How therefore neglecting whole in fabrication, can we survey demiur^ divided according to parts? Though Plato himself thinks with respect to the paradigm of the universe, that the world should not be assimilated to imy thing which naturally subsbts in the form of a part, but to all perfect animal; and on this account be tlemoostrates that the world is only* begotten, because its paradigm is one. For if it were aot one, but many paradigms, again it would be necessary that there should be another animal about it, of which it would be a part, and it would be more right to assert that the world is no longer similar to the many paradigms, but to that which comprehends them. For it is necessary that the one paradigm should precede the many^ in the same manner as the one good subsists prior to participated goods^ and that the whole world should be the image of one paradigm prior to many. For whether it is alone the image of many paradigms, whence will the world be one and a whole? And how is it possible it should not be more dishonourable than its parts? For these indeed, are assimilated to intelUgibles, but the whole world is similar to no one of real beings. Or whether all the world subsists from a certain intelligible paradigm, if indeed there are many paradigms of one world, these also will be similar to each other, if they are the causes of the same image. It is necessary therefore, that sameness should be communicated to these from one form; or again, the world will be more venerable than its paradigms according to union. But if the paradigm is one^ after the same manner also the demiurgic cause is one. For as there is one image from one paradigm, thus also the progeny being one;, derives its subsistence from one demiurgus and father. For it is ineoessary that the paradigmatic cause slionld either be the same with the damiosgusy and shoold be eataUished ia him, or that it should be prior to CHAR Xnr. OF PLATO. 545 the demiurgus, as we say it is, or that it should be posterior to the demiurgus, as some think proper to assert.
If however, the paradigm and the demiurgus are the same, the demiur* gus will be one according to Plato. For the paradigm is only-begotten, as he demonstrates. But if the demiurgus exists prior to the paradigm, which it is not lawful to assert, but the paradigm is one, much more will the demiurgus be one. For the causes which are more elevated are allotted a more unifoim hypostasis; since also the first cause of wholes is one. And if the paradigmatic cause has indeed the first order in beings^ but the demiurgic cause the second order, and this universe the last order, being the resemblance of the former, and the progeny of the latter, how is it possible since the extremes are monadic, the middle multitude should be without the monad? For it is necessary that the paradigm being intelligible, should impart by illumination a greater degree of union to the universe than the demiurgic cause* And as the paradigo^ being only-begotten, comprehends in itself the first paradigms, after the same manner it is necessary that the demiurgic monad should be compr^ hensive of many demiurgi. For if the world derives its only-begottea subsistence from the paradigm, but through tlie deoEiiurgus, the demi^ urgus also is indeed entirely one.
Farther still, I think that those who are the patrons of this opinion should direct their attention to that assertion of Socrates, that it is every where fit the many should be comprehended in the one. For on account of this we admit the hypothesis of forms [or ideas], and prior to other things we preestablish intellectual monads. How therefore are intellec- tual forms extended to one principle, and how do each of them proceed from one demiurgic cause, but the whole demiurgic form is multiplied^ and divided prior to the indivisible monad? For it is necessary that as all equals, whether they are intellectual, or psychical, or sensible, should be suspended from one first equality, all beautiful things, from beauty itself, and the many every where, from primary beings, thus also it is necessary that the multitude of demiurgi should be suspended fi*om one fabrication, and should subsist about one demiurgic monad. For how can it be lawful to leave the one in forms rather than in the Gods? For 544 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
forms indeed, have their hypostasis mingled with multitude; but the Gods are defined according to union itselfl If therefore all the multi*^ tudes of forms are the progeny of monads, much more are the orders of the Gods allotted peculiarities which originate from monads, and which throu^ monads are inherent in multitudes. But if this be the cas^, it is necessary that the whole demiurgus should subsist prior to the multitude of demiurgi, and that the three demiurgi slK)uld distribute the one cause of the generation of the universe.
Again therefore we assert from the beginning that it is necessary the demiurgic principle should either be one, or many, or one, and many. But if indeed, it is one alone, and the multitude in the world, and the different order which it contains subsist similarly from one demiurgic principle, how are mortal and immortal natures the progeny of the same cause without a medium? For all the natures that proceed from the one fabrication are immortal. But if the demiurgic principle is many only^ wlience is the common form of hyparxis communicated to the multitude^ if it does not originate from* one? For as the final cause is one, viz. the goodj as the paradigmatic cause is one, viz. animal itself, and as the world is a generated one, thus also after the same manner, the demiurgic cause is one. But if there are one and many demiurgic principles, whether does the one principle belong to partial or to total genera? If however, it belongs indeed to partial genera, bow is it extended to the first and intelligible paradigm? For the supermundane genera subsist about the intellectual Gods, and according to intellectual paradigms. For being partial, they entirely assimilate the natures posterior to themselves to intellectuals, co-ordinately to themselves. Or how will it any longer preserve the union of total fabrication which produces wholes totally? For a thing of this kind pertains to no partial natiu*e; but it belongs to a partial principle, to produce parts either totally ' or partially, as we before observed. But if the demiurgic principle belongs to the total orders, it is necessary that it should either be inteUigible or intellectual, or intelli- gible and intellectuaU If however, it is of an intelligible nature, how is ' oAixo)^ 16 omitted ia tbe original.
f V CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO- ' 3^ it divisive of wholes? How is it co-arranged with mundane natures? How is it said to fashion the universe? How from the genera of being •does it produce souU and the natures posterior to soul? For [on this hypothesis] we must admit that all these ane in intelligibles, viz. figure; the genera of being, and these divided, the similar and the dissimilar, and other things through which the demiurgic principle constitutes the whole world. But if the demiurgic principle is of an intelligible and at the same time intellectual nature, how does he produce participated intellect? How does he separate the multiform orders of souls? How does he divide the parts, or the circles that are io them? For that whidi is generative of participate intdlect, is imparticipable intellect. And that which has the pow^r of dividing multitude will not [on this liypothesis] differ from that which connects the total genera of the Gods. And in short, the demiurgHS of wholes, is called byTimaeus intellect, and is frequently said to see, to discover, and to reason, but he is no where denominated by him intelligible and at the same tisie intellectual. For the intelligible and at the same time intellectua] Godsi divide all things triadically. But the demiurgus, at one time indeed, divides the wodd into five parts, and at another divides the cirdes of the soul into hebdomads, that he may generate either the celestial spheres, or the seven parts of the soul. We must say therefore, that he is entirely secondary to the intelligible and at the same time intdlectual Gods, and he is the cause of secondary goods to the world. But we must refer to those Gods the cause of united forms and reasons. That the demiurgic intellect however, is &a intellectual God, is I think tbrpugh tl^ese things jnfficiently apparent at present.
CHAPTER XV.
Birv Plato appears to me ta have indicated the peculiarity of this God in a remarkable manner, by calling him intellect, and asserting that be Bees intelligibles, but admitting that they are visible to him according; to iiatm^e. For that which is truly intellect, and which establishes itself according to this hyparxis, is intellectual intellect. For intelligible intdi'^ lect alsoy is indeed simply intelligible, and is of that allotment; but is^ Mid to be intellect! as being the cause of every intellectual nature. And the intellect of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, has not its own nature unmingled with the intelligible. But intel- lectual intellect alone, k peculiarly intellect, being allotted the intellec* tual itself in intellectuals; just as the most principal of inlelligibles, is^ primarily, the firet, and the highest intelligible, which we denominate the- one being, and that which is occultly being. This therefore is that which, is simply intelligible. But that which is simply intellect is intellec-*^ tual intellect. For the int^igible indeed possesses the summit, but intellect the end of wholes. And the intermediate natures partly pertain? to the intelligible, and partly to intellect, and the intellectual nature- And the inteUigibles indeed, that are primarily so, possess intellect ac- cording to cause; but the first of intellectuals have the intelligibfer according to participation; and the natures that are collective of these,, conjoin the intelligible and intellectual peculiarity together. Since^ therefore, Timaeus also calls the demiurgus intellect indefinitely, and neither denominates him hfe, nor intelligible, in consequence of his pecu* 'liarity being alone intellectual, it is certainly necessary that he should be established at the end of the intellectual Gods.
For there intellect is intellect itself, and is not such an intellect as the Satumian is. For Saturn also is intellect, but he is a pure and incor* CHA^Xy* OFPLATa 547 ruptible intellect, which manifests his supreme empire in intellectuals, transcending the whole intellectual Gods. -But the demiurgus is simply intellect. As therefore, the simply intelligible is the first of intelligibles, so that which is simply intdlect, is the last of intellectuals. For all things are in each of the orders. For in intelligibles life and intellect }>reexist; and in the breadth of life, there are similarly life and intellect. And in intellectuals there is each of the rest. But in intelligibles indeed, being is according to essence, but life and intellect are according to cause. In intellectuals, intellect indeed is according to essence, but being and life are according to participation. And in the intermediate natures^ intellect is according to cause, but being is according to participation, and life according to essence. As therefore, that which is most vital in life is the middle, and as that which is especially intelligible is the summit in being, so in intellectuals, the extremity is that which is most intellectual. Hence if there is a certain intellect which is simply intel* lect, and a perceiving intellect, this is intellectual intellect, which Plato denominating the demiurgus unfolds to us the most manifest order, which it is allotted in intellectuals. On this account also^ prior to all other things, the demiurgus constitutes participated intellect, as'Timaeus says« For placing intellect in soul, and soul in body, he fashioned the universe. Energizing therefore, according to his own essence, and producing by his very being, he constituted the intellect of the universe prior to all othec things. For every participated proceeds from imparticipable intellect. Hence, as if Plato had said, that the generative cause which gives sub- sistence to participated intelligible, is that which is primarily being, so since the demiurgus first produces intellect from himself, he will be im- participable and intellectual intellect. From these things therefore, it is evident what the hyparxis of the demiurgus and father is, and what order it is allotted in intellectuals according to Timaeus.
348 ^^ '^^ THEOLOGY BOOK Yl.
CHAPTER XVf: Let us however after another manner syllogistically collect the pecuy fiaritj of the demiurgus, receiving from the Timaeus the principles of the arguments on this subject. This therefore is known to every one, that: Tlma^us calls the whole demiurgus fabricator and father, in the beginning; of what he says concerning him. For he says,." It is difficult to discover the fabricator and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men.'' Hence, he does not think fit to call. him either father alone, or fabricator alone, nor again connecting the two,^ &ther and fabricator, but on the contrary, he places the fabricative prior, to the paternal. Now therefore, we must show in the first place, in what respect fabricator and father differ from each.other; and in the pext place,, in addition to this, who the fabricator alone is, and who father and fa- bricator is, and how the fabricative and at the same time paternal pecik- liarity, is considered by Plato as adapted to the demiurgus* If therefore,. we divide all things into the Gods, and the progeny of the Gods, and this is tlie same thing as to divide them into superessential monads, and the progis^ions of beings, father indeed will be generative of the Gods and superessential unities;. but fabricator will give subsist- ence to essences and beings. For again, according to this reason Timaeus says, that the natures which are generated by the demiurgus are equal to the Gods; for the demiurgus is not only fabricator, but also father; but that those which are produced by the junior Gods, are allotted a mortal nature. For these Gods are alone producers and fabricators of things which participate of existence alone, and not of the superessential pecu^ liarity. Hence through that by which they suffer a diminution with re- spect to the demiurgic monad, through this they are not allotted a power generative of things equal to the Gods. And through that by which the^ CHAP. XVr; OF PLATO. 349 intellectual demiurgus is expanded above the junior Gods, through this he binds to himself the generations of all mundane natures. ' But if again, we diride beings into the total and partial, father indeed, will appear to us to be the hypostatic cause of wholes, but fabricator of partial natures. For the former is the cause exemptly of things that are generated; but the latter proximately. And the former, produces indeed by his very being, energy giving perfection to his hyparxis; but the latter produces by energizing, his hypostasis being fixed according to energy. If also we again separately divide the generations of perpe- tual and' mortal natures, we must refer the generation of perpetual na» tures to the paternal cause, but the generation of mortal natures to the iabricative cause. For the fabricator indeed produces that whidi is ge- nerated from non-being to being. For the Elean guest defines the effective art to be this. But the father constitutes things posterior ta hiinself consubsistent with himself. For he is father by his very being, and has the power of generating united with himself. Each therefore, I mean the paternal and the effective or fabricative, is assimilated to the principle of bound. And the former indeed is the cause of union, but the latter of the production of forms. And the former is the cause of wholes, but the latter of an extension as far as to parts. And the one' indeed; is the primary leader of simple, but the other of composite na* turcs; Again however, in^ these the generative cause, and the cause which is productive of life, are opposed to each other; because the paternal cause indeed is connascent with generative powers, but the eflFective witli vivific powers. And as the paternal and the effective causes pertain to the coordination of bound, so every thing prohfic and vivific, pertains to vivification, and the first infinity.
These things, however, being thus divided by us, it is evident that the paternal indeed, is itself by itself primarily in the intelligible Gods. For they are the fathers of wholes, being fixed according to supreme intelligi* We union. And on this account, Plato also calls the first God father, from the natures which are proximately established after him, transfer- ring to him the appellation of father. For every where indeed, it is usual with Plato ta introduce names to the ineffable from secondary causes,.* 350 ^N THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
and tlie causes which are postecici: to it.^ But at one tune indeed, he introduces the namei^ from all beings, and at another from the first bdlags. For it oeilher was nor is la^wful to refer names to him who is exempt from all beings^ from subordinate natures, and which are placed in an order verj remote from him. If therefore, all beingns participate of the paternal peculiarity, we must say that Plato gives this name to the one from aU beings; for there is. not among all beinga such a cause as this. Hence it is evident that Plato introduces to the one an appellation of this kind^ fi*ora that which is the first and hi^est in the Gods. The intelligible Gods^ however, are more ancient than all ^ divine orders, and subsist immediately after the one. The pftitemal cause therefore of beings is ia the intelligible Gods, and the intelligible Gods are the Others of all the divine genera; being established in the highest essences, and occultly pro* ducin^ wholes. And the first God indeed, is beyond the appellation of father, as he is likewise beyond all other names; and he is neither properly called the goody or the one^ through his inefiable and unkiiown transcen- dency.!l^t the intelligible Gods are primarily superessential unities and goodnesses, and are the exempt fathers of beings.
The paternal peculiarity, therefore, ori^nates supernally from the first intelligible triad; but the fabricative first presents itself to the view in the third triad. For that which generates all forms, and adorns all things with forms is the third triad of intelligibles. For there, as we have said, all-perfect animal subsists, which is comprehensive of the first and intel- ligible paradigms. Here therefore, the effective also or fabricative at the same time subsists. For animal itself constitutes the Gods, and produces the forms of all beings. Hence it is allotted the paternal peculiarity, according to the divine cause, but according to the formal cause, it un- folds into light the effective principle of wholes. But again, on the con- trary, the effective and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is allotted its hypostasis in the demiurgic monad. Hence also the demiurgus of wholes is the hypostatic cause of Gods. In a particular manner however, he fabricates the world, energizing with forms and demiurgic reasons. For he constitutes intellect, souls and bodies, adorning all things with formts^some indeed with first, others with middle, and others with last forms.
CHAP. XVL OF PLATO. 351 Pa you not see, therefore, how the end of intelligibles indeed, was paternal sxid at the same time effective; but the end of intellectuals is^ elective and at the same time paternaL There however, the paternal peculiarity is more predominant; but here the effective. For in both indeed, both causes preexist; nevertheless in the paradigm [i. e. in ani- mal itself 3 the paternal is more prevalent,^ but in the demiurgus tte effective. For the former produces by his very being; but the latter by energizing. And in the former indeed, fabrication [or effective energy] is essential; but in the latter essence is effective. Forms also are with both; but in the former intelligibly, and in the latter intellectually. Frona these things therefore^ it is evident, that the demiurgic cause subsists analc^us to the paradigmatic cause; and that it has the same order with respect to intellectuals, as that has with respect to intelligibles. And on this account Timaeus also says that the demiurgus of wholes was extended to thit paradigm. For he says, ^ Whatever ideas intellect perceived by the dianoetic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for the universe to contain.'* And together with this analogy^ there is a diminution of the intellectual with reference to the intelligible. For the latter is more united; but the former is more separated. And the one indeed is preestablished in the order of the desirable; but the ether is moved about the desirable. And the one fills with paternal power; but tlie other absorbs as it were and embosonis the whole prolific abundance of the desirable. And after this manner^ the demiurgus of the universe is all-perfect, receiving whole intelligible powers, from all-perfect animal. For the universe is threefold; one indeed being intelligibly [all]; another intellectually; and another sensibly. For the world is perfect,, from perfect natures, as Timaeus says. And animal itself is perfect ac- cording to all things, as the same Timaeus asserts. The demiurgus like- wise, being the best of causes, is all-perfect.
Again therefore, resuming what we have said, we repeat, that the paternal cause commences from the supreme union of intelligibles; but the paternal' and at the same time effective cause is consubsistent in the intelligible paradigm; and the effective and at the same time paternal cause is defined according to the whole demiurgus^ But the cause which 35^ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V^ is alone ^flfective and fabricative, pertains to the junior Gods who give subsistence to partial and mortal tilings. The peculiarity therefore of the demiurgic cause is effective and paternal. And this Tifnaeus asserts, j\ot only in the beginning of the discourse about it;, in which he says, " [To discover] therefore, the artificer and father of Ihis.univ.erse, &c.;*' but also in the speech to the junior Gods, he does Jthe same thing; for the jdemijurgus in a similar manner says to them: " Gods of Gods of whom I am the demiurgus and father, [Whatever is generated by me is indissolju- J>le, I being willing that it should be so.]" For he does not call himself Jather and demiurgus, but demiurgus and fatiier, just as there [Timaeus calls him] fabricator and father. And not in the Timaeus only is this jxiode of the arrangement of the names defined, but in the Politicus also^ .the Elean guest speaking. about the world says that it imitates theinstruc- vtion of its demiurgus and father; and in the beginning indeed, he uses ^hese jiames more accurately, but in the end more negligently. Since Plato therefore, every wherje preserves this.order of names unchanged, it is evident to those who are not entirely uoskilled in things of this kind^ that be defines the demiurgic monad According to this peculiarity^ and Jthat he considers it to be effective and at the same time paternal. For because indeed, it is the end of the intellectual triad, it is allotted a pa- ^mal transcendency with res|)ect to all the second genera of Gods; but because it ptroduces from itself all the partial genera and species of beings^ jt possesses an effective cause of the natures to which it gives subsistence. And because indeed, it js father, power is in it, and at the same time in- tellect. jFor the deiroiurgus himself says, " Imitating the power which I emtployed in your generation.^' And again, Timaeus says concerning the jdemiurgus; " Whatever ideas intellect perceived in animal itself, such and so many he conceived by the dianoetic energy it necessary for thi$ universe to contain.*' Hence he is father, and the power of JLhe father is in him^ and intellect. All these however, arje in him intellectually, and jiot intelligibly. Hence, I think he is called father indeed, not simply^