this Rational Psychology, the soul was originally and in its essence a =perceiving= substance, and only as a consequence thereof did it become possessed of volition. According as it carried on these two modes of its activity, Perception and Volition, conjoined with the body, or incorporeal, and entirely _per se_, so it was endowed with a lower or higher faculty of perception, and of volition in like kind.
In its higher faculty the immaterial soul was active solely by itself, and without co-operation of the body. In this case it was _intellectus purus_, being composed of concepts, belonging exclusively to itself, and of the corresponding acts of will, both of which were absolutely spiritual, and had nothing sensuous about them--the sensuous being derived from the body.[20] So that it perceived nothing else but pure Abstracts, Universals, innate conceptions, _aeternae veritates_, etc.; wherefore also its volition was entirely controlled by purely spiritual ideas like these. On the other hand, the soul's =lower= faculty of Perception and Volition was the result of its working in concert and close union with the various organs of the body, whereby a prejudicial effect was produced on its an mixed spiritual activity.
Here, _i.e._, to this =lower= faculty, was supposed to belong every =intuitive= perception, which consequently would have to be obscure and confused, while the =abstract=, formed by separating from objects their qualities, would be clear! The will, which was determined by preceptions thus sensuously conditioned, formed the lower Volition, and it was for the most part bad; for its acts were guided by the impulse of the senses; while the other will (the higher) was untrammelled, was guided by Pure Reason, and appertained only to the immaterial soul. This doctrine of the Cartesians has been best expounded by De la Forge, in his _Tractatus de Mente Humana_, where in chap. 23 we read:[21] _Non nisi eadem voluntas est, quae appellatur appetitus sensitivus, quando excitatur per judicia, quae formantur consequenter ad perceptiones sensuum; et quae appetitus rationalis nominatur, cum mens judicia format de propriis suis ideis, independenter a cogitationibus sensuum confusis, quae inclinationum ejus sunt causae...Id, quod occasionem dedit, ut duae istae diversae voluntatis propensiones pro duobus diversis appetitibus sumerentur, est, quod saepissime unus alteri opponatur, quia propositum, quod mens superaedificat propriis suis perceptionibus, non semper consentit cum cogitationibus, quae menti a corporis dispositione suggeruntur, per quam saepe obligatur ad aliquid volendum, dum ratio ejus earn aliud optare facit._ Out of the dim reminiscence of such views there finally arose Kant's doctrine of the Autonomy of the Will, which, as the mouth-piece of Pure, Practical Reason, lays down the law for all rational beings as such, and recognises nothing but =formal= motives, as opposed to =material=; the latter determining only the lower faculty of desires, to which the higher is hostile. For the rest, this whole theory, which was not really systematically set forth till the time of Descartes, is nevertheless to be found as far back as Aristotle.
In his _De Anima_ I. 1, it is sufficiently clearly stated; while Plato in the _Phaedo_ (pp. 188 and 189, edit. Bipont.) had already paved the way, with no uncertain hints. After being elaborated to great perfection by the Cartesian doctrine, we find it a hundred years later waxed bold and strong, and occupying the foremost place; but precisely for this reason forced to reveal its true nature. An excellent _résumé_ of the view which then prevailed is presented in Muratori's _Della Forza della Fantasia,_ chaps. 1-4 and 13. In this work the imagination is regarded as a purely material, corporeal organ of the brain (the lower faculty of perception), its function being to intuitively apprehend the external world on the data of the senses; and nought remains for the immaterial soul but thinking, reflecting, and determining. It must have been felt how obviously this position involves the whole subject in doubt. For if Matter is capable of the intuitive apprehension of the world in all its complexity, it is inconceivable that it should not also be capable of abstracting this intuition; wherefrom everything else would follow. Abstraction is of course nothing else than an elimination of the qualities attaching to things which are not necessary for general purposes, in other words, the individual and special differences. For instance, if I disregard, or abstract, that which is peculiar to the sheep, ox, stag, camel, etc., I reach the conception of ruminants. By this operation the ideas lose their intuitiveness, and as merely abstract, non-intuitive notions or concepts, they require words to fix them in the consciousness, and allow of their being adequately handled. All this shows that Kant was still under the influence of the after-effect of that old-time doctrine, when he propounded his Practical Reason with its Imperatives.
[1] These epigrams form the close of Schiller's poem "Die Philosophen," which is worth reading in this connection--(_Translator_.)
[2] More correctly, Huitzilopochtli: a Mexican deity.
[3] Or "shall," as in the "thou shall," of the Decalogue --(_Translator_.)
Schopenhauer means that his analysis has forced the real meaning out of Kant's language, just as Faust by his exorcism compels Mephistopheles, who was in the form of a poodle, to resume his true [5] _ὅ,τι_: _i.e._, the "what" a thing is; its principle, or its underlying cause.--(_Translator_.)
[7] Schopenhauer was doubtless thinking of the famous myth in where Eros is represented as the offspring of _Πόρος_ and _Πενία_, who on the birthday of Aphrodite were united in the garden of [8] Hugo Grotius attributes it to the Emperor Severus.
[9] Azote=Nitrogen. The formula for Ammonium Chloride or Sal-ammoniac is NH4Cl.--(_Translator_).
[10] To be found in the fifth number of the _Beiträge zur Uebersicht der Philosophie am Anfange des_ 19. _Jahrhunderts_--a journal of the greatest importance for critical philosophy.
[11] "_Einen erklecklichen_ SATZ, _ja, und der auch was_ SETZT."
SCHILLER.
[12] To argue from impossibility to non-existence is valid--_i.e._ the impossibility of a thing makes its non-existence a safe [13] _Dacht' ich's doch! Wissen sie nichts Vernünftiges mehr_ _zu erwidern,_ _Schieben sie's Einem geschwind in das Gewissen hinein_.
_Just as I thought! Can they give no more any answer of reason,_ _Quickly the ground is changed: Conscience, they say, is at fault._ --(_Translator._) [14] As from the Pythian tripod: _i.e._,--with official authority, _ex cathedra._ [16] _λόγιμος_ means "remarkable," being never used in the sense of "rational." _Tὸ logikὸn_ is perhaps a possible expression; the right word is _λόγος_.--(_Translator_.)
[17] The three Ideas are: (1) The Psychological; (2) The Cosmological; (3) The Theological. _V_. The Paralogisms of Pure Reasons, in the Dialectics: _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,_ Part I.--(_Translator_.)
[18] An example easy to be imitated in its faults. _V_. Horace, _Ep._ Lib. I., xix. 17.--(_Translator_.)
[19] The thinking substance, and substance in extension are one and the self-same substance, which is contained now under the latter attribute (_i.e._, extension), now under the former (_i.e._, the attribute of thinking).--_Ethica_, Part II., Prop. 7. Corollary.
[20] _Intellectio pura est intellectio, quae circa nullas imagines corporeas versatur_. (Pure intelligence is intelligence that has nothing to do with any bodily forms.)--Cart., _Medit_., p. 188.
[21] It is nothing but one and the same will, which at one time is called sensuous desire, when it is stimulated by acts of judgment, formed in consequence of perceptions of the senses; and which at another time is called rational desire (_i.e._ desire of the reason), when the mind forms acts of judgment about its own proper ideas, independently of the thoughts belonging to, and mixed up with, the senses; which thoughts are the causes of the mind's tendencies...That these two diverse propensities of the will should be regarded as two distinct desires is occasioned by the fact that very often the one is opposed to the other, because the intention, which is built up by the mind on the foundation of its own proper perceptions, does not always agree with the thoughts which are suggested to the mind by the body's disposition; whereby it (the mind) is often constrained to will something, while its reason makes it choose something CHAPTER V.
ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
After having tested in the preceding chapter the actual basis of Kant's Ethics, I now turn to that which rests on it--his =leading principle of Morals=. The latter is very closely connected with the former; indeed, in a certain sense, they both grew up together. We have seen that the formula expressing the principle reads as follows: "Act only in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should be a general law for all rational beings." It is a strange proceeding for a man, who _ex hypothesi_ is seeking a law to determine what he should do, and what he should leave undone, to be instructed first to search for one fit to regulate the conduct of all possible rational beings; but we will pass over that. It is sufficient only to notice the fact that in the above guiding rule, as put forth by Kant, we have obviously not reached the moral law itself, but only a finger-post, or indication where it is to be looked for. The money, so to say, is not yet paid down, but we hold a safe draft for it. And who, then, is the cashier?
To say the truth at once: a paymaster in this connection surely very unexpected, being neither more nor less than =Egoism=, as I shall now demonstrate.
The precept, it is said, which =I can wish= were the guide of all men's conduct, is itself the real moral principle. That which =I can wish= is the hinge on which the given direction turns. But what can I truly wish, and what not? Clearly, in order to determine what I can wish in the matter under discussion, I require yet another criterion; for without such I could never find the key to the instruction which comes to me like a sealed order. Where, then, is this criterion to be discovered? Certainly nowhere else but in my Egoism, which is the nearest, ever ready, original, and living standard of all volition, and which has at any rate the _jus primi occupantis_ before every moral principle. The direction for finding the real moral law, which is contained in the Kantian rule, rests, as a matter of fact, on the tacit assumption that I can only wish for that which is most to my advantage.
Now because, in framing a precept to be generally followed, I cannot regard myself as always active, but must contemplate my playing a =passive= part _eventualiter_ and at times; therefore from this point of view my =egoism= decides for justice and loving-kindness; not from any wish to =practise= these virtues, but because it desires to =experience= them. We are reminded of the miser, who, after listening to a sermon on beneficence, exclaims: "_Wie gründlich ausgeführt, wie schön!_-- _Fast möcht' ich betteln gehn."_ (How well thought out, how excellent!-- Almost I'd like to beg.)
This is the indispensable key to the direction in which Kant's leading principle of Ethics is embedded; nor can he help supplying it himself. Only he refrains from doing so at the moment of propounding his precept, lest we should feel shocked. It is found further on in the text, at a decent distance, so as to prevent the fact at once leaping to light, that here, after all, in spite of his grand _a priori_ edifice, =Egoism= is sitting on the judge's seat, scales in hand. Moreover, it does not occur, till after he has decided, from the point of view of the _eventualiter_ passive side, that this position holds good for the active _rôle_ as well. Thus, on p. 19 (R., p. 24) we read: "That I could not =wish= for a general law to establish lying, because people would no longer believe me, or else pay me back in the =same coin=." Again on p. 55 (R., p. 49): "The universality of a law to the effect that every one could promise what he likes, without any intention of keeping his word, would make the promise itself, together with the object in view, whatever that might be, impossible; for no one would =believe= it." On p. 56 (R., p.
50), in connection with the maxim of =hard-heartedness=, we find the following: "A will, which should determine this, would contradict itself; for cases can occur, in which a man needs the love and sympathy of others, and in which he, by virtue of such a natural law, evolved from his own will, would deprive himself of all hope of the help, which he desires." Similarly in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ (Part I., vol. i., chap. 2, p. 123; R., p. 192): "If every one were to regard others' distress with total indifference, and you were to belong to such an order of things; would you be there with the concurrence of your will?" _Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam_![1] one could reply. These passages sufficiently show in what sense the phrase, "to be able to wish," in Kant's formula is to be understood.
But it is in the _Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre_, that this real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated. In § 30 we read: "For every one wishes to be helped. If, however, a man were to give utterance to his rule of unwillingness to help others, all people would be justified in refusing him assistance. Thus this rule of selfishness contradicts itself." =Would be justified=, he says, =would be justified=! Here, then, it is declared, as explicitly as anything can be, that moral obligation rests solely and entirely on presupposed =reciprocity=; consequently it is utterly selfish, and only admits of being interpreted by egoism, which, under the condition of =reciprocity=, knows how to make a compromise cleverly enough. Such a course would be quite in place if it were a question of laying down the fundamentals of state-organisation, but not, when we come to construct those of ethics. In the _Grundlegung_, p. 81 (R., p. 67), the following sentence occurs: "The principle of always acting in accordance with that precept which you can also wish were universally established as law--this is the only condition under which a man's will can never be in antagonism with itself." From what has been said above, it will be apparent that the true meaning of the word "antagonism" may be thus explained: if a man should sanction the precept of injustice and hard-heartedness, he would subsequently, in the event of his playing a =passive= part, recall it, and so his will would =contradict= itself.
From this analysis it is abundantly clear that Kant's famous leading principle is not--as he maintains with tireless repetition--a =categorical=, but in reality a =hypothetical= Imperative; because it tacitly presupposes the condition that the law to be established for what I do--inasmuch as I make it universal--shall also be a law for what is done to me; and because I, under this condition, as the _eventualiter_ non-active party, =cannot= possibly =wish= for injustice and hard-heartedness. But if I strike out this proviso, and, trusting perhaps to my surpassing strength of mind and body, think of myself as always =active=, and never =passive=; then, in choosing the precept which is to be universally valid, if there exists no basis for ethics other than Kant's, I can perfectly well wish that injustice and hard-heartedness should be the general rule, and consequently order the world Upon the simple plan, That they should take, who have the power, And they should keep, who can.
--(WORDSWORTH.)
In the foregoing chapter we showed that the Kantian leading principle of Ethics is devoid of all real foundation. It is now clear that to this singular defect must be added, notwithstanding Kant's express assertion to the contrary, its concealed hypothetical nature, whereby its basis turns out to be nothing else than Egoism, the latter being the secret interpreter of the direction which it contains. Furthermore, regarding it solely as a formula, we find that it is only a periphrasis, an obscure and disguised mode of expressing the well-known rule: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_ (do not to another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself); if, that is, by omitting the _non_ and _ne_, we remove the limitation, and include the duties taught by love as well as those prescribed by law. For it is obvious that this is the only precept which I can wish should regulate the conduct of all men (speaking, of course, from the point of view of the possibly =passive part= I may play, where my =Egoism= is touched). This rule, _Quod tibi fieri, etc._, is, however, in its turn, merely a circumlocution for, or, if it be preferred, a premise of, the proposition which I have laid down as the simplest and purest definition of the conduct required by the common consent of all ethical systems; namely, _Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva_ (do harm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies in your power). The true and real substance of Morals is this, and never can be anything else. But on what is it based? What is it that lends force to this command? This is the old and difficult problem with which man is still to-day confronted. For, on the other side, we hear Egoism crying with a loud voice: _Neminem juva, immo omnes, si forte conducit, laede_ (help nobody, but rather injure all people, if it brings you any advantage); nay more, Malice gives us the variant: _Immo omnes, quantum potes, laede_ (but rather injure all people as far as you can). To bring into the lists a combatant equal, or rather superior to Egoism and Malice combined--this is the task of all Ethics. _Heic Rhodus, heic salta!_[2] The division of human duty into two classes has long been recognised, and no doubt owes its origin to the nature of morality itself. We have. (1) the duties ordained by law (otherwise called the--perfect, obligatory, narrower duties), and (2) those prescribed by virtue (otherwise called imperfect, wider, meritorious, or, preferably, the duties taught by love). On p. 57 (R., p. 60) we find Kant desiring to give a further confirmation to the moral principle, which he propounded, by undertaking to derive this classification from it. But the attempt turns out to be so forced, and so obviously bad, that it only testifies in the strongest way against the soundness of his position. For, according to him, the duties laid down by statutes rest on a precept, the contrary of which, taken as a general natural law, is declared to be quite =unthinkable= without contradiction; while the duties inculcated by virtue are made to depend on a maxim, the opposite of which can (he says) be conceived as a general natural law, but cannot possibly be wished for. I beg the reader to reflect that the rule of injustice, the reign of might instead of right, which in the Kantian view is not even thinkable as a natural law, is in reality, and in point of fact, the dominant order of things not only in the animal kingdom, but among men as well. It is true that an attempt has been made among civilised peoples to obviate its injurious effects by means of all the machinery of state government; but as soon as this, wherever, or of whatever kind, it be, is suspended or eluded, the natural law immediately resumes its sway. Indeed between nation and nation it never ceases to prevail; the customary jargon about justice is well known to be nothing but diplomacy's official style; the real arbiter is brute force. On the other hand, genuine, _i.e._, voluntary, acts of justice, do occur beyond all doubt, but always only as exceptions to the rule. Furthermore: wishing to give instances by way of introducing the above-mentioned classification, Kant establishes the duties prescribed by law first (p. 53; R., p. 48) through the so-called duty towards oneself,--the duty of not ending one's life voluntarily, if the pain outweigh the pleasure. Accordingly, the rule of suicide is held to be not even =thinkable= as a general natural law. I, on the contrary, maintain that, since here there can be no intervention of state control, it is exactly this rule which is proved to be an actually existing, unchecked natural law. For it is absolutely certain (as daily experience attests) that men in the vast majority of cases turn to self-destruction directly the gigantic strength of the innate instinct of self-preservation is distinctly overpowered by great suffering. To suppose that there is any thought whatever that can have a deferring effect, after the fear of death, which is so strong and so closely bound up with the nature of every living thing, has shown itself powerless; in other words, to suppose that there is a thought still mightier than this fear--is a daring assumption, all the more so, when we see, that it is one which is so difficult to discover that the moralists are not yet able to determine it with precision. In any case, it is certain that arguments against suicide of the sort put forward have never hitherto restrained any one tired of life even for a moment.
Thus a natural law, which incontestably exists, and is operative every day, is declared by Kant to be simply =unthinkable= without contradiction, and all for the sake of making his Moral Principle the basis of the classification of duties! At this point it is, I confess, not without satisfaction that I look forward to the groundwork which I shall give to Ethics in the sequel. From it the division of Duty into what is prescribed by law, and what is taught by love, or, better, into justice and loving-kindness, results quite naturally though a principle of separation which arises from the nature of the subject, and which entirely of itself draws a sharp line of demarkation; so that the foundation of Morals, which I shall present, has in fact ready to hand that confirmation, to which Kant, with a view to support his own position, lays a completely groundless claim.
[1] How rashly do we sanction an unjust law, which will come home to [2] "Here is Rhodes, here make your leap!" _I.e._, "Here is the place of trial, here let us see what you can do!" This Latin proverb is derived from one of Aesop's fables. A braggart boasts of having once accomplished a wonderful jump in Rhodes, and appeals to the evidence of the eye-witnesses. The bystanders then exclaim: "Friend, if this be true, you have no need of witnesses; for this is Rhodes, and your leap you can make here." The words are: _ἀλλ', ὦ ϕίλε, εἰ τοῡtο ἀληθές ἐστιν, oὐδὲν δεῑ σοι μαρτύρων αὕtη γὰρ 'Rόδος καὶ πήδημα_. _V._ _Fabulae Aesopicae Collectae_. Edit. Halm, Leipzig: Teubner. 1875. Nr.
203b, p. 102. The other version of the fable (Nr. 203, p. 101) gives: _ὦ oὗtos, eἰ ἀlêthès τoῡτ ἐstin, oὐdὲn deῑ soi martyrôn ἰdoὺ ἡ Ρόδος, ἰdoὺ kaὶ τὸ πήδημα._--(_Translator_.)
CHAPTER VI.
ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
It is well known that Kant put the leading principle of his Ethics into another quite different shape, in which it is expressed directly; the first being indirect, indeed nothing more than an indication as to how the principle is to be sought for. Beginning at p. 63 (R., p. 55), he prepares the way for his second formula by means of very strange, ambiguous, not to say distorted,[1] definitions of the conceptions =End= and =Means=, which may be much more simply and correctly denoted thus: an =End= is the direct motive of an act of the Will, a =Means= the indirect: _simplex sigillum veri_ (simplicity is the seal of truth). Kant, however, slips through his wonderful enunciations to the statement: "=Man=, indeed every rational being, exists =as an end in himself=." On this I must remark that "to exist as an end in oneself==" is an unthinkable expression, a _contradictio in adjecto_.[2] To be an end means to be an object of volition. Every end can only exist in relation to a will, whose end, _i.e._, (as above stated), whose direct motive it is.
Only thus can the idea, "end" have any sense, which is lost as soon as such connection is broken. But this relation, which is essential to the thing, necessarily excludes every "in itself." "End in oneself" is exactly like saying: "Friend in oneself;--enemy in oneself;--uncle in oneself;--north or east in itself;--above or below in itself;" and so on. At bottom the "end in itself" is in the same case as the "absolute ought"; the same thought--the theological--secretly, indeed, unconsciously lies at the root of each as its condition. Nor is the "absolute worth," which is supposed to be attached to this alleged, though unthinkable, "end in itself," at all better circumstanced.
It also must be characterised, without pity, as a _contradictio in adjecto_. Every "worth" is a valuation by comparison, and its bearing is necessarily twofold. First, it is =relative=, since it exists for some one; and secondly, it is =comparative=, as being compared with something else, and estimated accordingly. Severed from these two conditions, the conception, "worth," loses all sense and meaning, and so obviously, that further demonstration is needless. But more: just as the phrases "end in itself" and "absolute worth" outrage logic, so true morality is outraged by the statement on p. 65 (R., p. 56), that irrational beings (that is, animals) are =things=, and should therefore be treated simply as =means=, which are not at the same time ends. In harmony with this, it is expressly declared in the _Metaphysische Anfanggründe der Tugendlehre,_ § 16: "A man can have no duties towards any being, except towards his fellow-men;" and then, § 17, we read: "To treat animals cruelly runs counter to the duty of man =towards himself=; because it deadens the feeling of sympathy for them in their sufferings, and thus weakens a natural tendency which is very serviceable to morality in relation to =other men=." So one is only to have compassion on animals for the sake of practice, and they are as it were the pathological phantom on which to train one's sympathy with men! In common with the whole of Asia that is not tainted by Islâm (which is tantamount to Judaism), I regard such tenets as odious and revolting. Here, once again, we see withal how entirely this philosophical morality, which is, as explained above, only a theological one in disguise, depends in reality on the biblical Ethics.
Thus, because Christian morals leave animals out of consideration (of which more later on); therefore in philosophical morals they are of course at once outlawed; they are merely "things," simply =means= to ends of any sort; and so they are good for vivisection, for deer-stalking, bull-fights, horse-races, etc., and they may be whipped to death as they struggle along with heavy quarry carts.
Shame on such a morality which is worthy of Pariahs, Chandalas and Mlechchas[3]; which fails to recognise the Eternal Reality immanent in everything that has life, and shining forth with inscrutable significance from all eyes that see the sun! This is a morality which knows and values only the precious species that gave it birth; whose characteristic--=reason=--it makes the condition under which a being may be an object of moral regard.
By this rough path, then,--indeed, _per fas et nefas_ (by fair means and by foul), Kant reaches the second form in which he expresses the fundamental principle of his Ethics: "Act in such a way that you at all times treat mankind, as much in your own person, as in the person of every one else, not only as a Means, but also as an End." Such a statement is a very artificial and roundabout way of saying: "Do not consider yourself alone, but others also;" this in turn is a paraphrase for: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_ (do not to another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself); and the latter, as I have said, contains nothing but the premises to the conclusion, which is the true and final goal of all morals and of all moralising; _Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes juva_ (do harm to no one; but rather help all people as far as lies in your power). Like all beautiful things, this proposition looks best unveiled. Be it only observed that the alleged duties towards oneself are dragged into this second Kantian edict intentionally and not without difficulty. Some place of course had to be found for them.[4] Another objection that could be raised against the formula is that the malefactor condemned to be executed is treated merely as an instrument, and not as an end, and this with perfectly good reason; for he is the indispensable means of upholding the terror of the law by its fulfilment, and of thus accomplishing the law's end--the repression of crime.
But if this second definition helps nothing towards laying a foundation for Ethics, if it cannot even pass muster as its leading principle, that is, as an adequate and direct summary of ethical precepts; it has nevertheless the merit of containing a fine _aperçu_ of moral psychology, for it marks =egoism= by an exceedingly characteristic token, which is quite worth while being here more closely considered.
This =egoism=, then, of which each of us is full, and to conceal which, as our _partie honteuse_, we have invented =politeness=, is perpetually peering through every veil cast over it, and may especially be detected in the fact that our dealings with all those, who come across our path, are directed by the one object of trying to find, before everything else, and as if by instinct, a possible =means= to any of the numerous =ends= with which we are always engrossed. When we make a new acquaintance, our first thought, as a rule, is whether the man can be useful to us in some way. If he can do =nothing= for our benefit, then as soon as we are convinced of this, he himself generally becomes nothing to us. To seek in all other people a possible means to our ends, in other words, to make them our instruments, is almost part of the very nature of human eyes; and whether the instrument will have to suffer more or less in the using, is a thought which comes much later, sometimes not at all. That we assume others to be similarly disposed is shown in many ways; _e.g._, by the fact that, when we ask any one for information or advice, we lose all confidence in his words directly we discover that he may have some =interest= in the matter, however small or remote. For then we immediately take for granted that he will make us a means to his ends, and hence give his advice not in accordance with his =discernment=, but with his =desire=, and this, no matter how exact the former may be, or how little the latter seem involved; since we know only too well that a cubic inch of desire weighs much more than a cubic yard of discernment. Conversely, when we ask in such cases: "What ought I to do?" as a rule, nothing else will occur to our counsellor, but how we should shape our action to suit his own ends; and to this effect he will give his reply immediately, and as it were mechanically, without so much as bestowing a thought on our ends; because it is his Will that directly dictates the answer, or ever the question can come before the bar of his real judgment. Hence he tries to mould our conduct to his own benefit, without even being conscious of it, and while he supposes that he is speaking out of the abundance of his discernment, in reality he is nothing but the mouth-piece of his own desire; indeed, such self-deception may lead him so far as to utter lies, without being aware of it. So greatly does the influence of the Will preponderate that of the Intelligence. Consequently, it is not the testimony of our own consciousness, but rather, for the most part, that of our interest, which avails to determine whether our language be in accordance with what we discern, or what we desire. To take another case. Let us suppose that a man pursued by enemies and in danger of life, meets a pedlar and inquires for some by-way of escape; it may happen that the latter will answer him by the question: "Do you need any of my wares?" It is not of course meant that matters are always like this. On the contrary, many a man is found to show a direct and real participation in another's weal and woe, or (in Kant's language) to regard him as an end and not as a means. How far it seems natural, or the reverse, to each one to treat his neighbour for once in the way as an end, instead of (as usual) a means,--this is the criterion of the great ethical difference existing between character and character; and that on which the mental attitude of sympathy rests in the last resort will be the true basis of Ethics, and will form the subject of the third part of this Essay.
Thus, in his second formula, Kant distinguishes Egoism and its opposite by a very characteristic trait; and this point of merit I have all the more gladly brought out into strong light and illustrated, because in other respects there is little in the groundwork of his Ethics that I can admit.
The third and last form in which Kant put forward his Moral Principle is the =Autonomy= of the Will: "The Will of every rational being is universally legislative for all rational beings." This of course follows from the first form. As a consequence of the third, however, we are asked to believe (see p. 71; R., p. 60) that the specific characteristic of the Categorical Imperative lies in the =renunciation of all interest= by the Will when acting from a sense of duty. All previous moral principles had thus (he says) broken down, "because the latter invariably attributed to human actions at bottom a certain interest, whether originating in compulsion, or in pleasurable attraction--an interest which might be one's own, particularly noticed.) "Whereas a universally legislative Will must prescribe actions which are =not= based on any =interest= at all, but solely on a feeling of duty." I beg the reader to think what this really means. As a matter of fact, nothing less than volition without motive, in other words, effect without cause. Interest and