heaven, surveys justice, temperance ^nd science. Hqm^c^ the^e three fountains lare there, b^ing iat^l|i^ble deities,; aad itl^effounJaiftspf the intellectual virtues^ and not being, as sonie think they are, intellectual fonns. For Plato is accustomed to characterize these by the term itself, as for instance science itself and justice itself; and this Socrates says somewhere in the Phaedo. By^t ^^e when he says justice herself, temperance herself, and science herself, he appears to unfold to us certain self-perfect and intelligible deities, which have a triadic subsistence. And of these science indeed is the monad; but temi>erance has the second order; and justice the third. And science iddeed is the supplier of undefiled, firm and immutable intelligence; but temperance imparts to aU the Gods the cause of conversion to themselves; and justice imparts to them the cause of the distribution of the whole of good accordms to desert. And through science mdeed, each of the Gods intellectually piijrceiyes the natures prior to himself, and is filled with intelligible mteU ligjence; ' but through temperance he is converted to himself^, an^ ^^pf^ a second union, and a good coordinate to the conversion to.himself: and through justice he rules over the natures postenor to himself, in a silent path, as tt^ey sav« measures their desert, and supplies a distribution adapts to each. These three fountains therefore contain att the energies cif the Gpds. And science indeed proceeds analogous to the ^rst triad of Ind as that triad imparts essence to all thi intelligibles. And as that triad imparts essence to all things^ so this illuminates the Gods with knowledge. But temperance proceeds analogous to the second triad of intelligibles. For temperance imitates the connective iind measuring power ot that triaa; since it measures ^the energies of the Gods, and converts each of them to itself. Arid justice proceeds analogous to the third triad of intelligibles. For it also separates secondary natures according to appropriate desert,* in the same manner as that triad separates them intelligibly by the first para- digms.
■ Here also it is requisite to adopt the same reading as before, p. 262.
* Instead of xara njv frgowi^KotHrMf fxiivi), it teems^ requisite to read xmra n)y wfocviHowaif t^im, mo'xtf f xiiyi), as in the translation.
^54 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV, CHAPTER XV.
Aftjer these things therefore, we may survey another triad preexisting in this place, which also Socrates celebrates, viz. the plain of truth, the meadow, and the nutriment of the Gods. The plain of truth therefore, is intellectually expanded to intelligible light, and is splendid with the illuminations that proceed from thence. For as the one emits by illumination intelligible light, so the intelligible imparts to secondary natures a participation productive of essence. But the meadow is the prolific power of life, and of all- various reasons, is the comprehension of the first efficient causes of life, and is the cause of the variety, and generation of forms« For the meadows also which are here are pro* ductive of all-various forms and reasons, and bear water which is tlie symbol of vivification. And the nourishing cauee of the Gods, is a certain intelligible union, comprehending in itself the whole perfection of the Gods, and filling the Gods with acme and power, in order thjit they may bestow a providential attention to secondary natures, and may possess an immutable intellectual perception of such natures as are first. Above however, the Gods participate of these uniformly; but in a divided manner in their progressions.
With respect to the nutriment likewise, one kind is called by Pfato ambrosia^ but the other nectar. **For the charioteer," says he, ** stopping the horses at the manger, places before them ambrosia, and afterwards gives them nectar to drink.'' The charioteer therefore, being nourished with intelligibles, unically participates of the perfection which is imparted through illumination by the Gods. I5ut the horses participate of this divjsibly; first indeed of ambrosia, and afterwards of nectar. For it is necessary that from ambrosia, they should stably and undeviatingly abide in more excellent natures; but that through nectar they should Unmutably provide for secondary natures* For they say that ambrosia CHAP. XV. OF PLATO. 55^ is solid, bul nectar liquid nutriment; which Plato also indicates when. he says that the charioteer places before the horses ambrosia and afterwards gives them nectar to drink. Hence the nutriment of nectar manifesto the unrestrained and indissoluble nature of providence^ and its pro^ ceeding to all things in an unpolluted manner. But the nutriment of ambrosia manifests stability, and a firm settlement in more excellent natures. From both these however, it is evident that the Gods both abide and proceed to all things, and that neither their undeviating nature, and which is without conversion to subordinate beings, is unpro- lific, nor their prolific power and progression is unstable; but abiding they proceed, and being established in the divinities prior to themselves,, they provide for secondary natures without being contaminated. Nectar and ambrosia therefore, are the perfections of the Gods, so &r as they are Gods; but other things are the perfections of intellect, natare,.and bodies. Hence Plato having assumed these in souk, calls the souls^ [ which are nourished with these,] Gods. For so far as they also parti, cipate of the Gods, so far they are filled with nectar and andbrosia^ These however in their progressions have a bipartite division; the oneindeed, being the supplier to the Gods of stable and firm perfection; but the other, of undeviating providence, of liberated ladministration, and of an unenvying and abundant communication of good, according to tlte* two principles of the whole of things, which preside over a distribution of this kind. For it must be admitted that ambrosia is indeed analogous to bound, but nectar to infinity. Hence the one is as it were humid, and not bounded from itself; but the other is as it were solid, and lias a boundary from itself. Nectar therefore is prolific, and is perfective of the secondary presence of the Gods, and is the cause of power; of a vigour which provides for the whote of things, and of infinite and never- failing supply. But ambrosia is stable perfection, is similar to bound,, is the cause to the Gods* of an establishment in themselves, and is the supplier of firm and undeviating intellection. Prior to both these how*- ever^is the one fountain of perfection, and seat to all the Gods, which Plato calls nutriment, and the banquet, and delicious food, as unically perfecting indeed the divided multitude of the Gods, but converting aJli life ON rtk fifiOLOGY iobk iv.
manifestethe aivlaed drstribuiion olc ^ivin'e niitniiieit; kit ^^ -sumciency CHAPTER XVL superc^lestial place into three parte, ror \h% inielligitde sfutDinit of intellectuals is, as we have before observedt a triiia. immediately the'r6- fore, according to the first conception of this place, Plato unfolds its tnamc nature^ assuming indeed, three negsttives, the uncoloured, the unfigured, and the untansible^ Haviilg likewise established three divinities m it, vi^. science^ temperance, and justice, our preceptor and leader [Synanus] thinks fit to divide this tiriad Into three monads, irid also demonstrates this conformably to the Orpliicltheoloffles. If,' however, H be requisite to disc^over the definite peculiarit'ies of ihes^ i^fee'C<^- ^esses, from what ^as beet) already Ipid down, we must understand,^l!hat the plain of truth, the meadow, and the nourishing c^use of tfie GbdsWfe posited there. To nourish therefore is the province of intelligible perfec- tion. Hence the elevating impul^ is given to the wing of the soul, 'and also intellectual perfection, according to the nouiis^meht^ which ^^lAoWs from thence into the soul. But the pecufianty of fne meadow, is to CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 257 « possess a power generative of reasons and forms; and of the eauses' of the production of animals. Hence also souls are fed about the meadow; and the pabulum (ro/ti]) is indeed nutriment, but in^ a divided manner.
The plain however of truth is the expansion and manifestation of intelligible light, the evolution of inward reasons, and perfection pro- ceeding every where. This therefore* is the peculiarity of the third monad. But fecundity is the peculiarity of the second; and intelligible plenitude of the first For all the supercelestial place is indeed illumi- nated with the light of truth. Hence all the natures thai are contained in it are called true. And Socrates says, ** that whatever soul attending on divinity has beheld any thing of reality shall be free from damage, till another period takes place/' For every thing in that place is truly being and intelligible, and is full of divine union. In the first monads however [i. e. in the pl^in of truth and the meadow,] this intelligible light subsists contractedly, and is occultly established as it were in the adyta; but in the third monad [viz. in the nourishing cause of the Gods] it shines forth, and is co-expanded, and is co-divided with the multitude of powers. We may therefore from these things survey the differences of the three monads, in a manner conformable to the Platonic hypotheses. But if indeed science pertains to the first monad, temperance to the second, and justice to the third, from these things also the triad will be perfectly apparent And does not science which is stable, and the uni- form intelligence of wholes, and which at the same time is consubsistent with intelUgibles, pertain to the power which is united to the intelligible fisither, and which does not proceed, nor separate its union from the deity of that father? but does not the genus of justice pertain to the power which is divided^ which separates the intellectual genera, leads the intelligible multitude into order, and imparts by illumination distribution according to desert? And does not the genus of temperance pertain to the power which is the medium of both these, which is converted to itself, and possesses the common bond of this triad? For the harmonic, ' For tixmv I rea4 cuum. * u e. Perfection proceeding every where.
JProc. Vol* I. 2 K 258 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
and a communication with the extremes according to reason^ are the illustrious good of this middle power.
That we may not therefore be prolix, what has been said being suffi* cient to remind us of the meaning of Plato, those three deities are celebrated by us, which dividing the supercelestial place, are indeed all of them intelligible as in intellectuals, and are, likewise summits, and collective of all things into one intelligible union. One of these however is so stably; another generatively; and another convertively, possessing a primary effective power in intellectuals. For one of them indeed, unites the monads of all the Gods and collects them about the intelli- gible; bill another effects this about the progressions of the Gods; and another about their conversions. All of them however at the same time collect into one the whole of an hyparxis which always abides, proceeds, and returns. Hence also Plato elevates the Gods that are distributed in the world, to this one place, and converts them energizing about this as collective of the whole orders of the Gods to the participation of intelli- gibles. These monads, therefore, educe intelligible forms, fill them with the participation of divine union, and again recall the natures that have proceeded, and conjoin them to intelligibles. Concerning this whole triad however, what has been said may suffice.
CHAPTER XVn.
CHAPTER XVn.
It remains therefore, that we should pass to the discussion of Adrastia, Socrates indicating that she possesses her kingdom in this place. For that which defines the measures of a blameless life to souls from the vision of these inteUigible goods, is certainly there allotted its first evolution into light. For the elevating cause, being secondary to the objects of desire, CHAP. XVII. OF PLATO. 359 may be able to raise both itself and other things to the supercelestial place, through conversion. But that which defines and measures the fruits of the vision of the intelligible to souls, since it has its hyparxis in the intelligible, imparts by illumination beatitude to them from thence. It is established therefore, as I have said, in that place. But it rules over all the divine laws uniformly, from on high, as far as to the last of things. It likewise binds to the one sacred law of itself, all the sacred laws, viz. the intellectual, the supermundane, and the mundane. Whe- ther therefore, there are certain Saturnian laws, as Socrates in the Gorgies indicates there are, when he says, " The law therefore which was in the time of Saturn is now also among the Gods;" or whether there are Jovian laws, as the Athenian guest asserts there are, when he says, ** But justice follows Jupiter, which is the avenger of those that desert the divine law f or whether there are fatal laws, as Timaeus teaches there are, when he says, ^^ That the demiurgus announced to souls the laws of fate /' — of all these the sacred law of Adrastia is connective according to one intelligible simplicity, and at the same time imparts existence to all of them^ and the measures of power. And if it be requisite to relate my own opinion, the inevitable guardian power of this triad, and the immutable comprehension of order pervading every where, presubsist in this goddess. For these three deities not only unfold and collect all things, but they are also guardians according to the Oracle of the works of the father, and of one intelligible intellect.
This guardian power therefore, the sacred law of Adrastia indicates, which nothing is able to escape. For with respect to the laws of Fate, not only the Gods are superior to them, but also partial souls, when they live according to intellect, and give themselves up to the light of provi- dence. And the Saturnian Gods are essentially exempt from the Jovian laws, and the connective and perfective Gods from the Saturnian laws; but all things are obedient to the sacred law of Adrastia, and all the dis- tributions of the Gods, and all measures and guardianships subsist on i^count of this. By Orpheus also, she is said to guard the de^liur^us of the universe, and receiving brazen drumsticks, and a drum made from the skin of a goat, to produce so loud a sound as to convert all the Gods to ggQ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IVherself* AihI Socrates imitating this fabulous souod which extends a certain proclamation ' to all things, in a similar manner produces the sa« cred law of Adrastia to all souls. Por he says, ^' This is the sacred law of Adrastia, that whatever soul has perceived any thing of truth, shall be free from harm till another period,^^ all but expressing the Orphic sound through this proclamation, and uttering this as a certain hymn of Adras* tia* For in the first place indeed, he calls it dftr/tMf, a sacred law^ and not ¥9p»gy a law^ as he does the Saturnian and Jovian laws* For d<rft»; is con- nected with deity, and pertains nK>re to intelligibles [than to the inteliec-^ tuals]; but n^i^g indicating intellectual distribution, is adapted to the in- tellectual fathers. And in the second place, he speaks of it in the singular aind not in the plural number, as Timaeus does of the fatal laws. In the third place therefore, he extends it to all the genera of souls, and evinces that it is the common measure of their happy and blessed life, and the true guard of those souls that are able to abide on high free from all passivity. For such is the meaning of the words, ^^ And the soul that is able to do this always, shall always be free from harm.^' This sacred law therefore, comprehends all the undefiled life of divine souls, and the tem- poral blessedness of partial souls. And it guards the former indeed in- telligibly, but measures the latter by the vision of intelligible goods. And thus much concerning Adrastia.
CHAPTER XVIII.
With respect to what remain? therefore, we shall summarily say, that the supercelestial place is the first triad of the intelligible and at the same time inteHectuai Grods, possessing three peculiarities, the unfolding into ' For KnptfyiiMTi, it if requisite to read Kt^uyfiM n.
CHAP. XIX. OF PLATO. 261 light, the oonective, and the defensive. It likewise coniprelieiMls all these intelligibly, and in an unknown manner, conjoining indeed intellectuals to intelligiUes, but calling forth the prolific powers of intelligifates# re- ceiving in itself the plenitude of forms from the intelligible paradigms, and producing its own meadow from the fontal summit which is there. But from the one intellect it gives subsistence to the three virtues^ perfects all itself by intelligible impressions, and in its in^Sstble bosoms receives the whole of intelligible light. At one and the same time also it abides in the occult nature of the intelligible Gods, and proceeds inteltigibly from thence, shines forth to the view of intellectuals, and converts and draws upward by ineffable powers all the images of its proper unioD which it has disseminated in every thing. To this place likewise it is necessary that we should mystically approach, leaving in the earth aU the generation- producing life, and the corporeal nature, with which on coming hither we were surrounded as with a wall, but exciting al<me iAie summit of the soul to the. participation of total truths and the plenitude of inteUi^k nutri- ment.
CHAPTER XIX.
CHAPTER XIX.
After this intelligible, and unknown triad however, which presides over all the intellectual ' genera^let us survey the triad which ccmnectedly contains the bond of them, intelligibly and at the same time intellectually. For it is necessary that prior to intellect and the intellectual Gods, the cause of connectedly containing should be in these Gods; and that this being established in the middle of the intdUgible and intellectual order, should extend to all the divine multitudes, all the genera of beings, and ' For vwfTtgv, it i$ necessary to read fotpm.
g6'i ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
all the divisions of the world. For what is it which primarily connects things? If, as some say, the nature of spirit and local motion, body it- self which is connective of other things will require connexion. For every body according to its own composition is dissipable and divisible; which also the Elean guest indicating to those who make corporeal principles, says that the essence which is so much celebrated by them, is broken and dissipated. Body therefore, is not naturally adapted to be connective of other things, nor even if a power of this kind pertained to bodies, would spirit be able to afford us this power, because it is always defluous and dissipated, and diffusing itself beyond that which bounds it But if we suppose that habits and connective forms which are divided about bodies illuminate their subjects with connexion, it is perfectly necessary that they should effect this by being present with them; but how will these habits and forms connect themselves.'^ For it is difficult to devise how this can be effected. For these being distributed about material bulks, and di- vided together with their subjects, require a boundary and connexion. But tliey are not naturally adapted to be bounded or connected from themselves; because they have not an essence self-begotten and self- subsistent. That however, which neither produces nor perfects itself, cannot connect itself. And moreover, every habit, and every material form is alter- motive, and depends on another more ancient cause, and on this account is inseparable from subjects, not being able to verge to itself. But if abandoning these, we should assert that souls which are incor- poreal and self-begotten, are the first efficient causes of connexion, where shall we place the partible and at the same time impartible nature of souls, that which is mixed from the partible and impartible, that which partici- pates of the genera of being, and that which is divided into harmonic reasons? For souls indeed, connect bodies and natures, because they participate of an impartible peculiarity; but they are in want of another connective nature which may impart the first principle of mixture to the genera, and of connexion to divided reasons. For the self-motive nature of souls being transitive, and extended to time, requires that which may connect its one life, and may render it total and indivisible. For the whole which is connective of parts, exists prior to parts; since the whole CHAP. XIX. OF PLATO. 263 which consists of parts receives connexion introduced from something diflferent from itself. But if proceeding with the reasoning power beyond souls, we survey intellect, whether the intellect which is participated, or if you are willing, that which is imparticipable and divine, and in short, if we survey at once the intellectual genus of the Gods, if this is primarily connective of beings, we shall find also in this all-various multitude, divi- sions of genera, and as Socrates says, many and blessed visions, and dis* cussive energies. For the separation of divine natures, and the variety of forms, present themselves to the view in intellectuals, and also fabulous sections and generative powers. How therefore, can that which connects be primarily here, where the divisive genus shines forth? And how is it possible that intellectual multitude should not refer to another more an- cient cause the participation of its proper connexion? For intellectual multitude is that which is primarily connected (since it is that which is primarily divided, and that which requires connexion is divisible, but the indivisible itself is beyond the connective hyparxis), but it is not that which primarily connects. For every thing which is connected, is con*