In short, being which subsists according to, or is characterized by the oncy proceeds indeed from the unity prior to beings, but generates the CHAP« X. OP PLATO. Sg whole divine genufi^ via. the iotelligibte, iiiteUectiMJ, supcniiMidaae, and that which proceeds as &r aa to the muudaBe ooier. But our preceplea' likewise asserts, that each of the condusioiis is iadicadve of a diviae pe- culiarity. And though all the coackisioaahaciiionBe ta all the progres* sions of the one beings or of b^ng characterned bj the m^, yet I am of opinion, it is by bo means wonderful, that some eoodusioas should moFb accord with some hypoitheses than with others. For sudi tilings as ex- press the peculiarity: <^ certain orders,, do not necenarily bdong to all the Gods; but such as belong to aU, are doubtless by a mudi greater feasoa pieseiit with each. If, therelbic^ we asoibe to Plato, an adventitious division ot the divine orders,' and do not clearly evince that, in o^kt&t dialogues, he celebrate the progressions of the Gods from on high to tibe eKtremit;y of things, sometimes in faUes respecting the soul, and at other times, in other theological modes, we shaH absurdly attribute to him, such a divbion of being, and jtogether with this, of the progression of the one. But if we can evince from other dialogues, that he (as will be notanifest in the course of this work) has cdebrated all the kin^oms of the Gods, in a certain respect, is it not impossible, that in die most mystic of all his works, he should deliver through the first hypothesis, the exempt transcendency of the one with respect to all the g^iera of beings, to being itself, to a psychical essence, to form, and to matter, but that he should make no mention of the divine progressions, and their orderly separation? For if it is proper to contemplate last things only, why do we touch on the first principle before other things? Or if we think fit to unfold the multitude of the proper hypotheses, why do we pass by the genus of the Gods, and the divisions which it contains? Or if we un- fold the natures subsisting between the first and last of things, why do we leave unknown the whole orders of those divine beings, which subsist between the one^ and natures that are in any respect deified? For all these particulars evince, that the whole discourse is defective, with re- spect to the science of things divine. But still farther, Socrates, in the Philebus, calls upon those that love ' For wpc^tm^ it is Mcenarj to rtsd m^y.
$0 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
the cmitemplation of beings^ to me the dividing method, and always to explore the monads of total orders, and the duads, triads, or any other numbers proceeding from these. If this then is rightly determined, it is doubtless necessary that the Parmenides, which employs the whole dia^ kclic method, and discourses about being which is characterized by the ofte, should neither specul&te multitude about the one^ nor remain in the onp monad of beings, nor in short, introduce to the one which is above all beings, the whole multitude of first beings immediately, but should unfold, as in the fii*st. order, such beings as have an occult subsistence, and are allied to the one; but as in the middle rank, those genera of the Gpds which subsist according to progression, and which are more divided than the extremely united, but are allotted a union mor^ perfect, than such as have proceeded to the utmost; and should unfold as in the last rank, such as subsist according to the last division of powers, and together T^ith these, such as have a deified essence. If, therefore, the first of the hypotheses is about the one which is above all multitude, it is doubtless necessary that the hypothesis which follows this, should not unfold being itself in an indefinite and indistinct manner, but should deliver all the orders, of beings. For the dividing method does not admit, that we should introduce the whole of multitude at once to the one^ as Socrates teaches us in the Philebus.
Besides, we may evince the truth of what we assert from the very method of the demonstrations. For the first of the conclusions become immediately manifest from the least, most simple, most known, and as it were com« mon conceptions. But those which are next in order to these, become apparent through a greater multitudje of conceptions, and such as are more various. And the last conclusions are entirely the most composite. For he always uses the first conclusions, as subservient to the demonstrac tion of those that fpUow,* and presents us with an intellectual paradigm of the order observed in geometry, or other disciplines, in the connexion of these conclusions with each other. If, therefore, discourses bring with ihi^m an image of the things of which they are interpreters, and if, as are For ffpfoyriM^y it ift neceaeary to read a^l^iAivmy.
CHAP^Xt. OP PLATO. 31 the evolutions from demonstrations, such must tbe order necesBaiily be of the things exhibited, it appears to me to be neceMary, that, such things as derive their beginning from the most simple principles, must be in every respect of a more primary nature, and must be arranged as pon^^ joined with the one; bu.t that such as are always multiplied, and suspend*- ed from various demonstrations, must have proceeded farther from the subsistence* of Me owe.
For the demonstrations which have two conclusions, must necessarily contain the conclusions prior to themselves; but those which contain pri^ mary, spontaneous, and simple conceptions, are not necessarily united with such as are more composite^ which are exhibited through more abundant media, and which are farther distant from the principle of beings. It appears therefore, that some of the conclusions are indicative of more divine orders, but others, of such as are more subordinate; some, of more united, and others, of more multiplied orders; and agaiii, some, of more uniform, and others, of more multiform progressions. Fw demonstrations are universally from caused, and things first. If, there- fore, first are the causes of second conclusions, there is an order of causes, and things caused, in the multitude of the conclusions. For, indeed, to confound all things, and speculate them indefinitely in one, neither ac* cords with the nature of things, nor the science of Plato* CHAPTER Xt CHAPTER Xt Agaiv, therefore^ Jet us discuss this afiair in another way, and view with the dianbetic power, where any thing futile is delivered. I^or let it be said, if you please, and we will first of all allow it, that the conclusions of this second hypothesis are about true bdng. But as this is multitude, and not only one itself, like the me prior to bemgs; for being is that ' Fot a%Qvrw9»if k id neceadarjr to read vin^sicms.
S3 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
wfauA 18 passive to tke anty as the £Iean guest in the Sopbisia infimns us; a»d as it is vniversaUy acknowledged by our opponents, who establish dialt which is first AS Me oMj but intellect, as one Manyj soul, as one and numy^ and body, as many ^md me; — as therefore, this has been asserted k tlmisaiid times, I mean that in true being there is multitude together with umon, whether will they say ikat these things harmonize with the whole of being, but not with its parts, or both with the whole and its parts? And again, we ask than, whether they attribute all things to each part of bemg, or whether they ascribe different things to different parts?
If^ therefore, they ai« of opinion,, that each particular should alone karmomze with the whole of being, bang will consist of non^beings, that which is moved, of things immoveable, that which abides, of things de- prived of pamanency, and universally, all things will consist of their opposites, and we shall no longer agree with the discourse of Parmenides', who says that the parts of being characterized by the one, are in a certain respect wholes, and that each of them is one and being, in a manner sin^r to the whole. But if we attribute all things to each part, and there is nothing which we do not make all things, how can the summit of being, and that which is most eminently one, contain a wholeness, and an incomprehensible multitude of parts? How can it at one and the same time contain the whole of number^ figure, motion and permanency, and in short all forms and genera? For these difier from each other, and the hypothesis will assert things impossible. For things near to, will he simi- larly multiplied with things remote from the ane^ and that which is first, will not be a less multitude than that which is last; nor again, will the last of things be a less one than the first, and things in the middle will have no difference with respect to division from the extremes.
As therefore, it is not proper to ascribe all this multitude of conclu*- sions to the whole akne, nor to consider all things in a similar manner ii) all the parts of being, it remains that different conclusions must harmonize with difierent things. It is necessary, therefore, that either the enume^ ration of the conclusions should be inordinate, or ordinate. But if they say they are inordinate, they neither speak agreeably to the dialectic method, nor to the mode of demonstrations, which always generate things secondary from snbh as are first, noft to the scienoeof Plato^ ndiicb aiii^ys accompaDies the order of things. But if they say the conclusions are re^ gular» I think it is entirely necessary, that they should either b^in Irom things first according to nature, or from things last. But if from things laat being ckaraettrised by the one will be the last^ and that which is mo^ed according to time, the first. This, however, is impossiUe. For that which participates of time, must by a much greater priority participate of first being. But that which participates of first being, does not neces* sarily participate of time. First being, therefore, is above time. If then Plato begins from first being, but ends in that which participates of time, be proceeds supemally from the first to the last parts of true being* Hence, the first conclusions are to be referred to the first orders, the middle,, for the same reason, to the middle orders, and the last, as is efvi- debt, to such as are last. For it is necessary, as our discourse has evinced, that difierent conclusions should be assigned to different things, and that » distribution of this kind should commence irom sueh things as are highest.
But likewise, the order of the^ hypotheses, as it appears tome, is a suffix cient argument of the truth of our assertion. Fcht with us the one which 19 etempt from all multitude, is allotted the first order, and from this the evolution of all the arguments commences. But the second order afbec this, is about true beings, ami the unity which these participate. And the third order in regular succession, is about soul. Whether, therefore, is it about every soul or not? In answer to this, we diaJl observe, that our leader Syrianus has beautifially shown, that the discourse about whole souls is comprehended in the second hypothesis. If, therdbre^ the order o( these three hypotheses proceeds according to the nature of things, it is evident that the second is produced from the first, and the last from the second. For I would ask those who are not entirdy unskilled in discourses of this kind, what can be more allied to the oncy than being characterized by the one^ which the first of the conclusions of the second hypothesis mt^ folds? Or what can be more allied to soul, than that which participates of time, which subsists divisibly, and which is the last thing exhibited ia this hypothesis? For the life of partial as well as of total souls is according Froc. Vol. I. E Froc. Vol. I. E 54 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK L to time. And first being- is that which first participates of the oncj and through its connexion with being, has a redundant hyparxis with respect to the iniparticipable unity. But if this hypothesis is the middle^ and if we aptly harmonize the highest conclusions with things highest, we should doubtless harnoonize middles with middles. For this hypothesis com- mencing from first being, proceeds through all the genera posterior to it, till it ends in a nature participating of time. « But, farther, from Ihe common confession of those interpreters of Plato, who were skilled in divine concerns, we can demonstrate the same things as we have above asserted. For Plotinus, in his book On Numbers^ en- quiring whether beings subsist prior to numbers, or numbers prior to beings, clearly asserts that the first being subsists prior to numbers, and that it generates the divine number. But if this is rightly determined by him, and being is generative of the first number, but number is produced by being, it is not proper to confound the order of these genera, nor to collect them into one hypostasis, nor, since Plato separately produces first being, and separately number, to refer each of the conclusions to the same order. For it is by no means lawful, that cause and the thing caused, should have either the same power, or the same order: but these are distinct from each other; and the science concerning them is likewise distinct, and neither the nature, nor the definition of them is one and the same« But, after Plotinus, Porphyry in his treatise On Principlesy evinces by many and beautiful arguments, that intellect is eternal, but that at the same time, it contains in itself something prior to the eternal, and through which it is conjoined with the one. For the one is above all eternity, but the eternal has a second, or rather third order in intellect. For it appears to me to be necessary that eternity should be established in the middle of that which is prior to the eternal, and the eternal. But of this hereafter. At the same time, thus much may be collected from what has been said, that intellect contains something in itself better than the eternal. Ad«* mitting this, therefore, we ask the father of this assertion, whether this something better than the eternal is not only being characterized by the one, but is a whole and parts, and all multitude, number and figure, that which is moved, and that which is permanent; or whether we are to CHAP, XI. OF PLATO. 35 ascribe some of the conclusions to it^ but not others P For it is impossible that all these can accord with a nature prior to ^^mity, since every in« tellectual * motion, and likewise permanency, are established in etemity. But if we are to ascribe some of the conclusions to it, and not others, it is evident that other orders in intellect are to be investigated, and that each of the conclusions is to be referred to that order, to which it appears par* ticularly adapted. For intellect is not one in number, and an atom, as it appeared to be to some of the ancients, but it comprehends in itself the whole progression of first being.
But the third who makes for our purpose after these, is the divine Jam* blichus, who, in his treatise Concerning the Gods^ accuses those who place the genera of being in intelligibles, because the number and variety of these is more remote from the one. But afterwards he informs us where these ought to be placed. For they are produced in the end of Uie intellectual order, by the Gods which there subsist. How the genera of being, how* evOT, both are, and are not in intelligibles, will be hereaft^ apparent. But if, according to his arrangement qf the divine orders, inteUigibles ar^ exempt from the genera of being, much more are they exempt from similitude and dissimilitude^ equality and inequaUty« Each c^ the con* elusions, therefore, ought not in a similar manner to be accommodated to all things, so as to refer them to the whole breadth of the intelligible, or intdlectual order. Hence from what the best of the interpreters have said, when philosophizing according to their own doctrines, both the multitude of the divine orders, and of the Platonic arguments, are to be considered as proceeding according to an orderly distinction.
In addition, hkewise, to what has been said, this also may be asserted, that we cannot, on any other hypothesis, obtain a rational solution of th« many doubts which present themselves on this subject, but shall. igno« rantly ascribe what is rash and vain to this treatise of Plato. For in the first place, why are there only so many conclusions, and neither more nor less? For there are fourteen conclusions. But as there are so many, we cannot assign the reason of this, unless we distribute them in conjunction with things themselves. In the second place, neither shall we be able to find ' the cause of the order of the conclusioos with respect to each other, and how some have a prior^ and others a posterior establishment, accord-^ »g to the reason of science, unless the order or the conclusions proceeds in conjunction with the progression of beings. In the third place, why do some of the conclusions become known from things proximately dcp monstrated, but others from preceding demonstrations?. For that the one is a whole ^nd contains parts, is demonstrated from being, which is cha- racteriaed by the one; but its subsistence in itself and in another, Is placed in a proximate order, after the possession of figure, but is demonstrated from whole and parts. Or why are some things often demonstrated, fixmi two of the particulars previously evinced, but others from one of them? For we shall be ignorant of each of these, and shall ndther be able scien- tifically <K> speculate their number, nor their order, nor their alliance to each other, unless following things themselves, we evince that this whole hypothesis is a dialectic arrangement, proceeding from on high through all the middle genera, as far as to the termination of first being.
Again, if we should say, that all the conclusions demonstrate syllogisti-* cally only, in what respect shall we differ from those, who assert that the whole of this discussion consists of doxastic arguments, and only regwds a mere verbal contest? But if it is not only syllogistic, but likewise de- monstrative, it is doubtless necessary, that the middle should be the cause of, and by nature prior to the conclusion. As, therefore, we make the conclusions of the preceding reasons, the media of those that follow, the things which the arguments- respect, must doubtkss have a similar order as to being, and their progeny must be the causes of things subject, and generative of such as are secondary. But if this be admitted, how cao we allow that all of them have the same peculiarity and nature? For cause, and that which is produced from cause, are serrated from each other.
But this likewise will happ^i to those who assert that one nature is to be explored in all the arguments, that they will by no means perceive how in the three first conclusions, the one remains unseparated from being, but is first separated in the fourth conclusion. But in all the following conclusions, the one is explwed considered as subsisting itself by its^ Is it not therefoK necessary, that these orders must differ from each CHAP. XI. OF PLATO. 37 other? For that vhich is without separation, in coDsequeoce of baviog an occult and undivided si^ist6nce, is more allied to the one^ but that which is separated,'hafi proceeded farther from the first principle of things.
Again, if you are willing to consider the multitude of the argumente, and the extent of the hypothesis, how. much it differs from that which follows it,~neither from this will it appear to you to be entirely about one and an unseparated nature. For reasonings about divine concerns, are con- tracted in the more principal causes, because in these the occult is more abundant than the perspicuous, and the ineffable than the known. But they become multiplied and evolved, by proceeding to divine orders more proximate to our nature. For such things as are more allied to that which is ineffable, unknown, and exempt in inaccessible places, are allotted an hyparxis more foreign from verbal enunciation. But such things as have proceeded farther, are both more known to us, and more apparent to the phantasy, than such as have a prior subsistence.
This, therefore, being abundantly proved, it is necessary that the second hypothesis, should unfold all the divine orders, and should pro- ceed on high, from the most simple and unical to the whole multitude, and all the number of divine natures, in which the order of true being ends, which indeed is spread under the unities of tl^ Gods, and at the same time is divided in conjunction with their occult and ineffkble pecu- liarities. If, therefore, we are not deceived in admitting this, it follows, that from this hypothesis, the continuity of the divine orders^ and the pro- gression of second from first natures, is to be assumed, together with the peculiarity of all the divine gemera. And indeed, what their communion is with each other, and what their distinction proceeding according to measure, likewise, the auxiliaries which may be found in other dialogues respecting the truth of real beings, or the unities which they contain, are all to be referred to this hypothesis. For, here we may contemplate the total progressions of the Gods, and their all-perfect orders, according to theological science. For as we have before shown that the whole treatise of the Parmenides has reference to the truth of things, and that it was -fM)t devised 'as a vain evolution of words, it is doubtless necessary, Aat the nine hypotheses which it discusses, employing the dialectic method, 38 ' OJJ THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
but speculating with divine science, should be about things and certain natures, which are either middle or last. If, therefore, Parmenides ac- knowledges that his whole discourse will be about the one^ and how it subsists with respect to itself, and all other things, it is evident that the speculation of the one^ must commence from that which is highest, but end in that which is the last of all things. For the hyparxis of the one proceeds from on high, as far as to the most obscure hypostasis of things.
CHAPTER XII.
CHAPTER XII.
As the first hypothesis, however, demonstrates by negations the inef- fable supereminence of the first principle of things, and evinces that he is exempt from all essence and knowledge, — it is evident that the hypothesis after this, as being proximate to it, must unfold the whole order of the Gods. For Parmenides does not alone assume the intellectual and essen* tial peculiarity of the Gods, but hkewise the divine characteristic of their hyparxis through the whole of this hypothesis. For what other one can tlmt be which is participated by being, than that which is in every being divine, and through which all things are conjoined with the imparticipablc one? For as bodies through their life are conjoined with soul, and as souls through their intellective partj are extended to total intellect, and the first intelligence, in like manner true beings through the one which they contain are reduced to an exempt union, and subsist in unproceeding union with this first cause.
But because this hypothesis commences from that which is one beings or being characterized by the onCy and establishes the summit of intelligibles as the first after the one^ but ends in an essence which participates of time, s^nd deduces divine souls to the extremities of the divine orders, it is ne- cessary that the third hypothesis should demonstrate by various con?f elusions, the whole mijltitude of partial souls, and the diversities which CHAP. HI. OF PLATO. 39 they contain. And thus far the separate and incorporeal hypostasis proceeds.