» Licebit.
2 Fetu.
3 Tertullian perhaps mentions this " demus " of Athens as the birthplace of Plato (Oehler).
5 Si et alia.
providence, they are fate and necessity; and about fortune, it is man's freedom of will. Even the philosophers allow these distinc- tions; whilst on our part we have already undertaken to treat of them, on the principles of the (Christian) faith, in a separate work.* It is evident how great must be the influences which so variously affect the one nature of the soul, since they are commonly regarded as separate " natures.'' Still they are not differ- ent species, but casual incidents of one nature and substance — even of that which God con- ferred on Adam, and made the mould of all (subsequent ones). Casual incidents will they always remain, but never will they become specific differences. However great, too, at present is the variety of men's manners, it was not so in Adam, the founder of their race. But all these discordances ought to have ex- isted in him as the fountainhead, and thence to have descended to us in an unimpaired variety, if the variety had been due to nature.
CHAP, XXI. AS FREE-WILL ACTUATES AN INDI- VIDUAL SO MAY HIS CHARACTER CHANGE.
Now, if the soul possessed this uniform and simple nature from the beginning in Adam, previous to so many mental dispositions (be- ing developed out of it), it is not rendered multiform by such various development, nor by the triple 7 form predicated of it in ^^ the Valenti?iiati trinity" (that we may still keep the condemnation of that heresy in view), for not even this nature is discoverable in Adam. What had he that was spiritual? Is it because he prophetically declared " the great mystery of Christ and the church? " « " This is bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: she shall be called Woman. Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother, and he shall cleave unto his wife; and they two shall be one flesh." ' But this (gift of prophecy) only came on him afterwards, when God infused into him the ecstasy, or spiritual quality, in which prophecy consists. If, again, the evil of sin was developed in him, this must not be accounted as a natural disposition: it was rather produced by the instigation of the (old) serpent as far from being incidental to his nature as it was from being material in him, for we have already excluded belief in "Matter."'" Now, if neither the spiritual element, nor what the heretics call the ma- terial element, was properly inherent in him 6 Tertullian wrote a work De Fato, which is lost. Fulgen- tius, p. 561, gives a quotation from it.
7 i.e., the carnal, the animal, and the spiritual. Comp. Adv, Valentin, xxv., and De Resur, Carnis, hr.
lo See Adv. Hermog. xiii.
A TREATISE X)N THE SOUL.
[chap. XXII.
(since, if he had been created out of matter, the germ of evil must have been an integral part of his constitution), it remains that the one only original element of his nature was what is called the avimal (the principle of vitality, the soul), which we maintain to be simple and uniform in its condition. Con- cerning this, it remains for us to inquire whether, as being called natural, it ought to be deemed subject to change. (The here- tics whom we have referred to) deny that nature is susceptible of any change,' in order that they may be able to establish and settle their threefold theory, or "trinity," in all its characteristics as to the several natures, be- cause "a good tree cannot produce evil fruit, nor a corrupt tree good fruit; and no- body gathers figs of thorns, nor grapes of brambles."^ If so, then "God will not be able any longer to raise up from the stones children unto Abraham; nor to make a gen- eration of vipers bring forth fruits of repent- ance." ^ And if so, the apostle too was in error when he said in his epistle, "Ye were at one time darkness, (but now are ye light in the Lord;)"'' and, "We also were by nature children of wrath; " s and, " Such were some of you, but ye are washed."^ The sta,tements, however, of holy Scripture will never be discordant with truth. A corrupt tree will never yield good fruit, unless the better nature be grafted into it; nor will a good tree produce evil fruit, except by the same process of cultivation. Stones also will become children of Abraham, if educated in Abraham's faith; and a generation of vipers will bring forth the fruits of penitence, if they reject the poison of their malignant nature. This will be the power of the grace of God, more potent indeed than nature, exercising its sway over the faculty that underlies itself within us — even the freedom of our will, which is described as avre^ovaiog (of independent au- thority); and inasmuch as this faculty is itself also natural and mutable, in whatsoever direc- tion it turns, it inclines of its own nature. Now, that there does exist within us naturally this independent authority {rb avTE^ovciov), we have already shown in opposition both to Marcion' and to Hermogenes.® If, then, the natural condition has to be submitted to a definition, it must be determined to be twofold — there being the category of the born and the unborn, the made and not-made. Now that 'See Adv. yalentin. xxix, 3 Matt. iii. 7-g.
* I Cor. vi. II.
s In his work against this man, entitled De CeHtuAMifite, not now extant.
which has received its constitution by being made or by being born, is by nature capable of being changed, for it can be both born again and re-made; whereas that which is not-made and unborn will remain for ever immoveable. Since, however, this state is suited to God alone, as the only Being who is unborn and not-made (and therefore immortal and un- changeable), it is absolutely certain that the nature of all other existences which are born and created is subject to modification and change; so that if the threefold state is to be ascribed to the soul, it must be supposed to arise from the mutability of its accidental cir- cumstances, and not from the appointment of nature.
CHAP. XXII. — RECAPITULATION. DEFINITION OF THE SOUL.
Hermogenes has already heard from us what are the other natural faculties of the soul, as well as their vindication and proof; whence it may be seen that the soul is rather the offspring of God than of matter. The names of these faculties shall here be simply repeated, that they may not seem to be for- gotten and passed out of sight. We have as- signed, then, to the soul both that freedom of the will which we just now mentioned, and its dominion over the works of nature, and its occasional gift of divination, independently of that endowment of prophecy which accrues to it expressly from the grace of God. We shall therefore now quit this subject of the soul's disposition, in order to set out fully in order its various qualities. ' The soul, then, we define to be sprung from the breath of God, immortal, possessing body, having form, simple in its substance, intelligent in its own nature, developing its power in various ways, free in its determinations, subject to be changes of accident, in its faculties mutable, rational, supreme, endued with an instinct of presentiment, evolved out of one (archetypal soul). It remains for us now to consider how it is developed out of this one original source; in other words, whence, and when, and how it is produced.
9 TertuUian had shown that " the soul is the breath or afflatus of God," in ch. iv. and xi. above. He demonstrated its " immot-- iality" in ch. ii.-iv., vi., ix., xiv.; and he will repeat his proof hereafter, in ch. xxiv.. xxxviii., xlv., Ii., liii., liv. Moreover, he illustrates the soul's corporeity" in ch. v.-viii.; its " endow- ment vi'\t\\/orni or fi^re" in ch. ix.; its " simplicity in sub- stance " in ch. x. and xi.; its " inherent inteliigence," in ch. xii.; its varied development, in ch. xiii.-xv. The soul's " rationality, " supremacy " and "instinctive divination" TertuUian treated of in his treatise De Censu A nitiia> A^aXn^t Hermogenes (as he has said in the text); but he has treated somewhat of the soul's " rational nature " in the sixteenth chapter above; in the four- teenth and fifteenth chapters he referred to the soul's "supremacy or //<'^fw«>«_y,•" whilst we have had a hint about its ^' divining faculty," even in infants, in ch. xix. The propagation of souls from the one archetypal soul is the subject of the chapter before us, as well as of the five succeeding ones (La Cerda^.
CHAP. XXIV.]
A TREATISE ON THE SOUL.
CHAP. XXlll. — THE OPINIONS OF SUNDRY HERE- TICS WHICH ORIGINATE ULTIMATELY WITH PLATO.
Some suppose that they came down from heaven, with as firm a behef as they are apt to entertain, when they indulge in the pros- pect of an undoubted return thither. Satur- ninus, the disciple of Menander, who belonged to Simon's sect, introduced this opinion: he affirmed that man was made by angels. A futile, imperfect creation at first, weak and unable to stand, he crawled upon the ground like a worm, because he wanted the strength to maintain an erect posture; but afterwards having, by the compassion of the Supreme Power (in whose image, which had not been fully understood, he was clumsily formed), obtained a slender spark of Ufe, this roused and righted his imperfect form, and animated it with a higher vitality, and provided for its return, on its relinquishment of life, to its original principle. Carpocrates, indeed, claims for himself so extreme an amount of the supernal qualities, that his disciples set their own souls at once on an equality with Christ (not to mention the apostles); and sometimes, when it suits their fancy, even give them the superiority — deeming them, forsooth, to have partaken of that sublime virtue which looks down upon the principalities that govern this world. Apelles tells us that our souls were enticed by earthly baits down from their supercelestial abodes by a fiery angel, Israel's God and ours, who then enclosed them firmly within our sinful flesh. The hive of Valen- tinus fortifies the soul with the germ of Sophia, or Wisdom; by means of which germ they recognise, in the images of visible objects, the stories and Milesian fables of their own yEons. I am sorry from my heart that Plato has been the caterer to all these heretics. For in the Phcedo he imagines that souls wander from this world to that, and thence back again hither; whilst in the Timcetts he supposes that the children of God, to whom had been assigned the production of mortal creatures, having taken for the soul the germ of im- mortality, congealed around it a mortal body, — thereby indicating that this world is the figure of some other. Now, to procure belief in all this — that the soul had formerly lived with God in the heavens above, sharing His idea.^ with Him, and afterwards came down to live with us on earth, and whilst here recollects the eternal patterns of things which it had learnt before — he elaborated his new formula, fiaeiiaeLq avafivyaeig, which means that " learning is reminiscence;" implying that the souls which come to us from thence forget the things amongst which they formerly lived, but that they afterwards recall them, instructed by the objects they see around them. Forasmuch, therefore, as the doctrines which the heretics borrow from Plato are cunningly defended by this kind of argument, I shall sufficiently refute the heretics if I overthrow the argument of Plato.
CHAP. XXIV. — Plato's inconsistency, hk SUPPOSES THE SOUL SELF-EXISTENT, YET capable of FORGETTING WHAT PASSED IN A PREVIOUS STATE.
In the first place, I cannot allow that the soul is capable of a failure of memory; be- cause he has conceded to it so large an amount of divine quality as to put it on a par with God. He makes it unborn, which single at- tribute I might apply as a sufficient attesta- tion of its perfect divinity; he then adds that the soul is immortal, incorruptible, incorpo- real— since he believed God to be the same — invisible, incapable of delineation, uniform, supreme, rational, and intellectual. What more could he attribute to the soul, if he wanted to call it God? We, however, who allow no appendage to God ' (in the sense of equality), by this very fact reckon the soul as very far below God: for we suppose it to be born, and hereby to possess something of a diluted divinity and an attenuated felicity, as the breath (of God), though not His spirit; and although immortal, as this is an attribute of divinity, yet for all that passible, since this is an incident of a born condition, and conse- quently from the first capable of deviation from perfection and right,- and by consequence susceptible of a failure in memory. This point I have discussed sufficienly with Her- mogenes.3 But it may be further observed, that if the soul is to merit being accounted a god, by reason of all its qualities being equal to the attributes of God, it must then be sub- ject to no passion, and therefore to no loss of memory; for this defect of oblivion is as great an injury to that of which you predicate it, as memory is the glory thereof, which Plato himself deems the very safeguard of the senses and intellectual faculties, and which Cicero has designated the treasury of all the sciences. Now we need not raise the doubt whether so divine a faculty as the soul was capable of losing memory: the question rather is, whether it is able to recover afresh that which it has lost. I could not decide whether that, which ought to have lost memory, if it once incurred the loss, would be powerful enough to recollect itself. Both alternatives, 1 Nihil Deo appendimus.
2 Exorbitationis.
3 In his, now lost, treatise, De Ccnsn Animm* A TREATISE ON THE SOUL.
[chap. XXIV.
indeed, will agree very well with my soul, but not with Plato's. In the second place, my objection to him will stand thus: (Plato,) do you endow the soul with a natural compe- tency for understanding those well-known ideas of yours? Certainly I do, will be your answer. Well, now, no one will concede to you that the knowledge, (which you say is) the gift of nature, of the natural sciences can fail. But the knowledge of the sciences fails; the knowledge of the various fields of learning and of the arts of life fails; and so perhaps the knowledge of the faculties and affections of our minds fails, although they seem to be inherent in our nature, but really are not so: because, as we have already said,' they are affected by accidents of place, of manners and customs, of bodily condition, of the state of man's health — by the influences of the Supreme Powers, and the changes of man's free-will. Now the instinctive knowledge of natural objects never fails, not even in the brute creation. The lion, no doubt, will for- get his ferocity, if surrounded by the soften- ing influence of training; he may become, with his beautiful mane, the plaything of some Queen Berenice, and lick her cheeks with his tongue. A wild beast may lay aside his habits, but his natural instincts will not be forgotten. He will not forget his proper food, nor his natural resources, nor his natural alarms; and should the queen offer him fishes or cakes, he will wish for flesh; and if, when he is ill, any antidote be prepared for him, he will still require the ape; and should no hunting-spear be presented against him, he will yet dread the crow of the cock. In like manner with man, who is perhaps the most forgetful of all creatures, the knowledge of everything natural to him will remain in- eradicably fixed in him, — but this alone, as being alone a natural instinct. He will never forget to eat when he is hungry; or to drink when he is thirsty; or to use his eyes when he wants to see; or his ears, to hear; or his nose, to smell; or his mouth, to taste; or his hand, to touch. These are, to be sure, the senses, which philosophy depreciates by her preference for the intellectual faculties. But if the natural knowledge of the sensuous fac- ulties is permanent, how happens it that the knowledge of the intellectual faculties fails, to which the superiority is ascribed? Whence, now, arises that power of forgetfulness itself which precedes recollection? From long lapse of time, he says. But this is a shortsighted answer. Length of time cannot be incidental to that which, according to him, is unborn, ' Above, in rh. xix. xx. pp. 200, aoi.
and which therefore must be deemed most certainly eternal. For that which is eternal, on the ground of its being unborn, since it admits neither of beginning nor end of time, is subject to no temporal criterion. And that which time does not measure, undergoes no change in consequence of time; nor is long lapse of time at all influential over it. If time is a cause of oblivion, why, from the time of the soul's entrance into the body, does memory fail, as if thenceforth the soul were to be affected by time? for the soul, being undoubtedly prior to the body, was of course not irrespective of time. Is it, indeed, im- mediately on the soul's entrance into the body that oblivion takes place, or some time after- wards? If immediately, where will be the long lapse of the time which is as yet inad- missible in the hypothesis?= Take, for in- stance, the case of the infant. If some time afterwards, will not the soul, during the in- terval previous to the rrioment of oblivion, still exercise its powers of memory? And how comes it to pass that the soul subse- quently forgets, and then afterwards again remembers? How long, too, must the lapse of the time be regarded as having been, dur- ing which the oblivion oppressed the soul? The whole course of one's life, I apprehend, will be insufficient to efface the memory of an age which endured so long before the soul's assumption of the body. But then, again, Plato throws the blame upon the body, as if it were at all credible that a born sub- stance could extinguish the power of one that is unborn. There exist, however, among bodies a great many differences, by reason of their rationality, their bulk, their condition, their age, and their health. Will there then be supposed to exist similar differences in obliviousness? Oblivion, however, is uniform and identical. Therefore bodily peculiarity, with its manifold varieties, will not become the cause of an effect which is an invariable one. There are likewise, according to Plato's own testimony, many proofs to show that the soul has a divining faculty, as we have already advanced against Hermogenes. But there is not a man living, who does not himself feel his soul possessed with a presage and augury of some omen, danger, or joy. Now, if the body is not prejudicial to divination, it will not, I suppose, be injurious to memory. One thing is certain, that souls in the same body both forget and remember. If any corporeal condition engenders forgetfulness, how will it admit the opposite state of recollection? Because recollection, after forgetfulness, is -Or, " which Las been too short for calculatioo."
CHAP. XXV.]
A TREATISE ON THE SOUL.
actually the resurrection of the memory. Now, how should not that which is hostile to the memory at first, be also prejudicial to it in the second instance? Lastly, who have better memories than little children, with their fresh, unworn souls, not yet immersed in domestic and public cares, but devoted only to those studies the acquirement of which is itself a reminiscence? Why, indeed, do we not all of us recollect in an equal degree, since we are equal in our forgetfulness? But this is true only of philosophers! But not even of the whole of them. Amongst so many nations, in so great a crowd of sages, Plato, to be sure, is the only man who has combined the oblivion and the recollection of ideas. Now, since this main argument of his by no means keeps its ground, it follows that its entire superstructure must fall with it, — namely, that souls are supposed to be unborn, and to live in the heavenly regions, and to be instructed in the divine mysteries thereof; moreover, that they descend to this earth, and here recall to memory their previous existence, for the purpose, of course, of sup- plying to our heretics the fitting materials for their systems.
CHAP. XXV. TERTULLIAN REFUTES, PHYSIO- LOGICALLY, THE NOTION THAT THE SOUL IS INTRODUCED AFTER BIRTH.
I shall now return to the cause of this di- gression, in order that I may explain how all souls are derived from one, when and where and in what manner they are produced. Now, touching this subject, it matters not whether the question be started by the philosopher, by the heretic, or by the crowd. Those who profess the truth care nothing about their opponents, especially such of them as begin by maintaining that the soul is not conceived in the womb, nor is formed and produced at the time that the flesh is moulded, but is im- pressed from without upon the infant before his complete vitality, but after the process of parturition. They say, moreover, that the human seed having been duly deposited ex coticubiter in the womb, and having been by nat- ural impulse quickened, it becomes condensed into the mere substance of the flesh, which is in due time born, warm from the furnace of the womb, and then released from its heat. (This flesh) resembley the case of hot iron, which is in that state plunged into cold water; for, being smitten by the cold air (into which it is born), it at once receives the power of animation, and utters vocal sound. This view is entertained by the Stoics, along with ^Ene- sidemus, and occasionally by Plato himself, when he tells us that the soul, being quite a separate formation, originating elsewhere and externally to the womb, is inhaled ' when the new-born infant first draws breath, and by and by exhaled = with the man's latest breath. We shall see whether this view of his is merely fictitious. Even the medical profes- sion has not lacked its Hicesius, to prove a traitor both to nature and his own calling. These gentlemen, I suppose, were too modest to come to terms with women on the mysteries of childbirth, so well known to the latter. But how much more is there for them to blush at, when in the end they have the women to refute them, instead of commending them. Now, in such a question as this, no one can be so useful a teacher, judge, or witness, as the sex itself which is so intimately concerned. Give us your testimony, then, ye mothers, whether yet pregnant, or after delivery (let barren women and men keep silence), — the truth of your own nature is in question, the reality of your own suffering is the point to be decided. (Tell us, then,) wjiether you feel in the embryo within you any vital force ' other than your own, with whicli. your bowek tremble, your sides shake, your entire womb throbs, and the burden which oppresses you constantly changes its position? Are these movements a joy to you, and a positive re- moval of anxiety, as making you confident that your infant both possesses vitality and enjoys it? Or, should his restlessness ceas^, your first fear would be for him; and he would be aware of it within you, since he is disturbed at the novel sound; and you would crave for injurious diet,'' or would even loathe your food — all ^n his account; and then ^ou and he, ( in the closeness of your sympathy,) would share together your common ailments — so far that with your contusions and bruises would he actually become marked, — whilst within you, and even on the selfsame parts of the body, taking to himself thus peremp- torily s the injuries of his mother! Now, whenever a livid hue and redness are incidents of the blood, the blood will not be without the vital principle,^ or soul; or when disease attacks the soul or vitality, (it becomes a proof of its real existence, since) there is no disease where there is no soul or principle ot life. Again, inasmuch as sustenance by food, and the want thereof, growth and decay, fear and motion, are conditions of the soul or life, he who experiences them must be alive.
' " Inhaled " is Bp. Kaye's word for adduci^ " taken up."
2 Educi.
3 Vivacitas.
* Ciborura vanitates.
5 Rapiens.
6 Anima.
A TREATISE ON THE SOUL.
[chap. XXVI.