undeniably recognised that the ethical significance of human conduct is a metaphysical one, in other words, that it stretches out beyond this phaenomenal existence and reaches to eternity; but it is equally true that the presentment of this fact in terms of Command and Obedience, of Law and Duty, is no part of its essence. Furthermore, separated from the theological hypotheses whence they have sprung, these conceptions lose in reality all meaning, and to attempt a substitute for the former by talking with Kant of =absolute= obligation and of =unconditioned= duty, is to feed the reader with empty words, nay more, is to give him a _contradictio in adjecto_[3] to digest.
Every obligation derives all sense and meaning; simply and solely from its relation to threatened punishment or promised reward. Hence, long before Kant was thought of, Locke says: "For since it would be utterly in vain, to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will; we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law." (_Essay on the Human Understanding_, Bk. II., ch. 33, § 6). What =ought= to be done is therefore necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward; consequently, to use Kant's language, it is essentially and inevitably =hypothetical=, and never, as he maintains, =categorical=. If we think away these conditions, the conception of obligation becomes void of sense; hence absolute obligation is most certainly a _contradictio in adjecto._ A commanding voice, whether it come from within, or from without, cannot possibly be imagined except as threatening or promising.
Consequently obedience to it, which may be wise or foolish according to circumstances, is yet always actuated by selfishness, and therefore morally worthless.
The complete unthinkableness and nonsense of this conception of an =unconditioned obligation=, which lies at the root of the Kantian Ethics, appears later in the system itself, namely in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_: just as some concealed poison in an organism cannot remain hid, but sooner or later must come out and show itself.
For this =obligation=, said to be so =unconditioned=, nevertheless postulates more than one condition in the background; it assumes a rewarder, a reward, and the immortality of the person to be rewarded.
This is of course unavoidable, if one really makes Duty and Obligation the fundamental conception of Ethics; for these ideas are essentially relative, and depend for their significance on the threatened penalty or the promised reward. The guerdon which is assumed to be in store for virtue shows clearly enough that only in appearance she works for nothing. It is, however, put forward modestly veiled, under the name of the =Highest Good=, which is the union of Virtue and Happiness. But this is at bottom nothing else but a morality that derives its origin from Happiness, which means, a morality resting on selfishness. In other words, it is Eudaemonism, which Kant had solemnly thrust out of the front door of his system as an intruder, only to let it creep in again by the postern under the name of the =Highest Good=. This is how the assumption of =unconditioned absolute obligation=, concealing as it does a contradiction, avenges itself.
=Conditioned= obligation, on the other hand, cannot of course be any first principle for Ethics, since everything done out of regard for reward or punishment is necessarily an egoistic transaction, and as such is without any real moral value. All this makes it clear that a nobler and wider view of Ethics is needed, if we are in earnest about our endeavour to truly account for the significance of human conduct--a significance which extends beyond phaenomena and is eternal.
As all obligation is entirely dependent on a condition, so also is all duty. Both conceptions are very closely related, indeed almost identical. The only difference between them might be said to be that obligation in general may rest on mere force, whereas duty involves the sense of obligation deliberately undertaken, such as we see between master and servant, principal and subordinate, rulers and the ruled. And since no one undertakes a duty _gratis,_ every duty implies also a right. The slave has no duties, because he has no rights; but he is subject to an obligation which rests on sheer force. In the following Part I shall explain the only meaning which the conception "=Duty=" has in Ethics.
If we put Ethics in an =imperative= form, making it a Doctrine of Duties, and regard the moral worth or worthlessness of human conduct as the fulfilment or violation of duties, we must remember that this view of Duty, and of Obligation in general, is undeniably derived solely from theological Morals, and primarily from the Decalogue, and consequently that it rests essentially and inseparably on the assumption of man's dependence on another will which gives him commands and announces reward or punishment. But the more the assumption of such a will is in Theology positive and precise, the less should it be quietly and unsuspectingly introduced into philosophical Morals.
Hence we have no right to assume beforehand that for the latter the =imperative Form=, the ordaining of commands, laws, and duties is an essential and a matter of course; and it is a very poor shift to substitute the word "absolute" or "categorical" for the external condition which is indissolubly attached to such conceptions by their very nature: for this gives rise, as explained above, to a Kant, then, without more ado or any close examination, borrowed this =imperative Form= of Ethics from theological Morals. The hypotheses of the latter (in other words, Theology) really lie at the root of his system, and as these alone in point of fact lend it any meaning or sense, so they cannot be separated from, indeed are implicitly contained in, it. After this, when he had expounded his position the task of developing in turn a Theology out of his Morals--the famous _Moraltheologie_--was easy enough. For the conceptions which are implicitly involved in his Imperative, and which lie hidden at the base of his Morals, only required to be brought forward and expressed explicitly as postulates of Practical Reason. And so it was that, to the world's great edification, a Theology appeared depending simply on Ethics, indeed actually derived therefrom. But this came about because the ethical system itself rests on concealed theological hypotheses. I mean no derisive comparison, but in its form the process is analogous to that whereby a conjurer prepares a surprise for us, when he lets us find something where he had previously employed his art to place it. Described in the abstract, Kant's procedure is this: what ought to have been his first principle, or hypothesis (_viz_., Theology) he made the conclusion, and what ought to have been deduced as the conclusion (_viz_., the Categorical Command) he took as his hypothesis.[4] But after he had thus turned the thing upside down, nobody, not even he himself, recognised it as being what it really was, namely the old well-known system of theological Morals. How this trick was accomplished we shall consider in the sixth and seventh chapters of the present Part.
Ethics was of course frequently put in the imperative form, and treated as a doctrine of duties also in pre-Kantian philosophy; but it was always then based upon the will of a God whose existence had been otherwise proved, and so there was no inconsequence. As soon, however, as the attempt was made, as Kant attempted, to give a foundation to Ethics independent of this will, and establish it without metaphysical hypotheses, there was no longer any justification for taking as its basis the words "thou shalt," and "it is thy duty" (that is, the imperative form), without first deducing the truth thereof from some other source.
[1] Du sollt (_sic_) nicht lügen.
[2] Sollt is the old form for "_sollst_." Cf. Eng., _shalt_: Icel; [3] A contradiction in the adjective. This occurs when the epithet applied to a noun contradicts its essential meaning.--(_Translator_.)
[4] Like the converse of a geometrical proposition, this Kantian inversion is not necessarily true; its validity, in fact, depends on the conclusion being implicitly contained in the hypothesis.
--(_Translator_.)
CHAPTER III.
ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR.
This form of the doctrine of duties was very acceptable to Kant, and in working out his position he left it untouched; for, like his predecessors, along with the duties towards others he ranged also duties towards ourselves. I, however, entirely reject this assumption, and, as there will be no better opportunity, I shall here incidentally explain my view.
Duties towards ourselves must, just as all others, be based either on right or on love. Duties towards ourselves based on right are impossible, because of the self-evident fundamental principle _volenti non fit injuria_ (where the will assents, no injury is done). For what I do is always what I will; consequently also what I do to myself is never anything but what I will, therefore it cannot be unjust. Next, as regards duties towards ourselves based on love. Ethics here finds her work already done, and comes too late. The impossibility of violating the duty of self-love is at once assumed by the first law of Christian Morals: "Love thy neighbour as thyself." According to this, the love which each man cherishes for himself is postulated as the _maximum_, and as the condition of all other love; while the converse, "Love thyself as thy neighbour" is never added; for every one would feel that the latter does not claim enough. Moreover, self-love would be the sole duty regularly involving an _opus supererogationis_. Kant himself says 230): "That which each man inevitably wills of himself, does not belong to the conception of Duty." This idea of duties towards ourselves is nevertheless still held in repute, indeed it enjoys for the most part special favour; nor need we feel surprise. But it has an amusing effect in cases where people begin to show anxiety about their persons, and talk quite earnestly of the duty of self-preservation; the while it is sufficiently clear that fear will lend them legs soon enough, and that they have no need of any law of duty to help them along.
First among the duties towards ourselves is generally placed that of not committing suicide, the line of argument taken being extremely prejudiced and resting on the shallowest basis. Unlike animals, man is not only a prey to =bodily= pain limited to the passing moment, but also to those incomparably greater =mental= sufferings, which, reaching forwards and backwards, draw upon the future and the past; and nature, by way of compensation, has granted to man alone the privilege of being able to end his life at his own pleasure, before she herself sets a term to it; thus, while animals necessarily live so long as they can, man need only live so long as he =will=.
Whether he ought on ethical grounds to forego this privilege is a difficult question, which in any case cannot be decided by the usual superficial reasoning. The arguments against suicide which Kant does 57), I cannot conscientiously describe as other than pitiable, and quite undeserving of an answer. It is laughable indeed to suppose that reflections of such a kind could have wrested the dagger from the hands of Cato, of Cleopatra, of Cocceius Nerva (Tac. _Ann_., vi. 26) or of Arria the wife of Paetus (Plin., _Ep_., iii. 16). If real moral motives for not committing suicide actually exist, it is certain that they lie very deep, and cannot be reached by the plummet of ordinary Ethics.
They belong to a higher view of things than is adaptable even to the standpoint of the present treatise.[1] That which generally comes next on the rubric of duties towards ourselves may be divided partly into rules of worldly wisdom, partly into hygienic prescriptions; but neither class belongs to Morals in the proper sense. Last on the catalogue comes the prohibition of unnatural lust--onanism, _paederastia,_ and bestiality. Of these onanism is mainly a vice of childhood, and must be fought against much more with the weapon of dietetics than with that of ethics; hence we find that the authors of books directed against it are physicians (_e.g._, Tissot and others) rather than moralists. After dietetics and hygiene have done their work, and struck it down by irrefutable reasoning, if Ethics desires to take up the matter, she finds little left for her to do. Bestiality, again, is of very rare occurrence; it is thoroughly abnormal and exceptional, and, moreover, so loathsome and foreign to human nature, that itself, better than all arguments of reason, passes judgment on itself, and deters by sheer disgust. For the rest, as being a degradation of human nature, it is in reality an offence against the species as such, and in the abstract; not against human units. Of the three sexual perversions of which we are speaking it is consequently only with _paederastia_ that Ethics has to do, and in treating of Justice this vice finds its proper place. For Justice is infringed by it, in face of which fact, the dictum _volenti non fit injuria_ is unavailing. The injustice consists in the seduction of the younger and inexperienced person, who is thereby ruined physically and morally.
[1] There are ascetic reasons, which may be found in the Fourth Book, Vol. I., § 69, of my chief work (_Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_).
CHAPTER IV.
ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
With the imperative Form of Ethics, which in Chapter II. we proved to be a _petitio principii_, is directly connected a favourite idea of Kant's, that may be excused, but cannot be adopted. Sometimes we see a physician, after having employed a certain remedy with conspicuous success, henceforth prescribing it for almost all diseases; to such a one Kant may be likened. By separating the _a priori_ from the _a posteriori_ in human knowledge he made the most brilliant and pregnant discovery that Metaphysics can boast of. What wonder then that thereafter he should try to apply this method, this sundering of the two forms, everywhere, and should consequently make Ethics also consist of two parts, a pure, _i.e._ an _a priori_ knowable part, and an empirical? The latter of these he rejects as unreliable for the purpose of founding Ethics. To trace out the former and; exhibit it by itself is his purpose in the _Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten_, which he accordingly represents as a science purely _a priori_, exactly in the same way as he sets forth the _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft_. He asserts in fact that the =Moral Law=, which without warrant, without deduction, or proof of any sort, he postulates as existing, is furthermore a Law knowable _a priori_ and independent of all =internal= or =external experience=; it "_rests_" (he says) "=solely on conceptions of pure Reason; and is to be taken as a synthetic proposition a priori=" (_Kritik der from this definition the implication immediately follows that such a Law can only be formal, like everything else known _a priori_, and consequently has only to do with the =Form= of actions, not with their =Essence=. Let it be thought what this means! He emphatically adds (p. vi of the preface to the _Grundlegung;_ R., p. 5) that it is "useless to look for it either subjectively in man's nature, or objectively in the accidents of the external world," and (preface of the same, page vii; R., p. 6) that "nothing whatever connected with it can be borrowed from knowledge relating to man, _i.e._, from anthropology." On page 59 (R., p. 52) he repeats, "That one ought on no account to fall into the mistake of trying to derive one's principle of morality from the special constitution of human nature"; and again, on page 60 (R., p. 52), he says that, "Everything derived from any natural disposition peculiar to man, or from certain feelings and propensities, or indeed from any special trend attaching solely to human nature, and not necessarily to be taken as the Will of =every rational being=," is incapable of affording a foundation for the moral law.
This shows beyond all possibility of contradiction that Kant does not represent the alleged moral law as a _fact of consciousness_, capable of empirical proof--which is how the later would-be philosophers, both individually and collectively, wish to pass it off. In discarding every empirical basis for Morals, he rejects all internal, and still more decidedly all external, experience., Accordingly he founds--and I call special attention to this--his moral principle not on any provable _fact of consciousness_, such as an inner natural disposition, nor yet upon any objective relation of things in the external world. No! That would be an empirical foundation. Instead of this, _pure conceptions a priori_, _i.e._, conceptions, which so far contain nothing derived from internal or external experience, and thus are simply shells without kernels--these are to be made the basis of Morals. Let us consider the full meaning of such a position. Human consciousness as well as the whole external world, together with all the experience and all the facts they comprise, are swept from under our feet. We have nothing to stand upon. And what have we to hold to? Nothing but a few entirely abstract, entirely unsubstantial conceptions, floating in the air equally with ourselves. It is from these, or, more correctly, from the mere form of their connection with judgments made, that a _Law_ is declared to proceed, which by so-called =absolute necessity= is supposed to be valid, and to be strong enough to lay bit and bridle on the surging throng of human desires, on the storm of passion, on the giant might of _egoism_. We shall see if such be the case.
With this preconceived notion that the basis of Morals must be necessarily and strictly a priori, and entirely free from everything empirical, another of Kant's favourite ideas is closely connected.
The moral principle that he seeks to establish is, he says, a =synthetic proposition a priori, of merely formal contents=, and hence exclusively a matter of =Pure Reason=; and accordingly, as such, to be regarded as valid =not only for men=, but for =all possible rational beings=; indeed he declares it to hold good for man "on this account alone," _i.e._, because _per accidens_ man comes under the category of rational beings. Here lies the cause of his basing the Moral principle not on any feeling, but on =pure Reason= (which knows nothing but itself and the statement of its antithesis). So that this =pure Reason= is taken, not as it really and exclusively is--an intellectual faculty of man--but =as a self-existent hypostatic essence=, yet without the smallest authority; the pernicious effects of such example and precedent being sufficiently shown in the pitiful philosophy of the present day.
Indeed, this view of Morals as existing not for men, as men, but for all rational beings, as such, is with Kant a principle so firmly established, an idea so favourite, that he is never tired of repeating it at every opportunity.
I, on the contrary, maintain that we are never entitled to raise into a _genus_ that which we only know of in a single species. For we could bring nothing into our idea of the _genus_ but what we had abstracted from this one species; so that what we should predicate of the _genus_ could after all only be understood of the single species.
While, if we should attempt to think away (without any warrant) the particular attributes of the species, in order to form our _genus_, we should perhaps remove the exact condition whereby the remaining attributes, hypostatised as a _genus_, are made possible. Just as we recognise =intelligence in general= to be an attribute of animal beings alone, and are therefore never justified in thinking of it as existing outside, and independent, of animal nature; so we recognise =Reason= as the exclusive attribute of the human race, and have not the smallest right to suppose that Reason exists externally to it, and then proceed to set up a _genus_ called "Rational Beings," differing from its single known species "Man"; still less are we warranted in laying down laws for such imaginary =rational beings in the abstract=. To talk of rational beings external to men is like talking of =heavy beings= external to bodies. One cannot help suspecting that Kant was thinking a little of the dear cherubim, or at any rate counted on their presence in the conviction of the reader. In any case this doctrine contains a tacit assumption of an _anima rationalis,_ which as being entirely different from the _anima sensitiva_, and the _anima vegetativa_, is supposed to persist after death, and then to be indeed nothing else but _rationalis_. But in the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ Kant himself has expressly and elaborately made an end of this most transcendent hypostasis. Nevertheless, in his ethics generally, and in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ especially, there seems always to hover in the background the thought that the inner and eternal essence, of man consists of =Reason=.
In this connection, where the matter only occurs incidentally, I must content myself with simply asserting the contrary. Reason, as indeed the intellectual faculty as a whole, is secondary, is an attribute of phaenomena, being in point of fact conditioned by the organism; whereas it is the =Will= in man which is his very self, the only part of him which is metaphysical, and therefore indestructible.
The success with which Kant had applied his method to the theoretical side of philosophy led him on to extend it to the practical. Here also he endeavoured to separate pure _a priori_ from empirical _a posteriori_ knowledge. For this purpose he assumed that just as we know _a priori_ the laws of Space, of Time, and of Causality, so in like manner, or at any rate analogously, we have the moral plumb-line for our conduct given us prior to all experience, and revealed in a Categorical Imperative, an absolute "Ought." But how wide is the difference between this alleged moral law _a priori_, and our theoretical knowledge _a priori_ of Space, Time, and Causality!
The latter are nothing but the expression of the forms, _i.e._, the functions of our intellect, whereby alone we are capable of grasping an objective world, and wherein alone it can be mirrored; so that the world (as we know it) is absolutely conditioned by these forms, and all experience =must= invariably and exactly correspond to them--just as everything that I see through a blue glass must appear blue. While the former, the so-called moral law, is something that experience pours ridicule on at every step; indeed, as Kant himself says, it is doubtful whether in practice it has ever really been followed on any single occasion. How completely unlike are the things which are here classed together under the conception of =apriority=! Moreover, Kant overlooked the fact that, according to his own teaching, in theoretical philosophy, it is exactly the =Apriority= of our knowledge of Time, Space, and Causality--independent as this is of experience--that limits it strictly to phaenomena, _i.e._, to the picture of the world as reflected in our consciousness, and makes it entirely invalid as regards the real nature of things, _i.e._, as regards whatever exists independently of our capacity to grasp it.
Similarly, when we turn to practical philosophy, his alleged moral law, if it have an _a priori_ origin in ourselves, must also be only phaenomenal, and leave entirely untouched the essential nature of things. Only this conclusion would stand in the sharpest contradiction as much to the facts themselves, as to Kant's view of them. For it is precisely the moral principle in us that he everywhere (_e.g., Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, p. 175; R., p. 228) represents as being in the closest connection with the real essence of things, indeed, as directly in contact with it; and in all passages in the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,_ where the mysterious Thing in itself comes forward a little more clearly, it shows itself as the =moral principle= in us, as =Will=. But of this he failed to take account.
In Chapter II. of this Part, I explained how Kant took over bodily from theological Morals the =imperative form= of Ethics, _i.e._, the conception of obligation, of law, and of duty; and how at the same time he was constrained to leave behind that which in the realm of theology alone lends force and significance to these ideas. But he felt the need of some basis for them, and accordingly went so far as to require that the _conception of duty_ itself should be also the _ground of its fulfilment_; in other words, that it should itself be its own enforcement. An action, he says (p. 11; R., p. 18), has no genuine moral worth, unless it be done simply as a matter of duty, and for duty's sake, without any liking for it being felt; and the character only begins to have value, if a man, who has no sympathy in his heart, and is cold and indifferent to others' sufferings, and who is =not by nature a lover of his kind=, is nevertheless a doer of good actions, solely out of a pitiful sense of duty. This assertion, which is revolting to true moral sentiment; this apotheosis of lovelessness, the exact opposite, as it is, of the Christian doctrine of Morals, which places love before everything else, and teaches that without it nothing profiteth (1 Cor. xiii. 3); this stupid moral pedantry has been ridiculed by Schiller in two apposite epigrams, entitled _Gewissensskrupel_ (Scruples of Conscience) and _Entscheidung_ (Decision).[1] It appears that some passages in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, which exactly suit this connection, were the immediate occasion of the verses. Thus, for instance, on p. 150 (R., p. 211) we find: "Obedience to the moral law, which a man feels incumbent on him, is based not on voluntary inclination, nor on endeavour willingly put forth, without any authoritative command, but on a sense of duty." Yes, it must be commanded! What slavish morality! And again on p. 213 (R., p. 257): "Feelings of compassion, and of tender-hearted sympathy would be actually troublesome to persons who think aright, because through such emotions their well weighed maxims would become confused, and so the desire would grow up to be rid of them, and to be subject solely to the lawgiver--Reason." Now I maintain without hesitation that what opens the hand of the above-described (p. 11; R., p. 18) loveless doer of good, who is indifferent to the sufferings of other people, cannot (provided he have no secondary motives) be anything else than a slavish _δεισιδαιμονία_ (fear of the gods), equally whether he calls his fetich "Categorical Imperative" or Fitzlipuzli.[2] For what but fear can move a hard heart?
Furthermore, on p. 13 (R., p. 19), in accordance with the above view, we find that the moral worth of an action is supposed to lie, by no means in the =intention= which led to it, but in the maxim which was followed. Whereas I, on the contrary, ask the reader to reflect that it is the =intention alone= which decides as to the moral worth, or worthlessness, off an action, so that the same act may deserve condemnation or praise according to the intention which determined it. Hence it is that, whenever men discuss a proceeding to which some moral importance is attached, the =intention= is always investigated, and by this standard alone the matter is judged; as, likewise, it is in the _intention_ alone that every one seeks justification, if he see his conduct misinterpreted or excuse, if its consequence be mischievous.
On p. 14 (R., p. 20) we at last reach the definition of Duty, which is the fundamental conception of Kant's entire ethical system. It is: "The necessity of an action out of respect for the law." But what is =necessary= takes place with absolute certainty while conduct based on pure duty generally does not come off at all. And not only this; Kant himself admits (p. 25; R., p. 28) that there are =no certain instances= on record of conduct determined solely by pure duty; and on p. 26 (R., p. 29) he says: "It is utterly impossible to know with certainty from experience whether there has ever really been one single case in which an action, however true to duty, has rested simply on its idea."--And similarly on p. 28 (R., p. 30) and p. 49 (R., p. 50). In what sense then can =necessity= be attributed to such an action? As it is only fair always to put the most favourable interpretation on an author's words, we will suppose him to mean that an act true to duty is =objectively= necessary, but =subjectively= accidental. Only it is precisely this that is more easily said than thought for where is the =Object= of this =objective= necessity, the consequence of which for the most part, perhaps indeed always, fails to be realised in objective reality! With every wish to be unbiassed, I cannot but think that the expression--=necessity of an action=--is nothing but an artificially concealed, very forced paraphrase of the word "ought."[3] This will become clearer if we notice that in the same definition the word _Achtung_ (respect) is employed, where _Gehorsam_ (obedience) is meant. Similarly in the note on p. 16 (R., p. 20) we read: "_Achtung_ signifies simply the subordination of my will to a law. The direct determination of the will by a law, and the consciousness that it is so determined--this is what is denoted by _Achtung_" In what language?
In German the proper term is _Gehorsam_. But the word _Achtung_, so unsuitable as it is, cannot without a reason have been put in place of the word _Gehorsam._ It must serve some purpose; and this is obviously none other than to veil the derivation of the imperative form, and of the conception of duty, from theological Morals; just as we saw above that the expression "necessity of an action," which is such a forced and awkward substitute for the word "shall," was only chosen because "shall" is the exact language of the Decalogue. The above definition: "Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law," would therefore read in natural, undisguised, plain language: "Duty signifies an action which =ought= to be done out of obedience to a law."
This is "the real form of the poodle."[4] But now as to the Law, which is the real foundation stone of the Kantian Ethics. =What does it contain? And where is it inscribed?= This is the chief point of inquiry. In the first place, be it observed that we have two questions to deal with: the one has to do with the =Principle=, the other with the =Basis= of Ethics--two entirely different things, although they are frequently, and sometimes indeed intentionally, confused.
The principle or main proposition of an ethical system is the shortest and most concise definition of the line of conduct which it prescribes, or, if it have no imperative form, of the line of conduct to which it attaches real moral worth. It thus contains, in the general terms of a single enunciation, the direction for following the path of virtue, which is derived from that system: in other words, it is the _ὅ,τι_[5] of virtue. Whereas the =Basis= of any theory of Ethics is the _διότι_[6] of virtue, the =reason= of the obligation enjoined, of the exhortation or praise given, whether it be sought in human nature, or in the external conditions of the world, or in anything else. As in all sciences, so also in Ethics the _ὅ,τι_ must be clearly distinguished from the _διότι_. But most teachers of Morals wilfully confound this difference: probably because the _ὅ,τι_ is so easy, the _διότι_ so exceedingly difficult, to give. They are therefore glad to try to make up for the poverty on the one hand, by the riches on the other, and to bring about a happy marriage between _Πενία_ (poverty) and _Πόρος_ (plenty), by putting them together in one proposition.[7] This is generally done by taking the familiar _ὅ,τι_ out of the simple form in which it can be expressed, and forcing it into an artificial formula, from which it is only to be deduced as the conclusion of given premises; and the reader is led by this performance to feel as if he had grasped not only the thing, but its cause as well. We may easily convince ourselves of this by recalling all the most familiar principles of Morals. As, however, in what follows I have no intention of imitating acrobatic tricks of this sort, but purpose proceeding with all honesty and straightforwardness, I cannot make the principle of Ethics equivalent to its basis, but must keep the two quite separate. Accordingly, this _ὅ,τι_--_i.e._, the principle, the fundamental proposition--as to which in its essence all teachers of Morals are really at one, however much they may clothe it in different costumes, I shall at once express in the form which I take to be the simplest and purest possible, _viz.: Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva_. (Do harm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies in your power.) This is in truth the proposition which all ethical writers expend their energies in endeavouring to account for. It is the common result of their manifold and widely differing deductions; it is the _ὅ,τι_ for which the _διότι_ is still sought after; the consequence, the cause of which is wanting. Hence it is itself nothing but the _Datum_ (the thing given), in relation to which the _Quaesitum_ (the thing required) is the problem of every ethical system, as also of the present prize essay. The solution of this riddle will disclose the real foundation of Ethics, which, like the philosopher's stone, has been searched for from time immemorial. That the _Datum_, the _ὅ,τι_, the principle is most purely expressed by the enunciation I have given, can be seen from the fact that it stands to every other precept of Morals as a conclusion to given premises, and therefore constitutes the real goal it is desired to attain; so that all other ethical commandments can only be regarded as paraphrases, as indirect or disguised statements, of the above simple proposition. This is true, for instance, even of that trite and apparently elementary maxim: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_[8] (Do not to another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself.) The defect here is that the wording only touches the duties imposed by law, not those required by virtue;--a thing which can be easily remedied by the omission of _non_ and _ne_. Thus changed, it really means nothing