is greatest, it is present with the smallest masses, without being diminished or contracted. Nor must you conceive of it as something which is least; since you will thus again be. dubious how, being that which is least, it is present with the greatest masses, without being multi- plied or increased, or without receiving addition. - But at one and the same time receiving into the greatest magni- tude that which transcends the greatest bulk, and into the least magnitude that which transcends the least *, you will be able to conceive how the same thing, abiding in itself, may be simultaneously seen in any casual mag- nitude, and in infinite multitudes and corporeal masses. For according to its own peculiarity,’ it is present with the magnitude of the world impartibly and without mag- nitude. It also antecedes the bulk of the world, and comprehends every part of it, in its own impartibility; just as, vice versa, the world, by its multitude of parts, is mul- tifariously present, as far as it is able, with truly-existing being, yet cannot comprehend it, neither with the whole of its bulk, nor the whole of its power; but meets with it in all its parts as that which is infinite, and ‘cannot be passed beyond; and this both in other respects, and « In the original, αλλα τὸ exCsCunog τὸν μέγιστον ογκοῦ, εἰς τὸ μέγιστον, καὶ wr ἔλαχιστον εἰς τὸ ἐλαχίστον, aua λαΐων, κατ. This Holstenius most erroneously translates, “ Verum id quod maximam molem intervalle maximo, et minimam minimo excedit simul sumens, &c.”. For a truly incorporeal nature, such as that of which Porphyry is now speaking, has nothing to do with interval, and, therefore, does not by interval surpass either the greatest or the least corporeal mass; but is received transcendently by the greatest and the least magnitude..
Q 26Ὁϑ. AUXILIARIES TO THE because truly-existing being is entirely free from all cor- poreal extension.
37. That which is greater in bulk, is less in. power, when compared, not with things of a similar kind, bat with those that are of a different species, os of a different essence. For bulk is, as it were, the departure of a thing from itself, and a division of power into the smallest parts. Hence, that which transcends in power, is foreign from all bulk. For.power proceeding into itself, is filled with itself, and, by corroborating itself, obtains its proper strength; on which account, body proceeding into bulk through a diminution of power, is as much remote from truly-incorporeal being, as that which truly exists is from being exhausted by bulk; for the latter abides in the magnitude of the same power, through an exemption from bulk. As, therefore, truly-existing being is, with reference to a corporeal mass, without magnitude and without bulk; thus also, that which is corporeal is, with reference to truly-existing being, imbecile and powerless. For that which is greatest by magnitude of power, is exempt from all bulk; so that the world existing every where, and, as it is said, meeting with real being which ig truly every where, is not able to comprehend the magni- tude of its power. It meets, however, with true being, which is not partibly present with it, but is. present with- out magnitude, and without any definite limitation. The presence, therefore, of truly-existing being with the world, is not local, but assimilative, so far as it 1s possible for body to be assimilated to that which is corporeal, and for that which is incorporeal to be surveyed in a body assimilated to it. Hence, an incorporeal nature is not present with body, so far as it is not possible for. that which is material to. be assimilated to a perfectly imma~ terial nature; and it is present, so far as a corporeal can be assimilated to an incorporeal essence. Nevertheless, this is not ‘effected through reception; since, if it were, each would be. corrupted. For the material, indeed, in receiving the immaterial nature, would be corrupted; PERCEPTION ΟΕ INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 227 through being changed into it; and the immaterial essence would become material. Assimilations, therefore, and participations of powers, and the deficiency. of power, proceed into things which are thus different in essence from each other, into each other. The world, therefore; is very far from possessing the power of real being; and real being is very remote from the imbecility of a materiat nature. But that which subsists between these, assimi- lating and being assimilated, and conjoining the extremes to each other, becomes the cause of deception about the “extremes, In consequence of applying, through the assi- ' milation, the one to the other.
38. Truly-existing being is said to be many things, not by a subsistence in different places, nor in the measures of bulk, nor by coacervation, nor by the circumscriptions or comprehensions‘ of divisible parts, but by a difference which is immaterial, without bulk, and without plurality, and which is-divided according to multitude. Hence, also, it is one; not as one body, nor as in one place; nor as one bulk; nor as one which is many things; because it is different so far as it is one, and its difference is both divided and united. For its difference is not externally acquired, nor adscititious, nor obtained through the par- ticipation of something else, but it is many things from’ itself. For, remaining one, it energizes with all energies, because, through sameness, it constitutes all difference; not being surveyed in the difference of one thing with respect to another, as is the case.in bodies. For, on the . contrary, in these, unity subsists in difference; because _ diversity has in them a precedaneous existence; but the unity which they contain is externally and adscititiously derived. For in truly existing being, indeed, unity and - sameness precede; but difference is generated, from this unity being energetic. Hence, true being ts multiplied tx smpartibility; but body ts untied in multitude and bulk. The ' For διαληψεσιν, here, I read καταληψέσιν, and Holsténius also has ia this place comprehensionibus.
228. +.’ AUXILIARIES TO THE former also “18 established in itself, subsisting in itself according to unity; but the latter is never in itself, because it receives its hypostasis in an extension of existence. The former, therefore, is an all-energetic one; but the latter is an anited multitude. Hence, it is requi- site to explore how the former is one and different; and again, how the latter is multitude and one: Nor must we transfer the peculiarities of the one to those which per- tain to the other.
39. It is not proper to think that the multitude of souls was generated on account of the multitude of bodies; but it is necessary.to admit that, prior to bodies, there were many souls, and one soul [the cause of the manyj. Nor does the one and whole soul prevent the subsistence in it of many souls; nor do the multitude of souls distribute by division the one soul into themselves. For they are distinct from, but are not abscinded from the soul, which ranks as a whole; nor do they distribute into minute parts. this whole soul into themselves. They are also present with each other without confusion; nor do they produce the whole soul by coacervation. For they are not separated from each other by any boundaries; nor, again, are they confused with each other; just as neither are many sciences confused in one soul [by which they are. possessed]. For these sciences do not subsist in the soul like bodies, as things of a different essence from it; but they are‘certain energies of the soul. For the nature of soul possesses an infinite power. Every thing also that occurs in it is soul; and all souls are [in w certain respect] one; and again, the soul which ranks ag’ a whole, is different from all the rest. For. as bodies, though divided to infinity, do not end:in that which is incorporeal, but alone: receive a difference of segments: according to bulk; thus also ‘soul, being a vital form; may be conceived to consist of forms ad tnfinitumi ᾿ς. For it possesses specific differences, and the whole of it sub- _ gists together. with, or without these. For, if there is in the soul that which is as it were a part divided from the: PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 229 rest of the parts, yet, at the same time that there is dif- ference, the sameness remains.. If, however, in bodies, in which difference predominates over sameness, nothing incorporeal- when it accedes- cuts: off ‘the. union, but all ΄ the parts remain essentially anited, and are. divided by _ qualities and: other forms; what ought we to assert. and conceive of a specific incorporeal. life, in which sameness is more prevalent than difference; to. which: nothing foreign to form is subjected, and from which the union of bodies is derived? Nor does body, when it. becomes.con- nected with soul, cut off its union, though it is an impe- diment to its energies in many respects. But the same- ness of soul produces and discovers all things. through itself, through its specific energy, which. proceeds to infinity; since any part of it whatever is eapable of effecting all things, when it is-liberated and purified from a conjunction with bodies; just.as any part of seed pos- sesses the power of the whole seed. As, however, seed, _when it is united with matter, predominates over. it, according to each of the productive principles which the seeds contain; and all the seed, its power being collected into one, possesses the whole of its power in each of the parts; thus: also, in the immaterial soul, that which may be conceived as a part, has the power of the whole soul. But that part of it which verges to matter, is vanquished, indeed, by the form to whieh it verges, and yet-is adapted to associate with immaterial form, though it is. connected with matter, when withdrawing itself from.a material nature, it is converted to itself. Since, however, through verging to matter, it becomes in want of all things, and suffers an emptiness of its proper power; but when it.is elevated to intellect, is found to. possess a plenitude of: all its powers; hence those who first obtained a knowledge of this plenitude of the soul, very. properly. indicated its emptiness by calling it poverty, and its fulness s by de- nominating it satiety.
230 AUXILIARIES TO THE SECTION III.
40. The ancients, wishing to exhibit to us the pecu- liarity of incorporeal being, so far as this can be effected by words, when they assert that it is one, immediately add, that it is likewise all things; by which they signified that it is not some one® of thé things which are known by the senses. Since, however, we suspect that this mcorporeal one is different from sensibles, in conse- quence of not perceiving this total one, which is all things according to one, in a sensible nature, and which is so because this one is all things: — hence the ancients added, that it ἐδ one so far as one; in order that we might understand that what is all things in truly existing being, is something uncompounded, and that we might with- draw ourselves from the conception of a coacervation. When hkewise they say that it is every where, they add that it is no where. When also they assert that it is in all things, they add, that it is no where in every thing. Thus, too, when they say, that it 1s in all things, and in every divisible nature which is adapted to receive it, they add, that it is a whole in a whole. And, in short, they render it manifest to us, through contrary peculiarities; at one and the same time assuming these, in order that we may exterminate, from the apprehension of it, the fictitious conceptions which are derived from bodies, and which obscure the cognoscible peculiarities of real being.
41. When you have assumed an eternal essence, infinite in itself according to power, and begin to perceive ‘ intellectually an hypostasis unwearied, untamed, and never-farling, but transcending in the most pure and . 8 In the original, πκαϑὸ ey τὶ τῶν κατ᾿ αἰσθϑησιν συνεγνωσμανωγ; but it appears to me to be necessary, after χαϑο, to insert the words οὐχ tore, For incorporeal being is not like some one of the things which are known by the senses, because no one of these is ore, and, at the same time, all things. Holstenius did not perceive the necessity of this emendation, as is evident from his version of the passage.
PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 29] genuine life, and full from itself; and which is likewise established in itself, satisfied with, and seeking ‘nothing but itself:—-to this essence, if you add a subsistence in place, or a relation to a certain thing, at the same time that you [appear to] diminish it, by ascribing to it an indigence of place, or a relative condition of being, you do not [in reality] diminish this essence, but you separate yourself from the perception of it, by receiving as a veil the phantasy which runs under your conjectural appre- hetision of it. For you cannot pass beyond, or stop, or render mote perfect, or effect the least change in a thing. of this kind, because it is impossible for it to be in the smallest degree deficient. For it is much more. never- failing than any perpetually flowing fountain can be con- ceived to be. If, however, you are unable to keep pace with it, and to become assimilated to the intelligible all, you should not investigate any thing pertaining to real being; or, if you do, you will deviate from the path that leads to it, and will look to something else. - But if you investigate nothing else, being established in yourself and your own essence, you will be assimilated to the intel- _ligible universe, and will not adhere to any thing pos- terior to it. Neither, therefore, should you say, I am of a great magnitude. For, omitting this greatness, you will become universal; though you were universal prior to this. But, together with the universal, something else was present with you, and you became less by the addi- tion; because the addition was not from truly-éxisting being. For to that you cannot add any thing. When, therefore, any thing is added from non-being, a place is afforded to Poverty as an associate, accompanied by an indigence of all things. Hence, dismissing non-being, you will then become sufficient to yourself". For he will not return properly to himself who does not dismiss things h Immediately after this something is wanting in the original, (as is evident from the asterisks,) which, as it appears to me, no conjecture can appropriately supply.
222. AUXILIARIES TO FHE of a more vile and abject nature, and who opines himself to be something naturally small, and not to be such as he truly is. For thus he, at one and the same time, departs both from himself, and from truly-existing being.. When, also, any one is presemt with that which is present. in himself, then he is present with true being, which is every where.. But when you withdraw from yourself, then,. likewise, you recede from real being; —of such great consequence is it, for a man to be present with that which. is present with himself, [i.e. with his rational part], and to be absent from that which is external to him.
If, however, true being is present with us, but non- being is absent, and real being is not present with us in conjunction with other things [of a nature foreign to it]; it does not accede in order that it may be present, but, we depart from it, when it is not present [with things of a different nature]. And why should this be considered as wonderful? For you when present are not absent from yourself; and yet you are not present with yourself, though present. And you are both present with and absent from yourself when you survey other things, and omit to behold yourself. If, therefore, you are thus .present, and yet not [in reality] present with yourself, and on this account are ignorant of yourself, and in a greater degree discover all things, though remote from your essence, than yourself, with which you are naturally present, why should you wonder if that which is not present is remote from you who are remote from it, ᾿ because you have become remote from yourself? For, by how much the more you are [truly] present with yourself, though it is present, and inseparably conjoined with you, by so much the more will you be present with real being, which is so essentially united to you, that it is as impos- sible for it to be divulsed from you, as for you to. be separated from yourself. So that it is universally pos-- sible to know what is present with real being, and what is absent from it, though it is every where present, and again is also no where. For those who are able to pro < ~ PERCEPTION. OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 233 ceed into their own essence intellectually, and to obtain 8 knowledge of it, will, in the knowledge itself; and the science accompanying this knowledge, be able to recover er regain. theniselves, through the union of that ‘which knows with that which is known. And with those, who are present with ‘themselves, truly-existing being will also be present,. But from such as abandon the proper being of themselves to other -things,—from these, as they are absent from themselves, true being will ‘also be absent. If, however, we are naturally adapted to bé established in-the same essence, to be rich from our- selves, and not to descend to that which we are not;-in so doing becoming in want of ourselves, and thus again associating with Poverty, though Porus' [or Plenty] is present;— and if we are cut off from real being, from: which we are not separated either by place, or essence; nor by. any thing. else, through our conversion to non- being, we suffer as a just pupishment of our abandon- ment of true. bemg, ἃ departure from, and ignorance of ourselves. And again, by a proper attention to, we recover ourselves, and become united to divinity. It is, therefore, rightly said, that the soul is confined in body as in a prison, and is there detained in chains like a fugitive slave*. We should, however, [earnestly] en- deavour to be liberated from our bonds. For, through ‘being converted to these sensible objects, we desert our- selves, though we are of a divine origin, and are, as Empedocles ‘says, Heaven's exiles, straying from the orb of light.
‘ In the original, sas δια τούτων πάλιν τὴ wine σύγειναι, χαιπῈρ wacerres αὐτου; but for αὐτου, I rend πόρου; as it appears to me that Porphyry is. here alluding to what is said by Diotima, in the Banquet of Plato, con- cerning the parents of Love, viz. that they are Poverty and Porus, or Plenty.
k See the Phado of Plato. But something i is here wanting in the original, as is evident not only from the asterisks, but from the want of connexion in the words themselves, 484 -. ΑὔΧΙΣΙΆΒΙΕΒ TO THE So that every depraved life is full of servitude; and on. this account is without God and unjust, the spirit im it.being' full of impiety, and consequently of injustice. And thus, aguin,.it is rightly said, that justice ms to be found in the performance of that which is the province of him who performs it. The image also of true justice consists in distributing to each of those with whom: we live, that which is due to the desert of each..
42. That which possesses its existence in another [ἐὶ δ. ἴῃ something different from itself], ‘and is not essen tialized in itself, separably from another, if it should be converted to itself, in order to know itself, without that mn which it is essentialized, withdrawing itself from it} would be corrupted by this knowledge, in consequence of separating itself from its essence. But that which is able to know itself without the subject in which it exists, and is able to withdraw itself from this subject, without the destruction of itself, cannot be essentialized in that, from which it is capable of converting: itself to itself, without being corrupted, and of knowing itself by its own enér- gies. Hence, if sight, and every sensitive power, neither perceives itself, nor apprehends or preserves itself by separating itself from body; but intellect, when it sepa- rates itself from body, then especially perceives intel- lectually, is converted to itself, and is. not corrupted;— ait is evident that the sensitive powers obtain the power of energizing through the body; but that intellect possesses its energies and its essence not in body, but in itself.
43. Incorporeal natures are properly denominated, and conceived to be what they are, according to a pri- vation of body; just as, according to the ancients, matter, and the form which is in matter, and also natures.and {physical] powers, are apprehended by an abstraction from matter. And after the same manner place, time, and the boundaries of things, are apprehended. For all such things are denominated according to a privation of body. There are likewise other things which are said to be incorporeal improperly, not according to a privation οὗ PERCEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE NATURES. 2386 body, but, in short, because they are not naturally. adapted to generate. body'.- Hence those of the former signifir cation subsist in bodies;. but those of the second are perfectly separated from bodies, and from those incor- poreal natures which subsist.about bodies For bodies, indeed, are in place, and boundaries are.in. body. Bat intellect, and intellectual reason, neither. subsist in place nor in body; nor proximately give existence to bodies, nor subsist together. with bodies, or with those. incor- poreal natures which are denominated according to a privation of bodies. Neither, therefore, if a certain incorporeal vacuum should be conceived to exist, would it be possible for intellect to be in a.vacuum. Fora vacuum may be the recipient of bady; but it is imposr sible that it should be the recipient of intellect, and afford a place for its energy.. Since, however, the genus of an mncorporeal nature appears.to be twofold, one of these the followers of Zeno do not at all admit, but they adopt the other; and perceiving that the former is not such as the latter, they entirely subvert it, though they ought rather to conceive that it is of another genus, and not - to fancy that, because it is not the latter, it has no existence..
44. Intellect and the intelligible are one thing, and sense and that which is sensible another. And the intel- ligible, indeed, is conjoined with intellect, but that which is sensible with sense. Neither, however, can sense by itself apprehend itself ** *, But the intelligible, which 1 j.e. They are not adapted to be the immediate causes of body, because they are perfectly separated from it. The original is, sd δὲ w ἀλλα καταχρησίριως λεγομῖνα ασωμώτα, οὐ κατα clenow σωματος, κατα δὲ ολως μη ψεφυκέναι γέγγαν σωμα. Holstenius, not understanding what is here said by ' Porphyry, translates the words xara δὲ cdwe μιη πεφυκέναι γέενναν copa, “* sed quod naullum omnino corpus generare possunt.” For Porphyry, as is evident from what immediately follows, is here speaking of natures which are perfectly separated from bodies, and which are, therefore, not Ὁ naturally adapted to be the immediate generators of them, not through any deficiency, but through transcendency of power, 86. | AUXILIARIES TO THE