These are voices which you ought to shun just as Ulysses did; he would not sail past them until he was lashed to the mast. They are no less potent; they lure men from country, parents, friends, and virtuous ways; and by a hope that, if not base, is ill-starred, they wreck them upon a life of baseness. How much better to follow a straight course and attain a goal where the words “pleasant” and “honourable” have the same meaning! This end will be possible for us if we understand that there are two classes of objects which either attract us or repel us. We are attracted by such things as riches, pleasures, beauty, ambition, and other such coaxing and pleasing objects; we are repelled by toil, death, pain, disgrace, or lives of greater frugality. We ought therefore to train ourselves so that we may avoid a fear of the one or a desire for the other. Let us fight in the opposite fashion: let us retreat from the objects that allure, and rouse ourselves to meet the objects that attack.
Do you not see how different is the method of descending a mountain from that employed in climbing upwards? Men coming down a slope bend backwards; men ascending a steep place lean forward. For, my dear Lucilius, to allow yourself to put your body’s weight ahead when coming down, or, when climbing up, to throw it backward is to comply with vice. The pleasures take one down hill but one must work upwards toward that which is rough and hard to climb; in the one case let us throw our bodies forward, in the others let us put the check-rein on them.
Do you believe me to be stating now that only those men bring ruin to our ears, who praise pleasure, who inspire us with fear of pain—that element which is in itself provocative of fear? I believe that we are also injured by those who masquerade under the disguise of the Stoic school and at the same time urge us on into vice. They boast that only the wise man and the learned is a lover. “He alone has wisdom in this art; the wise man too is best skilled in drinking and feasting. Our study ought to be this alone: up to what age the bloom of love can endure!” All this may be regarded as a concession to the ways of Greece; we ourselves should preferably turn our attention to words like these: “No man is good by chance. Virtue is something which must be learned. Pleasure is low, petty, to be deemed worthless, shared even by dumb animals—the tiniest and meanest of whom fly towards pleasure. Glory is an empty and fleeting thing, lighter than air. Poverty is an evil to no man unless he kick against the goads. Death is not an evil; why need you ask? Death alone is the equal privilege of mankind. Superstition is the misguided idea of a lunatic; it fears those whom it ought to love; it is an outrage upon those whom it worships. For what difference is there between denying the gods and dishonouring them?”
You should learn such principles as these, nay rather you should learn them by heart; philosophy ought not to try to explain away vice. For a sick man, when his physician bids him live recklessly, is doomed beyond recall. Farewell.
CXXIV. ON THE TRUE GOOD AS ATTAINED BY REASON Full many an ancient precept could I give, Didst thou not shrink, and feel it shame to learn Such lowly duties.
But you do not shrink, nor are you deterred by any subtleties of study. For your cultivated mind is not wont to investigate such important subjects in a free-and-easy manner. I approve your method in that you make everything count towards a certain degree of progress, and in that you are disgruntled only when nothing can be accomplished by the greatest degree of subtlety. And I shall take pains to show that this is the case now also. Our question is, whether the Good is grasped by the senses or by the understanding; and the corollary thereto is that it does not exist in dumb animals or little children.
Those who rate pleasure as the supreme ideal hold that the Good is a matter of the senses; but we Stoics maintain that it is a matter of the understanding, and we assign it to the mind. If the senses were to pass judgment on what is good, we should never reject any pleasure; for there is no pleasure that does not attract, no pleasure that does not please. Conversely, we should undergo no pain voluntarily; for there is no pain that does not clash with the senses. Besides, those who are too fond of pleasure and those who fear pain to the greatest degree would in that case not deserve reproof. But we condemn men who are slaves to their appetites and their lusts, and we scorn men who, through fear of pain, will dare no manly deed. But what wrong could such men be committing if they looked merely to the senses as arbiters of good and evil? For it is to the senses that you and yours have entrusted the test of things to be sought and things to be avoided!
Reason, however, is surely the governing element in such a matter as this; as reason has made the decision concerning the happy life, and concerning virtue and honour also, so she has made the decision with regard to good and evil. For with them the vilest part is allowed to give sentence about the better, so that the senses—dense as they are, and dull, and even more sluggish in man than in the other animals,—pass judgment on the Good. Just suppose that one should desire to distinguish tiny objects by the touch rather than by the eyesight! There is no special faculty more subtle and acute than the eye, that would enable us to distinguish between good and evil. You see, therefore, in what ignorance of truth a man spends his days and how abjectly he has overthrown lofty and divine ideals, if he thinks that the sense of touch can pass judgment upon the nature of the Supreme Good and the Supreme Evil! He says: “Just as every science and every art should possess an element that is palpable and capable of being grasped by the senses (their source of origin and growth), even so the happy life derives its foundation and its beginnings from things that are palpable, and from that which falls within the scope of the senses. Surely you admit that the happy life takes its beginnings from things palpable to the senses.” But we define as “happy” those things that are in accord with Nature. And that which is in accord with Nature is obvious and can be seen at once—just as easily as that which is complete. That which is according to Nature, that which is given us as a gift immediately at our birth, is, I maintain, not a Good, but the beginning of a Good. You, however, assign the Supreme Good, pleasure, to mere babies, so that the child at its birth begins at the point whither the perfected man arrives. You are placing the tree-top where the root ought to be. If anyone should say that the child, hidden in its mother’s womb, of unknown sex too, delicate, unformed, and shapeless—if one should say that this child is already in a state of goodness, he would clearly seem to be astray in his ideas. And yet how little difference is there between one who has just lately received the gift of life, and one who is still a hidden burden in the bowels of the mother! They are equally developed, as far as their understanding of good or evil is concerned; and a child is as yet no more capable of comprehending the Good than is a tree or any dumb beast.
But why is the Good non-existent in a tree or in a dumb beast? Because there is no reason there, either. For the same cause, then, the Good is non-existent in a child, for the child also has no reason; the child will reach the Good only when he reaches reason. There are animals without reason, there are animals not yet endowed with reason, and there are animals who possess reason, but only incompletely; in none of these does the Good exist, for it is reason that brings the Good in its company. What, then, is the distinction between the classes which I have mentioned? In that which does not possess reason, the Good will never exist. In that which is not yet endowed with reason, the Good cannot be existent at the time. And in that which possesses reason but only incompletely, the Good is capable of existing, but does not yet exist. This is what I mean, Lucilius: the Good cannot be discovered in any random person, or at any random age; and it is as far removed from infancy as last is from first, or as that which is complete from that which has just sprung into being. Therefore, it cannot exist in the delicate body, when the little frame has only just begun to knit together. Of course not—no more than in the seed. Granting the truth of this, we understand that there is a certain kind of Good of a tree or in a plant; but this is not true of its first growth, when the plant has just begun to spring forth out of the ground. There is a certain Good of wheat: it is not yet existent, however, in the swelling stalk, nor when the soft ear is pushing itself out of the husk, but only when summer days and its appointed maturity have ripened the wheat. Just as Nature in general does not produce her Good until she is brought to perfection, even so man’s Good does not exist in man until both reason and man are perfected. And what is this Good? I shall tell you: it is a free mind, an upright mind, subjecting other things to itself and itself to nothing. So far is infancy from admitting this Good that boyhood has no hope of it, and even young manhood cherishes the hope without justification; even our old age is very fortunate if it has reached this Good after long and concentrated study. If this, then, is the Good, the good is a matter of the understanding.
“But,” comes the retort, “you admitted that there is a certain Good of trees and of grass; then surely there can be a certain Good of a child also.” But the true Good is not found in trees or in dumb animals the Good which exists in them is called “good” only by courtesy. “Then what is it?” you say. Simply that which is in accord with the nature of each. The real Good cannot find a place in dumb animals—not by any means; its nature is more blest and is of a higher class. And where there is no place for reason, the Good does not exist. There are four natures which we should mention here: of the tree, animal, man, and God. The last two, having reasoning power, are of the same nature, distinct only by virtue of the immortality of the one and the mortality of the other. Of one of these, then—to wit God—it is Nature that perfects the Good; of the other—to wit man—pains and study do so. All other things are perfect only in their particular nature, and not truly perfect, since they lack reason.
Indeed, to sum up, that alone is perfect which is perfect according to nature as a whole, and nature as a whole is possessed of reason. Other things can be perfect according to their kind. That which cannot contain the happy life cannot contain that which produces the happy life; and the happy life is produced by Goods alone. In dumb animals there is not a trace of the happy life, nor of the means whereby the happy life is produced; in dumb animals the Good does not exist. The dumb animal comprehends the present world about him through his senses alone. He remembers the past only by meeting with something which reminds his senses; a horse, for example, remembers the right road only when he is placed at the starting-point. In his stall, however, he has no memory of the road, no matter how often he may have stepped along it. The third state—the future—does not come within the ken of dumb beasts.
How, then, can we regard as perfect the nature of those who have no experience of time in its perfection? For time is three-fold,—past, present, and future. Animals perceive only the time which is of greatest moment to them within the limits of their coming and going—the present. Rarely do they recollect the past—and that only when they are confronted with present reminders. Therefore the Good of a perfect nature cannot exist in an imperfect nature; for if the latter sort of nature should possess the Good, so also would mere vegetation. I do not indeed deny that dumb animals have strong and swift impulses toward actions which seem according to nature, but such impulses are confused and disordered. The Good however, is never confused or disordered.
“What!” you say, “do dumb animals move in disturbed and ill-ordered fashion?” I should say that they moved in disturbed and ill-ordered fashion, if their nature admitted of order; as it is, they move in accordance with their nature. For that is said to be “disturbed” which can also at some other time be “not disturbed”; so, too, that is said to be in a state of trouble which can be in a state of peace. No man is vicious except one who has the capacity of virtue; in the case of dumb animals their motion is such as results from their nature. But, not to weary you, a certain sort of good will be found in a dumb animal, and a certain sort of virtue, and a certain sort of perfection—but neither the Good, nor virtue, nor perfection in the absolute sense. For this is the privilege of reasoning beings alone, who are permitted to know the cause, the degree, and the means. Therefore, good can exist only in that which possesses reason.
Do you ask now whither our argument is tending, and of what benefit it will be to your mind? I will tell you: it exercises and sharpens the mind, and ensures, by occupying it honourably, that it will accomplish some sort of good. And even that is beneficial which holds men back when they are hurrying into wickedness. However, I will say this also: I can be of no greater benefit to you than by revealing the Good that is rightly yours, by taking you out of the class of dumb animals, and by placing you on a level with God. Why, pray, do you foster and practise your bodily strength? Nature has granted strength in greater degree to cattle and wild beasts. Why cultivate your beauty? After all your efforts, dumb animals surpass you in comeliness. Why dress your hair with such unending attention? Though you let it down in Parthian fashion, or tie it up in the German style, or, as the Scythians do, let it flow wild—yet you will see a mane of greater thickness tossing upon any horse you choose, and a mane of greater beauty bristling upon the neck of any lion. And even after training yourself for speed, you will be no match for the hare. Are you not willing to abandon all these details—wherein you must acknowledge defeat, striving as you are for something that is not your own—and come back to the Good that is really yours?
And what is this Good? It is a clear and flawless mind, which rivals that of God, raised far above mortal concerns, and counting nothing of its own to be outside itself. You are a reasoning animal. What Good, then, lies within you? Perfect reason. Are you willing to develop this to its farthest limits—to its greatest degree of increase? Only consider yourself happy when all your joys are born of reason, and when—having marked all the objects which men clutch at, or pray for, or watch over—you find nothing which you will desire; mind, I do not say prefer. Here is a short rule by which to measure yourself, and by the test of which you may feel that you have reached perfection: “You will come to your own when you shall understand that those whom the world calls fortunate are really the most unfortunate of all.” Farewell.
SUBJECT INDEX (to the three volumes of Seneca’s Epistulae Morales) Accidens (συμβεβηκός, “contingent upon”), cxvii. 3 ff.
ἀδιάφορα (see media, “indifferent” things), lxxxii. 10 ff.
adsensio, cxiii. 18 and note Analogy, with regard to knowledge of the good, cxx. 4 f. and note Animals, instinct (ὁρμέ) for self-preservation in, cxxi. passim ἀπάθεια, impatientia, ix. 1 ff., xiii. 4, lxxxv. 3 ff., cxvi. passim Arch, invention of the, xc. 32 Archaisms, in style and wording, lviii. 1 ff., cxiv. 17 ff.
Arts, four classes of, lxxxviii. 21 ff.; discovery of the, xc. 7 ff.; in relation to doctrines and precepts, xcv. 7 ff.
Baths, distractions of the, lvi. 1 ff.; luxury of, lxxxvi. 5 ff.
Being, the only existing fact, according to Parmenides, lxxxviii. 44 Benefits, lxxxi. passim Body, regard for the, xiv. 1 ff.; cxxi. 5 ff.; in relation to mind, cxvii. 13. etc.
bona (“goods”), of various kinds, lxvi. 5 ff.; equality of, ib. 15 ff., lxxi. 7 ff.; desirability of, lxvii. 3 ff.; falsely so called, lxxiv. 12 ff.; varieties of, lxxxviii. 5 bonum (the “good”), xxiii. 6 ff.; defined, xxxi. 6; regarded by Academic School as variable, lxxi. 17 ff., lxxvi. 11 ff.; certain syllogisms on, lxxxvii. passim; corporeality of the, cvi. 3 ff., cxvii. 2 ff.; is it a “living thing”? cxiii. 20 ff. (reduc. ad absurdum); defined in several ways, cxviii. 8 ff.; relation to the honestum, cxx. 1 ff.; derived from the senses or from the intellect, cxxiv. 1 ff.; limited to reasoning man, cxxiv. 7 ff.
Books, thoroughness in reading, ii. passim; xlv. 1–5; selective reading of, lxxxiv. 1 ff.
Calx, cviii. 32 Categories, of Aristotle, lxv. 3 ff. and notes cause (contrasted with matter), as discussed by the Stoics, Aristotle, and Plato, lxv. 2 ff.
Circles, as indications of time, small and large, xii. 6 ff.
compositio (arrangement of words), cxiv. 15 ff.
Consolation, to the bereaved, lxiii., xcix.
Contempt, as a source of safety, cv. 2 ff.
Country-places, Seneca’s, xii. 1-4; Scipio’s, lxxxvi. passim; civ. 1 ff., cx. 1, cxxiii. 1 ff.
Death, scorn of, iv. 3 ff., xxii. 13 ff., xxiv. passim, xxvi. 4 ff.; anticipation of xxx. 4 ff., xxxvi. 8 ff., lxi., lxxxii. 16 ff., xciii. passim, suddenness of, ci. 1 ff.; resignation of, cii. 26 ff.
decreta (dogmas), see Appendix A, Ep. xciv. 32, etc.; specially defined, xcv. 44; necessity of, xcv. 61 f.
Degeneracy of morals, xcvii. passim distantia, defined and contrasted with continua and composita, cii. 6 and note.
distinctio (differentiation) of Chrysippus, ix. 14 f.
Drunkeness, lxxxiii. passim Emotions, as expressed by the features, xi. passim; during peril, lvii. 3 ff.; of bereaved women, lxiii. 13; only transitory in the wise man’s case, lxxi. 29; defined as “passions,” lxxv. 11 f.; subject to reason, lxxxv. 2 ff.; corporeality of the, cvi. 5 ff.; should be checked at the start, cxvi. 2 ff.
essentia (οὐσία), discussed, lviii. 6 ff. and note exempla (patterns of conduct and philosophy), vi. 5 ff., xi. 8 ff., xxv. 5 ff., lii. 7 ff., xciv. 55 f., 72 ff., xcv. 69 ff., civ. 21 ff.
Exercise, in moderation, xv. 1–6, lxxxiii. 3 ff.
expetibile, as distinguished from expetendum, cxvii. 5 Extracts (flosculi, summaries, maxims, chriai), xxxiii. passim, esp. 7 and note, xxxix. 1 f. and note; in proverbial form, xciv. 27 f.
Fame, xliii. 3, lxxix. 13 ff.; misguided desire for, xciv. 64 ff.; as a good, cii. 3 ff.
Fate, xvi. 4; complaints against, xciii. 1 f.
Figures of speech, abuse of, cxiv. 8 ff.
Fortune (Chance), treachery of, viii. 3 f.; groundless fear of, xiii. passim, xvi. 4, xviii. 6 f.; robs us of our friends, lxiii. 7 f.; gifts of, lxxii. 7 ff.; game of, lxxiv. 6 ff.; her part in the Lyons fire, xci. 2 ff.; fickleness of, xcviii. passim; equipment against, cxiii. 27 f.; inducements of, cxviii. 3 ff.
Friendship, distinctions in, iii. passim; as applied to the wise man, ix. passim, xix. 10 f., xxxv., xlviii. 2 ff., lv. 9 ff.; impartiality of, lxvi. 24 ff.
Genus, in relation to species, lviii. 8 ff. and notes Gladiatorial combats, cruelty of, vii. 2 ff.; rigorous training for, xxxvii. 1 f., lxxx. 1 ff.
Glass, invention of, xc. 25 God, xvi. 4; kinship with, xviii. 12 f., xxxi. 9 ff., xli., lxxxiii. 1; as Master Builder of the Universe, lviii. 27 f., lxv. 19 ff.; obedience to, in the face of obstacles, xcvi. 2; as Creator, cxiii. 16 Gods, compared with sages, lxxiii. 12 ff.; sharing reason with men, xcii. 27 ff.; belief in, xcv. 50; popular, cx. 1 Golden Age, xc. 36 ff.; simplicity and health of the, xcv. 13 ff.
Grammaticus, defined lxxxviii. 3 and note; as a critic of Vergil, cviii. 24 and note Happiness, dependent upon oneself, ix. 20 f.; defined, xcii. 3 ff.; summing up all the benefits of philosophy, xciv. 8; in its relation to precepts, xcv. 4 ff.
Honestum, lxvi. 9 ff. and note, lxxi. 4, lxxiii. passim, lxxvi. 6 ff., lxxxv. 17 ff.; relation to bonum, cxviii. 10 ff., cxx. 1 ff.
Idea (of Plato), lxv. 7 and note idos (εἶδος), lviii. 20 f., lxv. 4 and note Ill-health, and death, liv. 1 ff.; bravery in the face of, xxx. 1 ff., lxvi. 1 ff.; relieved by philosophy, lxxviii. 1 ff.; of Lucilius, xcvi. 3; civ. 1 ff.; of the mind, lxviii. 8 f.
imagine (similes), proper use of, lix. 6 f.
incommoda (disadvantages), lxxii. 5 Joy (gaudium), xxiii. 4 ff.; as contrasted with common pleasure, lix. 1 ff., 14 ff.
καθήκοντα (duties), lxxxi. 9 ff.
Knowledge (passim), discussed and defined, cxx. 3 ff.
Learning, excess in, xxvii. 5 ff.
Lectures, debasing effect of, lii. 8 ff.; on philosophy, lxxvi. 1 ff.; perfunctory, cviii. 5 ff.
Liberal studies, lxii. 1; defined, lxxxviii. 1 ff. and note Love, and other emotions, in relation to wisdom, cxvi. 5 ff.
Magister populi, cviii. 31 malum (evil), passim; defined, lxxxv. 28; discussed, ib. passim Mathematics (contrasted with philosophy), lxxxviii. 10 ff.
Matter (contrasted with cause), lxv. 2 ff.
Media (“indifferent” things, neither good nor bad), lxvi. 36 f., lxxxii. 10 ff., cix. 12 f.; “being wise” not an “indifferent” quality, cxvii. 9 f.
Mime (farce), as reflector of slave-life, xlvii. 14 Moral Philosophy, passim; Seneca’s projected book on, cvi. 2 and note; cviii. 1, cix. 17 Mourning, rules for, lxiii. 13 f.; limits to, xcix. passim Nature, as embodied in contented poverty, ii. 6 f., iv. 10 f.; as plain living, xviii. 5 ff., xx. 7 ff., xxvii. 9, lxxxvii. 1 ff., etc.; life according to, xvi. 7 f., xxv. 4 ff., xxx. 4, xli. 9, xciii. 2 ff., cvii. 7 ff., cxix. 2 ff.; in Seneca’s own case, cviii. 13 ff., cxxiii. 2 ff.; as source of reason, lxvi. 39 f., etc.; as explanation of rugged character in mountainous countries, li. 10 f.
οἰκονομική (with “civil,” a further division of philosophy), lxxxix. 10 Old Age, xii. passim, xxvi. 1 ff.; Seneca’s feebleness, lxvii. 1; as an “external” thing, xciii. 7 ὀμολογία (conformity, consistency of virtue), lxxiv. 30 ff.
Pain, as torture, xiv. 8 ff., xxiv. 3 ff.; with reference to virtue, lxvi. 18 ff.; endurance of, lxvii. 3 ff., lxxviii. 7 ff.; as endured by Maecenas, ci. 10 ff.
παρἀδοξα, lxxxi. 11 f. and note, lxxxvii. 1 pauperum cellae, xviii. 7 and note, c. 6 and note phaecasium, cxiii. 1 and note φιληταί (street rowdies), li. 13 and note philologus, on Cicero’s De Re Publica, cviii. 30 f.
Philosophy, and conformity, v. 1 ff.; as refuge, xiv. 11 ff., xvi. passim; and riches, xvii. passim; benefits of, xxxvii. 3 ff.; as critic of human worth, xliv. passim; inspiration of, liii. 8 ff.; demands of, lxxii. 3 ff.; as a public service (active or in retirement), lxxiii. 1 ff.; impregnability of, lxxxii. 5 ff.; as imagined in Homer, lxxxviii. 5 ff.; divided into physics, logic, ethics, ib. 24 f; divided and defined, lxxxix. 4 ff.; twofold Epicurean division, ib. 11; single Cyrenaic, ib. 12; moral ib., 14 ff.; natural ib., 16; rational ib., 17 f.; in relation to human progress, xc. passim; as escape from dangers, ciii. 4 f.; aid from, cviii. 4 ff.; as interpreting poetry, cviii. 25 ff.
Pleasure, in plain living, xxi. 10 f.; instability of, xxvii. 2 f., xxxix. 6 f.; developing into vice, li. 4 ff.; two kinds of, lxxviii. 22 ff.; devices of, xc. 19; in sadness, xcix. 25 ff.; to be avoided, civ. 34; devotion to gluttony and late hours, cxxii. 2 ff.; followers of pleasure, limit the good to the senses, cxxiv. 2 ff.
Poetry, as an aid to good ideas, viii. 8 ff., cviii. 8 ff.
Potter’s wheel, discovery of the, xc. 31 Prayer, x. 5; of the wrong sort, lx., cxvii. 28 f.; of the right sort, lxvii. 7 ff.; as a curse upon an enemy, cx. 2 f.
Precepts (advice, see Appendix A), xciv. and xcv. passim, cix. 14 ff.
prima litteratura (πρωτη ἀγωγή, elementary schooling), lxxxviii. 20 principale (ἡγεμονικόν, “ruling power,” a part of the world-soul which stimulates action in living beings), cxiii. 28, cxxi. 9 ff. and notes Producta (commoda, “advantages”), lxxiv. 17 ff. and note προκοπή (progress), lxxi. 30, and note, lxxii. 6 ff., lxxv. 8 ff.; proficiens, cix. 15 pseudomenos, xlv. 10 and note Reapse, cviii. 32 Reason (ratio), as curb of passions, xxxvii. 4; defined, lxxi. 12 ff. and note; the source of perfection and the good, cxxiv. 23 f.
Retirement, as contrasted with participation in affairs, viii. 1 ff., x. 1 f., xiv. 3 ff., xix. passim, xxii. passim, xxxvi. passim, lvi. 1 ff; mistaken idea of lv. 4 ff., xciv. 69 ff.; in Seneca’s own case, lvi. 9 ff., lxxiii. passim Sage, dual make-up of the, lxxi. 27 and note sapere, as distinguished from sapientia, cxvii. 1 ff.
Scientific observation, on Etna, li. 1; Etna and Sicily, lxxix. 1 ff.; xc. 10 ff.
Self-sufficiency, ix. 13 ff., etc.
Senses, inadequacy of the, lxvi. 35 sepse, cviii. 32 Sin, and reform, xxv. 1-3, cxii. passim; its removal through knowledge, xxviii. 9 f., xxix. 4 ff., xlii. 1 ff., l. 4 ff.; one’s own, lxviii. 8 ff.; reasons for xciv. 13 f., 21; and conscience, xcvii. 12 ff.
Slavery, xlvii. passim Soul, defined, cxiii. 14 and note; divinity of the, xli. 5 ff.; its contemplative function lxv. 16 ff.; source and destination, lxxxviii. 34; sustainer of life, xcii. 1 ff. and note; parts of the xcii. 8 ff. and note; unity of the, cxiii. 14 and note; ruler of the body, cxiv. 23 ff.; indicator of character, cxiv. 1 ff.
Soul after Death, various possibilities, lxxi. 16 and note; its release lxv. 16 ff., lxxix. 12, xcii. 30 ff.; method of departure, lvii. 6 ff., lxxvi. 33; eternity of the, cii. 21 ff., cxx. 17 ff.; transmigration, cviii. 17 ff.; reunion of friends in another world, lxxviii. 28 species, in relation to genus, lviii. 8 ff.
Style, eccentric in case of Maecenas, xix. 9 f., cxiv. 4 ff.; rapid, xl. 2 ff.; national characteristics of, xl. 11 f.; of Lucilius, xlvi. 2, lix. 4 ff.; simplicity and sincerity of, lxxxv. 3 ff.; of Fabianus, c. 1 ff.
Suicide, xxiv. 25, xxx. 15, lviii. 32 ff., lxx. 4 ff. and note, lxxvii. 5 ff.
supervacua, xlii. 6 ff., cx. 12 ff.
Supreme Good, defined, lxvi. 6 ff.; according to Epicurus ib., 45 ff.; lxxi. passim, lxxii. 5, lxxiv. 16, 26; another definition, lxxxv. 20; source of, lxxxvii. 21; xcii. 5 ff.; independence of the, ix. 15, cix. 1 ff.
Syllogisms, futility of, xiv. 8 ff.; as interrogationes, quaestiunculae, “posers”, logical fallacies, xlviii. 4 ff., xlix. 8 f., lxxxii. 8 ff., 21 ff., lxxxiii. 8 ff., lxxxv. passim; on the Good, riches, poverty, etc., lxxxvii. passim; vanity of, cii. 20 ff.; cavillationes, sophismata, cxi. passim, cxiii. 26, cxvii. 25 ff.
Tabellariae (naves), packet-ships from Alexandria, lxxvii. 1 f.
Theatre, hollowness of the profession, lxxx. 7 f.
Time, saving of, i. passim, xxxii. 3 f., xlix. 2 ff.; discussed, lxxxviii. 33 f. and note translationes (metaphors), proper use of, lix. 6 Transplanting, of olive-trees and vines, lxxxvi. 14 ff.
Travel, and peace of mind, xxviii. 1–8; hardships of sea-voyaging, liii. 1 ff.; by land, lvii. 1 ff.; vanity of, lxix. 1 ff., civ. 13 ff.
Virtue (passim), acquisition of, l. 7 ff.; power of, lxiv. 6 ff., lxvi. 2 ff.; uniformity of, lxxi. 8 ff., lxxix. 10 ff.; identical with truth, lxxi. 16; twofold aspect of, xciv. 45 f.; a vision of, cxv. 3 ff.; divided into its parts, cxx. 11 f.
Virtues (prudence, justice, bravery, temperance), discussed, lxvii. 3 ff., lxxxv. passim, lxxxviii. 29 ff.; prudence, bravery, justice, etc., xcv. 55 ff.; whether they possess life, cxiii. passim Voice, training of the, xv. 7 ff.
Wealth, as handicap to philosophy, xvii. passim; as a source of evil, lxxxvii. 22 ff.; to be avoided, civ. 34; scorn of, cviii. 11; emptiness of, cx. 14 ff.; the curse of, cxv. 9 ff.; the true variety, cxix. 5 ff.
Wisdom (sapientia, σοφία), defined, xx. 5, lxxxviii. 32 f.; as an art, xxix. 3; the heritage of, lxiv. 7 f.; defined by Socrates, lxxi. 7, lxxxiv. 12 f.; distinguished from philosophy, lxxxix. 4 ff.; her accomplishments, xc. 26 ff.; mutual benefits of, cix. 1 ff.
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