SigPhi · Proclus

Elements of Theology

Page 31 of 47

with the mysteries which are there, and with intelligible silence. It also appears to me that Plato sufficiently unfolds the three elevating causes, loy^, truth, and faith, to those who do not negligently read what he has written. For what besides love conjoins with beauty? Where is the plain of truth, e^ccept in this place? And what else than faith is the cause of this ineffable 771 we5w f For muesis in short, is neither through intelligence nor judgment, but through ihe uhical silence imparted by faith, which is better than every gnostic ener<;y, and which establishes both whole souls and ours, in the ineffable and unknown nature* of the ' « The word TiXmj or iniiiation,*^ szjs Hermeas, in his MS. Commentary on the Phxdrus, <« was so denominated from rendering the soul perfect. The soul therefore was once perfect. But here it is divided, and is not able to energize wholly by itself.'* He adds: « But it is necessary to know that telete, muesis, md epopteia, rekirrj, fwnjcrij, and rroTreia, diflfer from each other. Teletc, therefore, is analogous to that which is preparatory to purifications. But muesis, which is so called from closing the eyes, is more divine. For to close the eyes in initiation is no longer to receive by sense those divine mysteries, but with the pure soul itself. And froTrt i« Epopteia is to be esta- blished m, and become a spectator of the mysteries."

* ^uo-ci is omitted in the original.

CHAP. X. OV PLATO.

Gods. These things however, have proceeded to this length from my sympathy about such like concerns.

CHAPTER X.

But ftgain returning to the proposed theology, let us unfold the con- ceptions which Plato indicates to us concerning each order of the intel- ligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, llie supercelestial place therefore is intelligible. Hence also Plato says that it is essence which truly is, and that it is visible to the intellect of the soul. It is likewise the one comprehension and union of the intellectual Gods. For it is not intelligible after such a manner as animal itself, nor as the first eternity, nor as that which is itself primarily the one being. For as these are pri- marily intelligibles, they arc exempt from all other intelligibles, and pre- subsist by themselves. But the supercelestial place, is proximately es- tablished above the celestial circulation, and of this is the intelligible; yet it is not simply intelligible. And that we assert these things rightly, Socrates also testifies, imparting the intellection of this intelligible to souls likewise, through the heaven. For in this period, according to which they are carried round together with the circulation of the heaven, they behold indeed justice, they behold temperance, and they also behold sci-» ence, and each of the beings which have a true and real existence; so that if the supercelestial place is intelligible, and real being, yet it is intelligi- ble, as being above the heaven. The first intelligibles however, are in- telligible according to their own essence, and according to the exempt and first eflScient cause of all intellectual natures. For the mighty Saturn likewise, though he is an intellectual God, and the fulness of intellect, is intelligible as with reference to the demiurgus; for he is the summit of ^4A ON T»P THEOLOGY WQH IV.

\h^ iftt^Q^vwl iriaij. T^* ^h«c€^a?:«^ the pl^e algq ^Wcb k al>ove tU« heaven, is allotted an intelligible traHSC^iiHk?wy with ire*peot to th© Q^le^ tial circulation, and is intelligible as in the first intellectuals. * Hence also it subsists analogous to the first triad of intelligibles. That triad however, was simply intelligible. For the intelligible which is in ^intelli- grbles, at once exists prior to all second and third intelligibles. But the supercelestial place is not simply intelligible; for it is the summit of intel- lectuals, and not of intelligibles. Hence Plato calls the first triad of in- telligibles the one being; but he 4enon>i nates the supercelestial place^ truly-existing essence. For the former indeed, antecedes all beings in an admirable simplicity, and in the occult unity of being. For that being is tiie int?HigiWe itself, and i? not ia one respect ipt^UigibJe, bi»t; m a»Qther i»teHect;ut»l, ftor is it th^it which is passive tQ [vii:. participate?, ofj beit\g; Imt it is the ^eat, and the n\Q^t 9pcient monad of being* This order hQW-^ ever, [vi?. the supercelestial phtfle] falls ^hprt of the union of tha^t tci*d» 9»d participate! pf heicig, but is oot simply heing. Henc^ also Plgto chUs it essence, aq4 essence which truly is, a^ veceiving; thja intelligiU© a(i4 essential according to the essence of that; which is primarily being. 4ad the first triad indeed of iateUigibles was paternal;. fprit suhsi^t^ agcor^-r ing to divine union and bound> «nd is the occult, and highest boundary of aJI intelligibles. Bat the supercelestial place is maternal, SMbsijthjg ^q^ cording to infinity, and the power of infinity, ^ox this prder is fenainine and prolific J and produces all things by intelligible powersu Hence alw, PI^tQ calls it a place, as being the receptacle qf the paternaJ cftuse?, and "Ringing fortl^, and producing the gener4tive powers pf the Gods into the hj(postasis pf secondary natures. Foi: having denomina,ted matter also a ^lac^i he calls it the mother and nurse pf the reasons [i. e. of the produc- tive principJes], which proceed into it from being, ^nd the paternal <?an8fe- According to this analogy, therefore, Plato thus denominates the super-* q^estial place, as feminine, and as being the cause of those things ma^ t^rnally, of which the intdligible father is the cause paternally. Matter however receives forms alone; but the mother and nurse of the Gods, Dfbt only receives, but also constitutes and generates secondary natures, together with the father. Nor does this geaeralive deity produce from herself into an external place, her progeny, and separate them from her own com- prehension» in the §ame jnanner ^s th? natures which generate h^re, deliver their offspring into light external to themselves; but she generates, comprehends and establishes all thing? in herself. Hepce?i1sq she \s the place of them, ^s being a seat which on all sides, conttains them, an(J as by her prolific, and primarily efficient powers, preoccupying and con?^ twining in herself, all the progressions, multitude and variety of secondary n^^tures. for all beings subsist in the Gods, and are comprehended qnd saved by tbem. For where can they recede froRi the Gods, and from.th§ comprehension which is in them? And how, if they depart frpm theQi^i qao, they remain even for the smallest portion of time? In a particiil^r manner however the powers which are generative of divine natures^, gre s^id to comprehend their progeny, sq far as they are the proj:imate c^us^ pf them, and constitute their essence with a more abundant divisioQ, and a more particular providence. For paternal causes produce ^econd^ry natures uniformly^ exemptly, and without coordination, and coipprphpqd>^ Jbut unically their own progeny. And in simplicity indeed, they pref^QUr py the variety of them; but in union their multitude. It is evidQftt therefore, from what has been said> that the supercelestial place is. intel- ligible, and after what manner it is intelligible. In additioq to thesf^ things also it is evident, how it is feminine; for place is adapted to t;]^ generative Gods through the above-mentioned causes, And the meadpw ml the fountain of a vivific nature, as will be shortly demon3trated. Socral©}^ likewise assumes all the divine natures that are in this place,^ to be of thi* kind, [viz to be of the feminine genus] I mean science herself, justice her-? selfi temperance herself, truth herself, and Adrastia; which na^y ei;peci- ally be considered as a certain indication, that Plato particularly attri- bijtes the fenjinine to this order, aod not only other theologists.

g46 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IT- CHAPTER XI.

What therefore is the cause through which Plato in the first place ce- lebrates this deity negatively, analogous to the one f And what are the negations? For he denominates it, without colour, without figure, and without contact And he takes away from it these three hyparxes, colour, figure, and contact. I say therefore, that this order being the summit of the intellectual Gods, is unknown and ineffable, according to its peculi- arity, and is [only] to be known through intelligible impressions. For being the summit of intellectuals, it conjoins itself with intelligibles. For how could intellectuals be conjoined with intelligibles, unless they ante- cedently constituted an intelligible transcendency of themselves? But what connexion and communion could be surveyed of the whole orders of things, unless the extremities of such as are first possessed a certain ^militude to the beginnings of such as are second? For on account of this similitude, these are connascent with each other, and all things sub- sist according to one series. As therefore, the end of intelligibles was intellectual, so likewise the beginning of intellectuals is allotted an in- telligible hyparxis. And each of these indeed is intelligible; but the one is intelligible simply; and the other is not intelligible without the addi- tion of the intellectual. These therefore, are consubsistent with each other. And the one indeed, is the paternal cause of the whole of things, so far as it is intelligible, and the intellectual which is in it is extended in- telligibly. But the other is generatively constitutive of the same things, because it is intellectual, and intelligible good presides in the intellectual genus. All things therefore, are from both, exemptly indeed, from the intellectual of intelligibles, but coordinately, from the intelligible of in- tellectuals. And both indeed, rejoice in unknown hyparxes; and are alone, as Plato uays, known by intelligible, mystic, and ineffable impres- sions. Hence also he calls the attempt boldness which endeavours to unfold the arcana concerning them, and to explain by words their un- Jcnown union* CHAP. XI. OF PLATO. 24^ From the end of the intelligible order however, the summit of intetr lectuals possesses its unknown peculiarity. For so far as it conjoins itself to the first intelligibles, and is filled with their unical, ineffable, and paternal hyparxis, so far also it exists in an unknown manner prior to intellectuals. Hence it is incomprehensible by the natures posterior to it; but it is known by those prior to it, being super-expanded into a continued union with them." It likewise knows the natures prior to itself intelligibly; but this does not at all differ from uniform and ineffable knowledge. For intelligible knowledge is the union, cause, summit, and unknown and occult hyparxis of all knowledge. Since therefore, the one and united triad is, if it be lawful so to speak, the intellectual image of the unknown union of intelligibles, and presides over the same uniform and unknown power in intellectuals, as its own cause does, hence Plato mystically unfolds it through negations. For every where that which is highest, and that which is unknown, are analogous to the unical God. As therefore, we are taught to celebrate this God throu^ negations, after the same manner we endeavour to unfold negatively the uniform. and unknown summits of secondary orders. And in short, since' Socrates in the Pha&drus makes the ascent as far as to the supercelestial place, arranging^ it analogous to the first, as in this order, and in the ascent of souls, he celebrates it by negations. For in the Timeeus, Plato contends that the one demiurgus through whom every^ demiurgic genus of Gods subsists, is ineffable and unknown; and every where that which is highest has this transcendency with respect to secondary natures. For it imi- tates the cause which is at once unically exempt from all beings. We celebrate this cause however,. through negations alone, as existing prior to all things; but we unfold the summits which proceed analogous to It, ^ffinnatively and at the same time negatively. As participating indeed, the natures prior to themselves, we celebrate them affirmatively. For Plath calls the supercelestial place essence which truly is, the plain of truth, the meadow, and the intelligible place of survey of the Gods, and he does not only call it without colour, without figure, and without ■ For «tm|», it 18 necessary to read «ut«j^ jt|8 OS Tftt iTftEOLOGY btK>K iV.

TC&tAhx^ ikmh VAn^'og 'affimmtiottft ^ith tttgiitidni. Pot thU ordfef te a «Md'i%if& between die intelligibte Go(h &iid th6 firtt i&tellectEfal divi<ie «nrdei«, ^iitaining the biobd <)f both. And it guards indeed ititellectualiji tttctftditg to A ubifbrm lind unkttoivn tr^Ascendeticy, but tmnsMiu the ^iMiitttdeft of iMt^lligibles as faf <ii to the )a«t of things. It likewise «lei^teft %11 tMwgb ftt once, according to one t:otnt»on dnion, a-s f^r bs to th« iittMihgible father, and generates ^ftd prodttees them asfar as to blotter. Seitig then3fore e^ftabhsbed bet^neen iSeit imical and the Multiplied Gods, It4« unfolded, ttegati\"e!y indeed, through tihe unknotm manner in which it fmtiM;end6 ^ecdndat^ matures, but a^rmati^ly thtotigh it& pattici^ lotion of the 'fiftt Matures. fVMr the £r^ dtmiut^us is called in the l^cfiitMs fabricator and fatlte^, and good, and all such names, ^ far asbe purtidpates of t)reexi6teirt t^udes; but to tkr as he it the ttionad 'df all IkMdatiott, Hato leaves him unknown and inel&ble, «iempt from all the fabricittors of things. For he «ays, " it id i!ifficolt to discover him, sad ifbM Ibb&d, it it Impossible to ^penk dt him to all men.'' Thus llfsrefore flato unfolds the supencelestial (^ace, affirmatively indeed, as beittg illed flrom the first causes, at on6 time itideed ^ealling it essen(^ mt^t^ irtAy is, sA another the plain «>f truDk, and at another, something (^<of this kind; bat' so&r as it transt^nds the intellectual Gods, and «d fiir as it is «iipreiue and unical, he celebrated it negativieJly, in the tame mafiaer «& the principle irbidi <is eiempt firotm idl tMngs, CHAPT£R KIL It follows thetefore, in the next place, thai we should consider wha% th6 negations are, and from wh&t orders they are generated^ In the l^armenides then, the negations of the one are produced from all^ th^ ' 8f if omitted in At or^ind, wUch the setiae eridcBtly requires te be iseerted.

;£kir/s'Wh61<es,iat)cl'i1IUidinat^ fhetn ^with^idtelligible light^'Cdlour; boBatlse likewise ifi'e tipp^r^t b(3diirty df thts 'sefusiljle fa^bveiD Is Yespleddeit tndi all various colours, and with light. Hence be calls that heavendintBil>«> Ie<^tual cdlo\ir, and tight, ^orthe W^t pro'oeediilg ^from tke ^gml isfpn the ord^t^^ above [the heisiVtid] linktid^v^ta '^nd ck^iilt, ^abiding in xthe ladjta df the Gods; l^dtdt shin^ fdfth in tim order, and from rJjenig unappareht becoiin^s manifest. Hence it is' assimilated to colour >^ dfispring df light.

Farther still/if this h^tien >fs isight beholding the things above^ttkie intelligible ' of It may' very' propefly be called colour which- is oonjeiiBBed •wFtlrthe sight. Thte' icsWte thfeifefoi»e tif ' the- intelligibles in the ' heaven-is 'without ' eolovir, "btit Is ' ei^tci^t 'O^tMn 'tfcem; fbr sensible c6lour is^tlK 6£r^lirittgi6f th^it^lir'li^t. ^But Pkto denomiff^tes theotder^which'praxi. itikt^y sub^iists mfler tiie 'eek^tiAl brder, And which' we bave *oaUfidr>the subbelisstial ar6h,^figiilre. '^dr'thearcfa itself is the 'MMe 't>f '^M%ure. Ahd'in'^h6rt,'in this oMi^r,'Partn«nid%8 dlsp'plitces in«eHeiitUftl<^gtire. ^ButPl^'first^ktllibittte timtAtt 'fo' the'^tttfmit^ibf idt»lld«<iaals^as is 850 O^ THE THEOLOGY BOOK 1^, evident from the conclusions ^f the Parmenide^* For in the first hypor- thesii^ taking away figure from the om^ he uses this as a medium, \\z. i\iBttht one does not touch itself. "But /A^ o/ie/' says he, " does not touch itself." - And the conclusion is evident* Here therefore contact first subsists, and subsists according to cause* For of those things of which the demiurgus is proximately the caus^, the father who is prior to him is paradigmatically the cause. In this order therefore, contact is the paradigm of the liberated Gods. Hence these three prders are successive, viz. colour, figure, and contact. And fromt hese the super- celestial place is essentially exempt. Hence it is without colour, without jfigure, and without contact. Nor does it transcend these three priva- tively, but according to causal excellence. For it imparts to colour from, intelligibles the participation of light; on figure it confers by illu- mination intdlectual bound; and in contact it supernally inserts union and continuity, and perfects all things by its power, things which are touched indeed, through union, those that are figured, through the par- ticipation of bound, and those that are coloured, through the illumination of light..But it draws upward, and allures to itself every thing ineffably^ and through intelligible impressions, and fills every thing with unical goods.

If. therefore, we assert these things rightly, we must not admit.the interpretation of those who are busily occupied in sensible colours, and contacts, and figures, and who assert that the supercelestial place is exempt from these. For these are trifling, and by no means adapted to that place. For even nature, not only that which exists as a whole, but that also which is partial, is exempt from sensible colours, from apparent figures, and from corporeal contact. Wiiat therefore is there venerable in this, if it is also present to natures themselves? But it Jls necessary to extend colours, and figures, and contacts, from on high us fitr as to the last of things, and to evince that the supercelestial place, is similarly exempt from all these. For soul also and intellect participate .of figure; and contact is frequently in incorporeal natures, according to the communion of first with secondary beings, and it is usual to call these communications contacts, and Xo denominate the touchmgs of CHAP. XIII. OF PLATO. 35 J intellectual perceptions adhesions. We should not therefore be carried from things first to things last, nor compare the highest order of intel- lectuals with the last of beings, above which both soul and nature are established. For in so doing we shall err, and shall not attend to Plato, who exclaims that it is boldness to assert these things concerning it. For where is the boldness, and what the unknown power transcending our conceptions, in contemplating the truth of sensible colours, figures, and contacts. For an hypostasis of this kind is known by physiologists, and 'not by the sons of theologists. Such tlierefore is the power possessed by the negations through which Plato celebrates the supercelestial place.

CHAPTER XIIL CHAPTER XIIL Ac A IN then, let us in the next place survey the affirmations^ how thfcy exist according to the participation of the first intelligibles themselves. The supercelestial place therefore, is said to be eissence which truly is, because it participates of that which is primarily being. For to be, and truly to be are present to all things, as the progeny of the intelligible essence. For as tht one is from the first principle which is prior to intelligibles, so the nature of being is from intelligibles. For there the one being subsists, as Parmenides a little before taught us. But' the supercelestial place is beheld by the governor of the soul, because it is allotted an intelligible transcendency with respect to the other intel- lectual Gods. Hence the intelligible good of it is rendered manifest from its being known by intellect. This intelligible therefore, in the sam^e manner as that which is truly being, arrives to it from the unical Godd. For they are primarily and imparticipably intelligibles, and the first efficient causes of all intelligibles. These things also concur with each other, viz. that which is truly being, mid the intelligible. For every CHAPTER XIV- In the third place therefore, the genus of true science is said to be established about the supercelestial place. For these two things ascend to the contemplation of tbftt esstencp,.vi?. intellect the governor of the soul (but this is a partial intellect established indeed above souls, and elevating them to their paternal port) and true science which is the p^fection of the soul. This therefore /ei^rg^es ^^bout tb^ iplaoe, as transitively revolving in ^avrnQpic ^me^spir^rabopt being, ^^t inteJI^ct contemplates it, as einployiqg simply ^qt^lec^n. jF^aiitb^:rS|;ill, the science which is in m is one tliipg, butt^^t (^h^ is^in tbe^^i^pf^rqel^stial j>toce another. And the former indeed is true, bqt the latter tis truth itself. What therefore is it^ and wlienqedoejs.)t fub(4st? J(t|is iqd^d ^ ..dieity which is the fountain of all intellectual ^Bowl^c^g^y and the first .efficient caiise of undeQled:and stable intelUgepce. ',^ut itjshines forth in^the;first triad of intellectuals, beo^use this is pe^fi^qtive,pf all. other .tbi^gSfand likewise of divine souls. For these ascending rtp th^s;Uq|forni ipower of all knowledge, perfect their owp kqowl^dge. iFpr^jigh of. the joadefilod souls, says Socrates, revolying^tpgethi^r with Jupiter and the