many places they make three principles, the good^ intellect and soul, denominattng every [true] being intellect) you will also have the third in these intellect. But it is necessary not to be ignorant of the difference. Vw with respect to intellect, one kind is intellect as with reference to byparxis. For when we denominate the unity in each triad intelligibte, as the object of desire to being, and as filling being, thto we call that w^bich ranks as the third in the triad intellect. For it is intelligible as essence and intellect, but not as the intellect of essence, but of father aod deity. For every participated deity is intelligible, as being the plenitude of its participant. But another kind is intellect which k the intellect of essence; according to which we say that the being of the third triad, is the intellect of that which is primarily being. For this is essential intd- leet, being, allotted its own essence by energizing.' For all things ate essentially in it, and both the more simple genera, and the primary paradigms; for it is intelligible intellect. But the tihird kind is intellectual ^ ' Vte axm m nftfyaif it it Ofcetsarf to^cndL «Kircp rep mt^uf.
Proc. Vol. I. 2 C 20a Oli THE THEOLOGY BOOK IlL intellect, which subsists analogous ta intelligible intellect, is conjoined with it, and is filled from it, possessing intellectually those things which are in the other intelligibly. And in short, it is necessary every where that such things as are first according to each series, should have the form of the things that are prior to them. Hence also they are called tlungs first, and possess a certain transcendency of essence towards coordinate na- tures. Since therefore, that which is prior to intelligibles is God, the first intelligibles are Gods and unities. And since the intdligible is essential, the first intellects are essences. Since also intellect is every where ac« cording to its own nature intellectual, the first souls are intellectuaL Because likewise, souls are the plenitudes of life, the first of bodies are most vital And because the bodies that are perpetual are moved in a drcle, the summits of material bodies are moved in conjunction with those bodies that are perpetual. This therefore is the cause why the unities are frequently called inteUigibles, and beings intelligible intellects.
That Plato however knew this triad, I mean father, power and intellect, we shall learn by looking to the demiurgic order. For in this the triad is most remarkably apparent. Hence, on account of its union with the in« telligible, it is filled with tliis triad, and possesses these things in a more divided manner than animal itself,, or intelligible eternity. Immediately therefore, in the beginning of the fabricaiioii in the Timseus, the demi- urgus calls himself father, ^^ Of which works I am the demiurgus and father." * But shortly after he unfolds his power, " Imitating my power ia your generation/' This therefore is also wonderful, that he has deli- vered to us the most theological conception concerning power. For in the first place indeed, he calls it the power of the father, when he says, *' Of which works I am the demiurgus and father," and that the power is his, [is evident from the words,] *^ Imitating my power:'' so that accord* ing to Plato power is of the father. And in the next place, he ascribes to this powor a peculiarity generative of the whole of things; for this is evident from the words " In your generation.*' Power therefore is the cause of generation and of the progression of beings* And in the last place, he delivers the intellectual peculiarity of the demiurgus. ** Having thus spoke, again into the fomier crater in which he bad t^npered the CHAP. XXI. OF PLATO. 203 soul of the universe, he poured minting the remainder of the former mixture-'* For to pour, to mingle, mixture, and to be productive of soul, pertain to intellect. Though what necessity is there for asserting these things, since prior to this he calls the demiurgus intellect. ** AVhatever ideas therefore intellect perceived by the dianoetic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for this universe to contain/' Hence the demiurgus is father, and power and intellect. And he poss- esses these things as much as possible on account of intelligibles. For he is a God as father, on account of them. He is also power, and the gene- rator of wholes, and knows beings intell^tually, on account of them. For in them intelligible knowledge first subsists. Much more therefore are father, power and intellect in intelligibles; from which also the demi» urgus being filled, participates of this triad. For Plato assumes each of these analogously; For as the paternal triad in inteUigibles gives sub- sistence to intelligible eternity, so the demiurgus makes those works to be indissoluble of which he is the fath^. And as in intelligibles, eternity proceeding according to all power goierates intelligible animal itself, so the demiurgic power gives subsistence to mundane animals that are per«- petual and divine, and imparts to the junior Gods another power which is generative of mortal animals. That any one therefore may assume these names from Plato is evident firom what has been said.
Since however, being has an hypostasis triply in intelligibles, one is primarily being and prior to the eternal; but another is secondarily being, and the first eternity; and another is being ultimately, and is^ntelligible and eternal intellect. And here indeed there is being, but there eternity, and there intellect. And eternity is more comprehensive than intellect; but being than eternity. For every intellect is eternal, but not every thing eternal is intellect. For soul according to its essence is eternal, and every thing which participates of eternity, participates also by a muck greater priority of being. For with perpetuity of existence, existence is entirely consubsistent^ But that which participates of existence is not universally eternally being. For bodies also participate in a certain res* pect of the natvure of existence but they are not eternal. Intellect ther^ fore constitutes an intelleetual essoice only, so far as it is intiellect; since 204 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
BQ far as it is also life and being it constitutes all tilings* But eternity constitutes both tbe intellectual and psychical essence. iFor the mixture [in the second triad] was intdJigible life* But being constitutes the in- tellectual» the psychical, and the corporeal life. For matter also is being [most obscurely,] and is capacity indeed, but formless being, and non* being, falling off from the participation of being. If, however, some one should say that it is being in power or capacity, yet it has this power from being. For capacity is the forerunning participation of energy. Aod thus much concerning these things.
But what sufficient argumait of division does Socrates afford us in the Fbaedrus, cooceming these inteilig^e triads? And how from what is €leiivered by faim may we recur to tbe conception of the hypostasis of the iDostprindpd Gods? Socrates therefore in that dialogue, being inspired fay the NyEipl»^ celebrates evi^y thing divine as beautiiiil, wise and good^ Mid says l^at by th^se the ^ool is nototished. But if every thing divine 18 A tiling €tf tbb tkkid, tUs is the case with the intelligible by a much greater priority. AsmS fdi tiiese in<ieed are every wbere, bat in the first triad, the jgood pruicipaJiy tubsbts; in the second tbe wise; and in the third th^ beautifiil. For in this there is the most beautiful of intelligibks. But in the second triad truth and the first intelligence subsist. And in the first there is ibe comniensurate, which we say is the same as the good. _Btft Socrates in the Phi]ebus says that the element of the good is the de- airatble, the sufficient, and the perfect. The desirable therefore pertains indeed to bound; for it is the unioa and goodness of all the triad, and Ae triad converges about it. But the suflScient pertains to infinity. For tdfiictency is a power capable of pervading to all things, and of being present to aU things witJiont impediment. And the perfect pertains to that wbrch is mixed. For this is that which is primarily triadic; since •very miactureiias its coalition from tlie triad. The elements therefore of the good mrfbld to vs the ^rst triad; and the elements of intelligit^ Wmdcnn, the seoond triad. But every tiling wise is fall of being, is gene* i«tive of truth, a»d is ctmvertive of imperfect fiatures to their perfection^ Theftill therefore pertains to t^e second bomid; fer tbis is uniformly filled with the pMticipation of the natures prior to itself. For tbe full is every CJHAF. XKII. O^ PLATO. 205 trhere adapted to bouod, just as that which cannot be filled is adapted to the iirfinite. But the prolific pertains to the second power, and to infinity^ For that which does not abide in the fulness of itself, but is prolific and generative of other things, is -especially indicative of divine infinity. And the convertive pertains to that which is mixed. For this as being allotted the end of the triad, converts every thing imperfect to the fiiH, and unites itself prior to other things to the bound of the whc^ trift*!.
CHAPTER XXII.
» MoBSOTBB, the elements of beauty are the peculiarities of the thkd . triad of intelligibles. But these are, as we have before observed, tfaa lovely, the delicate, and the splendid. The lovely therefore, being ar- ranged analogous to the desirable, pertains to bound. But the delicate being coordinate to the sufficient, pertains to the infinite power which k in the beautiful. And the splendid is of an intellectual pecuharity. For this is the beautiful of beauty; is that which illuminates all things, and astonishes those that are able to behold it. And as apparent beauty shining most manifestly, is seen through the clearest of the senses (for the objects of this sense have many differences according to Aristotle, and this sense pervades farther than the rest) so likewise intelligible beauty af^pears to the intellect of the soul shining intelligibly. For it is an in- teiiigible form. And on this account the splendor of beauty is apparent to intellect. Splendid beauty therefore, as Socrates calls it, shines forth at the extremity of the intelligible order. For this is^he most splendid of intelHgihles, is intelligible intellect, and is tiiat which emits^ the intelligible light, that when it appeared astonished the intellectual Gods, and made them iulmire their fiilher, as Orpheus says. Such tlierefore is the prepa- ration to the »cieiv:e of the intelligible Gods which may from tl^ese thing*, be assumed. And now it will appear how beauty is indeed occultly in 205 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK HI.
the end of the first intelligible triads but subsists in the third triad so as to have manifestly proceeded into light For in the former it subsists kc- cording to one form only; but in the latter it subsists triadically. It is also evident how each of the triads is at one and the same time a monad and a triad* For the first triad being characterized according to the ^oarf,derives its completion from the three elements of the good. But the second being characterized by the wise is contained in the triad of wisdom. And the third subsisting according to the beautiful, is all-perfect through the triad of beauty. If however the beautiful is occultly in the first triad, and shines forth triadically in the third, it is evident that intelligible intellect loves the first triad, and has love conjoined with its beauty. And this is the intelligible love of the first beauty. From these there- fore, intellectual love proceeds, together with faith and truth, as we have before observed. For the three intelligible monads, the good, the wise and the beautiful, constitute three powers which lead 'upwards all other things, and prior to other things the intellectual Gods. Concerning these things however, we shall speak hereafter.
CHAPTER XXIII.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Let us now then direct our attention to the theory of the Parmenides. But I wish again to remind the reader of what we have before demon- strated. It has been shown therefore, that it isnecessary to divide the second hypothesis into the whole progressions of the one being; and that this hypothesis is nothing else than the generation and progression of the Gods, proceeding supernally from the supreme union of intelligibles as fiur as to a deified essence. For the discussion is not, as some say it is, in the first hypothesis, concerning God and the Gods. For it was not lawful to Parmenides to conjoin multitude with the one^ and the one with mul- CHAP. XXIII. OF PLATO. J07 titude. For the first God is perfectly exempt from the whole of thiDgn* But in the first hypothesis essence, and even theme it$elf^ are taken away from the first God* That such an ablation, however, as this is not adapted to the other Gods is evident te every one. Moreover, neither does Par- roenides in the first hypothesis speak about the intelligible Gods, as thc^ say he does; for they assert that the negations are of these Gods, bemuse they are conjoined with the one^ and in simplicity and union precede ^ all the divine genera. For how can the similar or the dissimilar, or contact and the privation of contact, and all the other particulars which are denied of ^Ae one, be inherent in the intelligible Gods? They appear indeed to me to be right in assertmg that the things which are taken away are simili* tudes of the Gods; but they do not speak rightly when they say that all of them are similitudes of the intelligible Go^s. To which it may be added, in opposition to this assertion, that the discussion is again cim* coming the intelligible Gods in the second hypothesis. For the things which are denied in the first, are affirmed in the second hypothesis. This therefore, as I have said, is demonstrated that the conclusions with refe^> ence to each other have the order of prior and posterior, of causes and effects. It is necessary therefore, that proceeding from the beginning, we should adapt the first conclusions to the first orders, the middle conclu* sions to the middle orders, and the last conclusions 1o the last orders, and should demonstrate that as many questions are asked, as there are pro- gressions of the divine orders. And in the first place, we must deliver the doctrine of Partnenides concerning the intelligible Gods, of whom we have proposed to speak; since Plato speaks about these in many places^ partly indicating, and partly clearly unfolding his meaning.
It is necessary however, that we should collect into one the elaborate and synoptical theory about each order^ since it wpuld not be proper pew to repeat the exposition which we have given in our commentaries on that dialogue. But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself, I will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods, following ill so doing the divine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus]. For we alsa ' Fof wpofr}(fini§ it it oecessarj to lead Trfotx^mi.
JI09 ON TMB THEOLOGY BOOk III.
tkffMipKh \ns as^stance hare ifith a divine bead puf&ued these sacred paths at^KHit t)i^ theory of the Parmenides being* agitated with a divine fuirjr, aod wakened a& from a ppofound steep to this arcane mystic discipline. Afid thus nfiueh concerning the. mode of the whole of the conckisioas« But from hence I shaU pass to the narration of the things proposed.
The first and imparticipable ooe therefore, which preexists, beyond the wiiole of things, and not only beyond the unkiesthat participate, but also those that are participated, is celebrated throi>gh the first hypothesis, being defnonstrated to* be thQ cause of alt things, inefi^Uy, but nut being defined itself i» any ooe of ^1 things, nor having any power or peculiarity of a kindred nature with the other Gods. But aftfv thm [imparticipabk ones} that which h aJo«,e wperessentiat and surpassing, and unmingied with aH hypavxi^, is a ui»ty participated by bdng, and constituting about itMlf tbe&*st essence, and by the addition of this participation becoming SKore veduiidant than that w>hich is primarily one. This however is a Buperessen'tia) hyparxis, and the hypa^rxis of die first inteliigible triad. As there are therefore these two things in the first triad, vie:, the one acfd being, and the former generates, but the latter is generated, and the former perfects, but the latter is perfected, it is necessary that the middle of both should be power, through which and together with which the one con* »titutes and is perfective of being* For the progression of being from the one, and its conversion to the one^ is through power. For what else ccmijoins being to the one^ or causes the one to be participated by being except power? For it is the progression of the one^ and its extension to being. Heace, in all the divine genera powers precede progressions and generations. This triad therefore, the one, power ajid being, k the summit of intelligibles. The first of these indeed producing; the third being pro* duced; aiid the second being suspended from the one^ but coalescing with beiag.
CHAP. XXIV. OF PLATO. 209 CHAPTER XXIV.
This triad therefore, Parmenides delivers immediately in the beginning of the second hypothesis, adjoining to the one the most simple participa- tion of essence. But he calls it the one being, and says that being par- ticipates of the one^ and the one of being. I'he participation however of these is diflferent. For the one " indeed so participates of being, as illumi- nating and filling, and deifying being; but being so participates of the one^ as suspended from the one^ and deified by it. But the habitude which is the middle of both, is ngt with them void of essence. For neither is the habitude which is* among sensibles in no respect being, and much more is this the case with the habitude which is there. But this habitude is biformed. For it is of the one^ and is connascent with being. For it is the motion of the one^ and its progression into being. Parmenides de- livers this triad, beginning what he says about it as follows: " See there- fore from the beginning if Me one is. Is it possible then for it to be, and yet not to participate of essence? It is not possible.'' But he ends speaking about it in the following words: " Will therefore that which is said be any thing else than this, that the one participates of essence, when it is summarily asserted by any one that the one is? It will not.'* This there- fore is the first intelligible triad, the one, being, and the habitude of both, through which being is of the one and the one of being, in a manner per- fectlyadmirable; Plato indicating through these things, that the father is the father of intellect, and that intellect is the intellect of the father, and that power is concealed between the extremes. For deity is the father of the triad, and beincr is the intellect of this deity. Yet it is not intel- lect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect of essence. For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the Elean guest says.
' In the original iv ov, but the trae readmg is eTidently rv alone.
Froc. Vol. T. 2 D 310 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IIL But that which is primarily being, neither stands still, nor is moved, as he also teaches. The first triad therefore is called one being; since power is here occultly. For the triad does not proceed from itself; but subsists without separation and uniformly, being primarily defined according to divine union. HenCe, this is the first participation of essence, which participates of the one- through power as the middle, which collects toge- ther and separates both the one and being. And it is superessentiai in- deed, but is conjoined with essence. We must never think therefore that all power is the progeny of essence. For the powers of the Gods are su- peressentiai, and are consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods. And through this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly there- fore, does poetry every where assert that the Gods are able to do all things. For essential powers indeed are not capable of effecting all things; since they are not constitutive of superessentiai natures. The first triad therefore, is through these things unfolded to us by Pannenides.
CHAPTER XXV.
CHAPTER XXV.
But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterizes by intelligible wholeness, as we have shown in the Sophista. For the first triad being uniform, and possessing all things intelligibly and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power and being, so that power which is the cause of division, subsisting between the one and being, is concealed, and becomes apparent through the comnmnion of the ex- tremes with each other, — the second triad proceeds, being characterised by the first intelligible power, and having the monads in itself distinguislied from each other. For all things being united and without distinction in the first triad, distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being also and power are more divided from each other. And that which con- CHAP. XXV. OF PLATO. 21 1 sists of these is no longer one being []or being characterized by the erne,] but is a whole, so that it has the owe and being in itself as parts. For above indeed [i. e. in the first triad] all things are prior to parts and wholeness. But in this triad there are both parts and a whole, power unfolding itselt* into light. For as there is separation here, there are parts and the whole consisting of these. The second -triad therefore is called intelligible wholeness. But tlie parts of it, the one and being, I call the extremes. And power being here the middle, connects the one and being, and does not cause them to be one, in the same manner as in the first triad. Since also it is the middle of both, through its communicm indeed with being, it renders the one one being; but through its communion with the oncy it perfectly causes being to be one. And thus the one being cqd- sists of two parts, viz. of being which is characterised by the one^ and of the one which is cliaracterized by being, as Parmenides himself says. He begins therefore to speak about this triad as follows: " Again therefi>re, let us say if the one is what will happen. Consider then if it is not ne- cessary that this hypothesis should signify the one to be a thing of such a kind as to have parts f But he ends in the following words: ^' That which is one therefore is a whole, and has a part."
Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order of intelligibles to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to all things from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an all-perfect division from the third. This however will be considered by us hereafter. Whole- ness therefore is triple, l>eing either prior to parts, or consisting of parts, or subsisting in a part, according to the doctrine of Plato. For in the J^oiiticus indeed, he calls genus a whole, but species a part, not that genus derives its completion from species, but exists prior to it. And in the 1 unaeus he says that the \vorld is a whole of wholes. And all the world indeed derives its completion from parts that are wholes; but each of the parts is a whole, not as the universe is, but partially. Wholeness there- fore, being triple as we have said, according to Plato, the unity, and the intelligible and occult cause of these is now delivered, unically compre- hending and constituting three wholenesses; according to the hyparxis indeed of itself, the wholeness prior to parts; but according to its power.
212 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK Ul,