may also have God's voucher on the subject, it is the soul which He addresses; it is the soul which He exhorts and counsels, to turn the mind and intellect to Him. It is the soul which Christ came to save; it is the soul which He threatens to destroy in hell; it is the soul (or life) which He forbids being made too much of; it is His soul, too (or life), which the good Shepherd Himself lays down for His 3 Concretum.
* Substantia; ofTicium. 5 Substantia: inassa.
* Faciein operis.
7 Fontrm materiz.
A IREATISE ON THE SOUL.
sheep. It is to the soul, therefore, that you ascribe the supremacy; in it also you possess that union of substance, of which you perceive the mind to be the instrument, not the ruling power.
CHAP. XIV. — THE SOUL VARIOUSLY DIVIDED BY THE philosophers; this division is not A MATERIAL DISSECTION.
Being thus single, simple, and entire in it- self, it is as incapable of being composed and put together from external constituents, as it is of being divided in and of itself, inasmuch as it is indissoluble. For if it had been pos- sible to construct it and to destroy it, it would no longer be immortal. Since, how- ever, it is not mortal, it is also incapable of dissolution and division. Now, to be di- vided means to be dissolved, and to be dissolved means to die. Yet (philosophers) have divided the soul into parts: Plato, for instance, into two; Zeno, into three; Pan- setius, into five or six; Soranus, into seven; Chrysippus, into as many as eight; and Apol- lophanes, into as many as nine; whilst certain, of the Stoics have found as many as twelve parts in the soul. Posidonius makes even, two more than these: he starts with two lead- ing faculties of the soul, — the directing faculty, which they designate riytiim>LK6v\ and the ra- tional faculty, which they call layiKov, — and ultimately subdivided these into seventeen' parts. Thus variously is the soul dissected by the different schools. Such divisions, however, ought not to be regarded so much as parts of the soul, as powers, or faculties, or operations thereof, even as Aristotle him- self has regarded some of them as being. ; For they are not portions or organic parts of \ the soul's substance, but functions of the soul — such as those of motion, of action, of thought, and whatsoever others they divide in this manner; such, likewise, as the five senses themselves, so well known to all — see- ing, hearing, tasting, touching, smelling. Now, although they have allotted to the whole of these respectively certain parts of the body as their special domiciles, it does not from that circumstance follow that a like distribu- tion will be suitable to the sections of the soul; for even the body itself would not admit of such a partition as they would have the soul undergo. But of the whole number of the limbs one body is made up, so that the ar- rangement is rather a concretion than a di- jvision. Look at that very wonderful piece of organic mechanism by Archimedes, — I mean his hydraulic organ, with its many Hmbs, parts, ' This is Oehler's text; another reading has twelve^ which one would suppose to be the right one.
\ \ bands, passages for the notes, outlets for their sounds, combinations for their harmony, and the array of its pipes; but yet the whole of these details constitute only one instrument. In like manner the wind, which breathes throughout this organ at the impulse of the hydraulic engine, is not divided into separate portions from the fact of its dispersion through the instrument to make it play: it is whole and entire in its substance, although divideti in its operation. This example is not remote from (the illustration) of Strato, and yEnesi- demus, and Heraclitus: for these philoso- phers maintain the unity of the soul, as difr fused over the entire body, and yet in every part the same..' Precisely like the wind blown in the pipes throughout the organ, the soul displays its energies in various ways by means of the senses, being not indeed divided, but rather distributed in natural order. Now, under what designations these energies are to be known, and by what divisions of themselves they are to be classified, and to what special offices and functions in the body they are to be severally confined, the physicians and the philosophers must consider and decide: for ourselves, a few remarks only will be proper.
chap. XV. THE soul's VITALITY AND IN- TELLIGENCE, ITS CHARACTER AND SEAT IN MAN.
' In the first place, (we must determine) whether there be in the soul some supreme principle of vitality and intelligence ^ which they call "the ruling power of the soul" — TO jiyeiiavLKov for if this be not admitted, the whole condition of the soul is put in jeopardy. Indeed, those men who say that there is no such directing faculty, have begun by sup- posing that the soul itself is simply a nonen- tity. One Dicaearchus, a Messenian, and amongst the medical profession Andreas and Asclepiades, have thus destroyed the (soul's) directing power, by actually placing in the mind the senses, for which they claim the ruling faculty. Asclepiades rides rough-shod over us with even this argument, that very many animals, after losing those parts of their body in which the soul's principle of vitality and sensation is thought mainly to exist, still retain life in a considerable degree, as well as sensation: as in the case of flies, and wasps, and locusts, when you have cut off their heads; and of she-goats, and tortoises, and eels, when you have pulled out their hearts. (He concludes), therefore, that there is no especial principle or power of the 2 Ubique ipsa.
3 Sapientialis.
A TREATISE ON THE SOUL.
[chap. XVI.
soul; for if there were, the soul's vigour and strength could not continue when it was re- moved with its domiciles (or corporeal or- gans). However, Dicaearchus has several au- thorities against him — and- philosophers too — Plato, Strato, Epicurus, Democritus, Emped- ocles, Socrates, Aristotle; whilst in opposi- tion to Andreas and Asclepiades (may be placed their Brother) physicians Herophilus, Erasistratus, Diodes, Hippocrates, and Sora- nus himself; and better than all others, there are our Christian authorities. We are taught by God concerning both these questions — viz. that there is a ruling power in the soul, and that it is enshrined ' in one particular recess of the body. For, when one reads of God as being " the searcher and witness of the heart; " ^ when His prophet is reproved by His discovering to" him the secrets of the heart; 3 when God Himself anticipates in His people the thoughts of their heart, "^ "Why think ye evil in your hearts? " ^ when David prays, "Create in me a clean heart, O God," ^ and Paul declares, "With the heart man be- lieveth unto righteousness," ^ and John says, " By his own heart is each man condemned;" ^ when, lastly, " he who looketh on a woman so as to lust after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart," ^ — then both points are cleared fully up, that there is a di- recting faculty of the soul, with which the purpose of God may agree; in other words, a supreme principle of intelligence and vitality (for where there is intelligence, there must be vitality), and that it resides in that most precious part '° of our body to which God es- pecially looks: so that you must not suppose, with Heraclitus, that this sovereign faculty of which we are treating is moved by some ex- ternal force; nor with Moschion," that it floats about through the whole body; nor with Plato, that it is enclosed in the head; nor with Zenophanes, that it culminates in the crown of the head; nor that it reposes in the brain, according to the opinion of Hippoc- rates; nor around the basis of the brain, as Herophilus thought; nor in the membranes thereof, as Strato and Erasistratus said; nor in the space between the eyebrows, as Strato the physician held; nor within the enclosure '- of the breast, according to Epicurus: but » Consecratum.
'° In eo thesauro.
" Not Suidas' philosopher of that name, but a renowned ohy- sician mentioned by Galen and Phny (Oehler). •= Lorica.
rather, as the Egyptians have always taught, especially such of them as were accounted the expounders of sacred truths; '^ in accordance, too, with that verse of Orpheus or Empedo- cles: " Namque homini sanguis circumcordialis est sensus." '■♦ " Man has his (supreme) sensation in the blood around his heart."
Even Protagoras '= likewise, and Apollodo- rus, and Chrysippus, entertain this same view, so that (our friend) Asclepiades may go in quest of his goats bleating without a heart, and hunt his flies without their heads; and let all those (worthies), too, who have predeter- mined the character of the human soul from the condition of brute animals, be quite sure that it is themselves rather who are alive in a heartless and brainless state.
CHAP. XVI. THE soul's PARTS. ELEMENTS OF THE RATIONAL SOUL.
That position of Plato's is also quite in keeping with the faith, in which he divides the soul into two parts — the rational and the irrational. To this definition we take no ex- ception, except that we would not ascribe this twofold distinction to the nature (of the soul). It is the rational element which we must be- lieve to be its natural condition, impressed upon it from its very first creation by its Author, who is Himself esentially rational. For how should that be other than rational, which God produced on His own prompting; nay more, which He expressly sent forth by His own afflatus or breath? The irrational element, however, we must understand to have accrued later, as having proceeded from the instigation of the serpent — the very achievement of (the first) transgression — which thenceforward became inherent in the soul, and grew with its growth, assuming the manner by this time of a natural development, happening as it did immediately at the be- ginning of nature. But, inasmuch as the same Plato speaks of the rational element only as existing in the soul of God Himself, if we were to ascribe the irrational element likewise to the nature which our soul has received from God, then the irrational element will be equally derived from God, as being a natural production, because God is the author of na- ture. Now from the devil proceeds the in- centive to sin. All sin, however, is irrational: therefore the irrational proceeds from the devil, from whom sin proceeds; and it is ex- 's The Ejjyptian hierophants.
14 The original, as given in Stobaeus, Eclog. i. p. 1026, is this hexameter: Aljua ydp acOpwTrocf n-epixapSioi/ eiTTi v6r\p.a..
'5 Or probably that Praxagoras the physician who is often mentioned by Athenaeus and by Pliny (Parael.).
CHAP. XVlI.j A TREATISE ON THE SOUL.
traneous to God, to whom also the irrational is an alien principle. The diversity, then, between these two elements arises from the difference of their authors. When, therefore, Plato reserves the rational element (of the soul) to God alone, and subdivides it into two departments the irascible, which' they call dvynKov, and the co?iciipiscible, which they desig- nate by the term eTzi&v/ii/rcKov (in such a way as to make the first common to us and lions, and the second shared between ourselves and flies, whilst the rational element is confined to us and God) — I see that this point will have to to be treated by us, owing to the facts which we find operating also in Christ. For you may behold this triad of qualities in the Lord. There was the rational element, by which He taught, by which. discoursed, by which He prepared the way of salvation; there was moreover indignation in Him, by which He inveighed against the scribes and the Phari- sees; and there was the principle of desire, by which He so earnestly desired to eat the pass over with His disciples.' In our own cases, accordingly, the irascible and the concupisci- ble elements of our soul must not invariably be put to the account of the irrational (nature), since we are sure that in our Lord these elements operated in entire accordance with reason. God will be angry, with perfect reason, with all who deserve His wrath; and with reason, too, will God desire whatever ob- jects and claims are worthy of Himself. For He will show indignation against the evil man, and for the good man will He desire salvation. To ourselves even does the apostle allow the concupiscible quality. " If any man, says he, " desireth the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work."= Now, by saying " a good work," he shows us that the desire is a reasonable one. He permits us likewise to feel indignation. How should he not, when he himself experiences the same? " I would," says he, "that they were even cut off which trouble you." 3 In perfect agree- ment with reason was that indignation which resulted from his desire to maintain discipline and order. When, however, he says, "We were formerly the children of wrath,"'* he censures an irrational irascibility, such as proceeds not from that nature which is the production of God, but from that which the devil brought in, who is himself styled the lord or " master " of his own class, " Ye can- not serve two masters, ' ' s and has the actual designation of "father:" " Ye are of your » Luke xxii. 15.
2 I Tim. iii. i.
father the devil." * So that you need not be afraid to ascribe to him the mastery and do- minion over that second, later, and deterio- rated nature (of which we have been speak- ing), when you read of him as " the sower of tares," and the nocturnal spoiler of the crop of corn.^ CHAP. XVII. THE FIDELITY OF THE SENSES, IMPUGNED BY PLATO, VINDICATED BY CHRIST HIMSELF.
Then, again, when we encounter the ques- tion (as to the veracity of those five senses which we learn with our alphabet; since from this source even there arises some support for our heretics. They are the faculties of seeing, and hearing, and smelling, and tasting, and touching. The fidelity of these senses is impugned with too much severity by the Platonists,** and according to some by Herac- litus also, and Diodes, and Empedocles; at any rate, Plato, in the Tiniceus, declares the operations of the senses to be irrational, and vitiated' by our opinions or beliefs. Decep- tion is imputed to the sight, because it asserts that oars, when immersed in the water, are inclined or bent, notwithstanding the certainty that they are straight; because, again, it is quite sure that that distant tower with its really quadrangular contour is round; because also it will discredit the fact of the truly par- allel fabric of yonder porch or arcade, by sup- posing it to be narrower and narrower towards its end; and because it will join with the sea the sky which hangs at so great a height above it. In the same way, our hearing is charged with fallacy: we think, for instance, that that is a noise in the sky which is nothing else than the rumbling of a carriage; or, if you prefer it '° the other way, when the thunder rolled at a distance, we were quite sure that it was a carriage which made the noise. Thus, too, are our faculties of smell and taste at fault, because the selfsame perfumes and wines lose their value after we have used them awhile. On the same principle our touch is censured, when the identical pavement which seemed rough to the hands is felt by the feet to be smooth enough; and in the baths a stream of warm water is pronounced to be quite hot at first, and beautifully temperate afterwards. Thus, according to them, our senses deceive us, when all the while we are (the cause of the discrepancies, by) changing our opinions. The Stoics are more moderate in their views; 7 Matt. xiii. 23.
8 Academici.
9 Coimplicitam " OBtangled " or "embarrassed. Timceus pp. 27, 28. wVel.
See the A TREATISE ON THE SOUL.
[chap. xvii.
for they do not load with the obloquy of de- ception every one of the senses, and at all times. The Epicureans, again, show still greater consistency, in maintaining that all the senses are equally true in their testimony, and always so — only in a different way. It is not our organs of sensation that are at fault, but our opinion. The senses only experience sensation, they do not exercise opinion; it is the soul that opmes. They separated opinion from the senses, and sensation from the soul. Well, but whence comes opinion, if not from the senses? Indeed, unless the eye had de- scried a round shape in that tower, it could have had no idea that it possessed roundness. Again, whence arises sensation, if not from the soul? For if the soul had no body, it would have no sensation. Accordingly, sensation comes from the soul, and opinion from sensa- tion; and the whole (process) is the soul. But further, it may well be insisted on that there is a something which causes the discrepancy between the report of the senses and the reality of the facts. Now, since it is possible, (as we have seen), for phenomena to be re- ported which exist not in the objects, why should it not be equally possible for phe- nomena to be reported which are caused not by the senses, but by reasons and conditions which intervene, in the very nature of the case? If so, it will be only right that they should be duly recognised. The truth is, that it was the water which was the cause of the oar seeming to be inclined or bent: out of the water, it was perfectly straight in appearance (as well as in fact). The delicacy of the sub- stance or medium which forms a mirror by means of its luminosity, according as it is struck or shaken, by the vibration actually destroys the appearance of the straightness of a right line. In like manner, the condition of the open space which fills up the interval between it and us, necessarily causes the true shape of the tower to escape our notice; for the uniform density of the surrounding air covering its angles with a similar light oblit- erates their outlines. So, again, the equal breadth of the arcade is sharpened or narrowed off towards its termination, until its aspect, becoming more and more contracted under its prolonged roof, comes to a vanishing point in the direction of its farthest distance. So the sky blends itself with the sea, the vision be- coming spent at last, which had maintained duly the boundaries of the two elements, so long as its vigorous glance lasted. As for the (alleged cases of deceptive) hearing, what else could produce the illusion but the similarity of the sounds? And if the perfume after- wards was less strong to the smell, and the wine more flat to the taste, and the water not so hot to the touch, their original strength was after all found in the whole of them pretty well unimpaired. In the matter, how- ever, of the roughness and smoothness of the pavement, it was only natural and right that limbs like the hands and the feet, so different in tenderness and callousness, should have different impressions. In this way, then, there cannot occur an illusion in our senses without an adequate cause. Now if special causes, (such as we have indicated,) mis- lead our senses and (through our senses) our opinions also, then we must no longer ascribe the deception to the senses, which follow the specific causes of the illusion, nor to the opinions we form; for these are occasioned and controlled by our senses, which only follow the causes. Persons who are afflicted with madness or insanity, mistake one object for another. Orestes in his sister sees his mother; Ajax sees Ulysses in the slaughtered herd; Athamas and Agave descry wild beasts in their children. Now is it their eyes or their phrenzy which you must blame for so vast a fallacy? All things taste bitter, in the redundancy of their bile, to those who have the jaundice. Is it their taste which you will charge with the physical prevarication, or their ill state of health? All the senses, therefore, are disordered occasionally, or imposed upon, but only in such a way as to be quite free of any fault in their own natural functions. But further still, not even against the specific causes and conditions themselves must we lay an indictment of deception. For, since these physical aberrations happen for stated reasons, the reasons do not deserve to be regarded as deceptions. Whatever ought to occur in a certain manner is not a decep- tion. If, then, even these circumstantial causes must be acquitted of all censure and blame, how much more should we free from reproach the senses, over which the said causes exercise a liberal sway! Hence we are bound most certainly to claim for the senses truth, and fidelity, and integrity, seeing that they never render any other account of their im- pressions than is enjoined on them by the specific causes or conditions which in all cases produce that discrepancy which appears be- tween the report of the senses and the reality of the objects. What mean you, then, O most insolent Academy? You overthrow the entire condition of human life; you disturb the whole order of nature; you obscure the good providence of God Himself: for the senses of man which God has appointed over all His works, that we might understand, in- habit, dispense, and enjoy them, (you re- CHAP. XVIII. J A TREATISE ON THE SOUL proach) as fafiacious and treacherous tyrants! But is it not from these that all creation re- ceives our services? Is it not by their means that a second form is impressed even upon the world? — so many arts, so many industri- ous resources, so many pursuits, such busi- ness, such offices, such commerce, such remedies, counsels, consolations, modes, civ- ilizations, and accomplishments of life! All these things have produced the very relish and savour of human existence; whilst by these senses of man, he alone of all animated nature has the distinction of being a rational animal, with a capacity for intelligence and knowledge — nay, an ability to form the Acad- emy itself '• But Plato, in order to disparage the testimony of the senses, in the Phcedrus denies (in the person of Socrates) his own ability to know even himself, according to the injunction of the Delphic oracle; and in the Theoptetus he deprives himself of the faculties of knowledge and sensation; and again, in the Phcedrus he postpones till after death the post- humous knowledge, as he calls it, of the truth; and yet for all he went on playing the philoso- pher even before he died. We may not, I say, we may not call into question the truth of the (poor vilified) senses,' lest we should even in Christ Himself, bring doubt upon " the truth of their sensation; lest perchance it should be said that He did not really " behold Satan as light- ning fall from heaven;"3 that He did not really hear the Father's voice testifying of Himself;'' or that He was deceived in touching Peter's wife's mother; 5 or tliat the fragrance of the ointment which He afterwards smelled was different from that which He accepted for His burial;* and that the taste of the wine was dif- ferent from that which He consecrated in memory of His blood.'' On this false prin- ciple it was that Marcion actually chose to believe that He was a phantom, denying to Him the reality of a perfect body. Now, not even to His apostles was His nature ever a matter of deception. He was truly both seen and heard upon the mount; ^ true and real was the draught of that wine at the marriage of (Cana in) Galilee;' true and real also was the touch of the then believing Thomas." Read the testimony of John: " That which we have seen, which we have heard, which we have