either of war, or excessive dryness, or pestilence, sacri- ficed some one of their dearest friends, who was seleeted by votes for this purpose. The Phenician history also is replete with instances of men being sacrificed, which history was written by Sanchoniatho in the Pheenician tongue, and was interpreted into Greek in eight books, by Philo Byblius. But Ister, in his collection of the Cretan sacrifices, says that the Curetes formerly sacri-. ficed children to Saturn. And Pallas, who is the best of those that have collected what pertains to the mysteries of Mithras, says, that under the Emperor Adrian the sacrificing of men was nearly totally abolished. For, prior to his time, in Laodicea, which is in Syria, they anciently sacrificed a virgin to Minerva, but now they sacrifice a stag. The Carthaginians too, who dwell in Libya, formerly sacrificed men; but this custom was abolished by Iphicrates. And the Dumatii, a people of Arabia, annually sacrificed a boy, whom they buried under the altar, which was used by them as a statue. But Phylarchus narrates, that it was the general custom of all the Greeks, before they went to war, to immolate men. I omit to mention the Thracians and Scythians, and also the Athenians, who slew the daughter of Erechtheus and Praxithea. And even at present, who 18 ignorant that in the great city of Rome, in the festival of Jupiter La- tialis, they cut the throat of aman? Human flesh, how- ever, is not on this account to be eaten; though, through” a certain necessity, a man should be sacrificed. For, when a famine takes place during a siege, some of the besieged feed on each other, yet at the same time those who do so are deemed execrable, and the deed is thought to be impious.
57. After the first war, likewise, waged by the Romans against the Carthaginians, in order to obtain Sicily, when the mercenary soldiers of the Phcenicians revolted, and, together with them, those of Africa deserted, Amilcar, who was surnamed Barkas, in attacking the Romans, was ANIMAL FOOD;:-—BOOK It. 89 reduced to such a scarcity of food, that at first his men ate those that fell in battle; but afterwards, these failing, they ate their captives; in the third place, their servants; and in the last place, they attacked each other, and devoured their fellow-soldiers, who were led to be slaugh- tered for this purpose by lot. But Amilcar, taking those men that were in his power, caused his elephants to trample on such of the soldiers as had acted in this manner, conceiving that it was not holy to suffer them to be any longer mingled with other men; and neither did he admit that men should be eaten because certain per- sons had dared to do this; nor his son Hannibal, who, when he was leading his army into Italy, was advised by a certain person to accustom his troops to feed on human flesh, in order that they might never be in want of food. It does not follow, therefore, that because famine and war have been the causes of eating other animals, it is also requisite to feed on them for the sake of pleasure; as neither must we admit, that on this account men are to be eaten. Nor does it follow, that because animals are sacrificed to certain powers, it is also requisite to eat them. For neither do those who sacrifice men, on this account, feed on human flesh. Through what has been said, therefore, it is demonstrated, that it does not entirely follow that animals are to be eaten because they are sacrificed.
58. But that those who had learnt what the nature is of the powers in the universe, offered sacrifices through blood, not to Gods, but to demons, is confirmed by theologists themselves. For they also assert, that or deemons, some are malefic, but others beneficent, who will not molest us, if we offer to them the first-fruits of those things alone which we eat, and by which we nourish either the soul or the body. After, therefore, we have added a few observations more, in order to show that the unperverted conceptions of the multitude accord with a right opinion respecting the Gods, we shall conclude \ 90 OQN ABSTINENCE FROM - this book. Those poets, therefore, who are wise, though. but in a small degree, say, What man so credulous and void of mind, What man so ignorant, as to think the Gods In fiery bile and fleshless bones rejoice, For haugry dogs a nutriment not fit; Or that such offerers they will e’er reward?
But another poet says, My offerings to the Gods from cakes alone And frankincense shall be; for not to friends But deities my sacrifice I make.
59. Apollo also, when he orders men to sacrifice according to paternal institutes, appears to refer every thing to ancient custom. But the ancient custom of sacrificing was, as we have before shown, with cakes and fruits. Hence also, sacrifices were called ϑυσιαι, thusiat, | and ϑυηλαι, thuelat, and ϑυμελαι, thumelai, and avro +o Susi, auto to thuein, i. 6. the act of sacrificing, signified the same thing as τοὺ Suuiav, tou thumian, i. 6. to offer incense, and which is now called by us, em:9vew, epithuein, i. 6. to sacrifice something more. For what we now call Svew, thuein, ὃ, e. to sacrifice, the ancients denominated ερδὲιν, erdein, ὦ i. 6. to per- form or make.
They perfect hecatombs of bulls, or goats, Made to Apollo.
60. But those who introduced costliness into sacri- fices, were ignorant that, in conjunction with this, they also introduced a swarm of evils, viz. superstition, luxury, an opinion that a divine nature may. be corrupted by gifts, and that a compensation may be made by sacrifices for injustice. Or whence do some make an oblation of three animals with gilded horns, but others of heca- tombs? And whence did Olympias, the mother of Alex- ander [the Great,] sacrifice a thousand of each species of animals, unless sumptuousness had at length proceeded to ANIMAL FOOD.—BOOK: II.. 2g) superstition? But when the young man was informed that the Gods rejoiced in magnificent sacrifices, and, as they say, in solemn banquets of oxen and other ani- mals, how, though he was willing to act wisely, was it possible that he could? How also, when he conceived that, these sacrifices were acceptable to the Gods, was it possible he should not fancy that he was permitted to act unjustly, when he might exonerate himself from erroneous conduct through sacrifices? But if he had been persuaded that the Gods have no need of these things, and that they look to the manners of those who approach to them, and conceive that a right opinion of them, and of things themselves, ts the greatest sacrifice, how is it possible that he should not have heen temperate, holy, and just?.. ΄ 61. To the Gods, indeed, the most excellent offering is ἃ pure intellect and an impassive soul, and also a moderate oblation of our own property and of other things, and this not negligently, but with the greatest alacrity. For the honours which we pay to the Gods should be accompanied by the same promptitude as that with which we give the first seat to worthy men, and with which we fise to, and salute them, and not by the promptitude with which we pay a tribute. For man must not use such language as the following to God: If, O Philinus, you recal to mind, And love me for, the benefits which I On you conferr’d, ‘tis well, since for the sake -Of these alone my bounty was bestow’d.
For divinity is not satisfied with such assertions as these. And hence Plato says [in his Laws], that it pertains to a good man to sacrifice, and to be always conversant with the Gods by prayers, votive offerings, sacrifices, and every kind of religious worship; but that to the bad man, much labour about the Gods is ineffica- cious and vain. For the good man knows what ought to,. be sacrificed, and from what it is requisite to abstain; what things are to be offered to divinity, and of what the first-fruits are to be sacrificed; but the bad man exhi- biting honours to the Gods from his own disposition and his own pursuits, acts in so doing more impiously than piously. Hence Plato thought, that a philosopher ought not to be conversant with men of depraved habits; for this is neither pleasing to the Gods, nor useful to men; but the philosopher should endeavour to change such men to a better condition, and if he cannot effect this, he should be careful that he does not himself become changed into their depravity. He adds, that having entered into the right path, he should proceed in it, neither fearing danger from the multitude, nor any, other blasphemy which may happen to take place. For it would be a thing of a dire nature, that the Syrians indeed will not taste fish, nor the Hebrews swime, nor most of the Phosnicians and Egyptians cows; and though many kings have endeavoured to change these customs, yet those that adopt them would rather suffer death, than a trans- gression of the law [which forbids them to eat these animals]; and yet that we should choose to transgress the laws of nature and divine precepts through the fear of men, or of a certain denunciation of evil from them. For the divine. choir of Gods, and divine men, may justly be greatly indignant with us, if it perceives us directing our attention to the opinions of depraved men, and idly looking to the terror with which they are attended, though we daily meditate how we may become [philoso- phically] dead to other things in the present life.
ΟΝ ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD. BOOK THE THIRD.
i. In the two preceding books, O Firmus Castricius,-we have demonstrated, that animal food does not contribute either to temperance and frugality, or to the piety which especially gives completion to the theoretic life, but -1s rather hostile to it. Since, however, the most beautiful part of justice consists in piety to the Gods, and this is principally acquired through abstinence, there is no occasion to fear that we shall violate justice towards men, while we preserve piety towards the Gods. Socrates therefore says, in opposition to those who contend that pleasure is the supreme good, that though all swine and goats should aceord in this opinion, yet he should never be persuaded that our felicity was placed in the enjoy- ment of corporeal delight, as long as intellect has domi- nion over all things. And we also say, that though all wolves and vultures should praise the eating of flesh, we should not admit that they spoke justly, as long as man is by nature innoxious, and ought to abstain from procuring . pleasure for himself by injuring others. We shall pass on, therefore, to the discussion of justice; and since our opponents say that this ought only to be extended to those of a similar species, and on this account deny that irrational animals can be injured by men, let us exhibit the true, and at the same time Pythagoric opinion, and demonstrate that every soul which participates of O44 ON ABSTINENCE FROM sense and memory is rational. For this being demon- strated, we may extend, as our opponents will also admit, justice to every animal. But we shall epitomize what has been said by the ancients on this subject.
2. Since, however, with respect to reason, one kind, according to the doctrine of the Stoics, is internal, but the other external*; and again, one kind being right, but the other erroneous, it is requisite to explain of which of these two, animals, according to them, are deprived. Are they therefore deprived of right reason alone? or are they entirely destitute both of internal and externally proceeding reason? They appear, indeed, to ascribe to brutes an entire privation of reason, and not a privation of right reason alone. For if they merely denied that brutes possess right reason, animals would not be irra+ tional, but rational beings, in the same manner’as nearly all men are according to them. For, according to their opinion, one ot two wise men may be found in whom alone right reason prevails, but all the rest of mankind are depraved; though some of these make a certain pros ficiency, but others are profoundly depraved, and yet, at the same time, all of them are similarly rational. Through the influence, therefore, of self-love, they say, that all other enimals are irrational; wishing to indicate by irra- tionality, an entire privation of reason. If, however, it be requisite to speak the ‘truth, not only reason may plainly be perceived in all animals, but in many of them it is so great as to approximate to perfection.
3. Since, therefore, reason is two-fold, one kind con- sisting in external speech, but the other in the disposition of the soul, we shall begin from that which is external, and which is arranged according to the voice.. But if ‘external reason is voice, which through the tongue is sig- nificant of the internal passions of the soul (for this is the mhost common definition of it, and is not adopted by one sect [of philosophers] only, and if it is alone indicative of 2 This external reason (λογας exgopopeos) 15 speech.
ANIMAL FOOD.—BOOK III. 98 the conception of [internal] reason) — if this be the case, in what pertaining to this are such animals as have 4 voice deficient? Do they not discursively perceive the manner in which they are inwardly affected, before it is vocally enunciated by them? By a discursive percep- tion, however, I mean the perception produced by the silent discourse which takes place in the soul. Since, therefore, that which is vocally expressed by the tongue 18 reason, in whatever manner it may be expressed, whether in a barbarous or a Grecian, a canine or a bovine mode, other animals also participate of it that are vocal; men, indeed, speaking conformably to the human laws [of speech], but other animals conformably to the laws which they received from the Gods and nature. But if we do not understand what they say, what is this to the purpose? For the Greeks do not understand what is said by the Indians, nor those who are educated in Attica the language of the Scythians, or Thracians, or Syrians; but the sound of the one falls on the ears of the other hke the clangor of cranes, though by others their vocal sounds can be written and articulated, in the same manner as ours can by us. Nevertheless, the vocal sounds of the Syrians, for instance, or the Persians, are to us inarticulate, and ‘cannot be expressed by writing, just as the speech of animals is unintelligible to all men. For as we, when we hear the Scythians speak, apprehend, by the auditory sense, a noise only and a sound, but are ignorant of the meaning of what they say, because their language appears to us to be nothing but a clangor, to have no articulation, and to employ only one sound either longer or shorter, the variety of which is not at all significant to us, but to them the vocal sounds are intel- ligible, and have a great difference, in the sathe manner as our language has to us; the like also takes placé in the vocal sounds: of other animals. For the several species of these understand the language which is adapted to them, but we only hear a sound, of the signification of which we are ignorant, because no one who has learnt 96 ON ABSTINENCE FROM.
our language, is able to teach us through ours the meaning of what is said by brutes. If, however, it is requisite to believe in the ancients, and also in those who have lived in our times, and the times of our fathers, there are some among these who are said to have heard and to have understood the speech of animals. Thus, for in- stance, this is narrated of Melampus and Tiresias, and others of the like kind; and the same thing, not much prior to our time, is related of Apollonius Tyanaus. For it is narrated of him, that once, when he was with his associates, a swallow happening to be present, and twit- tering, he said, that the swallow indicated to other birds, that an ass laden with corn had fallen down before the city, and that in consequence of the fall of the_ass, the corn was spread on the ground». An associate, also, of mine informed me, that he once had a boy for a servant, who understood the meaning of all the sounds of birds, and who said, that all of them were prophetic, and declarative of what would shortly happen. He added, that he was deprived of this knowledge through his’ mother, who, fearing that he would be sent to the Emperor as a gift, poured urine into his ear when he was asleep.
4. Omitting, however, these things, through the passion of incredulity, which is connascent with us, I think there is no one who is ignorant, that there are some nations even now who understand the sounds of certain animals, through an alliance to those animals. Thus, the Arabians understand the language of crows, and the Tyrrhenians of eagles. And, perhaps, all men would understand the language of all animals, if a dragon were to lick their ears. Indeed, the variety and differ- ence in the vocal sounds of animals, indicate that they are significant. Hence, we hear one sound when they are terrified, but another, of a different kind, when they call their associates, another when they summon their > Philostratus relates this of Apollonius, in his Life of him.
ANIMAL FOOD.—BOOK IIT, 97 young to food, another when they lovingly embrace each other, and another when they incite to battle. And so great is the difference in their vocal sounds, that, even by those who have spent their whole life in the observation of them, it is found to be extremely difficult to ascertain their meaning, on account of their multitude. Diviners, therefore, who predict from ravens and crows, when they have noted the difference of the sounds, as far as to a certain multitude, omit the rest, as not easily to be appre- hended by man...But when animals speak to each other, these sounds are manifest and significant to them, though they are not known to all of us. If, however, it appears that they imitate us, that they learn the Greek tongue, and understand their keepers, what man is so impudent as not to grant that they are rational, because he does not understand what they say? Crows, therefore, and magpies, the robin redbreast, and the parrot, imitate men, recollect what they have heard, are obedient to their pre- ceptor while he is teaching them; and many of them, through what they have learnt, point out those that have acted wrong in the house. But the Indian hyena, which the natives call crocotta, speaks in a manner so human, and this without a teacher, as to go to houses, and call that person whom he knows he can easily vanquish. He also imitates the voice of him who is most dear, and would most readily attend to the person whom he calls; so that, though the Indians know this, yet being deceived through the similitude, and obeying the call, they come forth, and are destroyed. If, however, all animals do not imitate, and all of them are not adapted to learn our language, what is this to the purpose? For neither is every man docile or imitative, I will not say of the vocal sounds of animals, but of the five dialects of the Greek tongue. To which may be added, that some animals, perhaps, do not speak, because they have not been taught, or because they are impeded by the ill conformation of the instruments of speech. We, therefore, when we were at Carthage, nurtured a tame partridge, which we caught Η 98 ON ABSTINENCE FROM flying, and which, in process of time, and by associating with us, became so exceedingly mild, that it was not only sedulously attentive to us, caressed and sported with us, — but uttered a sound corresponding to the sound of our voice, and, as far as it was capable, answered us; and this in a manner different from that by which partridges are accustomed to call each other. For it did not utter a corresponding sound when we were silent, but when we spoke to it.
5. It is also narrated, that some dumb animals obey their masters with more readiness than any domestic servants. Hence, a lamprey was so accustomed to the Roman Crassus, as to come to him when he called it by its name; on which account Crassus was so affectionately disposed towards it, that he exceedingly lamented its death, though, prior to this, he had borne the loss of three of his children with moderation. Many likewise relate that the eels in Arethusa, and the shell-fish de- nominated saperde, about Meander, are obedient to those that callthem. Is not the imagination, therefore, of an animal that speaks, the same, whether it proceeds as far as to the tongue, or does not? And if this be the case, is it not absurd to call the voice of man alone [external] reason, but refuse thus to denominate the voice of other animals? For this is just as if crows should think that their voice alone is external reason, but that we are irrational animals, because the meaning of the sounds which we utter is not obvious to them; or as if the inhabitants of Attica should thus denomi- nate their speech alone, and should think that those are irrational who are ignorant of the Attic tongue, though the inhabitants of Attica would sooner under- stand the croaking of a crow, than the language of a Syrian or a Persian. But is it not absurd to judge of rationality and irrationality from apprehending or not apprehending the meaning of vocal sounds, or from silence and speech? For thus some one might say, that _ the God who is above all things, and likewise the other ΑΔ τινος, εἰ / ANIMAL FOOD.—BOOK III. 99 .Gods, are not rational, because they do not speak. The Gods, however, silently indicate their will, and birds apprehend their will more rapidly than men, and when they have apprehended it, they narrate it to men as much as they are able, and different birds are the messengers to men of different Gods. Thus, the eagle is the messenger of Jupiter, the hawk and the crow of Apollo, the stork of Juno, the crex and the bird of night of Minerva, the crane of Ceres, and some other bird is the messenger of some other deity. Moreover, those among us that ob- serve animals, and are nurtured together with them, know the meaning of their vocal sounds. -The hunter, there- fore, from the barking of his dog, perceives at one time, indeed, that the dog explores a hare, but at another, that the dog has found it; at one time, that he pursues the game, at another that he has caught it, and at another that he is in the wrong track, through having lost the scent of it. Thus, too, the cowherd knows, at one time, _ indeed, that a cow 1s hungry, or thirsty, or weary, and at another, that she is incited to venery, or seeks her calf, [from her different lowings]°. A lion also manifests by his roarmg that he threatens, a wolf by his howling that he is in a bad condition, and shepherds, from the bleating of sheep, know what the sheep want.
6. Neither, therefore, are animals ignorant of the meaning of the voice of men, when they are angry, or speak kindly to, or call them, or pursue them, or ask them to do something, or give something to them; nor, in short, are they ignorant of any thing that is usually said to them, but are aptly obedient to it; which it would be impossible for them to do, unless that which is similar to intellectton energized, in consequence of being excited by its similar. The immoderation of their passions, also, is suppressed by certain modulations, and stags, bulls, and © The words within the brackets are added from the version of _ Felicianus. Hence it appears, that the words ἐκ τῶν διαφόρων μυκημάτων are wanting in the original, after the word 297s, But this defect is not noticed by any of the editors.
λ 100 ON ABSTINENCE FROM other animals, from being wild become tame. Those, too, who are decidedly of opinion that brutes are. deprived of reason, yet admit that’: dogs have a knowledge of dia- _ lectic, and make use of the syllogism which consists of many disjunctive propositions, when, in searching for their game, they happen to come to a place where there are three roads. For they thus reason, the beast has either fled through this road, or through that, or through the remaining road; but it has not fled either through this, or through that, and therefore it must have fled through the remaining third of these roads?. After which syllogistic process, they resume their pursuit in that road. It may, however, be readily said, that animals do these things naturally, because they were not taught by any one to do them; as if we also were not allotted reason by nature, though we likewise give names to things, because we are naturally adapted to do so. Besides, if it be requisite to believe in Aristotle, animals are seen to teach their offspring, not only something per- taining to other things, but also to utter vocal sounds; as » the nightingale, for instance, teaches her young to sing. And as he likewise says, animals learn many things from each other, and many from men; and the truth of what he asserts is testified by all the’ tamers of colts, by every jockey, horseman, and charioteer, and by all hunters, herdsmen, keepers of elephants, and masters of wild beasts and birds. He, therefore, who estimates things rightly, will be led, from these instances, to ascribe intelligence to brutes; but he who is inconsiderate, and is ignorant of these things, will be induced to act rashly, through his inexhaustible avidity co-operating with him against them, For how is it possible that he should not defame and calumniate animals, who has determined to cut them in pieces, as if they were stones? Aristotle, however, Plato, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, and all such as Porphyry derived this from the treatise of Plutarch, in which it is investigated whether /and are more sagacious than aguatic animals.
ANIMAL FOOD.—BOOK III. 101 endeavoured to discover the truth concerning animals, have acknowledged that they participate of reason.
7. But it is now requisite to show that brutes have internal reason. The difference, indeed, between our reason and theirs, appears to consist, as Aristotle some- where says, not in essence, but in the more and the less; just as many are of opinion, that the difference between the Gods and us is not essential, but consists in this, that in them there is a greater, and in us a less accuracy, of the reasoning power®. And, indeed, so far as pertains to sense and the remaining organization, according to the sensoria and the flesh, every one nearly will grant that these are similarly disposed in us, as they are in brutes. For they not only similarly participate with us of natural passions, and the motions produced through these, but we may also survey in them such affections as are preter- natural and morbid. No one, however, of a sound mind, will say that brutes are unreceptive of the reasoning power, on account of the difference between their habit of body and ours, when he sees that there is a great variety of habit in men, according to their race, and the nations to which they belong, and yet, at the same time, it is granted that all of them are rational. An ass, there- fore, is afflicted with a catarrh, and if the disease flows to his lungs, he dies in the same manner as a man. A horse, too, 1s subject to purulence, and wastes away through it, like a man. He is likewise attacked with rigour, the gout, fever, and fury, in which case he is also said to have a depressed countenance. A mare, when pregnant, if she happens to smell a lamp when it is just extin- guished, becomes abortive, in the same manner as a woman. An ox, and likewise a camel, are subject to