Let the discussion, thereforei of the intelligible Gods, unfolding the mystic doctrine of Plato concerning them be here terminated by us. But it entirely follows in the next place, that we should consider after the same manner the narration concerning the intellectual Gods. Since, however, of intellectuals some are both intelligible and intellectual, viz. such as ac- cording to the Oracle perceiving intellectually are at the same time intel- lectually perceived; but others are intellectual only; — this being the case, beginning from those that are intellectual and at the same time intelligi- ble, we will in the first place determine what pertains to them in common, from which we shall render the doctrine concerning each order of them more perspicuous. Again, therefore, let us recal to our memory those things which we a little before demonstrated, viz. that there are three total monads which are entirely beyond the Gods that are divided accord- ing to parts, viz. essence, life and intellect. And these prior to the par- tial participate of the superessential unities. Essence, however, is exempt from the rest. Life is allotted the middle order. But intellect converts the end of this triad to the beginning. And all these are indeed intelligibly in essence; but intelligibly and intellectually in life; and intellect 224 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
tually ID intellect. And as secondary natures always participate of the natures placed above them, but these prior to participation presubsist themselves by themselves; and as in each order there are these three things, the cause of abiding, the cause of proceeding, and the cause of con-- version, thou^ intellect is more formalized according to conversion, but life according to progression, and essence according to permanency; — this being the case, it is certainly necessary that the first intellectual Gods being essentialized according to lifb should conjoin imparticipable intel- lect, and the intelligible genus of Gods, and that they should uniformly connect the various progressions of secondary, but unfold and expand the stable hyparxis of precedaneous causes. For imparticipable life is a thing of this kind, circumscribing that which is primarily being and intellect, and participating indeed of being, but participated by intellect But this is the same thipg ai to assert that intelligence is filled indeed from the intelligible, but fills intellect from itself. For being is the intel- ligible, but life is intelligence. And being indeed is characterized ao* cording to a divine hjfxinis; biit life according to poiver; aiid intellect according to inteUigifaie intellect. For as being is to hyparxis, so is intel- feet to betnfg. And as intdligible power is to eadb of the extren^y, so is life to tile intelligible and to intdlect. And as power is generated from ^le one and hyparxis, but constitutes in ootrjunction with the one the aature of l»£Dg, so life proceeds indeed from being, and gives subsistence to a power different from that which is in being. As also the one itself which exists prior to being, imparts to being from itself a second unity, so lUcewise life being allotted an hypostasis prior to intellect, generates in- tellectual hfe. For true being and tlje intelligible which precede the rest, supply both life and intellect with union. Imparticipable life, therefore, but which participates of the intelligible monads is the second after being, is generative of imparticipable intellect, and giving completion to this medium, and containing the bond of intelligibles and intellectuals, is illu- minated by Gods who are allotte<l a union secondary to the occult subsistence of intelligibles, but preceding according to cause the sepaiation of intellectual natures. For the unical, indivisible, simple, and primary na- ture of intelligibles, subsides through the medium of these Gods into CHAP. I. OF PLATO. 225 multitude and separation, aod the inexplicable evolution of the divine orders. Whence also, I think, the Gods who connectedly contain life which is infinite, being the middle of the intelligible and intdlectoal Gods, and carried in the divisions of themselves as in a vehicle, are called intelligible and at the same time intellectual; being filled indeed, from the first intelligibles, but filling the intellectual Gods. For we call theintdligible Gods intelligible, not as coordinate with intdlect. For the intelligible which is in intdlect is one thing, and that which produces the intellecti^ Gods another: and we denominate the Gods that subsist according to life intelligible and at the same time intdlectual, not as giving completion to intellect, nor as being established according to intellectual intelligence, and imparting to intdlect the power of intellectual perception, but to the intelligible the power of being intellectually percdved, but we give them this appdlation, as deriving their subsistence from the intelligible monads, but generating all the intdlectual hebdomads. And because they are illuminated indeed with intelligible life, but subsist prior to intellectuals, according to a generative cause, we think fit to denominate them in com«> mon, connecting their names from the extremes, in the same manner as they also are allotted a peculiarity collective <^ wholes in the divine orders* It is evident, therefore, that they subsist according to this medium, and that they are proximate to the intelligible Gods, who are both monadic and triadic. For the intelligible triads, with reference indeed to the highest union and which is exempt from all things, are triads; but with reference to the divided es^nce of triads, they are monads, unfolding into light from themselves total triads. Since intelligibles, therefore, in their triadic progression, do not depart from a unical hyparxis, the intelligible and at the same time intdlectual Gods subsist triadically, exhibiting in themselves the separation of the monads, and through divine difference, proceeding into multitude, and a variety of powers and essences. For the natures which subsist more remote from the one principle [of all things,] are more multiplied than the natures which are prior to them;' and are diminished indeed in powers, and the comprehensions of second* ' For fitimis it 18 nepetiar^ to Tead mtrm, PrQc. Vol. I. aF 22(5 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IVarj natures^ but are divided into more numbers^ and such as are more distant from the monad. They likewise relinquish the union which is the cause of primarily efficient natures^ and variety is assumed by them in exchange for the occult hyparxis of those primary- essences. According to this reasoning, therefore, the intelligible and intellectual separation is greater than the separation which is only intelligible. And of these again, the partial orders are allotted a much greater division, so as to un- f(^d to us a multitude of Gods which cannot be comprehended in the numbers within the decad. Their peculiarities also are indescribable, and inex[>licable by our conceptions, and are manifest only to the Gods them- selves, and to the causes of them. Such, therefore, are the intelligible und intellectual Gods, and such is the peculiarity which they are allotted, a peculiarity connective of extremes, and which unfolds into light prece* daneous, but converts secondary natures. For they intellectually per- ceive the Gods prior to them, but are objects of intellection to the Gods posterior to them. Hence also Timaeus establishes all-perfect animal to be the most beautiful of intelligibles, because there are kitelligibles posterior to it, which it surpasses in beauty, as being superior to them, and because it is the boundary of the first intelligibles, the natures posterior to it subsisting intellectually. According to this reasoning, therefore, the first intellectual Gods are also intelligible; and we do not, deriving these things from a foreign source, ascribe them to Plato, but they are as- serted by us in consequence of receiving auxiliaries from him. This, however, will be more manifest through what follows.
CHAPTER II.
In the next place, therefore, we shall discuss the manner in which the Gods who illuminate the breadth of imparticipable life proceed from the intelligible Gods. Since then the intelligible Gods establish in themselves CHAP. ir. OF PLATO. 227 uniformly things multipKedy occultly such as are divided, and according to a certain admirable transcendency of simplicity, the various genera of beings, — ^hence the first intellectual Gods,' unfolding their indistinct union, and the unknown nature of their hypostasis,,and being filled through intelligible power and essential life with the prolific abun- dance of wholes, are allotted a kingdom which ranks as the second after them. And they always indeed produce, perfect, and connect them- selves, but receive from the intelligible Gods an'occdlt generation; from intelligible power indeed, receiving a peculiarity generative of all things; but from intelligible life which preexists according to cause in the iivtelU- gible, receiving the nature which is spread under them. For life is pri- marily indeed in intelligibles; but secondarily in intelligibles and intd-' lectuals; and in a third degree in intellectuals; existing indeed according to cause in the first, but according to essence in the second, and according to participation in the last of these. The first intellectual, therefore, pro- ceed from the intelligible Gods, multiplying indeed their union, and their unical powers, unfolding their occult hyparxis, and through prolific, connective, and perfective causes assimilating themselves to the essential, en- tire, and all*perfect transcendencies of intelligibles. For in intelligibles th^re were three primarily effective powers; one indeed constituting the essence of wholes; another measuring things which are multiplied; and another being productive of the forms of all generated natures. • And conformably to these, the intelligible and intellectual powers sub- sist; one indeed, by its very essence producing the life of secondary na- tures, according to a certain intelligible comprehension; but another being connective of every thing which is divided, and imparting by illu- mination the intelligible measure to those natures that relinquish the one union [of all things;] and another supplying all things with figure, and form and perfection. The intelhgible and intellectual orders of the Gods, therefore, are generated according to all the intelligible causes. From power indeed, being allotted the peculiarity of progression; but from life receiving the portion of being which is suspended from them, for life is conjoined with power; since life is of itself infinite, all motion ' |t ia necessary to supply in this place in the original, fot^t tm.
f J3 ^N THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV faaviog infinity consub^isteot with its nature^ and the power of infinity^ is generative of the whole of things. But from the triadic hypostasis of in« telligibles, they receive a distribution into first, middle and last. For it is necessary that all things should be detained by a triadic progression, and that this should be the case prior to all [other] things with the intelli- gible and at the same time intellectual genera of Gods. For because they subsist as the middle of wholes, and give completion to the bond of the ^grst orders, according to their summit indeed, they are assimilated to in* tdligibles, but according to their extremity, to intellectuals. And they are partly indeed intelligible, and partly intellectual. For every where the progressions of the divine genem are effected through continued shni* litude. And the first of subordinate are united to the ends of preexistent causes. As however, the first and the last in the middle of wholes are both intelligible and intellectual, it is necessary there should be aconnec- live medium of these, according to which medium the peculiarity of these Gods is principally apparent. For that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual, in one part indeed is more abundant than, but in another equally c(»nmunicates with both these. From these things^^ therefore, the continuity of the progression of the divine orders appears to be admirable. For the extremity of intelligibles indeed was intellec- tual, yet as in intelligibles. But the summit of intelligibles and at the same time intellectuals,* is intelligible indeed, yet it possesses this peculiarity vitally. And again, the end of intelligibles and at the same time intel- lectuals, is intellectual, but it is vitally so. But the beginning of intel- lectuals, is intelligible, and presides over the intellectual Gods, yet it has the intelligible intellectually. And thus all the divine genera are allotted an indissoluble connexion and communion, an admirable friendship, and well-ordered diminution, and a transcaidency, partly coordinate and partly exempt. That which proceeds too, is always in continuity with its producing cause; and secondary natures together with a firm esta- blishment in their causes, make a progression froin them. There is likewise one series and alliance of all things; secondary natures always subsisting from those prior to them, through similitude. After what manner, there- fore, the intelligible and ^t the same time intellectual Gods, unfold them- CHAP. IIL OP PLAf O.
selves into light from tbe inteliigible Gods, may through these things be Kcollected.
CHAPTER IIL In ihe next place, let us show how they are divided in their progreK* sions, and what difference the triads of these Gods are allotted with respect to the intelligible triads. These Gods, therefore, are also divided triply, after the above mentioned manner; being conjoined indeed to the intelligible^ through their summit; but to the intellectual through their end; and through the middle bond of the extremes, being allotted the pecuti* arity of each equally, and extending to both the intelligible and intellec* tua] genera of Gods, as the centre of these two-fold orders, uniformly containing the communion of wholes. They are likewise divided triply^ because in these all things, viz. essence, hfe, and intellect, are vitally, in the same manner as they are intelligibly in the Gods prior to them, and ' intellectually in the Gods that derive their subsistence from these. And essence indeed is the intelligible of life; but life is the middle and at th^ same time the peculiarity of this order; and intellect is the extremity, and that which is proximately carried in intellectuals as in a vehicle. All things therefore subsisting in these Gods, there will be a division of them into first, middle, and last genera. And in the third place, they are di* yided triply, because it is necessary that life should abide, proceed, and be converted to its principles; since of beings, the first triad was said to estabUsh all things, and prior to other things the second triad* Eternity, therefore, abides stably in the first triad. But the triad posterior to this, is the supplier to wholes [and therefore to all things,] of progression, mo- tion, and life according to energy. And the third triad is the supplier of conversion to the one, and of perfection which convolves all secondary natures to their principles. Hence it is necessary that the intelligible and iSO- ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV at the same time intellectual Gods, should primarily participate of these ihtee powers, and should abide indeed in the summit of themselves; but proceeding from thence, and extending themselves to all things, should again be converted to the intelligible place of survey, and conjoin to the beginning of their generation the end of their whole progression.
The intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods therefore are, as I have said, triply divided. And essence indeed is that which ranks as first in them, but life is the middle, and intellect the extremity of them. Since however, each of these three is perfect, and participates of the in- telligible monads, I mean of the essence which is there, of intelligible life, and of intelligible intellect, they are tripled according to the participation of primarily efficient causes. And the intelligible of life indeed possesses essence, intellect, and life inteUigibly; but the intelligible and intellectual of it, possesses essence, life and intellect, intelligibly and at the same time intellectually; and the intellectual of it possesses these intellectually and intelligibly. ' And every where indeed, there is a triad in each of the sec- tions, but in conjunction with an appropriate peculiarity. Hence three intelligible and at the same time intellectual triads present themselves to our view, which are indeed illuminated by the divine unities, but each of them contains an all-various multitude. For since in intelligibles, there was, an all-powerful and all-perfect multitude, how is it possible that this multitude should not in a much greater degree, be evolved and multiplied, in the Gods secondary to the intelUgible order, according to the prolific cause of them? Each triad therefore comprehends in itself a multitude of powers, and a variety of forms, producing intelligible multitude into energy, and unfolding into light the generative infinity of intelligibles. And we indeed, being impelled from the participants, discover the pecu- liarity of the participated superessential Gods. But according to the order of things, the intelligible and intellectual monads generate about themselves essences, and all lives, and the intellectual genera. And through these, they unfold the unknown transcendency of themselves, > In Ae original, after x«i vouy in this sentence, it is necessary to supply ¥wrrws x«i voi^s, re de vo§g9¥. Apd after mpms, it is also requisite to supply xtu yoi^rco;, as in the above transhitioa« CHAP. III. OF PLATO- 231 preserving by itself the preexistent cause of the whole of things. There are however, as we have said, three intelligible triads. And there are also three triads posterior to these, which appear to be tripled from them, according to their prolific perfection. ' But it is necessary that the peculiarity of the intelligible, and also of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual triad, should be defined according to another mode.!For in the intelligible order indeed, each, triad had only the third part of being; for it consisted of bounds and in- finity, and from both these. But this was essence indeed in the first triad, intelligible life in the second, and intelligible intellect in the third. The natures however prior to tliese were unities and superessential powers, which give completion to the whole triads. But in the inteUigible and at the same time intellectual order, each triad Jias essence, life and intellect; one indeed intelligibly and at the same time intellectually, but more in- telligibly, so far as it is in continuity with the first intelligibles; but ano- ther intellectually and intelligibly, but more intellectually, because it is proximately carried in intellectuals; and another according to an equal part, as it comprehends in itself both the peculiarities. Hence the first triad,that we may speak of each, was in intelligibles, bound, infinity, and essence; for essence was that which was primarily mixed. But here the first triad is essence, life and intellect, with appropriate unities. For essence is suspended from the first deity [of this triad,] life from the second, and intellect from the third. And these three superessential monads, unfold the monads of the first triad. But again, the second triad after this, was in the intelligible order, a superessential unity, power, and intelligible and oc- cult life. Here however, essence, life and intellect are all vital, and are sus- pended from the Gods who contain the one bond of the whole of this or- der. For as the first unities were allotted a. power unific of the middle genera, so the second unities after them^ exhibit the connective peculia- rity of primarily efiicient causes. After these therefore, succeeds the third triad, which in the intelligible order indeed was unity, power, and intelligible intellect; but here it consists of three superessential Gods, who close the termination of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, and begird all things intellectually, I mean essence, life and intdlect.