CHAP. XII. — THE MODE OF CONTROVERSY CHANGED. THE PREMISSES OF HERMOGENES ACCEPTED, IN ORDER TO SHOW INTO WHAT CONFUSION THEY LEAD HIM.
Come now, let us suppose Matter to be evil, nay, very evil, by nature of course, just as 7 Et in Deum credi.
8 Gestivit.
9 Jam vero. 'oTum.
>2 Utique: with a touch of irony, in the argnmentum adkomi- nem.
13 Matt. XXV. 4t.
'8 Conditionis: "creation."
'9 Condixerint.
" Male deputantur.
AGAINST HERMOGENES.
[chap. XIV.
we believe God to be good, even very good, in like manner by nature. Now nature must be regarded as sure and fixed, just as persist- ently fixed in evil in the case of Matter, as immoveable and unchangeable in good in the case of God. Because, as is evident,' if nat- ure admits of change from evil to good in Matter, it can be changed from good to evil in God. Here some man will say, Then will "children not be raised up to Abraham from the stones? " "^ Will " generations of vipers not bring forth the fruit of repentance?" ^ And " children of wrath " fail to become sons of peace, if nature be unchangeable? Your reference to such examples as these, my friend,* is a thoughtless s one. For things which owe their existence to birth — such as stones and vipers and human beings — are not apposite to the case of Matter, which is un- born; since their nature, by possessing a be- ginning, may have also a termination. But bear in mind * that Matter has once for all been determined to be eternal, as being un- made, unborn, and therefore supposably of an unchangeable and incorruptible nature; and this from the very opinion of Hermogenes himself, which he alleges against us when he denies that God was able to make (anything) of Himself, on the ground that what is eternal is incapable of change, because it would lose — so the opinion runs '' — what it once was, in becoming by the change that which it was not, if it were not eternal. But as for the Lord, who is also eternal, (he maintained) that He could not be anything else than what He always is. Well, then, I will adopt this definite opinion of his, and by means thereof refute him. I blame Matter with a like cen- sure, because out of it, evil though it be — nay, very evil — good things have been created, ay, "very good" ones: "And God saw that they were good, and God blessed them"* — because, of course, of their very great good- ness; certainly not because they were evil, or very evil. Change is therefore admissible in Matter; and this being the case, it has lost its condition of eternity; in short,' its beauty is decayed in death." Eternity, however, cannot be lost, because it cannot be eternity, except by reason of its immunity from loss. For the same reason also it is incapable of change, inasmuch as, since it is eternity, it can by no means be changed.
' Scilicet.
4 O homo.
5 Temere. ' Tene.
7 Scilicet. 9Denique. ■0 That IS, of course, by its own natural law.
CHAP. XIII, ANOTHER GROUND OF HERMOG^ ENES THAT MATTER HAS SOME GOOD IN IT. ITS ABSURDITY.
Here the question will arise How creatures were made good out of it," which were formed without any change at all? " How occurs the seed of what is good, ay, very good, in that which is evil, nay, very evil? Surely a good tree does not produce evil fruit, '^ since there is no God who is not good; nor does an evil tree yield good fruit, since there is not Matter except what is very evil. Or if we were to grant him that there is some germ of good in it, then there will be no longer a uniform nat- ure (pervading it), that is to say, one which is evil throughout; but instead thereof (we now encounter) a double nature, partly good and partly evil; and again the question will arise, whether, in a subject which is good and evil, there could possibly have been found a harmony for light and darkness, for sweet and bitter? So again, if qualities so utterly di- verse as good and evil have been able to unite together,"* and have imparted to Matter a double nature, productive of both kinds of fruit, then no longer will absolutely '5 good things be imputable to God, just as evil things are not ascribed to Him, but both qualities will appertain to Matter, since they are derived from the property of Matter. At this rate, we shall owe to God neither gratitude for gooil things, nor grudge '* for evil ones, because He has produced no work of His own proper character. '7 From which circumstance will arise the clear proof that He has been subser- vient to Matter.
CHAP. XIV. TERTULLIAN PUSHES HIS OPPONENT INTO A DILEMMA, Now, if it be also argued, that although Matter may have afforded Him the oppor- tunity, it was still His own will which led Him to the creation of good creatures, as having detected '^ what was good in matter — although this, too, be a discredit-^ible supposition '» — yet, at any rate, when He produces evil like- wise out of the same (Matter), He is a servant to Matter, since, of course,-" it is not of His own accord that He produces this too, having nothing else that He can do than tc effect creation out of an evil stock" — unwillingly, no " Matter.
'= i. e. in their nature, Matter being evil, and they good, oa the hypothesis";. •3 Matt. vii. ig. '4 Concurrisse. »5 Ipsa. •6 Invidiam. '7 Ingenio. ■'' Nactus. ■9 Turpe. 20 Utique. 2' E.X malo.
CHAP. XV.]
AGAINST HERMOGENES.
doubt, as being good; of necessity, too, as l)eing unwilling; and as an act of servitude, because from necessity. Which, then, is the worthier thought, that He created evil things of necessity, or of His own accord? Because it was indeed of necessity that He created them, if out of Matter; of His own accord, if out of nothing. For you are now labouring in vain when you try to avoid making God the Author of evil things; because, since He made all things of Matter, they will have to be as- cribed to Himself, who made them, just be- cause ' He made them. Plainly the interest of the question, whence He made all things, identifies itself with (the question), whether He made all things out of nothing; and it matters not whence He made all things, so that He made all things thence, whence most glory accrued to Him.- Now, more glory accrued to Him from a creation of His own will than from one of necessity; in other words, from a creation out of nothing, than from one out of Matter. It is more worthy to believe that God is free, even as the Author of evil, than that He is a slave. Power, whatever it be, is more suited to Him than infirmity. ^ If we thus even admit that matter had nothing good in it, but that the Lord produced whatever good He did produce of His own power, then some other questions will with equal rea- son arise. First, since there was no good at all in Matter, it is clear that good was not made of Matter, on the express ground in- deed that Matter did not possess it. Next, \i good was not made of Matter, it must then have been made of God; if not of God, then it must have been made of nothing. — For this is the alternative, on Hermogenes' own show- ing.* CHAP. XV. THE TRUTH, THAT GOD MADE ALL THINGS FROM NOTHING, RESCUED FROM THE opponent's FLOUNDERINGS.
Now, if good was neither produced out of matter, since it was not in it, evil as it was, nor out of God, since, according to the posi- tion of Hermogenes, nothing could have been produced out of god, it will be found that good was created out of nothing, inasmuch as it was formed of none — neither of Matter nor of God. And if good was formed out of noth- ing, why not evil too? Nay, if anything was formed out of nothing, why not all things? Unless indeed it be that the divine might was insufficient for the production of all things, though it produced a something out of noth- ' Proinde quatenus.
2 We subjoin the original of this sentence: " Plane sic interest unde fecerit ac si de nihilo fecisset, nee interest unde fecerit, ut inde fecerit unde eum magis decuit.
3 Pusillitas.
^ Secundum Hermogenis dispositionem.
ing. Or else if good proceeded from evil matter, since it issued neither from nothing nor from God, it will follow that it must have proceeded from the conversion of Matter con- trary to that unchangeable attribute which has been claimed for //, as an eternal being. s Thus, in regard to the source whence good derived its existence, Hermogenes will now have to deny the possibility of such. But still it is necessary that (good) should proceed from some one of those sources from which he has denied the very possibility of its hav- ing been derived. Now if evil be denied to be of nothing for the purpose of denying it to be the work of God, from whose will there would be too much appearance of its being derived, and be alleged to proceed from Mat- ter, that it may be the property of that very thing of whose substance it is assumed to be made, even here also, as I have said, God will have to be regarded as the Author of evil; because, whereas it had been His duty^ to produce all good things out of Matter, or rather good things simply, by His identical attribute of power and will. He did yet not only not produce all good things, but even (some) evil things — of course, either willing that the evil should exist if He was able to cause their non-existence, or not being strong enough to effect that all things should be good, if being desirous of that result. He failed in the ac- complishment thereof; since there can be no difference whether it were by weakness or by will, that the Lord proved to be the Author of evil. Else what was the reason that, after creating good things, as if Himself good. He should have also produced evil things, as if He failed in His goodness, since He did not confine Himself to the production of things which were simply consistent with Himself? What necessity was there, after the produc- tion of His proper work, for His troubling Himself about Matter also by producing evil likewise, in order to secure His being alone acknowledged as good from His good, and at the same time ^ to prevent Matter being re- garded as evil from (created) evil? Good would have flourished much better if evil had not blown upon it. For Hermogenes himself explodes the arguments of sundry persons who contend that evil things were necessary to impart lustre to the good, which must be understood from their contrasts. This, there- fore, was not the ground for the production 5 Contra denegatam aetemi conversationem. Literally, " Con- trary to that convertibility of an eternal nature which has been denied (by Hermogenes) to be possible." It will be obvious why we have, in connection with the preceding clause preferred the equivalent rendering of our text. For the denial of Hermogenes, which TertuUian refers to, see above, chap. xii. p. 484.
* Debuisset protulisse.
7 This clumsy expedient to save the character of both God and Matter was one of the weaknesses of Hermogenes' system.
AGAINST HERMOGENES.
[chap, xvil of evil; but if some other reason must be sought for the introduction thereof, why could it not have been introduced even from noth- ing,' since the very same reason would ex- culpate the Lord from the reproach of being thought the author of evil, which now excuses the existence of evil things, when He produces them out of Matter? And if there is this ex- cuse, then the question is completely^ shut up in a corner, where they are unwilling to find it, who, without examining into the rea- son itself of evil, or distinguishing how they should either attribute it to God or separate it from God, do in fact expose God to many most unworthy calumnies.^ CHAP. XVI. — A SERIES OF DILEMMAS. THEY SHOW THAT HERMOGENES CANNOT ESCAPE FROM THE ORTHODOX CONCLUSION.
On the very threshold,* then, of this doc- trine,* which I shall probably have to treat of elsewhere, I distinctly lay it down as my posi- tion, that both good and evil must be ascribed either to God, who made them out of Matter; or to Matter itself, out of which He made them; or both one and the other to both of them together,* because they are bound to- gether— both He who created, and that out of which He created; or (lastly) one to One, and the other to the Other,' because after Matter and God there is not a third. Now if both should prove to belong to God, God evi- dently will be the author of evil; but God, as being good, cannot be the author of evil. Again, if both are ascribed to Matter, Matter will evidently be the very mother of good,^ but inasmuch as Matter is wholly evil, it can- not be the mother of good. But if both one and the other should be thought to belong to Both together, then in this case also Matter will be comparable with God; and both will be equal, being on equal terms allied to evil as well as to good. Matter, however, ought not to be compared with God, in order that it may not make two gods. If, (lastly,) one be ascribed to One, and the other to the Other — that is to say, let the good be God's, and the evil belong to Matter — then, on the one hand, evil must not be ascribed to God, nor, on the other hand, good to Matter. And God, more- over, by making both good things and evil things out of Matter, creates them along with • Cur non et ex nibilo potuerit induci? =" Ubique et undique.
3 Destructionibus. " Ruin of character " is the true idea of this strong term.
4 Praestructione. The notion is of the /bundaiion of an edi- fice: here — "preliminary remarks" (see our Anti-Marcion, v.
3 Articuli.
• Utrumque utrique. 7 Alterum alteri.
• Boni matrix.
it. This being the case, I cannot tell how Hermogenes ' is to escape from my conclu- sion; for he supposes that God cannot be the author of evil, in what way soever He created evil out of Matter, whether it was of His own will, or of necessity, or from the reason (of the case). If, however, He is the author of evil, who was the actual Creator, Matter being simply associated with Him by reason of its furnishing Him with substance,'" you now do away with the cause " of your introducing Matter. For it is not the less true, that it is by means of Matter that God shows Himself the author of evil, although Matter has been assumed by you expressly to prevent God's seeming to be the author of evil. Matter be- ing therefore excluded, since the cause of it is excluded, it remains that God, without doubt, must have made all things out of noth- ing. Whether evil things were amongst them we shall see, when it shall be made clear what are evil things, and whether those things are evil which you at present deem to be so. For it is more worthy of God that He produced even these of His own will, by producing them out of nothing, than from the predetermination of another," (which must have been the case) if He had produced them out of Matter. It is liberty, not necessity, which suits the char- acter of God. I would much rather that He should have even willed to create evil of Him- self, than that He should have lacked ability to hinder its creation.
CHAP. XVII. THE TRUTH OF GOD's WORK IN CREATION. YOU CANNOT DEPART IN THE LEAST FROM IT, WITHOUT LANDING YOURSELF IN AN ABSURDITY.
This rule is required by the nature of the One-only God,'^ who is One-only in no other way than as the sole God; and in no other way sole, than as having nothing else (co-ex- istent) with Him. So also He will be first, because all things are after Him; and all things are after Him, because all things are by Him; and all things are by Him, because they are of nothing: so that reason coincides with the Scripture, which says: " Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His counsellor? or with whom took He counsel? or who hath shown to Him the way of wisdom and knowledge? Who hath first given to 9 The usual reading is "Hermogenes." Rigaltius, however, reads " Hermogenis," of which Oehler approves; so as to make TertuUian say, " I cannot tell how I can avoid the opinion of Her- mogenes, who," etc. etc.
'0 Per substantive suggestum.
" Excusas jam causam. H»rmogenes held that Matter was eternal, to exclude God from the authorship of evil. This causa of Matter he was now illogically evading. Excusare = ex, causa, " to cancel the cause."
'lUnici Dei.
CHAP, xvni.]
AGAINST HERMOGENES.
Him, and it shall be recompensed to him again?"' Surely none! Because there was present with Him no power, no material, no nature which belonged to any other than Him- self. But if it was with some (portion of Matter) ' that He effected His creation. He must have received from that (Matter) itself both the design and the treatment of its order, as being" the way of wisdom and knowledge." For He had to operate conformably with the quality of the thing, and according to the nat- ure of Matter, not according to His own will; in consequence of which He must have made^ even evil things suitabl)-^ to the nature not of Himself, but of Matter.
CHAP. XVIII. — AN EULOGY ON THE WISDOM AND WORD OF GOD, BY WHICH GOD MADE ALL THINGS OF NOTHING.
If any material was necessary to God in the creation of the world, as Hermogenes supposed, God had a far nobler and more suitable one in His own wisdom * — one which was not to be gauged by the writings of^ philosophers, but to be learnt from the words of s prophets. This alone, indeed, knew the mind of the Lord. For "who knoweth the things of God, and the things in God, but the Spirit, which is in Him?"* Now His wis- dom is that Spirit. This was His counsellor, the very way of His wisdom and knowledge.' Of this He made all things, making them tHrough It, and making them with It. " When He prepared the heavens," so says (the Scrip- ture^), "I was present with Him; and when He strengthened above the winds the lofty clouds, and when He secured the fountains ' which are under the heaven, I was present, compacting these things " along with Him. I was He" in whom He took delight; more- over, I daily rejoiced in His presence: for He rejoiced when He had finished the world, and amongst the sons of men did He show forth His pleasure."'^ Nov;, who would not rather approve of '^ this as the fountain and origin of all things — of this as, in very deed, the Matter of all Matter, not liable to any end,'* not diverse in condition, not restless in ' Rom. xi. 34, 35; comp. Isa. xl. 14. * De aliquo.
3 Adeo ut fecerit.
4 Sophiara suam scilicet. SApud.
8 Or the " inquit " may indicate the very words of " Wisdom."
9 Fontes. Although Oehler prefers Junius ' reading " monies,'" he yet retains " fontes," because Tertullian (in ch. xxxii. below) has the unmistakable reading " fontes " in a like connection.
loCompingens.
" Ad quem: the expression is masculine. '3 Commendet.
u " Non fini subditam ' is Oehler's better reading than the old *'sibi subditam."
motion, not ungraceful in form, but natural, and proper, and duly proportioned, and beau- tiful, such truly as even God might well have required, who requires His own and not an- other's? Indeed, as soon as He perceived It to be necessary for His creation of the world. He immediately creates It, and generates It in Himself. "The Lord," says the Scripture, " possessed '5 me, the beginning of His ways for the creation of His works. Before the worlds He founded me; before He made the earth, before the mountains were settled in their places; moreover, before the hills He generated me, and prior to the depths was I begotten."'* Let Hermogenes then confess that the very Wisdom of God is declared to be born and created, for the especial reason that we should not suppose that there is any other being than God alone who is unbegotten and uncreated. For if that, which from its being inherent in the Lord '' was of Him and in Him, was yet not without a beginning, — I mean '^ His wisdom, which was then born and created, when in the thought of God It began to assume motion'' for the arrangement of His creative works, — how much more impossi- ble ^ is it that anything should have been without a beginning which was extrinsic to the Lord! " But if this same Wisdom is the Word of God, in the capacity " of Wisdom, and (as being He) without whom nothing was made, just as also (nothing) was set in order without Wisdom, how can it be that anything, except the Father, should be older, and on this account indeed nobler, than the Son of God, the only-begotten and first-begotten Word? Not to say that '^ what is unbegotten is stronger than that which is born, and what is not made more powerful than that which is made. Because that which did not require a Maker to give it existence, will be much more elevated in rank than that which had an author to bring it into being. On this principle, then,^* if evil is indeed unbegotten, whilst the Son of God is begotten ("for," says God, "my heart hath emitted my most excellent Word " ^5), I am not quite sure that evil may not be introduced by good, the stronger by the weak, in the same way as the unbegotten is by the begotten. Therefore on this ground Hermogenes puts Matter even before God, by putting it before the Son. Because the '5 Condidit: created. '6 See Prov. viii. T Intra Dominum. '•^Scilicet. '9 Coepti agitari. ™ Multo magis non capit. =■ Extra Dominum. 2- Sensu. 23Nedum. 24 Proinde.
=5 On this version of Ps. xlv. 1., and iu application by Tertullian, see our Anti-Marcion (p. 299, note 5).
AGAINST HERMOGENES.
[chap. XX.
Son is the Word, and "the Word is God,"^ and " I and my Father are one." - But after all, perhaps, 3 the Son will patiently enough submit to having that preferred before Him, which (by Hermogenes), is made equal to the Father!
CHAP. XIX. AN APPEAL TO THE HISTORY OF CREATION. TRUE MEANING OF THE TERM BEGINNING, WHICH THE HERETIC CURIOUSLY WRESTS TO AN ABSURD SENSE.
But I shall appeal to the original docu- ment* of Moses, by help of which they on the other side vainly endeavour to prop up their conjectures, with the view, of course, of appearing to have the support of that authority which is indispensable in such an inquiry. They have found their opportunity, as is usual with heretics, in wresting the plain meaning of certain words. For instance the very beginning,^ when God made the heaven ttnd the earth, they will construe as if it meant something substantial and embodied,* to be regarded as Matter. We, however, insist on the proper signification of every word, and say that principiiwi means beginning, — being a term which is suitable to represent things which begin to exist. For nothing which has come into being is without a beginning, nor can this its commencement be at any other mo- ment than when it begins to have existence. Thus principium or beginning, is simply a term of inception, not the name of a sub- stance. Now, inasmuch as the heaven and the earth are the principal works of God, and since, by His making them first. He consti- tuted them in an especial manner the begin- ning of His creation, before all things else, with good reason does the Scripture preface (its record of creation) with the words," In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth;" 7 just as it would have said, "At last God made the heaven and the earth," if God had created these after all the rest. Now, if the beginning is a substance, the end must also be material. No doubt, a substan- tial thing* may be the beginning of some other thing which maybe formed out of it; thus the clay is the beginning of the vessel, and the seed is tlie beginning of the plant. But when we employ the word beginning in this sense of origiti, and not in that of order, we do not omit to mention also the name of