the assertion that “faith is the evidence of things not seen.” For here the things which do not appear are the _æones_; these, according to the Valentinians, subsisting in deity. So that from our version, Paul might say with great propriety, that “we understand by faith, that the _æones_ were framed by the word of God, in order that things which are seen, might be generated from such as do not appear,” for this naturally follows from his definition of faith.
I farther add, that among these _æones_ of the Valentinians were νους, βυθος, σιγη, αληθεια, σοφια, i.e. _intellect, a profundity, silence, truth, and wisdom_, which as Gale well observes in his notes on Iamblichus de Mysteriis, &c. prove their dogmas to be of Chaldaic origin. For these words perpetually occur in the fragments of the Chaldaic oracles. And the middle of the Chaldean intelligible triad is denominated αιων _æon_,[15] i.e. _eternity_, and is also perfectly conformable to the theology of Plato, as is very satisfactorily shown by Proclus in the third book of the following work. According to the Chaldeans therefore, the æones are Gods; and considered as the exemplars of the visible universe, they are analogous to the ideas of Plato, which also are Gods, as is evident from the Parmenides of that philosopher.[16] According to Paul too, as the _æones_ are the fabricators of the visible world, they must be beings of a much higher order than angels, and consequently must be Gods; productive power being one of the great characteristics of a divine nature.
Again, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, chap. i. v. 21. Paul says that God has exalted Christ “far above every principality, and power, and might, and dominion,” υπερανω πασης αρχης και εξουσιας, και δυναμεως και κυριοτητος. And in the 6th chapter and 12th verse he conjoins with principalities and powers, _the rulers of the world_, i.e. the seven planets, προς τας αρχας, προς τας εξουσιας, προς τας κοσμοκρατορας.
Augustin[17] confesses that he is ignorant what the difference is between those four words, (principality, power, might, and dominion,) in which the Apostle Paul seems to comprehend all the celestial society. “Quid inter se distent quatuor illa vocabula, quibus universam ipsam cœlestem societatem videtur Apostolus esse complexus, dicant qui possunt, si tamen possunt probare quod dicunt; ego me ista ignorare fateor.” Ignatius also (in Epist. ad Trallianos) speaks of the angelic orders, the diversities of archangels and armies, the differences of the orders characterised by might and dominion, of thrones and powers, _the magnificence of the æones_,[18] and the transcendency of Cherubim and Seraphim,” και γαρ εγω ου καθ’ ο, τι δεδεμαι, και δυναμαι νοειν τα επουρανια, και τας αγγελικας ταξεις, και τας των αρχαγγελων και στρατιων εξαλλαγας, δυναμεων τε και κυριστητων διαφορας, θρονων τε και εξουσιων παραλλαγας, αιωνων δε μεγαλοτητας, των τε χερουβιμ και σεραφιμ τας υπεροχας.
The opinion of Grotius[19] therefore, is highly probable, that the Jews obtained the names of Powers, Dominations, and Principalities, from their Babylonic captivity; and Gale in his notes on Iamblichus[20] says, that certain passages of Zoroaster and Ostanes cited by the author of Arithm. Theolog. confirm this opinion of Grotius. Indeed, the appellation of αρχαι _principles_, which are the first of the four powers mentioned by Paul, was given by the Chaldeans to that order of Gods called by the Grecian theologists _supermundane_ and _assimilative_, the nature of which is unfolded by Proclus in the sixth book of the following work; and Proclus in the fourth book of his MS. Commentary On the Parmenides of Plato shows that the order of Gods denominated νοητος και νοερος, _intelligible and at the same time intellectual_, is according to the Chaldean oracles[21] principally characterized by _domination_. In proof of this, the two following oracles are cited by him, the first, concerning the empyrean, and the second concerning the material Synoches.[22] Τοις δε πυρος νοερου νοεροις πρηστηρσιν απαντα Εικαθε δουλευοντα, πατρος πειθηνιδι βουλῃ.
i.e. “All things yield ministrant to the intellectual presters of intellectual fire, through the persuasive will of the father.” And αλλα και υλαιοις οσα δουλευει Συνοχευσι.
i.e. “But likewise such as are in subjection to the material Synoches.”
Farther still, Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, chap. viii. v. 38, says, “For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor _angels_, nor _principalities_, nor _powers_, nor things present, nor things to come, nor _height_, nor _depth_, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, &c.” From this arrangement therefore, it is evident that principalities and powers are not the same with angels; and as according to Paul they are beings so exalted, that in his Epistle to the Ephesians, he could not find any thing more magnificent to say of Christ, than that he is raised even above them, it follows that they must be Gods, since they are superior to the angelic order. It is remarkable too, that he coarranges _height_ and _depth_ (υψωμα και βάθος) with principalities and powers; and βυθός is one of the _æones_ according to the Valentinians.
In the first Epistle to the Corinthians likewise, chap. viii. v. 5.
Paul expressly asserts that there is a divine multitude. For he says, “Though there be that are called Gods, whether in heaven or in earth, (as there be Gods many and Lords many;)” in the parenthesis of which verse, it is incontrovertibly evident that he admits the existence of a plurality of Gods, though as well as the heathens he believed that one God only was supreme and the father of _all_ things. Nor am I singular in asserting that this was admitted by Paul. For the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in the second chapter of his treatise On the Divine Names observes concerning what is here said by Paul as follows: “Again, from the deific energy of God, by which every thing according to its ability becomes deiform, many Gods are generated; in consequence of which there appears and is said to be a separation and multiplication of the one [supreme] God. Nevertheless, God himself, who is the chief deity, and is superessentially the supreme, is still one God, remaining impartible in the Gods distributed from him, united to himself, unmingled with the many, and void of multitude.” And he afterwards adds, “that this was in a transcendent manner understood by Paul, who was the leader both of him and his preceptor, to divine illumination,” in the above cited verse. And, “that in divine natures, unions vanquish and precede separations, and yet nevertheless they are united, after the separation which does not in proceeding depart from _the one_, and is unical.”[23] Paul therefore, according to this Dionysius, considered the Gods, conformably to Plato and the best of his disciples, as deiform processions from _the one_, and which at the same time that they have a distinct subsistence from, are profoundly united to their great producing cause. Dionysius also employs the very same expression which Proclus continually uses when speaking of the separation of the Gods from their source; for he says that the divine multitude ανεκφοιτητος του ενος, i.e. does not depart from, but abides in _the one_. Hence Proclus in the fifth book of his MS. Commentary On the Parmenides of Plato, speaking of the divine unities says, “Whichever among these you assume, it is the same with the others, because all of them are in each other, and are rooted in _the one_. For as trees by their summits (i.e. their roots) are fixed in the earth, and through these are earthly, after the same manner also divine natures are rooted by their summits in _the one_, and each of them is unity and one, through unconfused union with _the one itself_.” Ην γαρ αν τουτων λαβῃς, την αυτην ταις αλλαις λαμβανεις, διοτι δη πασαι και εν αλληλαις εισι, και ενερριζονται τῳ ενι. Καθαπερ γαρ τα δενδρα ταις εαυτων κορυφαις ενιδρυνται τῃ γῃ, και εστι γηινα κατ’ εκεινας, τον αυτον τροπον και τα θεια ταις εαυτων ακροτησιν ενερριζωνται τῳ ενι, και εκαστον αυτων ενας εστι, και εν, δια την προς το εν ασυγχυτον ενωσιν.
This Dionysius, who certainly lived posterior to Proclus, because he continually borrows from his works, barbarously confounding that scientific arrangement of these deiform processions from _the one_, which is so admirably unfolded by Proclus in the following work, classes them as follows. The first order, according to him, consists of Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones. The second of the divine essences characterized by dominion, might, and power. And the third of Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. Hence he has transferred the characteristics of the intelligible triad of Gods to Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones. For symmetry, truth, and beauty, which characterize this triad, are said by Plato in the Philebus to subsist _in the vestibule of the good_; (επι μεν τοις του αγαθου νυν ηδη προθυροις εφεσταναι) and Dionysius says[24] of his first order that “_it is as it were arranged in the vestibules of deity_.” Goodness, wisdom, and beauty also, are shown by Proclus in the third book of the following work to belong to the intelligible triad; _goodness_ to its summit, _wisdom_ to the middle of it, and _beauty_ to its extremity.
And Dionysius says, that according to the Hebrews, the word Cherubim signifies _a multitude of knowledge, or an effusion of wisdom_, την δε χερουβιμ εμφαινειν, πληθος γνωσεως, η χυσιν σοφιας. The characteristics of the Gods called νοητοι και νοεροι _intelligible and at the same time intellectual_, and of the Gods that are νοεροι _intellectual_ alone, he appears to have transferred to his middle triad which is characterized by _dominion, might, and power_. And he has adapted his third triad consisting of _Principalities_, _Archangels_, and _Angels_, to the _supermundane_, _liberated_, and _mundane_ orders of Gods.
For the supermundane Gods are called by Proclus in the sixth book of the following work αρχαι _Principalities_, or _rulers_, which is the word employed by Dionysius and Paul. And the mundane Gods are said by Proclus (in Parmenid.) to be the sources of a _winged_ life, and angels are celebrated by Dionysius as having _wings_. Hence it is evident that Dionysius has accommodated the peculiarities of the different orders of Gods to the nine orders which he denominates _celestial powers_; and his arrangement has been adopted by all succeeding Christian theologists.
Vestiges therefore of the theology of Plato may be seen both in the Jewish and Christian religion; and in a similar manner, a resemblance in the religions of all other nations to it might be easily pointed out, and its universality be clearly demonstrated. Omitting however, a discussion of this kind for the present, I shall farther observe respecting this theology, that the deification of dead men, and the worshipping men as Gods form no part of it when it is considered according to its genuine purity. Numerous instances of the truth of this might be adduced, but I shall mention for this purpose, as unexceptionable witnesses, the writings of Plato, the Golden Pythagoric verses,[25] and the treatise of Plutarch On Isis and Osiris. All the works of Plato indeed, evince the truth of this position, but this is particularly manifest from his Laws. The Golden verses order, that the immortal Gods be honoured first as they are disposed by law; afterwards the illustrious Heroes, under which appellation, the author of the verses comprehends also angels and dæmons properly so called: and in the last place the terrestrial dæmons, i.e. such good men as transcend in virtue the rest of mankind. But to honour the Gods as they are disposed by law, is, as Hierocles observes, to reverence them as they are arranged by their fabricator and father; and this is to honour them as beings superior to man. Hence, to honour men, however excellent they may be, as Gods, is not to honour the Gods according to the rank in which they are placed by their Creator, for it is confounding the divine with the human nature, and is thus acting directly contrary to the Pythagoric precept. Plutarch too in his above-mentioned treatise most forcibly and clearly shows the impiety of worshipping men as Gods, as is evident from the following extract: “Those therefore, who think that things of this kind [i.e.
fabulous stories of the Gods as if they were men] are but so many commemorations of the actions and disasters of kings and tyrants, who through transcendency in virtue or power, inscribed the title of divinity on their renown, and afterwards fell into great calamities and misfortunes, these employ the most easy method indeed of eluding the story, and not badly transfer things of evil report, from the Gods to men; and they are assisted in so doing by the narrations themselves. For the Egyptians relate, that Hermes was as to his body, with one arm longer than the other; that Typhon was in his complexion red; but Orus white, and Osiris black, as if they had been by nature men. Farther still, they also call Osiris a commander, and Canopus a pilot, from whom they say the star of that name was denominated. The ship likewise, which the Greeks call Argo, being the image of the ark of Osiris, and which therefore in honour of it is become a constellation, they make to ride not far from Orion and the Dog; of which they consider the one as sacred to Orus, but the other to Isis.
“I fear, however, that this [according to the proverb] would be to move things immoveable, and to declare war, not only, as Simonides says, against a great length of time, but also against many nations and families of mankind who are under the influence of divine inspiration through piety to these Gods; and would not in any respect fall short of transferring from heaven to earth, such great and venerable names, and of thereby shaking and dissolving that worship and belief, which has been implanted in almost all men from their very birth, would be opening great doors to the tribe of atheists, who convert divine into human concerns; and would likewise afford a large license to the impostures of Euemerus of Messina, who devised certain memoirs of an incredible and fictitious mythology,[26] and _thereby spread every kind of atheism through the globe, by inscribing all the received Gods, without any discrimination, by the names of generals, naval-captains, and kings, who lived in remote periods of time_. He further adds, that they are recorded in golden characters, in a certain country called Panchoa, at which neither any Barbarian or Grecian ever arrived, except Euemerus alone, who, as it seems, sailed to the Panchoans and Triphyllians, that neither have, nor ever had a being. And though the great actions of Semiramis are celebrated by the Assyrians, and those of Sesostris in Egypt; and though the Phrygians even to the present time, call all splendid and admirable actions Manic, because a certain person named Manis who was one of their ancient kings, whom some call Masdes, was a brave and powerful man; and farther still, though Cyrus among the Persians, and Alexander among the Macedonians, proceeded in their victories, almost as far as to the boundaries of the earth, yet they only retain the name of good kings, and are remembered as such, [and not as Gods.]
“But if certain persons, inflated by ostentation, as Plato says, having their soul at one and the same time inflamed with youth and ignorance, have insolently assumed the appellation of Gods, and had temples erected in their honour, yet this opinion of them flourished but for a short time, and afterwards they were charged with vanity and arrogance, in conjunction with impiety and lawless conduct; and thus, Like smoke they flew away with swift-pac’d fate.
And being dragged from temples and altars like fugitive slaves, they have now nothing left them, but their monuments and tombs.
Hence Antigonus the elder said to one Hermodotus, who had celebrated him in his poems as the offspring of the sun and a God, ‘he who empties my close-stool-pan knows no such thing of me.’ Very properly also, did Lysippus the sculptor blame Apelles the painter, for drawing the picture of Alexander with a thunder-bolt in his hand, whereas he had represented him with a spear, the glory of which, as being true and proper, no time would take away.”
In another part of the same work also, he admirably reprobates the impiety of making the Gods to be things inanimate, which was very common with Latin writers of the Augustan age, and of the ages that accompanied the decline and fall of the Roman empire. But what he says on this subject is as follows: “In the second place, which is of still greater consequence, men should be careful, and very much afraid, lest before they are aware, they tear in pieces and dissolve divine natures, into blasts of wind, streams of water, seminations, earings of land, accidents of the earth, and mutations of the seasons, as those do who make Bacchus to be wine, and Vulcan flame. Cleanthes also somewhere says, that Persephone or Proserpine is the spirit or air that _passes through_ (φερομενον) the fruits of the earth, and is then _slain_, (φονευομενον.) And a certain poet says of reapers, Then when the youth the limbs of Ceres cut.
For these men do not in any respect differ from those who conceive the sails, the cables, and the anchor of a ship, to be the pilot, the yarn and the web to be the weaver, and the bowl, or the mead, or the ptisan, to be the physician. But they also produce dire and atheistical opinions, by giving the names of Gods to natures and things deprived of sense and soul, and that are necessarily destroyed by men, who are in want of and use them. For it is not possible to conceive that these things are Gods; since, neither can any thing be a God to men, which is deprived of soul, or is subject to human power. From these things however, we are led to conceive those beings to be Gods, who both use them and impart them to us, and supply them perpetually and without ceasing. Nor do we conceive that the Gods who bestow these, are different in different countries, nor that some of them are peculiar to the Barbarians, but others to the Grecians, nor that some are southern, and others northern; but as the sun and moon, the heavens, the land, and the sea, are common to all men, yet are differently denominated by different nations; so the one reason that adorns these things, and the one providence that administers them, and the ministrant powers that preside over all nations, have different appellations and honours assigned them according to law by different countries.
Of those also that have been consecrated to their service, some employ obscure, but others clearer symbols, not without danger thus conducting our intellectual conceptions to the apprehension of divine natures. For some, deviating from the true meaning of these symbols, have entirely slipt into superstition; and others again flying from superstition as a quagmire, have unaware fallen upon atheism as on a precipice. Hence, in order to avoid these dangers, it is especially necessary that resuming the reasoning of Philosophy as our guide to mystic knowledge, we should conceive piously of every thing that is said or done in religion; lest that, as Theodorus said, while he extended his arguments with his right hand, some of his auditors received them with their left, so we should fall into dangerous errors, by receiving what the laws have well instituted about sacrifices and festivals in a manner different from their original intention.”
The Emperor Julian, as well as Plutarch appears to have been perfectly aware of this confusion in the religion of the Heathens arising from the deification of men, and in the fragments of his treatise against the Christians, preserved by Cyril, he speaks of it as follows: “If any one wishes to consider the truth respecting you [Christians,] he will find that your impiety is composed of the Judaic audacity, and _the indolence and confusion of the Heathens_. For deriving from both, not that which is most beautiful, but the worst, you have fabricated a web of evils. With the Hebrews indeed, there are accurate and venerable laws pertaining to religion, and innumerable precepts which require a must holy life and deliberate choice. But when the Jewish legislator forbids the serving all the Gods, and enjoins the worship of one alone, whose portion is Jacob, and Israel the line of his inheritance, and not only says this, but also omits to add, I think, you shall not revile the Gods, the detestable wickedness and audacity of those in after times, wishing to take away all religious reverence from the multitude, thought that not to worship should be followed by blaspheming the Gods. This you have alone thence derived; but there is no similitude in any thing else between you and them. Hence, from the innovation of the Hebrews, you have seized blasphemy towards the venerable Gods; _but from our religion you have cast aside reverence to every nature more excellent than man, and the love of paternal institutes_.”
“So great an apprehension indeed, says Dr. Stillingfleet,[27] had the Heathens of the necessity of _appropriate acts of divine worship_, that some of them have chosen to die, rather than to give them to what they did not believe to be God. We have a remarkable story to this purpose in Arrian and Curtius[28] concerning Callisthenes. Alexander arriving at that degree of vanity, as to desire to have divine worship given him, and the matter being started out of design among the courtiers, either by Anaxarchus, as Arrian, or Cleo the Sicilian, as Curtius says; and the way of doing it proposed, viz. by incense and prostration; Callisthenes vehemently opposed it, _as that which would confound the difference of human and divine worship, which had been preserved inviolable among them_. The worship of the Gods had been kept up in temples, with altars, and images, and sacrifices, and hymns, and prostrations, and such like; _but it is by no means fitting_, says he, _for us to confound these things, either by lifting up men to the honours of the Gods, or depressing the Gods to the honours of men_. For neither would Alexander suffer any man to usurp his royal dignity by the votes of men; how much more justly may the Gods disdain for any man to take their honours to himself. And it appears by Plutarch,[29] that the Greeks thought it a mean and base thing for any of them, when sent on an embassy to the kings of Persia, to prostrate themselves before them, because this was only allowed among them in divine adoration. Therefore, says he, when Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent to Artaxerxes, Pelopidas did nothing unworthy, but Ismenias let fall his ring to the ground, and stooping for that was thought to make his adoration; which was altogether as good a shift as the Jesuits advising the crucifix to be held in the Mandarins’ hands while they made their adorations in the Heathen temples in China.
“Conon[30] also _refused to make his adoration, as a disgrace to his city_; and Isocrates[31] accuses the Persians for doing it, _because herein they shewed, that they despised the Gods rather than men, by prostituting their honours to their princes_. Herodotus mentions Sperchius and Bulis, who could not with the greatest violence be brought to give adoration to Xerxes, _because it was against the law of their country to give divine honour to men_.[32] And Valerius Maximus[33] says, _the Athenians put Timagoras to death for doing it_; so strong an apprehension had possessed them, that the manner of worship which they used to their Gods, should be preserved sacred and inviolable.” The philosopher Sallust also in his treatise On the Gods and the World says, “It is not unreasonable to suppose that impiety is a species of punishment, and that those who have had a knowledge of the Gods, and yet despised them, will in another life be deprived of this knowledge. And it is requisite to make the punishment of those who have honoured their kings as Gods to consist in being expelled from the Gods.”[34] When the ineffable transcendency of the first God, which was considered as the grand principle in the Heathen theology, by its most ancient promulgators Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, was forgotten, this oblivion was doubtless the principal cause of dead men being deified by the Pagans. Had they properly directed their attention to this transcendency they would have perceived it to be so immense as to surpass eternity, infinity, self-subsistence, and even essence itself, and that these in reality belong to those venerable natures which are as it were first unfolded into light from the unfathomable depths of that truly mystic unknown, about which all knowledge is refunded into ignorance. For as Simplicius justly observes, “It is requisite that he who ascends to the principle of things should investigate whether it is possible there can be any thing better than the supposed principle; and if something more excellent is found, the same enquiry should again be made respecting that, till we arrive at the highest conceptions, than which we have no longer any more venerable. Nor should we stop in our ascent till we find this to be the case. For there is no occasion to fear that our progression will be through an unsubstantial void, by conceiving something about the first principles which is greater and more transcendent than their nature. For it is not possible for our conceptions to take such a mighty leap as to equal, and much less to pass beyond the dignity of the first principles of things.” He adds, “This therefore is one and the best extension [of the soul] to [the highest] God, and is as much as possible irreprehensible; viz. to know firmly, that by ascribing to him the most venerable excellencies we can conceive, and the most holy and primary names and things, we ascribe nothing to him which is suitable to his dignity. It is sufficient however, to procure our pardon [for the attempt,] that we can attribute to him nothing superior.”[35] If it is not possible therefore to form any ideas equal to the dignity of the immediate progeny of the ineffable, i.e. of the first principles of things, how much less can our conceptions reach that thrice unknown darkness, in the reverential language of the Egyptians,[36] which is even beyond these? Had the Heathens therefore considered as they ought this transcendency of the supreme God, they would never have presumed to equalize the human with the divine nature, and consequently would never have worshipped men as Gods. Their theology, however, is not to be accused as the cause of this impiety, but their forgetfulness of the sublimest of its dogmas, and the confusion with which this oblivion was necessarily attended.
In the last place, I wish to adduce a few respectable testimonies to prove that statues were not considered nor worshipped by any of the intelligent Heathens as Gods, but as the resemblances of the Gods, as auxiliaries to the recollection of a divine nature, and the means of procuring its assistance and favour. For this purpose, I shall first present the reader with what the philosopher Sallust says concerning sacrifices and the honours which were paid to the divinities, in his golden treatise On the Gods and the World. “The honours, says he, which we pay to the Gods are performed for the sake of our advantage; and since the providence of the Gods is every where extended, a certain habitude or fitness is all that is requisite in order to receive their beneficent communications. But all habitude is produced through imitation and similitude. Hence temples imitate the heavens, but altars the earth; statues resemble life, and on this account they are similar to animals; prayers imitate that which is intellectual; but characters superior ineffable powers; herbs and stones resemble matter; and animals which are sacrificed the irrational life of our souls. But from all these nothing happens to the Gods beyond what they already possess; for what accession can be made to a divine nature? But a conjunction with our souls and the Gods is by these means produced.
“I think however, it will be proper to add a few things concerning sacrifices. And in the first place, since we possess every thing from the Gods, and it is but just to offer the first fruits of gifts to the givers; hence, of our possessions we offer the first fruits through consecrated gifts; of our bodies through ornaments; and of our life through sacrifices. Besides, without sacrifices, prayers are words only; but accompanied with sacrifices they become animated words; the words indeed corroborating life, but life animating the words. Add too, that the felicity of every thing is its proper perfection; but the proper perfection of every thing consists in a conjunction with its cause. And on this account we pray that we may be conjoined with the Gods. Since therefore life primarily subsists in the Gods, and there is also a certain human life, but the latter desires to be united to the former, a medium is required; for natures much distant from each other cannot be conjoined without a medium. And it is necessary that the medium should be similar to the connected natures. Life therefore must necessarily be the medium of life; and hence men of the present day that are happy, and all the ancients, have sacrificed animals. And this indeed not rashly, but in a manner accommodated to every God, with many other ceremonies respecting the cultivation of divinity.”[37] In the next place, the elegant Maximus Tyrius admirably observes concerning the worship of statues[38] as follows: “It appears to me that as external discourse has no need, in order to its composition, of certain Phœnician, or Ionian, or Attic, or Assyrian, or Egyptian characters, but human imbecility devised these marks, in which inserting its dulness, it recovers from them its memory; in like manner a divine nature has no need of statues or altars; but human nature being very imbecile, and as much distant from divinity as earth from heaven, devised these symbols, in which it inserted the names and the renown of the Gods. Those, therefore, whose memory is robust, and who are able, by directly extending their soul to heaven, to meet with divinity, have, _perhaps_,[39] no need of statues. This race is, however, rare among men, and in a whole nation you will not find one who recollects divinity, and who is not in want of this kind of assistance, which resembles that devised by writing masters for boys, who give them obscure marks as copies; by writing over which, their hand being guided by that of the master, they become, through memory, accustomed to the art. It appears to me therefore, that legislators devised these statues for men, as if for a certain kind of boys, as tokens of the honour which should be paid to divinity, and a certain manuduction as it were and path to reminiscence.
“Of statues however, there is neither one law, nor one mode, nor one art, nor one matter. For the Greeks think it fit to honour the Gods from things the most beautiful in the earth, from a pure matter, the human form, and accurate art: and their opinion is not irrational who fashion statues in the human resemblance. For if the human soul is most near and most similar to divinity, it is not reasonable to suppose that divinity would invest that which is most similar to himself with a most deformed body, but rather with one which would be an easy vehicle to immortal souls, light, and adapted to motion. For this alone, of all the bodies on the earth, raises its summit on high, is magnificent, superb, and full of symmetry, neither astonishing through its magnitude, nor terrible through its strength, nor moved with difficulty through its weight, nor slippery through its smoothness, nor repercussive through its hardness, nor groveling through its coldness, nor precipitate through its heat, nor inclined to swim through its laxity, nor feeding on raw flesh through its ferocity, nor on grass through its imbecility; but is harmonically composed for its proper works, and is dreadful to timid animals, but mild to such as are brave, It is also adapted to walk by nature, but winged by reason, capable of swimming by art, feeds on corn and fruits, and cultivates the earth, is of a good colour, stands firm, has a pleasing countenance, and a graceful beard, In the resemblance of such a body, the Greeks think fit to honour the Gods.”
He then observes, “that with respect to the Barbarians, all of them in like manner admit the subsistence of divinity, but different nations among these adopt different symbols.” After which he adds, “O many and all-various statues! of which some are fashioned by art, and others are embraced through indigence: some are honoured through utility, and others are venerated through the astonishment which they excite; some are considered as divine through their magnitude, and others are celebrated for their beauty! There is not indeed any race of men, neither Barbarian nor Grecian, neither maritime nor continental, neither living a pastoral life, nor dwelling in cities, which can endure to be without some symbols of the honour of the Gods. How, therefore, shall any one discuss the question whether it is proper that statues of the Gods should be fabricated or not? For if we were to give laws to other men recently sprung from the earth, and dwelling beyond our boundaries and our air, or who were fashioned by a certain Prometheus, ignorant of life, and law, and reason, it might perhaps demand consideration, whether this race should be permitted to adore these spontaneous statues alone, which are not fashioned from ivory or gold, and which are neither oaks nor cedars, nor rivers, nor birds, but the rising sun, the splendid moon, the variegated heaven, the earth itself and the air, all fire and all water; or shall we constrain these men also to the necessity of honouring wood, or stones or images? If, however, this is the common law of all men, let us make no innovations, let us admit the conceptions concerning the Gods, and preserve their symbols as well as their names.
“For divinity indeed, the father and fabricator of all things, is more ancient than the sun and the heavens, more excellent than time and eternity, and every flowing nature, and is a legislator without law, ineffable by voice, and invisible by the eyes. Not being able, however, to comprehend his essence, we apply for assistance to words and names, to animals, and figures of gold and ivory and silver, to plants and rivers, to the summits of mountains, and to streams of water; desiring indeed to understand his nature, but through imbecility calling him