there is a first monad of the total divisions in intellectuals, and together with the twofold triads, I mean the paternal and the undefiled, it gives completion to the whole intellectual hebdomad. And we, following Plato, and other theologists, concede the same things.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
Let us now, however, return to the beginning, and demonstrate that Parmenides delivers the same things concerning this intellectual hebdomad, and that he produces this hebdomadic _aiōn_ (_eternity_) and the peculiarity of the Gods which is intellectual alone, in continuity with the triple orders of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual Gods. And, in the first place, let us survey what he says concerning the father of the intellectual Gods, and the undefiled power which is co-arranged with him. For after the threefold figure, and the order of the Gods which perfects all things, that which is in itself[296] and in another, becomes apparent. These things, however, are demonstrated to be signs of the intellectual summit of the intellectual monads. For the first father of the Gods in this order, at one and the same time is allotted a paternal transcendency with respect to those posterior to him, and is the intellect of the first intelligibles. For every imparticipable intellect is said to be the intellect of the natures prior to itself, and towards them, from whom it is produced, it has an intellectual conversion, and in them as first-effective causes it establishes itself. Whence also the demiurgic intellect is the intellect of the natures above itself, and proximately indeed of its own father, from which likewise it proceeds, but eminently of the intelligible unities beyond [Saturn].
The first king, therefore, in intellectuals, is both an intellectual father, and a paternal intellect. He is, however, the intellectual father indeed of the Gods that proceed from himself; but he is the paternal intellect of the intelligibles prior to himself. For he is indeed intellectual essentially; but he has an intelligible transcendency in intellectuals; because he is also established analogous to the unknown order of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, and to the occult order of the intelligible triads. And as they are expanded above the triadic hypostases of the Gods posterior to themselves, thus also the father of intellectuals, is a father expanded above the whole intellectual hebdomad, in consequence of being a paternal intellect. And analogously to the above-mentioned orders of Gods, he establishes himself in them, and is filled from them with paternal and intelligible union. On this account also, he is occult, shuts in himself the prolific powers of himself, and producing from himself total causes, he again establishes them in, and converts them to himself.
These things, therefore, Parmenides also indicating, magnificently celebrates this order by these twofold signs, and characterizes the first king and father of the intellectual[297] Gods through these peculiarities. For he is in himself, and in another. For so far indeed as he is a total intellect, his energy is directed to himself, but so far as he is in the intelligibles prior to himself, he establishes in another the all-perfect intelligence of himself. For, indeed, this subsistence in another, is more excellent than the subsistence of a thing in itself; since, as Parmenides himself concludes, the subsistence of Saturn in another, pertains to him according to whole, but the subsistence of him in himself, according to parts. Where, therefore, does _the another_ pre-exist? And to what order of the Gods prior to Saturn does it belong? Or is not this also divinely unfolded by our preceptor? For he says that this _another_, remarkably pertains to that order, according to which the power of difference first shines forth, being the progeny of intelligible and paternal power. Hence in the first triad _the another_ was occultly, so far as power also had there an occult subsistence; but it particularly shines forth in the first order of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. For there the first difference, the feminine nature of the Gods, and the paternal and unvocal power subsist.
[Saturn therefore] who is the first of the intellectual fathers being intelligible, so far as he is a whole, establishes himself in the intelligible triads prior to himself, from which also he is filled with united and occult goods. And on this account he is said to be in another. With respect to those triads indeed, _the another_ is occultly and according to cause in the intelligible [i.e. in the first triad] of intelligibles; but according to essence in the intelligible of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. All intelligibles therefore are united; the intelligible indeed of the intelligible and intellectual Gods being united to the intelligible of the intelligibles prior[298] to intellectuals; but the intelligible of intellectuals, to both. And the subsistence indeed in another, adheres to the difference which is according to unical number. But unical number is suspended from the occult union of the one being; on which account also it is unical.
Farther still, we also say, that there is a twofold conversion in those orders, the one indeed being towards themselves, but the other towards the causes of them, (for it neither was nor will be lawful for divine natures, to convert themselves in any respect to natures posterior to themselves). And the intelligible Gods generate all things stably; but the intelligible and intellectual Gods who illuminate imparticipable life, impart the original cause of progression to all things; and the intellectual Gods arrange and adorn wholes according to conversion.
Hence, it is indeed necessary that the summit of intellectuals which pours forth from itself the whole and all-perfect form of conversion, should be characterized by both the convertive symbols, and should be at one and the same time converted to itself, and to the natures prior to itself. Hence, because indeed, it is converted to itself, it is _in itself_; but because it is converted to the intelligible orders beyond itself, it is _in another_. For the _another_ is more excellent than the whole intellectual order. As, therefore, the summit of intelligibles primarily subsists according to the intelligible peculiarity itself, and is firmly established above wholes; and as the summit of intelligibles and intellectuals primarily unfolds the peculiarity of this order, subsisting according to divine diversity, and being to all things the cause of all-various progressions;--thus also the intelligible deity of intellectuals, exhibits from himself according to union the twofold forms of conversion, being indeed _in another_ according to the more excellent form of conversion, but _in himself_ according to the less excellent form. For to be converted to himself is inferior to the conversion to more excellent natures.
Again, therefore, the subsistence _in another_, is the illustrious prerogative of the intelligible and paternal peculiarity, For _the another_ is intelligible, and difference was the power proceeding from the intelligible fathers, and from the natures firmly established in them. Hence, that which is comprehended in this power, and is filled from it, is paternal and intelligible. But the subsistence of a thing _in itself_ is the proper sign of the unpolluted monad. For as we have before observed, the summits of the two intellectual triads are conjoined. And the monad of the guardian triad has eternally established itself in the paternal monad, and again establishes in, and converts to itself the natures which have proceeded from itself. And the first intellectual father is indeed father on account of himself, but on account of the unpolluted [monad,] he comprehends in himself the genera of himself, stably recalls them [when they have proceeded from him] to himself, and in his own allness[299] contains the intelligible multitudes of intellectuals in unproceeding[300] union with their monad.
The first leader, therefore, of the guardian order subsists in conjunction with the father. And the father indeed comprehends the unpolluted cause, but is comprehended by the first intelligibles.
And as he is intelligibly established in them, so likewise he has established in himself, and constituted about himself, the one summit of the inflexible Gods. In the Parmenides, therefore, also the same God appears to us to be a pure intellect. Because, indeed, he is intellect, being extended to the intelligible place of survey, and on this account being _in another_, so far as he is wholly established in it. But again, because he is pure and immaterial, being converted to himself, and shutting _in himself_ all his own powers. For the parts of this wholeness, are more partial powers, which hasten indeed to a progression from the father, but are on all sides established and comprehended by the wholeness. And the wholeness itself is a deity, connectedly containing in itself intelligible parts, being parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, generating all things stably, and again embosoming and collecting to itself its progeny, and as the more tragical fables say, absorbing and depositing them in itself. For the progeny of it are twofold; some indeed, being, as it were, analyzed into it; but others being divided from it. And some abiding in it through the first unpolluted monad; but others proceeding according to the prolific cause of the intellectual Gods, surmounting the union of the father, and being the primary leaders of another order, and of the arrangement and ornament of secondary natures. The first order therefore of the intellectual Gods, is thus delivered to us by Parmenides.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
The second order however, after this, is that which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, is the cause to all things of progression and prolific power, and is in continuity with the first order of the intellectual Gods. What else therefore than life is every where in continuity with the intelligible and true being? For it is the medium between intellect and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the intelligible, and expressing the intelligible power which collects together _the one_ and being. As the intelligible therefore is to _the one_ and hyparxis, so is life to power, and intellect to being. And as in intelligibles, _the one_ is the object of desire, but being aspires after the participation of _the one_, and power collects being to the participation of _the one_, and _the one_ to a communion with being, (for _the one_ here is not imparticipable, and exempt from all power) so likewise the intelligible is the object of desire to intellect, but intellect is filled with it. And life binds indeed intellect to the intelligible, but unfolds the intelligible to intellect. Whence also, I think, those who are wise in all divine concerns, call _the one_ and hyparxis intelligible. But that which is primarily being, they call[301] the first intellect, conformably to this analogy.
Life therefore, is the medium between being and intellect, in the same manner as power subsists between _the one_ and being. And all these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in intelligibles; but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals; and according to a third diminution, in intellectuals. In intelligibles however, being is according to essence; for there intellect is primarily according to cause. But in intellectuals, intellect indeed, is according to essence; but the natures prior to intellect, are according to participation. Since therefore, life is surveyed in a threefold respect, in intelligibles indeed according to cause; but in intelligibles and intellectuals, according to hyparxis; and an intellectuals,[302] according to participation, it is indeed necessary that the life which is in the intellectual order, should both be life, and participate of the causes generative of life prior of itself.
_The one_ therefore of the intellectual Gods which is arranged in the middle, is not motion, but that which is moved. For prior to this, it has been demonstrated by Plato, that all life is motion. For soul is self-motive because it is self-vital. And intellect is on this account moved, because it has the most excellent life. The first vivific cause, therefore, of the intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion.
If, however, it was the first-effective and highest life, it would be requisite to denominate it motion, and not that which is moved. But since it is life as in intellectuals, but is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time motion, and that which is moved. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides demonstrate that _the one_ in this order is moved, because it proceeds from the causes of all life that are placed above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals. Hence also, Socrates in the Phædrus calls this middle triad Heaven; for the whole of it is life and motion. But that which is moved, is the middle in intellectuals, as being filled from it, [i.e. from the life in the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals;] since eternity also, which is arranged according to the intelligible wholeness, is all-perfect life, and all life, according to Plotinus. There, however, the middle is life according to cause; but in intellectuals, it is life according to participation; and in the order between these, it is life according to essence, proceeding indeed from intelligible life, (as Parmenides also manifests, characterizing both according to wholeness, though the wholeness in intelligibles is different from that which is in intelligibles and intellectuals, as we have before observed,) but producing after this, intellectual life. For that which is moved, is indeed entirely allied to the circulation of the Heaven, and to intellectual and intelligible life.
Moreover, the permanency which is coordinate with this motion, is not one certain genus of being, as neither is motion. For beings indeed are naturally adapted to participate of the genera of being; but the superessential goods of the Gods, are expanded above the order of beings. If, therefore, Parmenides here, assuming _the one itself_ by itself, surveys in this motion and permanency, he evidently does net attribute the elements of being to the Gods, but assigns to them peculiarities appropriate, all-perfect, and transcending wholes. And thus asserting that _the one_ is moved and stands still, according to motion, indeed, he delivers the vivific hyparxis of the Gods, the generative fountain of wholes, and the leading cause of all things. But according to permanency, he delivers the unpolluted monad coordinated with motion, and which connectedly-contains the middle centres of the guardian triad. For as the summit of the guardian triad, is united to the first father, according to the first hypostasis, thus also the deity who contains the middle bond of the unpolluted leaders, is by a congeniality of nature consubsistent with the motive cause of all the Gods, which moves wholes, and is primarily moved from itself.
And through this deity, the prolific power of this Goddess [Rhea] is firmly established in herself. Producing likewise, and multiplying all things, she is [through this deity] exempt from wholes, and inflexibly exists prior to her progeny. With respect, therefore, to motion here and permanency, the former indeed is the fountain of the life and generative power that proceeds to all things; but the latter,[303] establishes the whole vivific fountain in itself, but is from thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Parmenides, therefore, delivering to us these things, and the progression of them, demonstrates that that which is moved is generated from that which is in another, but that which stands still, from that which is in itself. For the first monad of the paternal triad constitutes the natures posterior to it. And after the same manner, the highest of the unpolluted triad, and which is intelligible as in this triad, imparts at one and the same time the middle and last monad of the triad. On this account, also, motion here is better than permanency. For as a subsistence in another is according to cause more ancient than the subsistence of a thing in itself, so likewise that which is moved, is causally more ancient than that which is permanent. For the unpolluted Gods, are in power subordinate to the fathers, and are comprehended in them.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
The third, therefore, to the Saviour, as they say, and let us direct our attention to the demiurgic monad, unfolding itself into light together with the coordinate Gods it contains. In the first place, then, here also the communion of _the one_ with other things is apparent, and we must no longer consider _the one_ alone by itself, but according to its habitude towards other things. Because, therefore, the demiurgic order produces wholes from itself, and arranges and adorns a corporeal nature, it also generates all the second and ministrant causes of the Gods. For what occasion is there to say that the term _other things_, is a sign of a corporeal condition of being, since formerly the Pythagoreans thought fit to characterize an incorporeal nature by _the one_, but indicated to us the nature which is divisible about body, through the term _others_? In the second place, the number of the conclusions [in this part of the Parmenides] is doubled. For _the one_ is no longer demonstrated to be alone same, or different, as it is to be in itself, and in another, or to be moved, and stand still, but it is demonstrated to be the same with itself, and different from itself,[304] and to be different from other things, and the same with other things. But this twice appeared to us before to be entirely adapted to the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologists, and to Socrates in the Cratylus, who says that the demiurgic name is composed from two words. In the third place, therefore, the multitude of causes is here separated, and all the monads of the Gods present themselves to the view, according to the demiurgic progression. For the demiurgic order is apparent, the prolific power coordinate with it, the undefiled monad the cause of exempt providence, and the distributive fountain of wholes; and together with these, as I may say, all the orders about the demiurgus are apparent, according to which he produces and preserves all things, and being exempt from the things produced, is firmly established in himself, and separates his own kingdom, from the united empire of his father.
How, therefore, and through what particulars do these things become apparent? We reply, that _the same with itself_ (for this Parmenides first demonstrates) represents to us about the nature of _the one_, the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which the demiurgus also subsists. Hence, likewise, _the one_ is said to be the same with itself. For _the another_ is in the demiurgus according to the transcendency of different causes; but _the same_, appears to be a sign of his proper, viz. of his paternal, hyparxis. For being one, and the exempt father and demiurgus of wholes, he establishes his proper union in himself. And in this one, Parmenides in a remarkable manner shows the uniform, and that which is allied to bound. But _the same with other things_, is the singular good of prolific power, and of a cause proceeding to, and pervading through all things without impediment.
For the demiurgus is present to all things which he produces, and is in all things the same, which he arranges and adorns, pre-establishing in himself the generative essence of wholes. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, bound and infinity subsist in him demiurgically.
And the one indeed is in the sameness which is separate from other things, but the other is in the power which generates other things.
For every where power is prolific of secondary natures. But the principle which subsists according to bound, is the supplier of an united and stable hypostasis.
Moreover, _the different from other things_, manifests his undefiled purity, and his transcendency which is exempt from all secondary natures. For the first intellect was on this account pure and incorruptible, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, because it is established above coordination or communion[305] with all sensible natures. For as some one of the Gods says, he does not incline his power to matter, but is at once exempt from all fabrication. But the demiurgic intellect receiving from thence total power, and a royal dominion, adorns indeed sensibles, and constitutes the whole of a corporeal nature. Together however, with prolific abundance, and the providential attention to secondary natures, he transcends his progeny, and abides in his own accustomed manner, as Timæus says, through the inflexible guard which subsists with him, and the power imparted to him from it, which is uncontaminated with other participants. Hence, through the never-failing supply of good, and providential energies, and the generation of subordinate natures, he is _the same with them_. For he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his own providential care. But through his purity, undefiled power, and inflexible energies, he is separate from wholes, is disjoined from them, and is imparticipable by other things. And as the first king of intellectuals is allotted his non-inclination to matter, through the guard which is united to him, and through the undefiled monad; and as the vivific goddess possesses her stable and inflexible power from the second cause of the guardian Gods; thus also the demiurgic intellect preserves a transcendency exempt from other things, and a union separated from multitude, through the third monad of the leaders of purity. For the cause of separate providence is a guard coordinate with the demiurgus, who hastens to produce[306] all things, and to pervade through all things. But the guard which is the supplier of stable power, is coordinate with the vivific deity, who is moved to the generation of wholes. And with the intellect that is multiplied according to intellectual conceptions [i.e. with Saturn,] the guard is coordinate, that imparts an undefiled union of the conversion of all his energies to himself. The monad, therefore, remains, which is arranged as the seventh of these intellectual monads, which is present with, and energizes with all of them, but particularly unfolds itself into light in the demiurgic order, and which Parmenides also producing for us together with the whole demiurgus, defines it in _difference_, in the same manner as he does the undefiled cause in the demiurgus.
He says however, that this difference separates the demiurgic monad itself from itself. For we have before observed that this order is the supplier of separation to all the Gods. As therefore, the demiurgus is the same with himself, through the paternal union, after the same manner he is separated from himself and his father through this difference. Whence therefore, does he derive this power? From being in himself, says Parmenides, and in another. For these were indeed unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third. Separation therefore, pre-existed there according to cause; but in the demiurgus it shines forth, and unfolds the power of itself.
That the cause however of division, is in a certain respect in the first father, Parmenides manifests in the first hypothesis, when he says, “that every thing which is in itself is in a certain respect a duad, and is separated from itself.” There however, the duad is occultly; but here it subsists more clearly, where also all intellectual multitude shines forth to the view. For difference is the progeny of the firmly-abiding duad which is there. This therefore separates the demiurgic intellect from the Gods prior to it, and divides the monads in it from each other. For if so far as it is in another, it is united to the intelligible of itself, but so far as it is in itself it is separated from it, because it proceeds according to each order of its own intelligible,--if this be the case, it is necessary that this difference should be the cause to it of separation from its father. All the intellectual monads therefore, have appeared to us to subsist coordinately with each other. And the subsistence indeed, _in another_ is the sign of the father. But the subsistence _in itself_, is the sign of the first unpolluted monad. Again, _motion_ is the sign of vivific goodness; but _permanency_ of the inflexible power conjoined with motion. And _sameness with itself, and with another_, is the sign of the demiurgic peculiarity; but the being _different from other things_, is the sign of the guard about the demiurgus. And in the last place, _the being different from itself_, is the sign of the seventh intellectual monad, which is according to cause indeed, and occultly in the first father, but is allotted its hypostasis more clearly in the demiurgus. Parmenides likewise appears to me, when dividing the signs of fabrication, to have unfolded in the middles themselves, the peculiarities of the undefiled monad, and of the dividing monad, so far as they also are in a certain respect comprehended in the fabrication. For he shows in the first of the conclusions that _the one_ is _the same with itself_; in the second, that it is _different from itself_; in the third, that it is _different from other things_; and in the fourth that it is _the same with other things_. For he co-arranges indeed, the dividing power with the paternal union; but connects with a transcendency separate from secondary natures, the providential cause of them. For in the Gods, it is necessary that union should exist prior to separation, and a purity unmingled with secondary natures, prior to a providential inspection of them; through which likewise, being every where, they are no where, being present with all things, they are exempt from all things, and being all things, they are not any of their progeny.
END OF VOL. I.
[2] i.e. The highest order of intelligibles.
[3] Viz. the present and other works of Proclus, together with those of Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Syrianus, Ammonius, Damascius, Olympiodorus, and Simplicius.
[4] Ενα ιδοις αν εν πασα γῃ ομοφωνον νομον και λογον, οτι θεος εις παντων βασιλευς και πατηρ, και θεοι πολλοι, θεου παιδες, συναρχοντες θεῳ. Ταυτα και ο ελλην λεγει, και ο βαρβαρος λεγει, και ο ηπειρωτης και ο θαλαττιος, και ο σοφος και ο ασοφος. Κᾳν επι του ωκεανου ελθῃς τ εις ηϊονας, κᾳκει θεοι, τοις μεν ανισχοντες αγχου μαλα, τοις δε καταδυομενοι. Dissert. I. Edit. Princ.
[5] In his commentary on the second book of Aristotle’s treatise On the Heavens.
[7] Apud Cyril.
[8] What these are will be shortly explained, when we come to speak of the Apostle Paul.
[9] Synesius does not here speak conformably to the Chaldean theologists, from whom he has derived these appellations. For the ζωναιοι and the αζωνοι, are according to them Gods, the former being the divinities of the stars, and the latter forming that order of Gods which is called by Proclus in the sixth book of this work απολυτος, _liberated_. Both these orders therefore, are superior to the angelic series. This unscientific manner however of calling both the highest and lowest divine powers by the common name of angels, is not peculiar to Synesius and the Jews, but to all the fathers of the church, and all the Christian divines that succeeded them.
[10] Dr. Gregory, in the 70th proposition of, the first book of his Elements of Astronomy, says of Kepler, “That his archetypal ratios, geometrical concinnities, and harmonic proportions, show such a force of genius as is not to be found in any of the writers of physical astronomy before him. So that Jeremiah Horrox, a very competent judge of these matters, though a little averse to Kepler, in the beginning of his astronomical studies, after having in vain tried others, entirely falling in with Kepler’s doctrine and physical reasons, thus addresses his reader: _Kepler is a person whom I may justly admire above all mortals beside: I may call him great, divine, or even something more; since Kepler is to be valued above the whole tribe of philosophers.
Him alone let the bards sing of.--Him alone let the philosophers read; being satisfied of this, that he who has Kepler has all things._” I quote this passage, not from the justness of the encomium it contains; for it is extravagant, and by no means true; but that the reader may see what an exalted opinion some of the greatest of the moderns have had of the genius of Kepler.
[11] “Et primum quidem de anima totius universi etsi non repugno, nihil tamen hoc libro IV. dicam. Videtur (si est talis aliqua) in centro mundi, quod mihi sol est, residere, indeque in omnem ejus amplitudinem commercio radiorum lucis, qui sint loco spirituum in corpore animali propagari.”
[12] “Denique terræ globus tale corpus erit, quale est alicujus animalis: quodque animali est sua anima, hoc erit telluri hæc, quam quærimus, natura sublunaris.”
[13] “Videbam pleraque omnia, quæ ex corpore animantis provenientia, testantur animam in illo inesse, provenire etiam ex telluris corpore.
Ut enim corpus in cutis superficie pilos, sic terra plantas arboresque profert; inque iis ibi pediculi, hic crucæ, cicadæ, variaque insecta et monstra marina nascuntur: et ut corpus lachrymas, blennam, auriumque recrementa, est ubi et gummi ex faciei pustulis, sic tellus electrum, bitumen: utque vesica urinam, sic montes flumina fundunt; et ut corpus excrementum sulphurei odoris, crepitusque, qui etiam inflammari possunt, sic terra sulphur, ignes subterraneos, tonitrua, fulgura: utque in venis animantis generatur sanguis, et eum eo sudor, extra corpus ejectus; sic in venis terræ, metalla et fossilia, vaporque pluvius.”
[14] “Relucet igitur in anima telluris imago quædam circuli sodiaci sensibilis, totinsque adeo firmamenti, vinculum sympathiæ rerum cœlestium et terrestrium.”
[15] Proclus begins the sixth book of the following work with observing that he has celebrated in the preceding book the hebdomadic _æon_ of the intellectual Gods. The _æones_ therefore, though the cause of them exists in the intelligible, properly belong to the intellectual order; and the Demiurgus or artificer of the universe subsists at the extremity of that order. But the demiurgus according to Orpheus, prior to the fabrication of the world absorbed in himself Phanes the exemplar of the universe. Hence he became full of ideas of which the forms in the sensible universe are the images. And as all intellectual natures are in each, it is evident that _things which are seen were generated from the invisible æones_, conformably to the assertion of Paul.
[16] I refer the reader who is desirous of being fully convinced of this to the notes accompanying my translation of that dialogue, in vol.
3 of my Plato.
[18] Here we see the _æones_ are acknowledged by Irenæus to be beings of an order superior to angels.
[19] Ad Cap. 18. Matthæi.
[21] See my Collection of these Oracles in the old Monthly Magazine.
[22] The Synoches form the second triad of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual order of Gods.
[23] Παλιν τῃ εξ αυτου θεωσει, τῳ κατα δυναμιν εκαστου θεοειδει θεων πολλων γιγνομενων, δοκει μεν ειναι και λεγεται του ενος θεου διακρισις και πολλαπλασιασμοσ· εστι δε ουδεν ηττον ο αρχιθεος και υπερθεος υπερουσιως, εις θεος, αμεριστος εν τοις μεριστοις, ηνωμενος εαυτῳ, και τοις πολλοις αμιγης και απληθυντος. Και τουτο υπερφυως εννοησας ο κοινος ημων και του καθηγεμονος επι την θειαν φωτοδοσιαν χειραγωγος, ο πολυς τα θεια, το φως του κοσμου, τα δε φησιν ενθεαστικως εν τοις ιεροις αυτου γραμμασι. Και γαρ ειπερ εισι λεγομενοι θεοι, ειτε εν ουρανῳ, ειτε επι γης, κ.λ.----Και γαρ επι των θειων αι ενωσεις των διακρισεων επικρατουσι και προκαταρχουσι, και ουδεν ηττον εστιν ηνωμενα, και μετα την του ενος ανεκφοιτητον και ενιαιαν διακρισιν.
[24] Ταις πρωταις ουσιαις, αι μετα την ουσιοποιον αυτων θεαρχιαν ιδρυμεναι, και οιον εν προθυροις αυτης τεταγμεναι, πασης εισιν αορετου και ορατης υπερβεβηκυιαι γεγονυιας δυναμεως, ως οικειον οιητεον ειναι, και κατα παν ομοειδη την ιεραρχιαν. De Cœlest. Hierarch. cap. 7.
[25] “Diogenes Laertius says of Pythagoras, _That he charged his disciples not to give equal degrees of honour to the Gods and heroes_.
Herodotus (in Euterpe) says of the Greeks, _That they worshipped Hercules two ways, one as an immortal deity and so they sacrificed to him: and another as a Hero, and so they celebrated his memory_.
Isocrates (Encom. Helen.) distinguishes between the honours of heroes and Gods, when he speaks of Menelaus and Helena. But the distinction is no where more fully expressed than in the Greek inscription upon the statue of Regilla, wife to Herodes Atticus, as Salmasius thinks, which was set up in his temple at Triopium, and taken from the statue itself by Sirmondus; where it is said, _That she had neither the honour of a mortal, nor yet that which was proper to the Gods_: ουδε ιερα θνητοῖς, αταρ ουδε θεοισιν ομοια. It seems by the inscription of Herodes, and by the testament of Epicteta extant in Greek in the _Collection_ of _Inscriptions_, that it was in the power of particular families to keep festival days in honour of some of their own family, and to give _heroical honours_ to them. In that noble inscription at Venice, we find three days appointed every year to be kept, and a _confraternity_ established for that purpose with the laws of it. The first day to be observed in honour of the Muses, and sacrifices to be offered to them as _deities_. The second and third days in honour of the _heroes_ of the family; between which honour and that of deities, they shewed the difference by the distance of time between them, and the preference given to the other. But wherein soever the _difference_ lay, that there was a _distinction_ acknowledged among them appears by this passage of Valerius in his excellent oration extant in Dionysius Halicarnass. Antiq. Rom. lib. 11. p. 696. _I call_, says he, _the Gods to witness, whose temples and altars our family has worshipped with common sacrifices; and next after them, I call the Genii of our ancestors, to whom we give_ δευτερας τιμας, _the second honours next to the Gods_, as Celsus calls those τας προσηκουσας τιμας _the due honours that belong to the lower dæmons_. From which we take notice, that the Heathens did not confound all _degrees of divine worship_, giving to the lowest object the same which they supposed to be due to the _celestial deities_, or the _supreme God_. So that if the distinction