the multitude of intelligible parts, and that it is connective of all intelligible parts. It must be inferred therefore that this triad is the first cause of production and fabrication. For if it contains the primary paradigms of things, it is evident that the orderly distribution of secondary natures, originates from it. And if it is an animal constitutive of all animals, every psychical extent, and all the extent of bodies, have their progression from thence; and it will also comprehend the intelligible causes of all the vivific and demiurgic orders.
CHAPTER XX.
Such conceptions therefore, as these, may be assumed from what is written in the Timæus concerning the three intelligible triads, conformably to what is said of them in the Philebus, surveying in each bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. If you are willing also, we will show from what is scattered in the Sophista, that Plato had the same conception as we have concerning the first principles. The Elean guest therefore, in that dialogue, doubting against the assertion of Parmenides that the universe is one, unfolding intelligible multitude, and showing how it is suspended from _the one_, at first indeed, he argues from the one being [or being characterized by the one] and reminds us that this is passive to _the one_, and participates of _the one_, but is not _the one itself_, nor that which is primarily one.
But afterwards, he produces the conception of the distinction between the imparticipable one and being, from whole. For if the one being is a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has parts, and that which has parts, is not _the one itself_, the one being will not be the same as _the one_. In the third place therefore, he argues from the all-perfect. For that which is perfectly divided, and is connective of many parts, can never have the same subsistence as that which is entirety one. And having proceeded thus far he shows that what is void of multitude, is in its own nature exempt from the one being, proceeding in the demonstration of this through three arguments.
And at one time indeed, he begins from the one being, at another time from whole, and at another from all. It is better however to hear the words themselves of Plato. That _the one_ therefore, is not the same with the one being, he proves through the following words. “But what with respect to those who assert that the universe is one? Must we not enquire to the utmost of our power what they say being is? Certainly.
To this question therefore they may answer: Do you say there is one thing alone? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner? They will. What then, do you call being any thing? Yes. Do you call it _the one_, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say?
What will be their answer after this O guest?” Through this therefore, Plato separating _the one_ and being from each other, and showing that the conception of _the one_ is different from that of being, and that these are not the same with each other, evinces that the most proper and primary one is exempt from the one being. For the one being does not abide purely in an hyparxis void of multitude and possessing the form of one. But _the one itself_ is exempt from every addition. For by whatever you may add to it, you will diminish its supreme and ineffable union. Hence it is necessary to arrange _the one_ prior to the one being, and to suspend the one being from that which is one alone. For if _the one_ and the one being were the same, and it made no difference to say one and being (since if they differed, _the one_ would again be changed from the one being,) if therefore _the one_ differs in no respect from the one being, all things will be one, and there will not be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to denominate things, lest there should be two things, the thing and the name. For being exempt from all multitude, and all division, there will neither be a name of any thing, nor any discourse about it, but the name will appear to be the same with the thing. And neither will a name be the name of a thing, but a name will be the name of a name, if a thing is the same with a name, and a name is the same with a thing,[197] and a thing will be the thing of a thing. For all things will exist about a thing the same as about a name, through the union of the thing and the name. If therefore, these things are absurd, and _the one_ is, and also being, and being participates of _the one_, _the one_ and the one being are not the same.
But that whole also is not the same with _the one_, Plato afterwards demonstrates [in the same dialogue,] beginning as follows: “What then?
Will they say that whole is different from the one being, or that it is the same with it? Undoubtedly they will and do say so. If therefore whole is, as Parmenides says, “that which is every where similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this:”--if this be the case, it is necessary that being should have a middle and extremities. And having these, there is every necessity that it should have parts. Or how shall we say? Just so. Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of _the one_ in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one. Undoubtedly.
But is it not impossible that that which suffers these things should be _the one_? Why? Because according to right reason, that which is truly one should be said to be entirely without parts. It must indeed necessarily be so. But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in consequence of consisting of many parts would not accord with _the one_.” Through these things therefore, the Elean guest arguing from wholeness after the one being, and also from the division of the parts of wholeness, demonstrates that the all is not one. For if whole is in beings, as Parmenides in his verses testifies it is, all things will not be _the one_. For _the one_ is impartible; but whole possesses parts. Whole therefore is not _the one itself_. For that transcends all things and wholeness; but whole is passive to _the one_. Hence also it is denominated whole; for it is not _the one itself_. Hence all things are not one void of separation and multiplication.
Moreover, the all is comprehensive of many parts. For whole indeed, consists at first of two parts; but the all possesses a multitude of parts, and participating of wholeness at the same time is all, as being perfectly distributed into parts. This therefore is not _the one itself_, but is passive to _the one_. For _the one itself_ is impartible. But it is impartible in such a manner as to be exempt from all parts. Hence the all is not the same with _the one_. We therefore, have divided whole and the all, but Plato conjoins them, when he says: “Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one.” At the same time however, they are divided after the above mentioned manner. From these three arguments therefore, the Elean guest separates _the one_ from the participants of _the one_, and doubts against those who assert all things to be one, viz. the one being, whole and the all; of which the all indeed participates of whole, and is a self-perfect multitude, consisting of many parts; but whole participates of being. For being is not whole, as Parmenides testifies. These therefore, having such an order as this, is it not necessary that the arguments of Plato should be made conformably to the three intelligible[198] triads? For it was requisite, since Parmenides defined the one being in intelligibles, that Plato should from thence derive his demonstrations of the distinction between _the one_ prior to intelligibles, and the one which is in intelligibles. For the doubts against Parmenides, evince in many places that the one which is participated derives its subsistence from the imparticipable union.
_The one_[199] therefore is not in these triads, but the one being and whole. But with respect to the all, it is evident that it is in the extremity of the intelligible order. For that which is in every respect perfect, and all intelligible multitude, have their subsistence in that extremity. But whole is in the middle centre, and in the bond of the intelligible breadth. For whole is adapted to have a subsistence prior to the all; since the all is a whole, but whole is not necessarily all.
For the all is divided multitude; but that which contains multitude in itself, and which is not yet separated is whole. And this especially pertains to eternity. For eternity is the measure of all intelligible multitude, just as whole is the coherence and union of the all. But the one being is in the first triad. For _the one_ is especially the peculiarity of this triad, as Timæus also has demonstrated. And being which is occultly and intelligibly being, and which is the cause of essence to all other things, primarily shines forth there. Again therefore, following the Elean guest, three triads present themselves to our view; the first indeed according to the one being; the second according to whole; and the third according to the all. To which also the demiurgus of the universe looking, adorns the sensible universe, defining the visible nature with reference to that intelligible all; but time with reference to the intelligible wholeness. On which account also time is continued. And as the intelligible whole comprehends two parts, but contains the parts in one boundary, after the same manner, time also is bounded by _the now_, but by its twofold parts is infinite. These things therefore, we shall shortly after more fully discuss when we speak concerning the Parmenides. For the conceptions of the Elean guest are the _proteleia_ of the mysteries of the Parmenides.
Before however we turn to the Parmenides, let us discuss, if it is agreeable to you, the three triads from the beginning, collecting the conception of Plato from his assertions that are scattered in many places.
CHAPTER XXI.
There are three triads therefore, as we have frequently observed, and they are divided after this manner into bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. Hence there are triple intelligible bounds, triple infinities, and triple mixtures. But of every intelligible triad, the bound in each is denominated father; the infinite, power; and that which is mixed, intellect. And let not any one apprehend that these names are foreign from the philosophy of Plato. For it will appear that he uses these appellations in the before mentioned triads more than any one. For he denominates the first God father and lord in his Epistles. It is evident however, that as the first God surpasses even the paternal order, the first paternal is in the intelligible Gods. For these are they that are most eminently allied to _the one_, and that intelligibly unfold his ineffable and unknown union. If therefore the first God is denominated one and father from the natures that proximately proceed from him,--if this be the case, as the intelligible Gods are primarily unities, so likewise they are primarily fathers.
For Plato gives names to the ineffable in a twofold respect, either from the summits of beings, or from all beings. For through these the transcendency of the one is known. Moreover, the Elean guest calls being that which is powerful and power. The first power therefore exists prior to being, and is united to the father; but it particularly accords with being, which also it fills. Hence being as participating of power is denominated powerful; but as united to it, and producing all beings according to it, it is called power. If however both Plato himself, and his most genuine disciples, frequently call all [true] beings intellect (on which account, in many places they make three principles, _the good_, intellect and soul, denominating every [true] being intellect) you will also have the third in these intellect. But it is necessary not to be ignorant of the difference.
For with respect to intellect, one kind is intellect as with reference to hyparxis. For when we denominate the unity in each triad intelligible, as the object of desire to being, and as filling being, then we call that which ranks as the third in the triad intellect. For it is intelligible as essence and intellect, but not as the intellect of essence, but of father and deity. For every participated deity is intelligible, as being the plenitude of its participant. But another kind is intellect which is the intellect of essence; according to which we say that the being of the third triad, is the intellect of that which is primarily being. For this is essential intellect, being allotted its own essence by energizing.[200] For all things are essentially in it, and both the more simple genera, and the primary paradigms; for it is intelligible intellect. But the third kind is intellectual intellect, which subsists analogous to intelligible intellect, is conjoined with it, and is filled from it, possessing intellectually those things which are in the other intelligibly. And in short, it is necessary every where that such things as are first according to each series, should have the form of the things that are prior to them. Hence also they are called things first, and possess a certain transcendency of essence towards coordinate natures. Since therefore, that which is prior to intelligibles is God, the first intelligibles are Gods and unities. And since the intelligible is essential, the first intellects are essences. Since also intellect is every where according to its own nature intellectual, the first souls are intellectual. Because likewise, souls are the plenitudes of life, the first of bodies are most vital. And because the bodies that are perpetual are moved in a circle, the summits of material bodies are moved in conjunction with those bodies that are perpetual.
This therefore is the cause why the unities are frequently called intelligibles, and beings intelligible intellects.
That Plato however knew this triad, I mean father, power and intellect, we shall learn by looking to the demiurgic order. For in this the triad is most remarkably apparent. Hence, on account of its union with the intelligible, it is filled with this triad, and possesses these things in a more divided manner than animal itself, or intelligible eternity.
Immediately therefore, in the beginning of the fabrication in the Timæus, the demiurgus calls himself father, “Of which works I am the demiurgus and _father_.” But shortly after he unfolds his power, “Imitating my _power_ in your generation.” This therefore is also wonderful, that he has delivered to us the most theological conception concerning power. For in the first place indeed, he calls it the power of the father, when he says, “Of which works I am the demiurgus and father,” and that the power is his, [is evident from the words,] “Imitating my power:” so that according to Plato power is of the father. And in the next place, he ascribes to this power a peculiarity generative of the whole of things; for this is evident from the words “In your generation.” Power therefore is the cause of generation and of the progression of beings. And in the last place, he delivers the intellectual peculiarity of the demiurgus. “Having thus spoke, again into the former crater in which he had tempered the soul of the universe, he poured mingling the remainder of the former mixture.” For to pour, to mingle, mixture, and to be productive of soul, pertain to intellect. Though what necessity is there for asserting these things, since prior to this he calls the demiurgus intellect. “Whatever ideas therefore _intellect_ perceived by the dianoëtic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for this universe to contain.” Hence the demiurgus is father, and power and intellect. And he possesses these things as much as possible on account of intelligibles. For he is a God as father, on account of them. He is also power, and the generator of wholes, and knows beings intellectually, on account of them. For in them intelligible knowledge first subsists. Much more therefore are father, power and intellect in intelligibles; from which also the demiurgus being filled, participates of this triad. For Plato assumes each of these analogously. For as the paternal triad in intelligibles gives subsistence to intelligible eternity, so the demiurgus makes those works to be indissoluble of which he is the father. And as in intelligibles, eternity proceeding according to all power generates intelligible animal itself, so the demiurgic power gives subsistence to mundane animals that are perpetual and divine, and imparts to the junior Gods another power which is generative of mortal animals. That any one therefore may assume these names from Plato is evident from what has been said.
Since however, being has an hypostasis triply in intelligibles, one is primarily being and prior to the eternal; but another is secondarily being, and the first eternity; and another is being ultimately, and is intelligible and eternal intellect. And here indeed there is being, but there eternity, and there intellect. And eternity is more comprehensive than intellect; but being than eternity. For every intellect is eternal, but not every thing eternal is intellect. For soul according to its essence is eternal, and every thing which participates of eternity, participates also by a much greater priority of being. For with perpetuity of existence, existence is entirely consubsistent.
But that which participates of existence is not universally eternally being. For bodies also participate in a certain respect of the nature of existence, but they are not eternal. Intellect therefore constitutes an intellectual essence only, so far as it is intellect; since so far as it is also life and being it constitutes all things. But eternity constitutes both the intellectual and psychical essence. For the mixture [in the second triad] was intelligible life. But being constitutes the intellectual, the psychical, and the corporeal life.
For matter also is being [most obscurely,] and is capacity indeed, but formless being, and non-being, falling off from the participation of being. If, however, some one should say that it is being in power or capacity, yet it has this power from being. For capacity is the forerunning participation of energy. And thus much concerning these things.
But what sufficient argument of division does Socrates afford us in the Phædrus, concerning these intelligible triads? And how from what is delivered by him may we recur to the conception of the hypostasis of the most principal Gods? Socrates therefore in that dialogue, being inspired by the Nymphs, celebrates every thing divine as beautiful, wise and good, and says that by these the soul is nourished. But if every thing divine is a thing of this kind, this is the case with the intelligible by a much greater priority. And all these indeed are every where, but in the first triad, the good principally subsists; in the second the wise; and in the third the beautiful. For in this there is the most beautiful of intelligibles. But in the second triad truth and the first intelligence subsist. And in the first there is the commensurate, which we say is the same as the good. But Socrates in the Philebus says that the element of the good is the desirable, the sufficient, and the perfect. The desirable therefore pertains indeed to bound; for it is the union and goodness of all the triad, and the triad converges about it. But the sufficient pertains to infinity. For sufficiency is a power capable of pervading to all things, and of being present to all things without impediment. And the perfect pertains to that which is mixed. For this is that which is primarily triadic; since every mixture has its coalition from the triad. The elements therefore of the good unfold to us the first triad; and the elements of intelligible wisdom, the second triad. But every thing wise is full of being, is generative of truth, and is convertive of imperfect natures to their perfection. The full therefore pertains to the second bound; for this is uniformly filled with the participation of the natures prior to itself. For the full is every where adapted to bound, just as that which cannot be filled is adapted to the infinite. But the prolific pertains to the second power, and to infinity. For that which does not abide in the fulness of itself, but is prolific and generative of other things, is especially indicative of divine infinity. And the convertive pertains to that which is mixed. For this as being allotted the end of the triad, converts every thing imperfect to the full, and unites itself prior to other things to the bound of the whole triad.
CHAPTER XXII.
Moreover, the elements of beauty are the peculiarities of the third triad of intelligibles. But these are, as we have before observed, the lovely, the delicate, and the splendid. The lovely therefore, being arranged analogous to the desirable, pertains to bound. But the delicate being coordinate to the sufficient, pertains to the infinite power which is in the beautiful. And the splendid is of an intellectual peculiarity. For this is the beautiful of beauty; is that which illuminates all things, and astonishes those that are able to behold it. And as apparent beauty shining most manifestly, is seen through the clearest of the senses (for the objects of this sense have many differences according to Aristotle, and this sense pervades farther than the rest) so likewise intelligible beauty appears to the intellect of the soul shining intelligibly. Far it is an intelligible form.
And on this account the splendor of beauty is apparent to intellect.
Splendid beauty therefore, as Socrates calls it, shines forth at the extremity of the intelligible order. For this is the most splendid of intelligibles, is intelligible intellect, and is that which emits the intelligible light, that when it appeared astonished the intellectual Gods, and made them admire their father, as Orpheus says. Such therefore is the preparation to the science of the intelligible Gods which may from these things be assumed. And now it will appear how beauty is indeed occultly in the end of the first intelligible triad, but subsists in the third triad so as to have manifestly proceeded into light. For in the former it subsists according to one form only; but in the latter it subsists triadically. It is also evident how each of the triads is at one and the same time a monad and a triad.
For the first triad being characterized according to _the good_, derives its completion from the three elements of _the good_. But the second being characterized by the wise is contained in the triad of wisdom. And the third subsisting according to the beautiful, is all-perfect through the triad of beauty. If however the beautiful is occultly in the first triad, and shines forth triadically in the third, it is evident that intelligible intellect loves the first triad, and has love conjoined with its beauty. And this is the intelligible love of the first beauty. From these therefore, intellectual love proceeds, together with faith and truth, as we have before observed. For the three intelligible monads, the good, the wise and the beautiful, constitute three powers which lead upwards all other things, and prior to other things the intellectual Gods. Concerning these things however, we shall speak hereafter.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Let us now then direct our attention to the theory of the Parmenides.
But I wish again to remind the reader of what we have before demonstrated. It has been shown therefore, that it is necessary to divide the second hypothesis into the whole progressions of the one being; and that this hypothesis is nothing else than the generation and progression of the Gods, proceeding supernally from the supreme union of intelligibles as far as to a deified essence. For the discussion is not, as some say it is, in the first hypothesis, concerning God and the Gods. For it was not lawful to Parmenides to conjoin multitude with _the one_, and _the one_ with multitude. For the first God is perfectly exempt from the whole of things. But in the first hypothesis essence, and even _the one itself_, are taken away from the first God. That such an ablation, however, as this is not adapted to the other Gods is evident to every one. Moreover, neither does Parmenides in the first hypothesis speak about the intelligible Gods, as they say he does; for they assert that the negations are of these Gods, because they are conjoined with _the one_, and in simplicity and union precede[201] all the divine genera. For how can the similar or the dissimilar, or contact and the privation of contact, and all the other particulars which are denied of _the one_, be inherent in the intelligible Gods? They appear indeed to me to be right in asserting that the things which are taken away are similitudes of the Gods; but they do not speak rightly when they say that all of them are similitudes of the intelligible Gods. To which it may be added, in opposition to this assertion, that the discussion is again concerning the intelligible Gods in the second hypothesis. For the things which are denied in the first, are affirmed in the second hypothesis. This therefore, as I have said, is demonstrated that the conclusions with reference to each other have the order of prior and posterior, of causes and effects. It is necessary therefore, that proceeding from the beginning, we should adapt the first conclusions to the first orders, the middle conclusions to the middle orders, and the last conclusions to the last orders, and should demonstrate that as many questions are asked, as there are progressions of the divine orders. And in the first place, we must deliver the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the intelligible Gods, of whom we have proposed to speak; since Plato speaks about these in many places, partly indicating, and partly clearly unfolding his meaning.
It is necessary however, that we should collect into one the elaborate and synoptical theory about each order, since it would not be proper now to repeat the exposition which we have given in our commentaries on that dialogue. But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself, I will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods, following in so doing the divine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus].
For we also through his assistance have with a divine head pursued these sacred paths about the theory of the Parmenides, being agitated with a divine fury, and wakened as from a profound sleep to this arcane mystic discipline. And thus much concerning the mode of the whole of the conclusions. But from hence I shall pass to the narration of the things proposed.
The first and imparticipable one therefore, which preexists beyond the whole of things, and not only beyond the unities that participate, but also those that are participated, is celebrated through the first hypothesis, being demonstrated to be the cause of all things ineffably, but not being defined itself in any one of all things, nor having any power or peculiarity of a kindred nature with the other Gods. But after this [imparticipable one,] that which is alone superessential and surpassing, and unmingled with all hyparxis, is a unity participated by being, and constituting about itself the first essence, and by the addition of this participation becoming more redundant than that which is primarily one. This however is a superessential hyparxis, and the hyparxis of the first intelligible triad. As there are therefore these two things in the first triad, viz. _the one_ and being, and the former generates, but the latter is generated, and the former perfects, but the latter is perfected, it is necessary that the middle of both should be power, through which and together with which _the one_ constitutes and is perfective of being. For the progression of being from _the one_, and its conversion to _the one_, is through power. For what else conjoins being to _the one_, or causes _the one_ to be participated by being except power? For it is the progression of _the one_, and its extension to being. Hence, in all the divine genera powers precede progressions and generations. This triad therefore, _the one_, power and being, is the summit of intelligibles. The first of these indeed producing; the third being produced; and the second being suspended from _the one_, but coalescing with being.
CHAPTER XXIV.
This triad therefore, Parmenides delivers immediately in the beginning of the second hypothesis, adjoining to _the one_ the most simple participation of essence. But he calls it the one being, and says that being participates of _the one_, and _the one_ of being. The participation however of these is different. For _the one_[202] indeed so participates of being, as illuminating and filling, and deifying being; but being so participates of _the one_, as suspended from _the one_, and deified by it. But the habitude which is the middle of both, is not with them void of essence. For neither is the habitude which is among sensibles in no respect being, and much more is this the case with the habitude which is there. But this habitude is biformed. For it is of _the one_, and is connascent with being. For it is the motion of _the one_, and its progression into being. Parmenides delivers this triad, beginning what he says about it as follows: “See therefore from the beginning if _the one_ is. Is it possible then for it to be, and yet not to participate of essence? It is not possible.” But he ends speaking about it in the following words: “Will therefore that which is said be any thing else than this, that _the one_ participates of essence, when it is summarily asserted by any one that _the one_ is?
It will not.” This therefore is the first intelligible triad, the one, being, and the habitude of both, through which being is of _the one_ and _the one_ of being, in a manner perfectly admirable; Plato indicating through these things, that the father is the father of intellect, and that intellect is the intellect of the father, and that power is concealed between the extremes. For deity is the father of the triad, and being is the intellect of this deity. Yet it is not intellect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect of essence. For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the Elean guest says. But that which is primarily being, neither stands still, nor is moved, as he also teaches. The first triad therefore is called one being; since power is here occultly. For the triad does not proceed from itself; but subsists without separation and uniformly, being primarily defined according to divine union. Hence, this is the first participation of essence, which participates of _the one_ through power as the middle, which collects together and separates both _the one_ and being. And it is superessential indeed, but is conjoined with essence. We must never think therefore that all power is the progeny of essence. For the powers of the Gods are superessential, and are consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods. And through this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly therefore, does poetry every where assert that the Gods are able to do all things. For essential powers indeed are not capable of effecting all things; since they are not constitutive of superessential natures. The first triad therefore, is through these things unfolded to us by Parmenides.
CHAPTER XXV.
But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterizes by intelligible wholeness, as we have shown in the Sophista. For the first triad being uniform, and possessing all things intelligibly and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power and being, so that power which is the cause of division, subsisting between _the one_ and being, is concealed, and becomes apparent through the communion of the extremes with each other,--the second triad proceeds, being characterized by the first intelligible power, and having the monads in itself distinguished from each other. For all things being united and without distinction in the first triad, distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being also and power are more divided from each other. And that which consists of these is no longer one being [or being characterized by _the one_,] but is a whole, so that it has _the one_ and being in itself as parts. For above indeed [i.e. in the first triad] all things are prior to parts and wholeness. But in this triad there are both parts and a whole, power unfolding itself into light. For as there is separation here, there are parts and the whole consisting of these. The second triad therefore is called intelligible wholeness. But the parts of it, _the one_ and being, I call the extremes. And power being here the middle, connects _the one_ and being, and does not cause them to be one, in the same manner as in the first triad. Since also it is the middle of both, through its communion indeed with being, it renders _the one_ one being; but through its communion with _the one_, it perfectly causes being to be one. And thus the one being consists of two parts, viz. of being which is characterised by _the one_, and of _the one_ which is characterized by being, as Parmenides himself says. He begins therefore to speak about this triad as follows: “Again therefore, let us say if _the one_ is what will happen. Consider then if it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify _the one_ to be a thing of such a kind as to have parts?” But he ends in the following words: “That which is one therefore is a whole, and has a part.”
Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order of intelligibles to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to all things from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an all-perfect division from the third. This however will be considered by us hereafter. Wholeness therefore is triple, being either prior to parts, or consisting of parts, or subsisting in a part, according to the doctrine of Plato. For in the Politicus indeed, he calls genus a whole, but species a part, not that genus derives its completion from species, but exists prior to it. And in the Timæus he says that the world is a whole of wholes. And all the world indeed derives its completion from parts that are wholes; but each of the parts is a