the wholeness which is from parts; and according to its being the whole- ness which is in a part. For the one is prior to all multitude; but power communicates in a certain respect with both the extremes, and compre- hends in itself the peculiarities of them; and being in a certain resf)ect participates of the one. Hence the first of the wholenesses, or that which is prior to parts is deri^'ed from a unical hyparxis. For it is a monad, and is itself constitutive of parts, and of the multitude which is in them. But the second wholeness is from power. For it derives its completion from parts, just as in the power which is collective of the one and being, the extremes in a certain respect shine fojth to the view. Ahd the third wholeness is from being. For being is a part, and is the progeny both of power and the one^ and possesses each of these partially. i\fter the in- telligible therefore, three wholenesses are divided according to the diflfer- ent orders of beings. But the intelligible wholeness comprehends the three unically, and is the intelligibly connective monad of this triad, every way extending the powers of itself from the middle of the intelligible and occult order.
CHAPTER XXVL CHAPTER XXVL Immediately after this triad we may see another proceeding, in which all intelligible multitude shines forth, and which Parmenides indeed constitutes a wholeness, but a wholeness consisting of many parts. For after the occult union of the first triad, and the dyadic separation of the second, the progression of the third is generated, which has indeed its subsistence from parts, but the parts are many, with the multitude of which the triad prior to it is parturient. For in this triad there is a unity, ^nd power, and being. But the one is multiplied, and also being and * Instead of avrti^ it is necessary to read fvo^.
CHAR XXVI. OF PLATO, 213 power. And thus all the triad indeed is a wholeness; but each of its ex- tremes, viz. the one and being, as it is multitude conjoined through collec* tive power, is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining unical multitude to the multitude of beings, of some of these it causes each through progression to be being characterized by the one^ but or others each according to participation to be the one characterized by be- ing. For here indeed there are two parts of the wholeness, the one and being; but the one participates of being, for it is conjoined with it^ and being participates of the one. The one of being therefore, is again divid- ed, so that the one and being generate a second unity conjoined with the part of being. But being participating of the one^ is again separated into being and the one. For it generates a more partial being suspended from a more partial unity. And being consists of more partial deified beings, and is a more specific mojiad. The cause however of this progression is power. For power is effective of two things, and is the operator of multitude. For /Ac one indeed calls forth into multitude, but being con- verts to the participation of the divine unities. Whence therefore does Parmenides begin to teach us concerning this triad? And where does he conclude his discourse about it? The beginning, therefore, of what he says on this subject is as follows: " What then? Can each of these parts of the one being, viz. the one and being, desert each other, so that the one shall not be a part of being, or being shall not be a part of the one? It cannot be."' But he ends thus: " Will not, therefore, the one being after this manner be an infinite multitude? It seems so."
In the first place, therefore, it is proper to understand the manner of the progression of the divine genera; and that conformably to the intel- ligible monad, which we arrange according to the one being, the duad posterior to it which we call a wholeness [proceeds.] But we say that it consistsof two parts which are separated by power, and that intelligible multitude presents itself to the view from the monad and the duad. For when all things are said to be parts of the one being, viz. secondary things, and such as become apparent through the separating cause of power, then ' It is necessary to correct the text here, and to read as follows: n ow; rmv iMpioov txartpov rot^ TflOy TOV t¥OS 0VT9S TO, Tf t¥ KCU TO OV Of a tfTOXf ITf 0*f OVj \ TO CV. X. T. A.
214 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK UU Parmenides delivers the union which pervades from the monad to the third triad. But when power separating and conjoining the unities and beings, gives completion to multitude, then the participation of the duad becomes perfectly apparent, as I think Parmenides demonstrates when lie says, *• so that it is necessary two things should always be generated, and that there should never be one thing (only.)" This triad, therefore, pro- ceeds according to both the preexistent triads, flowing according to the Oracle, and proceeding to all intelligible multitude. For infinite multitude is indicative of this flux, and of the incomprehensible nature of f)ower. Hence, in the first place, I have said that the hypostasis of this triad is through these things demonstrated to be suspended from the triads prior to it. And in the next place, I say, that this triad, according to Parme- nides, is primogenial. For this first imparts the power of being generated; and Parmenides calls the multitude which is in it in generatiouj [i. e. be^ coming to 6e, or rising into existence^ For he says: •* And the part will be generated from two parts at least.'* xVnd again.: " Whatever part is generated^ will always have these parts/' And in what follows: " So that it is necessary it should always be generated two things, and should never be one.'' Does not he, therefore, who frequently uses the word ge- neration in teaching concerning the progression of the intelligil)le nuilti- tude, proclaim that the natures prior to this order are more united to each otiier? But this order proceeds to a greater extent, unfolds the occult nature of the triads prior to itself, and is primogenial, unfolding in itself prolific power.
In addition to these things also, it is necessary to consider the infinity of multitude, not as those think fit to speak, who assume the infinite in quantity, but since in the principles of the whole of things, there are bound and infinity, the former being the cause of the union, but the latter of the sepanition of multitude, Parmenides calls the first and intel- ligible multitude infinite, because all multitude indeed, according to its own nature, is infinite, as being the progeny of the first infinity. All in- telligible multitude, however, is a thing of this kind. For it is the first multitude, and multitude itself. But multitude itself is the first progeny of intelligible infinity. Intelligible multitude, therefore^ is on this ac- CHAP. "XXVII. OF PLATO, 215 count infinite, as unfolding into light the first infinity, and this infinity is the same with the all^perfect. For that which has proceeded to the all^ and as far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, through the power which is generative of the whole of things, is infinite. For it cannot be comprehended by any other thing. But intelligible multitude is comprehensive of all intelligible multitude. For if indeed tliat which isf primarily infinite, was infinite according to quantity, it would be re* quisite to admit that the intelligible is infinite multitude of this kind. Since, howevei% the. intelligible is infinite power, it is necessary that the partici- pant of the primarily infinite, should cause infinity to shine forth accord- ing to the power which is comprehensive of all prior natures. And if it be requisite to rekte my own opinion, as that which is primarily one is primarily bound, so that ^hich is primarily multitude is infinite multitude^ For it receives the whole power of infinity, and producing all unities, and all beings, as far as to the most individual natures, it possesses never-failing power. It is, therefore, more total than all multitude, and is an iticom^ prehensible infinite. Hence unfolding into light all multitude, it bounds and measures it by infinite power, and through wholeness introduces bound to all things. These things, thereficire, may be assumed from Par« menides concerning the third intelligible triad* CHAPTER XXVH.
Let us in the next place speak in common about all the intelligible Iriads. With respect to the first triad, therefore, which is occult, and is allotted the intelligible summit in intelligibles, Plato at one time proceed*- ing from the union which is in it, and its exempt transcendency with re- spect to the other triads, denominates it one, as in the Timasus. For eter- nity, says he, abides in one. But reason evinces that this one is the first triaid of intelligibles. But at another time proceeding from the extremi- 21g ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK llL ties which are in it, viz. that which is participated, and that which parti- cipates, he calls it the one being, considering the power which is compre- hended in these as ineffable, in consequence of its subsisting uniformly and occultly. And at another time, he unfolds the whole of it, accord- ing to the monads which are in it, bound, infinity, and that which is mixed; bound indeed indicating its divine hyparxis, infinity its generative power, aqd that which is mixed, the essence proceeding from this power. Plato, therefore, as I have said, teaches us through these names the first intelligible triad; at one time indeed through one name, but at another through two names, and at another again through three names, unfolding it to our view. For there is a triad in it, according to which the whole is characterized; and a duad according to which the extremes communicate with each other; and a monad which exhibits the ineffable, occult, and Unical nature cf the first, through its own monads.
But Ihe second triad after this, Plato denominates in the Timaeus in- deed, eternity; but in the Parmeuides the first wholeness. How these, however, are allotted the same peculiarity we may learn by considering that every thing eternal is indeed a whole; viz. if it is perfisctly eternal, and has the whole of its essenccand energy at once present. For every intellect is a thing of this kind, perfectly establishing at once in itself, the whole of intellectual perception. It likewise does not possess one part of being, but is deprived of another part, nor does it partially participate of energy, but it summarily comprehends the whole of being, and the whole of intelligence. If, however, in its energies it proceeded according to time, but had an eternal essence, it would be allotted the whole of the latter, and this alwa^'s stably the same, but would possess the former va- riably, so as to exert different energies at different times. Eternity, there- fore, is every where the cause of wholeness to the natures to which it is primarily present. But whole also is every where comprehensive of per- petuity. For no whole aband9ns either its essence or its proper perfec- tion; but that which is primarily corrupted and vitiated is a partial nature. For on this account also the whole world is perpetual, viz. because it is a whole, and this is likewise the case with all that the heavens contain, and with each of the elements. For every where wholeness is connective CHAP. XXVIL, OF PLATO. tl7 of subjects. Hence eternity is consubsisteiit with wholeness^ and whole and eteraitj are tjie same. Eadi also is a measure) the one of things eternal, and of all perpetual natures, but the other of parts and of all muk titude. Since, however, there are three wholenesses, one indeed being prior to parts, another subsisting from parts, and another in a part, — through the wholeness which is {Mior to parts, eternity measures those unities of divine natures whidi are exempt from beings; but through the wholeness which derives its subsistence from parts, it measures the unities that are co-ordinate with beings; and through the wholeness which is in a part, it measures all beings and whole essences. For these wholenesses being parts of the divine unities, they possess. partibly what pre-exists unically in the unities. And, moreover, eternity is nothing else than the ever shining forth from the unity which is connected with beings But whole consists of two parts, vi?. of the o$ie and being, power existing as the collector of the parts. According to both these conceptions, there* fore, the duad pertaining to the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uni- form and occidt hypostasis of the first triad.
Moreover, in the Timseus, Plato calls the third triad of intelligibles, animal itself, intelligible, all-perfect, and only-begotten. But in the Par- inenides he denominates it infinite multitude, and a wholeness compre- hensive of many parts. And in the Sophista he peq>etually calls it the intelligible distributed into many beings. All these assertions, therefore, are the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible truth. For when Timseus calls this triad intelligible animal, he also asserts it to be all-perfect, and comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts, both ac- cording to one and according to parts. Hence animal itself is according to this a whole, comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts. And Parmenides, when he shows that the <me being is all-perfect multitude, demonstrates that it is consubsistent with this order. For the infinite will be all-powerful and all-perfect, as we have beforeobserved, comprehend- ing in itself an intelligible multitude of parts, which also it generates; some of these being more total, but others more partial, and as Timseus says, both according to one, and according to genera. Farther still, as he calls animal itself eternal and only-begotten, so Parmenides first attri- Proc. Vol. h 2 E 218 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
butes the ever and to be geoerated, to infinite multitude^ wlien he says, " And thus, according to the same reasoning, whatever partis generated >fill always possess these two parts: for the one will always contain being, and being the one; so that two things will necessarily always be gene- rated, and no part will ever be one/' • Who, therefore, so clearly reminds us of eternal animal, and the primo- genial triad, as Parmenides, first assuming id this order generation and the ever, and so continually using each of these? The same thing, therefore, is both an all-perfect animal, and all-powerful intelligible multitude. For the first infinity being power, and every intelligible subsisting according to it, and receiving from it a division into parts, I think it proper to call it all-powerful; thus avoiding the appellation of the infinite, which dis- turbs the multitude. That, however, which in these things is both difli- cult to understand, and for which Plato especially deserves to be admired, we must not omit, but demonstrate to the genuine lovers of truth. For intelligible animal comprehends four intelligible ideas, according to which it not only constitutes the genera of Gods, but also the more excellent iirid of beings after the Gods, and also mortal animals themselves; for generating it extends the idea of air- wandering, the idea of aquatic, and the idea of terrestrial animals, from the Gods as far as to mortal animals. Since animal itself, therefore, comprehends four ideas, and through the same paradigms produces totally divine, daemoniacal and mortal animals, this deservedly produces a doubt in those who love the contemplation of tf utby. how, the causes being the same, and the same primary paradigms preexisting, some of the natures which are constituted are Gods, others daemons, and others mortal animals. For all these being generated with reference to one form, how is it possible they should not have the same form and nature; since it is requisite that one idea should every where be generative of things that have a similar form? For on this account we admit the hypothesis of ideas, in order that the intelligible genus of Gods may possess and contain prior to multitude monads productive of similar natures. This doubt,' therefore^ being so difficult, some one may solve it logically by saying, that all things which subsist according to one form * Instead of «Tgigi«f^ it is necessary to read avo§Kx^^ CHAP. XXVII. OF 1>LAT0. 219 are not synonimous, and that they do not similarly participate of their common cause, but some things primarily, and others ultiniately. For each form is the leader of a certain series, beginning supemally, and sub- siding as far as to the last of things. For according to the oracle, all things begin supernally to extend their admirable rays to tjie downward place. Hence it will not be wonderful that the same idea should pre- exist as the cause of Gods, daemons, and mortal animals, producin^g all things totally, and delivering the more partial separation of things to the demiurgic order, in the same manner as this order delivers the production of individuals to the junior Gods. For inteliigibles are the causes of whole series; but intellectuals of divisions according to common genera^. Supermundane forms are the causes of specific differences; but mundane of things which are now individuals. For they are causes which are moved, and are the leaders of mutation to their progeny.
If however it be requisite to survey the thing itself by itself, and how one intelligible form is the cause ' of Gods, and daemons and mortals, Parmenides alone is able to satisfy us about the parts which are contained in the intelligible multitude. For be characterizes some things according to being, but others according to the one. For the one being, indeed^ is absorbed by the one^ but being which is one is rather absorbed by being, and the one being, and being which is one, contain in themselves each of the intelligible animals. According to the one being, therefore, Parme- nides constitutes the divine genera, together with an appropriate peculiari- ty. But according to being which is one, he constitutes the genera posterior to the Gods. And according to the one being indeed of being which is one, he constitutes the genera of daemons, but according to being which is one, the mortal genera. And again, according to the one being of the one being, he constitutes the first and highest genera of the Gods; but accord- ing to the being which is one of it, the second genera, and which have an angelic order. And tlius all things are full of Gods, angels, daemons, ani- mals, and mortal natures. And you see how the medium is preserved of the more excellent genera. For being which is one is the angelic boun- dary of the one being which produces the Gods. But the one being is the > It leeim requisite to eupplj the vord mmv after the woids to w fvrnv nSof.
JJ20 ON THE THEOLOGY KOOK III.
llaDQiouiacal summit of being which is one, and wliich adorns secondary natures. As to the unions, however, of secondary natures, it is not im- manifest that they approximate to multitude, and to the progression of the natures placed above tliem. Nor must you woiider if being which is one is the cause of angels^ but the one being of daemons. For in one place,, being which is one is a part of the one being, but in another the one being is a part of being which is one. And here, indeed, the union is essential, but there essence has the form of the one. For the sunmiit of being which is one is a thing of this kind. Deservedly, therefore, is intel--^ ligible multitude all-powerful, and intelKgible animal alUperfect,. as being jat once the cause of all things, and this as far as to the last of things, Plata all but exclaiming, [iti the words of the Chaldaean Oracle,] ^^ Thence a fiery whirlwind sweeping along^ obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the same time into the cavities of ihe worlds.^ For the divine unities pro- ceeding gradually, generate the multitude of all mundane natures. This triad, therefore^ is the fountain and cause of all things: and firoin it all the liie, and all the progression of the Gods^ and the genera superior to us,, and of mortal animals subsist. For it produces totally and uniformly all things, and binds to itself the whole principles of the divisible rivers of nvifiibatioii^ and the production of forms.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Again, therefore, let us recur from the divided theory of intelfigibles to the all-perfect and one science of them, and let us say to ourselves, that this intelligible genus of the Gods is unically exempt from all the other di- vine orders, and is neither called intelligible as known by a partial intel- lect, nor as comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, nor yet as preexisting in all-p^ect intellect. For it transcends botfi total CHAP. XXVIII- OP PUkTD. 22i and partial intelligibles^ and exists prior to all intellectual objects, being an imparticipable and divine intelligible. Hence, also^ it is allotted the same transcendency with respect to all the intelligible orders, as the otic with respect to every genus of the Gods. For this intdligible is impar* ticipable, and supernally fills the divine and intellectual orders. For if every intellect is intelligible to itself, it possesses this property through the intelligible Gods. For plenitude is derived to all things from thence. And thus the intelligible is at the same time exempt from intellect, exist- ing itself by itself; and at the same time the intelligible is not external to intellect. For there is an intelligible which is conjoined with intellect; the co-ordinate being derived from that which is exempt, the participated from that which is imparticipable, that which is inherent from that which is preexistent, and that which is multiplied from that which is uniform. Intelligible simplicity, therefore, must not be defined to be such as that which we are accustomed to assert of intelligibles* For in these the one becomes equal to multitude,^ and separation ta the uniform sameness of essence. But intelligible simplicity is uniform, without separation and occult, excelling every divisible form of life, and intellectual multitude. Hence I do not place intelligible simplicity in the order of idea* For this form is partial, and is subordinate to intelligible union. But I consider it as the hyparxis of divine natures, and as generative of the whole of the good which is distributed to all divine natures, and in which the Gods themselves subsist. For the goodness of the Gods, is neither form nor habit, but the plenitude of divine self-sufllciency and divine power, ac- cording to which the Gods fill all things with good. In a much greater degree,^ therefore, are the intelligible Gods,^ because they are united to* the goody wholly full of superessential goodness, and being established in this, they contain in it the supreme hyparxis of themselves. Very pro* perly,. therefore, do we say that the intelligible Gods unfold the in^fiable principle of all things, and his admirable transcendency and uniop:; sub« sisting themselves indeed occultly, but comprehending multitude uni-- formly and unically; reigning over the whole of things exemptly, and be- ing uncoordinated with all the other Gods. For as the good illuminates all things with superessential light, and exhibits the Gods who are the fa** S9S ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
then of all things, so likewise the intelligible genus of Gods, according to a similitude to the good, imparts from its^elf to all the secondary Gods, intelligible plenitude. Hence, according to each distribution of the Gods, there is an appropriate intelligible multitude, just as a monad analogous to the good exists prior to each of the divine orders. And this monad indeed is the preexistent leader of union to secondary natures. But in- telligible multitude is the preexistent source of beauty, self-sufficiency, power, essence, and all inteUigible goods. For the Gods antecedently and intelligibly comprehend all intellectual natures, and contain in them* selves all ' things according to supreme union.
■ Instead of ra x«f ' cmdo-iv, it is requisite to read iretyrx x»V evtociv$ and then the end of this book will be CO mplete, and not defective as the latin translatorPortus imagined it was.
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.