necessarily be incorporeal, and impartible according to its own nature.
For if this also is itself corporeal, it is either wholly in each of the parts, or not wholly. If therefore, it is indeed wholly in each, it will itself be separated from itself. For the parts in which it is are separate from each other. But if it is not wholly in each of the parts, this also will be divisible, and will have parts after the same manner as the above mentioned parts; and there will again be the same inquiry concerning these, viz. whether in these also there is something common, or nothing; since if there is nothing common, we shall place _the many_ separate from _the one_.
Let us however consider the whole; for every body is a whole, and has parts. What therefore will that be which is connective of the parts, since they are many? For it is necessary to say either that the whole is unific of the parts, or the parts of the whole, or that some third thing prior to both, which is neither a whole, nor has any part, connects and unites the whole with its parts, and the parts with the whole. But if the whole indeed is connective of the parts, the whole will be incorporeal and impartible. For if it is a body, this also will be partible, and will be indigent of a nature which is capable of connecting the parts; and this will be the case to infinity. But if the parts are connective of the whole, how can _the many_ be connective of _the one_; and things divided, of that which consists from them? For on the contrary, it is necessary that _the one_ should have the power of uniting _the many_, and not _the many_ of uniting _the one_. And if that which connects both, is neither a whole nor has parts, it will be perfectly impartible. But being impartible, it is also necessarily without interval. For every thing which has interval has parts, and is divisible. But being without interval it is incorporeal; for every body possesses interval.
Farther still, it is necessary that the principle should be perpetual; for every being is perpetual or corruptible. Hence it must be admitted that the principle of beings is perpetual or corruptible. But if we should grant that this may be corrupted, there will be no being incorruptible. For the principle being destroyed, it will neither be itself generated from any thing, nor will another thing be generated from it. For it can neither be able to generate itself (since it is not, if it is not perpetual) nor can another thing be able to generate it, if it is the principle of all things. But if it is incorruptible, it will have the power of not being corrupted, and this power will be infinite, in order that it may exist to infinity through the whole of time. For every finite power of existence pertains naturally to that which is corruptible. But an infinite power pertains to perpetual natures, the existence of which continues to infinity. This infinite therefore, I mean the infinite according to power, is either impartible or partible. But if it is partible indeed, there will be the infinite in a finite body. For the principle is finite; since if it were infinite, there will be nothing else besides itself. But if it is impartible, the power of infinitely existing will be incorporeal.
And the principle of beings is incorporeal,[140] so far as it is this power through which the subject of it always is. That it is impossible therefore, the principle of beings can be corporeal is from these things evident.
If however it is incorporeal, it must either be separate, or inseparable from bodies. But if inseparable indeed, it will have all its energies in bodies, and subsisting about them. For that is inseparable from body which is not any where naturally adapted to energize except in and with bodies. But if the principle is a thing of this kind, it is evidently necessary that none of the things which subsist according to it should be more powerful, or possess greater authority than the principle of all beings. If however, nothing is more excellent in bodies than the power which subsists in and energizes about bodies, and a corporeal essence, there will not any where be intellect and the power which energizes according to intellect. For every such like motion [i.e. energy] proceeds from a power, which is entirely in its energies independent of body. But it neither was, nor is lawful for generated natures to surpass the power of their causes.
For every thing which is in the things begotten is from primary natures, and the latter are the lords of the essence of the former.
If therefore, the principle of beings is able to generate intellect and wisdom, how is it possible it should not generate it, on account of and in itself? For one of two things is necessary, either that intellectual perception pertains in no respect to beings, or that it is inferior to them; and that if it exists it acts in bodies only. These things however, it is impossible to assert. But if that which is the first of beings, and which is the principle of all things is separate from bodies, it is perfectly necessary to admit that it is either immoveable or moved. And if indeed it is moved, there will be something else prior to it, about which it is moved. For every thing which is moved, is naturally adapted to be moved about something else which is permanent. And farther still, besides this, it is moved through desire of another thing. For it is necessary indeed that it should be moved in consequence of desiring a certain thing; because motion itself by itself is indefinite. But the end of it is that for the sake of which it subsists. It desires however, either something else, or itself. But every thing which desires itself is immoveable. For why should any thing that is present with itself want to be in another thing? For of things which are moved, the motion of that is less to which the good is nearer, but the motion is greater of that to which the good is more remote. But that which possesses good in itself, and for the sake of which it subsists, will be immoveable and stable; since being always in itself, it is in good. That however which is in itself is in same; for each thing is the same with itself. But of that which is in itself we say indeed that it stands still and is immoveable; while that which is not immoveable, is not in itself but in another, is moved towards another thing, and is perfectly indigent of good. If therefore the principle of beings is moved, but every thing which is moved is moved through the want of good, and towards another thing which is the object of desire to it, there will be something else which is desirable to the principle of beings besides itself, and about which possessing a sameness of subsistence, we must say it is moved. This however is impossible. For the principle is that for the sake of which all things subsist, which all things desire, and which is indigent of nothing.
For if it were in want of something, it would be entirely subordinate to that of which it is in want, and to which its energy is directed as the object of desire. But if the principle is immoveable (for this is what remains,) it is necessary that it should be one incorporeal essence, possessing an eternal sameness of subsistence. After what manner, however, does it possess _the one_? And how is it one essence?
For if essence and _the one_ are the same, it must be admitted that the principle of beings is essence. But if essence is different from _the one_, it must be granted that to be _the one_ is not the same thing as to be essence. And if, indeed, essence is better than _the one_, according to this it must be said to be with the principle. But if _the one_ is better than essence and beyond it, _the one_ is also the principle of essence. And if they are coordinate to each other, the many will be prior to _the one_.[141] This, however, is impossible as we have before demonstrated. It is evident, indeed, that essence is not the same as _the one_. For it is not one and the same thing to say one, and that essence is one; but the former is not yet a sentence, and the latter is. To which may be added, that if essence and _the one_ are the same, multitude will be the same as that which has no existence, and which is not essence. This, however, is impossible. For in essence the many are contained, and in that which is not essence is _the one_. But if essence and _the one_ are not the same, they will not be coordinate to each other; for if they were coordinate there will be some other thing prior to them, if it is necessary that all things should subsist from one principle. And if one of these is better than the other, either _the one_ is prior to essence, or essence is prior to _the one_.
But if _the one_ indeed is prior to essence, this and not essence is the principle of all things. For it is necessary that nothing should be better than the principle. And if essence is prior to _the one_, _the one_ will be passive to essence, and not essence to _the one_.
But if _the one_ is passive to essence, it is necessary that _the one_ and essence should be every thing, and that all such things as are one should be essence, but not that all such things as are essence should be one. There will, therefore, be a certain essence deprived of _the one_. If, however, this be the case, it will be nothing. For that which is deprived of _the one_ is nothing. Hence _the one_ is prior to essence.
But if that which is first is something which is not essence, it is absurd to assert that it is subordinate to essence. For the principle is that which has the greatest power and the most absolute authority, and is most sufficient to itself, and is not that which is most ignoble, and indigent of the many. And, in short, it is necessary that no secondary nature should be better than the principle; for it is requisite that beings should not be governed badly. But if, indeed, the principle has an order subordinate to the things which proceed from it, and the things proceeding from it are better than it, all things will be badly confounded, nor will the principle according to nature be any thing else than something which is not the most excellent of things, nor will things which proceed from the principle possess from it a power of ruling over their principle. The principle of beings, therefore, will indeed be fortuitous, and also the beings which are its progeny. But this is impossible. For things which are fortuitous (if to have a fortuitous subsistence is this, not to exist according to intellect, nor with a view to a definite end) are disorderly, infinite, and indefinite, and are all of them things which have a less frequency of subsistence. But the principle is invariably principle, and other things proceed from it. If however, that which is not essence is better than all essence, it will either be participated by it, or it will be entirely imparticipable. If, however, essence participates of the principle, of what will it be the principle? And how will it be the principle of all beings? For it is necessary that the principle of beings should be no one of beings; since if it were any one of them, it is necessarily not the principle of all beings. But every thing which is participated by another thing is said to be that by which it is participated, and in which it primarily is. The principle, however, is separate, and belongs in a greater degree to itself than to other things. Besides, every thing which is participated proceeds from another more excellent cause; since that which is imparticipable is better than that which is participable. It is not, however, possible to conceive any thing better than that which is most excellent, and which we call the principle. For it is not lawful to assert that things secondary to the principle, and which proceed from it, are in any respect better than their principle. The cause therefore of all beings is above all essence, is separate from every essence, and is neither essence, nor has essence as an addition to its nature. For such an addition as this is a diminution of simplicity, and of that which is one.
CHAPTER III.
See, therefore, the third argument after these, leading us to the same conclusion with the former arguments. For it is necessary that the cause of all beings should be that of which all beings participate, to which they refer the subsistence of themselves, and which separates itself from nothing that in any respect whatever is said to have an existence. For this alone is the object of desire to beings, which primarily, or in some other way, is itself the cause of their subsistence. And it is necessary that every thing which is produced with reference to, and on account of it, should have a certain habitude with relation to it, and through this also, a similitude to it. For every habitude of one thing towards another, is predicated in a twofold respect, either from both participating of one thing, which affords to the participants a communion with each other; or from one of them participating of the other; of which, indeed, the one as being more excellent, imparts something to that which is subordinate to itself; but the other, as being inferior, is assimilated to the more excellent nature, so far as it participates of it. Hence it is necessary, if all sensible natures possess a habitude to that which is first, aspire after, and subsist about it, either that there should be a certain third thing the cause of the habitude, or that the principle should impart to the natures posterior to itself, a tendency to itself, and that desire, through which every thing is preserved, and exists.
Nothing else, however, is more excellent than that which is first.
Hence, the habitude of beings, their existence, and their tendency to the first, are derived from thence. And all things participate of the principle of themselves, if it is necessary that this which is participated, should from thence become apparent in all beings, since it is the principle of all things, and deserts no being whatever.
What, therefore, will this nature be, which is every where, and in all beings? Is it life and motion? But there are indeed many things which are deprived of these. Is, therefore, permanency every where, and in all things? But neither is this true. For motion, so far as it is motion, will not participate of permanency. Is much-honoured intellect, therefore, so far as it is intellect, participated by all beings?
But this also is impossible. For all beings would have intellectual perception, and no being would be deprived of intellect.
Shall we say, therefore, that being itself and essence are participated by all things that in any respect whatever have a subsistence? But how is this possible? For that which is in generation, or passing into existence, is said to be, and is destitute of essence. Nor must we wonder, if it also, since it ranks among beings, should now participate of essence. For so far as it is in generation, it is not; but it ends in existence and essence when it is now actually generated, and is no longer rising into existence. All things, therefore, that have in any respect whatever a subsistence, do not participate of essence. What then will that be which is every where and by all things participated?
Let us consider every being, and see what that is to which all beings are passive, and what it is which is common in all of them, as in essence, sameness, difference, permanency, and motion. Can we say, therefore, that each of these is any thing else than one thing, and not only separately, but this is also the case with the things which subsist from them; and in short, it is not possible in a certain respect to speak otherwise of all things, than this, that all things, and each thing is one. For if any thing should be deprived of _the one_, though you should speak of parts, or of beings, immediately, that which becomes destitute of _the one_, will be altogether nothing. Or with what intention do we say that a thing which is not is perfectly nothing, [or not even one thing] unless _the one_ is the last thing which deserts beings? This it is, therefore, to become that which in no respect is, and to be perfectly deprived of _the one_. For it is possible for that which is not moved to be, and for that which has no being to have an hyparxis; but that which is not even one thing, and which is destitute of _the one itself_, will be entirely nothing. Hence _the one_ is present with all beings; and though you should speak of multitude itself, it is necessary that this also should participate of _the one_; for if it does not become one thing, it is not possible for it to subsist. And if even you divide the whole to infinity, immediately nothing else than one occurs. For either that which is divided does not subsist, or becoming to be, or subsisting something else, it will be immediately one.[142] _The one_, therefore, which is every where apparent, and is in all beings, and which deserts no being whatever, is either derived from _the one_ which is simply one, or from that which is more excellent than _the one_. For it is not possible for _the one_ to be otherwise passive, [i.e. to be consubsistent with something else] than from the first one, to which _the one_ is no longer present, but which is _the one itself_, or nothing else than one.
Again, therefore, from another principle we may arrive at the same conclusion, by speaking as follows: It is necessary either that the causes of beings and things caused should proceed to infinity, and that there should be nothing first or last in beings; or that there should be no first, but that there should be the last of things, infinity existing in one part only. Or on the contrary, it is necessary that beings should proceed to infinity from a definite principle, or that there should be a certain first and last, and a boundary of beings each way. And if there are boundaries of beings, things either proceed from each other, and the generation of beings is in a circle; or if they are not from each other, either one of them is from another, or the first indeed is one, but the last not one, or the contrary, or both are one, or each is not one. If, therefore, first things, and the causes of beings are infinite, each thing will consist of infinites. For that which proceeds from a certain principle, must necessarily participate of that principle from which it proceeds. But that which derives its subsistence from many causes, will be in its own nature multiform, as participating of many powers. And that which is produced from infinites prior to itself, will have infinite peculiarities derived from the principles, and adapted to itself. Every being, therefore, being infinite, and consisting of infinites, will render all things infinitely infinite, and there will neither be a knowledge of any being, nor any evolution of powers. For the power of the infinite is perfectly unknown, and incomprehensible, by those natures to whom it is infinite.
But if things are infinite in a descending progression, whether is each of them infinite always proceeding most downward, in the same manner as we say all things do, or is each whole indeed finite, but the beings which are produced from these are infinite? For if every being according to the beginning of itself is definite, but according to its end is infinite, there will neither be in parts nor in wholes, a conversion of beings to their proper principle, nor will that which is second in order ever have a subsistence so as to be assimilated to the extremity of a preexistent order; though as we frequently say, the summits of inferiors are conjoined with the boundaries of superiors.
For where there is no last, by what contrivance can such a similitude of progression as this, and such a mutual coherence of beings be left, according to which secondary things are always conjoined to the natures prior to them? But if all things alone have an infinity of this kind, each being bounded by that which is posterior to itself, wholes will be subordinate to parts, and the parts of beings will be naturally more perfect [than wholes.] For wholes, indeed, will be without conversion to the principle prior to themselves; but parts will be converted to it after their progression. By how much the more, however, every being hastens to conjunction with that which is more perfect than itself, by so much the more must it necessarily excel, as it appears to me. And if this whole proceeding to infinity is not convolved to the summit of itself, and circularly converted and perfected according to such a conversion [it will not desire its proper good.] If, however, we admit that there is an infinity both ways these things must necessarily happen.
In addition to these things, also, there will be no common object of desire to all beings, nor any union nor sympathy of them. For things which are perfectly infinite have not that which is first in them; but not having a first, we shall not be able to say what is the common end of beings, and why some things are more excellent, but others are allotted a subordinate nature. For we call one thing better and another less excellent, from proximity to that which is best, just as we define the more and the less hot from communion with that which is hot in the first degree. And in short, we form a judgment of the more and the less from a reference to that which is a maximum. It is necessary, therefore, that the boundary in beings should be that which is first and that which is last.
But if, indeed, these are from each other, the same thing will be older and younger, cause and at the same time the thing caused, and each thing will be first and last. For it makes no difference, whether these are from each other, or the things which subsist between these.
For the extremes being indifferent, how is it possible that a mutation according to essence should intervene? But if the one is from the other, whether is the first derived from the last, as some say, who generate things more excellent from things subordinate, and things more perfect from such as are more imperfect? In this case, however, must not that which is allotted the power of generating and producing the perfect, by a much greater priority perfect and adorn itself by its present power? And how is it possible that leaving itself to be of an inferior allotment it should definitely assign a more excellent order to another thing? For every thing aspires after its proper perfection, and simply desires good; though not every thing is able to participate of a thing of this kind. If, therefore, it has the power of producing this most perfect thing, that which is last will energize on account of itself prior to other things, and the whole of good, and all perfection, will be first established in itself.
But if that which is last is produced from that which is first, and the most imperfect from that which is most perfect, whether, is each of them one, or is this one, but that not one? If, however, that which is first, or that which is last, is not one, neither of them will be first or last. For, as there will be multitude in each, each of them will have the better and the worse; and neither will that which is best be unmingled with that which is inferior to it, nor that which is the most obscure of all things according to being, have so great a subjection entirely deprived of a more perfect nature; but there will be something more extreme than that which is last, and something more perfect than that which is first. For every where, that which is best if it receives another addition through that which is inferior will be more perfect than that which does not abide in the best, [through not receiving this very addition.] If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, _the one_ is the principle of all things, and the last of beings is one. For it is necessary, I think, that the end of the progression of beings should be assimilated to the principle, and that as far as to this, the power of the first should proceed.
Summarily, therefore, recapitulating what we have said, it is necessary either that the first principle should be one, or that there should be alone many[143] first principles, or one containing multitude in itself, or many participating of one. But if there are many first principles only, there will not be one thing from them. For what will make one and a whole, if there are many principles, and there is nothing which produces one? For it is certainly necessary that things posterior to the principles should be assimilated to them. Either, therefore, there will not be _the one_ in any being, or it will not be from these principles; so that each of the things which in any respect whatever have a subsistence will be divided multitude alone.
And again each of the parts of any being will be a thing of this kind, and we shall in no way whatever stop, dividing into minute parts essence and existence. For all things will be many, and _the one_ will be no where in the universality of things, nor will either wholes or parts be apparent.
But if it is necessary, indeed, that there should be many principles, and that they should participate of _the one_, _the one_ will be coordinated in the many. Again, however, it is necessary, that the uncoordinated should every where be more ancient than the coordinated, and the exempt than the participated. For how is _the one_ in each of the many except from one principle which co-arranges the multitude, and converts it to itself according to the communion of _the one_? Again, if the first one were multiplied, _the one_ will be passive; for at the same time it will be one and not one, and will not be that which is one [only.] It is necessary, however, in each genus of things, that there should be that which is unmingled with an inferior nature, in order that there may be that which is mingled, in the same manner as we say respecting forms. For from the equal itself, things which are equal in these sublunary realms, appear indeed as equal, though they are filled with a contrary nature; and from that which is primarily being, that which is mingled with non-being is derived, and which presents itself to the view as being. And in short every where the simple unmingled subsistence of each thing precedes those things which through remission are mingled with the privations of themselves. _The one_ therefore is by itself exempt from all multitude; and that which is one, and at the same time not one, is not the first one, but is suspended[144] from that which is primarily one; through the principle, indeed, participating of _the one_, but through the diminution arising from multitude, now manifestly exhibiting in itself the cause of separation.
CHAPTER IV.
That _the one_ therefore is the principle of all things, and the first cause, and that all other things are posterior to _the one_, is I think evident from what has been said. I am astonished however at all the other interpreters of Plato, who admit the existence of the intellectual kingdom, but do not venerate the ineffable transcendency of _the one_, and its hyparxis which surpasses the whole of things.
I particularly, however, wonder that this should have been the case with Origen, who was a partaker of the same erudition with Plotinus.
For Origen ends in intellect and the first being, but omits _the one_ which is beyond every intellect and every being. And if indeed he omits it, as something which is better than all knowledge, language and intellectual perception, we must say that he is neither discordant with Plato, nor with the nature of things, But if he omits it because _the one_ is perfectly unhyparctic, and without any subsistence, and because intellect is the best of things, and that which is primarily being is the same as that which is primarily one, we cannot assent to him in asserting these things, nor will Plato admit him, and connumerate him with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind is remote from the philosophy of Plato, and is full of Peripatetic innovation. If you are willing, however, we will adduce some arguments against this dogma, and against all others who are the patrons of this opinion, and we will strenuously contend for the doctrine of Plato, and show that according to him the first cause is beyond intellect, and is exempt from all beings, as Plotinus and Porphyry, and all those who have received the philosophy of these men, conceive him to assert.
We shall begin, therefore, from the Republic; for here Socrates clearly shows that _the good_ is established above being, and the whole intellectual order, following the analogy of the first goodness to the sun. For if, as the sovereign sun is to generation, to every thing visible, and to all visive natures according to the power generative of light, so it is necessary _the good_ should be with reference to intellect and intelligibles, according to a cause productive of truth,--if this be the case, we must say that the sun is exempt at one and the same time from visive and visible natures, and must admit that _the good_ transcends the natures which are always intellective, and also those which are eternally intelligible. It is better, however, to hear the Platonic words themselves: “You may say that the sun not only imparts the power of being seen to visible natures, but also that he is the cause of their generation, increase, and nutriment, not being himself generation. Certainly. We may say, therefore, that things which are known, have not only this from _the good_ that they are known, but likewise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst _the good itself_ is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it both in dignity and in power.” Through all these things, therefore, it is evident how _the good_ and the first principle are defined by Plato to be expanded above not only the intellectual, but also the intelligible extent, and essence itself, according to union, in the same manner as it is inferred the sun surpasses all visible natures, and perfects and generates all things by his light. How, therefore, following Plato, can we admit that intellect is the best of things, and the cause of all things? How can we assert that being itself[145] and essence are the same with the principle which is the leader of all the divine progressions? For essence and intellect are said to subsist primarily from _the good_, to have their hyparxis about _the good_, to be filled with the light of truth proceeding from thence, and to obtain the participation which is adapted to them from the union of this light, which is more divine than intellect itself and essence, as being primarily suspended from _the good_, and affording in beings a similitude to that which is first. For the light which is emitted from the sun causes every thing visible to be solar-form. And the participation of the light of truth renders that which is intelligible boniform and divine. Intellect, therefore, is a god through a light which is more ancient than intellectual light and intellect itself, and that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual participates of a divine hyparxis through a plenitude of this light being appropriately imparted to it.[146] And in short, every divine nature is that which it is said to be, on account of this light, and is through it united to the cause of all beings. By no means, therefore, is the first good to be considered as the same with intellect, nor must it be admitted that the intelligible is more ancient than all the hyparxis of the whole of things, since it is even subordinate to the light proceeding from _the good_, and being perfected by this light, is conjoined according to its own order with _the good itself_. For we must not say that the intelligible is united to the first after the same manner as the light [of truth;] but the latter through continuity with _the good_ is established in it without a medium; while the former, through this light, participates of a vicinity to _the good_; since in sensibles also, the solar light is primarily connascent with the circulation of the sun, ascends as far as to the centre of the whole sphere, and subsists on all sides about it. But all sensible natures through this obtain a similitude to the sun, each of them according to its own nature being filled with solar-form illumination.
These things, therefore, will be sufficient to recall into the memory of those who love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of Plato on this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary to the exempt transcendency of _the one_.
If, however, it is requisite to evince the same thing through many testimonies, let us survey what the Elean guest in the Sophista determines concerning these things. He says, therefore, it is necessary that the multitude of all beings, whether they are contraries or not, should be suspended from the one being, [i.e. from being characterized by the one;] but that the one being itself should be suspended from _the one_. For when we call the hot or the cold, or permanency or motion, being, we do not denominate each of these as the same with being itself. For if permanency were being itself, motion would not be being; or, if motion were such like being, permanency would not participate of the appellation of being. But it is evident that being accedes to permanency, to motion, and to every multitude of beings from one thing which is primarily being. This very thing, therefore, which is the cause of essence to all things, and which is participated by all other things, is a participant of this one, and on this account, as it is being alone, so also it is primarily being.[147] It is, however, being itself indeed, and is not allotted _to be_, from participation; but it is one according to participation, and on this account it is passive to _the one_. But it is being[148] primarily. If, therefore, Plato gives to _the one_ a subsistence beyond being, in the same manner as that which is first in wholes is supposed by him to transcend beings, how is it possible that being should not be posterior to _the one_, since it participates of it, and on this account is denominated one?
Moreover, Socrates in the Philebus clearly demonstrates the same thing to those who are able to know wholes from parts, viz. that intellect has not the same order as the first cause of all.
Investigating, therefore, the good of the human soul and its end, of which participating in every respect sufficiently it will reap the fruits of a felicity adapted to its nature, he in the first place removes pleasure from an end of this kind, and after this intellect, because neither is this replete with all the elements of _the good_. If, therefore, the intellect which is in us is an image of the first intellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not to be defined according to this alone, is it not necessary that in wholes also, the cause of good must be established above intellectual