fection, will be first established in itself.
But if that which is last is produced from that which is first, and the most imperfect from that which is most perfect, whether, is each of them one, or is this one, but that not one? If, however, that which is first, or that which is last, is not one, neither of them will be first or last. For, as there will be multitiide in each, each of them will have the better and the worse; and neither will that which is best be unmingled with that which is inferior to it, nor that which is the most c^bscure of all things according to being, have so great a subjection entirely deprived of a more perfect nature; but there will be something more extreme than that which is last, and something more perfect than that which is first. For every where.
112 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 11.
that which is best if it receives another addition through that which is in- ferior will be more perfect than that which does not abide in the best, [through not receiving this very addition.] Ifj therefore, we rightly assert these things, the one is the principle of ail things, and the last of beings is one. For it is necessary, I think, that the end of the progression of beings should be assimilated to the principle, and that as far as to this, the power of the first should proceed.
Summarily, therefore, recapitulating what we have said, it is necessary either that the first principle should be one, or that there should be alone many * first principles, or one containing multitude in itself, or many par- ticipating of one. But if there are many first principles only, there will not be one thing from them. For what will make one and a whole, if there are many principles, and there is nothing which produces one? For it is certainly necessary that things posterior to the principles should be assimilated to them. Either, therefore, there will not be the one in any being, or it will not be from these principles; so that each of the things which in any respect whatever have a subsistence will be divided multi- tude alone. And again each of the parts of any being will be a thing of this kind, and we shall in no way whatever stop, dividing into minute parts essence and existence. For all things will be many, and the one yrHl be no where in the universality of things, nor will either wholes or parts be apparent- ^ut if it is necessary, indeed, that there should be many principles, and that they should participate of the one^ the one will be co-ordinated in the many. Again, however, it is necessary, that the unco-ordinated should every where be more ancient than the co-ordinated, and the exempt than the participated. Yov how is the one in each of the many except from one principle which co-arranges the multitude, and converts it to itself ac- cording to the communion of the one f Again, if the first one were multi- plied, the one will be passive; for at the same time it will be one and not one, and will not be that which is one [only.] It is necessary, however, in each genus of things, that there should be that which is unmingled with ' viz. which are multitude only without any participation of the one.
CHAP. IV. OF PLATO. 113 an inferior nature, in order that there may be that which ia mingled, in the iaame manner as we say respecting forms. For from the equal itself, things which are equal in these sublunary realms, appear indeed as equal, though they are filled with a contrary nature; and from that which is primarily being, that which is mingled with non-being is derived, and which presents itself to the view as being. And in short every where the simple unmingled subsistence of each thing precedes those things which through remission are mingled with the privations of themselv^. The one therefore is by itself exempt from all multitude; and that which is one, and at the same thne not one, is not the first one, but is suspended ' from that which is primarily one; through the principle, indeed, participating of the one^ but through the diminution arising from multitude, now mani« iestly exhibiting in itself the cause of separation.
CHAPTER IV.
CHAPTER IV.
That ihe one therefore is the principle of all things, and the first cause, and that all other things are posterior to the one^ is I think evident from what has been said. I am astonished however at all the other interpre- ters of Plato, who admit the existence of the intellectual kingdom, but do not venerate the ineffable transcendency of the one^ and its hyparxis which surpasses the. whole of things. I particularly, however, wonder that this should have been the case with Origen, who was a partaker of Ithe same erudition with Plotinus. For Origen ends in intellect and the first being, but omits the one which is beyond every intell^t and every being. And if indeed he omits it, as something which is better than all jknowledge, language and intellectual perception, we must say that he is neither discordant with Plato, nqr witih the nature of things, But if he * For i^nf^eu it U necessary to read i^fifyrrreu, The punctuation also of the text in this place^ pu9t be altered agreeably to the translation.
Proa. Vol. I, 114 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK If.
omits it because the one is perfectly unhyparctic, and without any sub* sistence, and because intellect is the best of things, and that which is primarily being is the same as that which is primarily one, we cannot as* sent to him in asserting these things, nor will Plato admit him, and con* numerate him with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind is remote from the philosophy of Plato, and is full of Peripatetic innova* tion. If you are willing, however, we will adduce some arguments against this dogma, and against all others who are the patrons of this opinion, and we will strenuously contend for the doctrine of Plato, and show that ac- cording to him the first cause is beyond intellect, and is exempt from all beings, as Plotinus and Porphyry, and all those who have received the philosophy of these men, conceive him to assert We shall begin, therefore, from the Republic; for here Socrates clearly shows that the good is established above being, and the whole intellectual order, following the analogy of the first goodness to the sun. For if, as the sovereign sun is to generation, to every thing visible, and to all visive natures according to the power generative of light, so it is necessary fke good should be with reference to intellect and intelligibles, according to a cause productive of truth,— ^if this be the case, we must say that the sun is exempt at one and the same time from visive and visible natures, and ffiust admit that the good transcends the natures which are always inteU lective, and also those which are eternally intelligible. It is better, how- ever, to hear the Platonic words themselves: " You may say that the sun not only imparts the power of being seen to visible natures, but also that he is the cause of their generation, increase, and nutriment, not being him* self generation. Certainly. We may say, therefore, that things which are known, have not only this from the good that they are known, but like- wise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst the good itself is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it both in dignity and in power." Through all these things, therefore, it is evident how the good and the first principle are defined by Plato to be expanded above not only the intellectual, but also the intelligible extent, and essence itself, accord- ing to union, in the same manner as it is inferred the sun surpasses all Visible natures, and perfects and generates all things by his light. How, CHAP. IV. OF PLATO. ij^ tiierefore, following Plato, can we admit that intellect is the best of things, and the cause of all things? How can we assert that being itself and essence are the same with the principle which is the leader of all the di- vine progressions? For essence and intellect are said to subsist primarily from the goodj to have their hyparxis about the good^ to be filled with the light of truth proceeding from thence, and to obtain the participation which is adapted to them from the union of this light, which is more di- vine than intellect itself and essence, as being primarily suspended from the goody and affording in beings a similitude to that which is first. For the light which is emitted from the sun causes every thing visible to be solar-form. And the participation of the light of truth renders that which is intelligible boniform and divine. Intellect, therefore, is a god through a li^t which is more ancient than intellectual light and intellect itself, and that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual participates of a divine hyparxis through a plenitude of this light being appropriately imparted to it/ And in short, every divine nature is that which it is said to be, on account of this light, and is through it united to the cause of all beings. By no means, therefore, is the first good to be considered as the same with intellect, nor must it be adniitted that the intelligible is more ancient than all the hyparxis of the whole of things, since it is even sub- ordinate to the light proceeding from the good, and being perfected by this light, is conjoined according to its own order with the good itself. For we must not say that the intelligible is united to the first after the same manner as the light [of truth;] but the latter through continuity with the good is established in it without a medium; while the former, through this light, participates of a vicinity to the good; since in sensibles also, the sdar light is primarily connascent with the circulation of tbesuuj ascends as hx as to the centre of the whole sphere, and subsists on all sides about it. But all sensible natures through this obtain a similitude to the sun, each of them according to its own nature being filled with solar-form illu- mination. These things, therefore, will be sufiicient to recall into tho * For euno TO tv it is necessary to read cuno ro ov.
* This sentence is very er^roneous in the original, as will be eTi4ent from comparing it with the ^|)p}re trauslationt 110 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IL inemory of those who love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of Plato on this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary to the exempt transcendency of the one.
If, however, it is requisite to evince the same thing through many testi- monies, let US survey what the Elean guest in the Sophista determines concerning these things. He says, therefore, it is necessary that the mul- titude of all beings, whether they are contraries or not, shoiild be sus- pended from the one being, [i. e. from being characterized by the one;] but that the one being itself should be suspended from the one. For when we call the hot or the cold, or permanency or motion, being, we do not denominate each of these as the same with being itself. For if perma- nency were being itself, motion would not be being; or, if motion were such like being, permanency would not participate of the appellation of being. But it is evident that being accedes to permanency, to motion, and to every multitude of beings from one thing which is primarily being.. This very thing, therefore, which is the cause of essence to all things, and which is participated by all other things, is a participant of this one, and on this account, as it is being alone, so also it is primarily being.' It is, however, being itself indeed, and is not allotted to be, from participation; but it is one according to participation, and on this account it is passive to the one. But it is being* primarily. If, therefore, Plato gives to the one a subsistence beyond being, in the same manner as that which is first in wholes is supposed by him to transcend beings, how is it possible that being should not he posterior to the one^ since it participates of it, and on this account is denominated one?
Moreover, Socrates in the Philebus clearly demonstrates the same thing to those who are able to know wholes from parts, viz. that intellect has not the same order as the first cause of all. Investigating, therefore, the good of the human soul and its end, of which participating in every re- spect suflficiently it will reap the fruits of a felicity adapted to its nature, he in the first place removes pleasure from an end of this kind, and after this intellect, because neither is this replete with all the elements of the * For tv it is necessary to read oy.
^ Here also ov must be substituted for en CHAR IV. OF PLATO. 117 good. If, therefore, the intellect which is in us is an image of the first in- tellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not to be defined accord- ing to this alone, is it not necessary that in wholes also, the cause of good must be established above intellectual perfection? For if that which is primarily good subsisted according to total intellect, in us also and all other [intellectual natures,] self-sufficiency and appropriate good would be present through the participation of intellect. Our intellect, indeed, is disjoined from the goody and is indigent, and on this account requires pleasure in order to the attainment of human perfection. But a diviije intellect always participates of the goody and on this account is divine. For it is boniform through the participation of good; but divine, as being suspended from the first deity. It is the same reasoning, therefore, which infers that the good is exempt from the first intellect, and which defines fdicity to consist not in intelligence only, but in the all-perfect presence of the good. For the intellectual form of energy is itself by it^ self defective with respect to blessedness. And why is it requisite to be prolix? For Parmenides teaches us most clearly the diflFerence of the one from essence and being, and shows that the one is exempt from all other things and from essence; for this he evinces of the one at the end of the first hypothesis. But how is it possible that the cause of essence, and which is exempt from it through supreme transcendency, should not also be beyond the intellectual order? For intellect is essence. But if in in- tellect there is permanency and motion, and Parmenides demonstrates that the one transcends both these, does he not immediately bring us to the ineffable cau^e of all things, which is prior to every intellect? -And if every intellect is converted to itself, and is in itself, but the one is demon- strated to be neither in itself, nor in another, how can we any longer con- sider intellect as the same with the first cause of all? In what respect, also, will the one which is prior to being differ from the one being, which is the subject of the second hypothesis, if intellect is the best of things, and the first principle of all? For the one being participates of the one; but that which participates is secondary to that which is participated* That the one^ however, is according to Plato more ancient than intellect and essence, is through what has been said recalled to our memory.
119 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK U.
CHAPTER V.
Iir the next place, if the one is neither intelligible nor intellectual, nor in short participates of the power of being, let us survey what will be the modes of leading us to it, and through what intellectual conceptions Plato unfolds as far as he is able, to his familiars, the ineffable and un<^ known transcendency of the first. I say then, that at one time he unfolds it through analogy, and the similitude of secondary natures; but at an^ other time he demonstrates itg exempt transcendency, and its separation from the whole of things, through negations. For in the Republic, indeed, he indicates the ineffable peculiarity and hyparxis of the goodj through analogy to the sun; but in the Parmenides, he demonstrates the differ- ence of the one with respect to all things posterior to it through negations. But he appears to roe through one of these modes to unfold the progres- sion from the first cause of all other things, and prior to other things, of the divine orders. For on this account the first cause is exempt from all the natures produced by it, because every where cause is established above its effects; and on this account the first is nothing of all things, because all things proceed from him. For he is the principle of all things, both of beings, and at the same time of non-beings. But again, accord- ing to the other of these modes, he adumbrates the conversion to the first of the things which have proceeded from it. For in each order of beings, through similitude to it there is a monad analogous to the good^ which has the same relation to the whole series conjoined with it, that the good has to all the orders of the Gods. The cause, however, of this similitude is entirely the conversion of the whole of things to the good. These, thercr fore, proceed from thence and are converted to it. And the progression indeed of all things demonstrates to us the ascent to the first through net gations; but the conversion of all things demonstrates this to us through analogies. Let not, however, any one considering these negations to be such tilings as privations despise such a mode of discussion, nof defining GHAP. V. OF PLATO. li^ the sameness in words analogously, and words in habitudes, endeavour to calumniate this anagogic progression to the first principle. For negations, as it appears to me, extend a triple peculiarity in things. And at one time, indeed, being more primogenial than affirmations, they are procrea- tive and perfective of the generation of them. But at another time, they are allotted an order co-ordinate to affirmations, and negation is then in no respect more venerable than affirmation. And again, at another time, they are allotted an order subordinate to affirmations, and are nothing else than the privations of them. For with respect to non-being itself, with which there is also a negation of beings, at one time considering it as be- yond being, we say that it is the cause and the supplier of beings; but at another time we evince that it is equivalent to being; just as I think, the Elean guest demonstrates [in the Sophista] that non-being is in no respect less, if it be lawful so to speak, than being; and at another time we leave it as a privation of, and indigent of being..For indeed, according to this mode, we call every generation, and matter itself, non-being.
Analogies, however, are assumed for the purpose alone of indicating the Similitude of secondary natures to the first principle. And neither any reason, nor habitude, nor communion of this principle with things pos* terior to it, becomes apparent from these. For its exempt nature is not of such a kind as is beheld in the second and third orders of beings; but the good transcends the whole of things in a much greater degree than intellect surpasses the natures posterior to itself, whether it be the demi- urgic intellect, or the intellect of the whole world, or some other intellect from among the number of those that are called divine. Every intellect however, and every god, is allotted a transcendency with respect to subor- dinate natures, and those things of which it is the cause, inferior to that which the first principle has to every being; for this principle similarly transcends all things, and not some in a greater, but others in a less de* gree; since thus we should introduce a greater and less habitude of it to secondary natures. It is necessary, however, to preserve it without habi- tude to all things, and similarly exempt from the whole of things. But of other natures, some are indeed nearer, and others are more remote from it. For each thing proceeds from it, since it produces all things IJIO ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK. If.
according to one cause. And different things are indeed converted to it in a different manner, this principle in the mean time, receiving no habi* tude or communion with things posterior to itself.
CHAPTER VL The mode of demonstration, therefore, pertaining to the one is, as we have said, twofold. For again, Plato delivers to us twofold names of the ineffable cause. In the Republic indeed he calls it the gaod^ and demonstrates it to be the fountain of the truth which unites intellect and intelli^ibles. But in the Parmenides, he denominates such a prin- ciple as this the one^ and shows that it gives subsistence to the divine unities. Again therefore, of these names, the one is the image of the progression of the whole of things, but the other of their conversion, Tor because indeed all things derive their subsistence and proceed from the first principle, on this account referring the one to it, we demonstrate that it is the cause of all multitude and every progression. For whence is multitude unfolded into light except from the one? But because again the progressions from it are naturally converted to it, and de-p sire its ineffable and incomprehensible hyparxis, we denominate it the good. For what else is that which converts all things, and which is ex« tended to all beings as the object of desire, but the good? For all other things subsist distributedly, and are to some beings honourable, but to others not.* And every thing which in any respect whatever is said to have a subsistence aspires after some things^ and avoids others. But the good is the common object of desire to all beings, and all things accord- ing to their nature verge and are extended to this. The tendency however of desiring natures is every where to the appropriate object of desire. The good therefore converts, but the one gives subsistence to all secondary natures. Let not, however, any one suppose that the ineffable can on ttu^ Chap. vi. of plato. i^X account be named, or that the cause of all union is doubkid. For bem indeed we transfer to it names, looking to that which is posterior to it, and to the progressions from, or the circular conversions to it. Because, in- deed, multitude subsists from it, we ascribe to it the appellation of the one; but because all things even as far as to things that have the most obscure existence, are converted to it, we denominate it the good.
We endeavour therefore to know the unknown nature of the first prin- ciple, through the things which proceed from, and are converted to it; and we also attempt through the same things to give a name to that which is ineffable. This principle, however, is neither known by beings, nor is effable by any one of all things; but being exempt from all knowledge, and all language, and subsisting as incomprehensible, it produces from itself according to one cause all knowledge, every thing that is known, all words, and whatever can be comprehended by speech. But its unical nature, and which transcends all division, shines forth to the i^iew dyadically in the natures posterior to it, or rather triadically. For all things abide in, proceed from, and are converted to the one. For at one and the same time, they are united to it, are in subjection to its union which is exempt from the whole of things, and desire the participation of it. And union indeed imparts a stable transcendency to all secondary natures, and which subsists in unproceeding conjunction with the cause of them. But subjection defines the progression of beings, and their se* paration from the imparticipable and first unity. And desire perfects the conversion of the subsisting natures, and their circular tendency to the