HAPPINESS is the proper good of every intellectual nature. Since then God is an intellectual being, happiness will be His proper good. But God in regard of His proper good is not as a being that is still tending to a proper good not yet possessed: that is the way with a nature changeable and in potentiality; but God is in the position of a being that already possesses its proper good. Therefore He not only desires happiness, as we do, but is in the enjoyment of happiness.
2. The thing above all others desired or willed by an intellectual nature is the most perfect thing in that nature, and that is its happiness. But the most perfect thing in each is its most pcrfeCt activity: for power and habit are perfected by activity: hence the Philosopher says that happiness is a perfeCt aCtivity.J Now the perfection of activity depends on four conditions. First, on its kind, that it be immanent in the agent. I call an activity 4 im- manent in the agent/ when nothing else comes of it besides the aCt itself: such are the acts of seeing and hearing: such aCts are perfections of the agents whose aCts they are, and may have a finality of their own in so far as they are not directed to the production of anything else as an end. On the other hand, any aCtivity from which there results something done besides itself, is a perfection of the thing done, not of the doer: it stands in the relation of a means to an end, and therefore cannot be the happiness of an * * Not Himself/ that is, not His whole self. It this chapter, and so many similar conclusions in this might be part of Himself, but then He would have book, amount to this: that God is one self-conscious parts. alt, the realisation of the whole ideal order, of life, t This text may be not so immediately applicable of wisdom, of power, of goodness, of necessary being, as it seems, if it be the utterance, not of God as God, — what Plato was groping after (Ads xvii, 27) in his ad intra, but of God made Man, communicator of a theory of Ideas, — gathered all in one, living, conscious, divine life to His elec\ ad extra. See my notes on St pure a&uality.
John i, 3, 4; xi, 25; xiv, 6. t Aristotle, Etk. Nic, I, vii, 15, 16: Ethics and Be that application as it may, the conclusion of Natural Lav, pp. 6-13 73 intelleftual nature- Secondly, on the principle of activity^ that it be an activity of the highest power: hence our happiness lies not in any activity of sense, but in an activity of intellect, perfected by habit. Thirdly, on the objeSi of activity; and therefore our happiness consists in understanding the highest object of understanding. Fourthly, on the form of aftivity, that the action be perfeft, easy, and agreeable. But the aftivity of God fulfils all these condi- tions: since it is (i) aftivity in the order of understanding; and (2) His understanding is the highest of faculties, not needing any habit to perfeft it; and (3) His understanding is bent upon Himself, the highest of intelligible objects; and (4) He understands perfeftly, without any difficulty, and with all delight. He is therefore happy.
3. Boethius says that happiness is a state made perfeft by a gathering of all good things. But such is the divine perfeftion, which includes all perfec- tion in one single view (Chapp. XXVIII, LIV).
4. He is happy, who is sufficient for himself and wants nothing. But God has no need of other things, seeing that His perfeftion depends on no- thing external to Himself; and when He wills other things for Himself as for an end, it is not that He needs them, but only that this reference befits His goodness. ' 5. It is impossible for God to wish for anything impossible (Chap. LXXXIV). Again it is impossible for anything to come in to Him which as yet He has not, seeing that He is nowise in potentiality (Chap. XVI). Therefore He cannot wish to have what He has not: therefore He has whatever He wishes; and He wishes nothing evil (Chap. XCV). Therefore He is happy, according to the definition given by some, that "he is happy who has what he wishes and wishes nothing evil."
His happiness the Holy Scriptures declare: Whom he will show in his own time, the blessed and powerful one (1 Tim. vi, 15).
CHAPTER CI-That Qodis His own Happiness GOD'S happiness is the aft of His understanding (Chap. C). But that very a6t of God's understanding is His substance (Chap. XLV). He therefore is His own happiness.
CHAPTER Cll-Thattbe Happiness of God is most perfe&, and exceeds all other happiness WHERE there is greater love, there is greater delight in the attain- ment of the object loved. But every being, other things being equal, loves itself more than it loves anything else: a sign of which is that, the nearer anything is to oneself, the more it is naturally loved. God therefore takes greater delight in His happiness, which is Himself, than other blessed ones in their happiness, which is not what they are.
3. What is by essence, ranks above what is by participation. But God is happy by His essence, a prerogative that can belong to no other: for nothing else but God can be the sovereign good; and thus whatever else is happy, must be happy by participation from Him. The divine happiness therefore exceeds all other happiness.
4. Perfeft happiness consists in an aft of the understanding. But no other aft of understanding can compare with God's aft: as is clear^ not only from this that it is a subsistent aft,* but also because by this one aft God per- * That is to say, an aft which has all the permanence and self-containedness of substance, 74 OF GOD AS HE IS IN HIMSELF feflly understands Himself as He is, and all things that are and are not, good and evil; whereas in all other intellectual beings the aft of understanding is not itself subsistent, but is the adt of a subsistent subject. Nor can any one understand God, the supreme objedt of understanding, so perfectly as He is perfect, because the being of none is so perfect as the divine being, nor can any adt ever be more perfect than the substance of which it is the adt.* Nor is there any other understanding that knows even all that God can do: for if it did, it would comprehend the divine power. Lastly, even what another understanding does know, it does not know all with one and the same act. God therefore is incomparably happy above all other beings.
5. The more a thing is brought to unity, the more perfect is its power and excellence. But an activity that works in succession, is divided by different divisions of time: in no way then can its perfection be compared to the perfection of an activity that is without succession, all present to- gether, especially if it does not pass in an instant but abides to eternity. Now the divine act of understanding is without succession, existing all together for eternity: whereas our adt of understanding is in succession by the acci- dental attachment to it of continuity and time. Therefore the divine happi- ness infinitely exceeds human happiness, as the duration of eternity exceeds the 'now in flux* of time {nunc temporis fluens).
6. The fatigue and various occupations whereby our contemplation in this life is necessarily interrupted, — in which contemplation whatever happi- ness there is for man in this life chiefly consists, — and the errors and doubts and various mishaps to which the present life is subjedt, show that human happiness, in this life particularly, can in no way compare with the happi- ness of God.
7. The perfedtion of the divine happiness may be gathered from this, that it embraces all happinesses according to the most perfedt mode of each. By way of contemplative happiness, it has a perfedt and perpetual view of God Himself and of other beings. By way of adtive life, it has the govern- ment, not of one man, or of one house, or of one city, or of one kingdom, but of the whole universe. Truly, the false happiness of earth is but a shadow of that perfedt happiness. For it consists, according to Boethius, in five things, in pleasure, riches, power, dignity and fame. God then has a most ex- cellent delight of Himself, and a universal joy of all good things, without ad- mixture of contrary element. For riches. He has absolute self-sufficiency of all good. For power, He has infinite might. For dignity, He has primacy and rule over all beings. For fame, He has the admiration of every understanding that in any sort knows Him.
To Him then, who is singularly blessed, be honour and glory for ever and ever, Amen.t • It would follow from this, that a man cannot essence understands His substance, and that is His perfectly comprehend an angel, nor even another happiness. Hence it is said: When he appeareth, rte man vastly superior to himself. The saint then, on shall be tike unto him, because tie shall see him as he is some points of his character, is not amenable to the (1 John iii, 2). And the Lord said: / dispose unto you, judgement of the ordinary man of common sense; as my Father hath disposed unto me, a kingdom, that ye eat nor the philosopher, or theologian, or man of science, and drink, at my table in my kingdom (Luke xxii, 29). to the unrevised verdict of the plain man; nor the This cannot be understood of corporal meat or statesman, or hero, to the man in the street. drink, but must be spoken of that food which is t The interest of all this to us is that the heaven, taken at the table of Wisdom, whereof Wisdom her- which is the term of the labours of a Christian man, self says: Eat my bread, and drink, the vtine that I haJe is a participation in the perfect and transcendent mingled for you (Prov. ix, 5). They then eat and drink happiness here shadowed forth. I will anticipate and at the table of God, who enjoy the same happiness quote the conclusion of B. Ill, Chap. LI. — " By wherewith God is happy, seeing Him in the way in this vision we are made like to God, and become which He sees Himself/' partakers of His happiness. For God Himself by His 75 Google BOOK II GOD THE ORIGIN OF CREATURES GOD THE ORIGIN OF CREATURES CHAPTER \-Qonnexion of what follows with what has gone before THERE can be no perfect knowledge of anything, unless its activity be known: for from the mode of activity proper to a thing, and the species to which it belongs, the measure and quality of its power is estimated; and the power shows the nature of the thing, for each thing is naturally a<5Hve according to the nature with which it is adtually endowed.* But there is a twofold activity:f one immanent in the agent, and a perfec- tion of his, as feeling, understanding and willing; the other passing out to an exterior thing, and a perfe&ion of the thing made and constituted thereby, as warming, cutting and building. Both of these afts are proper to God: the first, inasmuch as He understands, wills, rejoices and loves; the second, inas- much as He produces and brings things into being, conserves and governs them. Of the first adt of God we have spoken in the previous book, treating of the divine knowledge and will. It remains now to treat of the second aftion, whereby things are produced and governed by God.
CHAPTER IV-That the Philosopher and the Theologian view Qreatures from different Standpoints HUMAN philosophy considers creatures as they are in themselves: hence we find different divisions of philosophy according to the diffe- rent classes of things. But Christian faith considers them, not in themselves, but inasmuch as they represent the majesty of God, and in one way or another are directed to God, as it is said: Of the glory of the Lord his work is full: hatb not the Lord made his saints to tell of his wonders t (Ecclus xlii, 1 6, 17.) Therefore the philosopher and the faithful Christian (fidelis) consider different points about creatures: the philosopher considers what attaches to them in their proper nature: the faithful Christian considers about creatures only what attaches to them in their relation to God, as that they are created by God, subject to God, and the like. \ Hence it is not to be put down as an imperfection in the doctrine of faith, if it passes unnoticed many properties of things, as the configuration of the heavens, or the laws of mo- tion. And again such points as are considered by philosopher and faithful Christian alike, are treated on different principles: for the philosopher takes his stand on the proper and immediate causes of things; but the faithful Christian argues from the First Cause, showing that so the matter is divinely revealed, or that this makes for the glory of God, or that God's power is in- finite. Hence this speculation of the faithful Christian ought to be called the highest wisdom, as always regarding the highest cause, according to the text: • Hence * nature' is defined in the school 'the not one branch of philosophy. The word 'philosopher* principle of operation/ in the text therefore includes the physicist. Nor does t 'Immanent' and 'transient/ as presently de- the word 'philosopher* exclude the 'faithful Christian scribed. man.' It is a difference of formalities, or characters, as I We have not gained by the divorce between between 'professor' and 'volunteer/ not an incompaphilosophy and what is now called ' science,' as though tibili ty. philosophy were not science, or (physical) science were 79 This is your wisdom and understanding before the nations (Deut. iv, 6). And therefore human philosophy is subordinate to this higher wisdom; and in sign of this subordination divine wisdom sometimes draws conclusions from premises of human philosophy. Further, the two systems do not observe the same order of procedure. In the system of philosophy, which considers crea- tures in themselves and from them leads on to the knowledge of God, the first study is of creatures and the last of God; but in the system of faith, which studies creatures only in their relation to God, the study is first of God and afterwards of creatures; and this is a more perfect view, and more like to the knowledge of God, who, knowing Himself, thence discerns other beings. Following this latter order, after what has been said in the first book about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the beings that come from God.
CHAPTER V-Order of Matters to be Treated THE order of our treatise will be to deal first with the production and bringing of things into being (Chapp. VI-XXXVIII); secondly, with the distinction of things (Chapp. XXXIX-XLV); thirdly, with the nature of things thus produced and distinct so far as it appertains to the truth of faith (Chapp. XLVI-CI).
CHAPTER Vl-That it belongs to God to be to other Beings the Principle of Existence IN inferior agents it is a sign of attained perfection, when they can pro- duce their own likeness. But God is sovereignly perfeCt (B. I, Chap. XXVIII). Therefore it belongs to Him to make some being like Himself in aCtual existence.
6. The more perfeCt any principle of activity is, the wider its sphere of aCtion. But that pure aCtuality, which is God, is mo^c perfect than aCtuality mingled with potentiality, such as is in us. Now aCtuality is the principle of aCtion. Since then by the aCtuality which is in us, we are not only capable of immanent aCts, such as understanding and willing, but also of aCts tending to exterior things and productive of effeCts, much more can God, by virtue of His aCtuality, not only understand and will, but also produce an effeCt.
Hence it is said: Who ma keth great and Wonderful and inscrutable *toor\s Voith- out number (Job v, 9).
CHAPTER Vll-That there is in God ABive Power AS passive power, or passivity, follows upon being in potentiality, so aCtive power follows upon being in aCtuality; for everything aCts by being in aCtuality, and is aCted upon by being in potentiality. But it belongs to God to be in aCtuality; and therefore there is suitably ascribed to Him aCtive power, but not passive power.
Hence it is said: Thou art powerful^ O Lord (Ps. lxxxviii, 9); and, Thy power and thy justice^ O Qod, are even to the highest heaven^ in the wonders that thou hast made (Ps. lxx, 18, 19).
80 CHAPTER Will-That God's Power is His Substance ACTIVE power belongs to the perfection of a thing. But every divine perfection is contained in God's own being (B. I, Chap. XXVIII). God's power therefore is not different from His being. But God is His own being (B. I, Chap. XXII); He is therefore His own power.
4. In things the powers of which are not their substance, the said powers are accidents.* But there can be no accident in God (B. I, Chap. XXIII), who is therefore His own power.
CHAPTER IX- That God's Tower is His AElion GOD'S power is His substance, as has been shown in the previous chapter: also His adtion is His substance, as has been shown of His intellectual activity (B. I, Chap. XLV), and the same argument holds of His other activities. Therefore in God power and a£tion are not two different things, t 2. The a6tion of any being is a complement of its power; for it stands to power as the second aCtuality to the first. J But the divine power, being God's very essence, has no other complement than itself. And therefore in God aCtion and power are not distindt.
4. Any action that is not the agent's very substance is in the agent as an accident in its subjeCt. But in God there can be nothing accidental. There- fore in God His action is none other than His substance and His power.
CHAPTER X— In what manner Power is said to be in Qod SINCE the divine action is nothing else than the divine power, it is mani- fest that power is not said to be in God as a principle of His action (for nothing is the principle of itself), but as a principle of the thing made or done: also that when power is said to be in God in respect of the things made or done by Him, this is a predication of objective fact: but when it is said to be in Him in respect of His own action, such predication regards only our way of viewing things, inasmuch as our understanding views under two different concepts God's power and God's action.§ Hence if there be any actions proper to God, that do not pass into anything made or done, but are immanent in the agent, in respect of these actions there is not said to be power in God except in our way of viewing things, not in objective fact. There are such actions, namely, understanding and willing. Properly speak- ing, the power of God does not regard these actions, but only effects produced in the world external to Him. Intellect and will, then, are in God, not as ' faculties,' or € powers,' but only as actions. It is also clear from the aforesaid that the multitude of actions which are attributed to God, as understanding, * Without discussing this statement, it is at least to act but not yet acting, is said to be in the 'first safe to say that, for their working to any orderly pur- actuality/ e.g. a soldier with his rifle levelled and pose, these powers depend upon a concatenation of sighted; in acting, an agent is said to be in the 'second conditions accidental to the powers themselves,— con- actuality/ e.g. the soldier firing, ditions, that is to say, which may or may not be present S Writing in (Mind {ox November, 1902, Mr where the agents are present. Bradley refuses to allow the term 'will' in man to t But hence a difficulty. God necessarily has the bear any other meaning than that of actual 'volition/ power of creating: if His power be His action, it He merges 'power/ or 'faculty/ in 'act/ an identiappears that the action of creating in Him is also ne- fication which, St Thomas says, holds only in God.
cessary, and He cannot but create, contrary to what This is in keeping with Mr Bradley's steady and unhas been already argued (B. I, Chap. LXXXI). This compromising repudiation of all potential being, difficulty is met in Chapp. XXXII, XXXV, arg. 2. Potential being, if it be at all, is the undoing of his X In Aristotelian philosophy, an agent, quite ready philosophy. But see Appearance and Reafity, pp. 3 8 4- 7.
81 willing, producing creatures, and the like, are not different things, since each one of these actions in God is His own being, which is one and the same.
CHAPTER Xl-That something is predicated of Qod in relation to Qreatures SINCE power is proper to God in respect of the effects of His production, and power ranks as a principle, and a principle is so called in relation to its derivative; it is clear that something may be predicated of God in relation to the effects of His production.
2. It is unintelligible how one thing can be made a subject of predication in relation to another thing, unless contrariwise that other thing be made a subject of predication in relation to it. But other beings are made subjects of predication in relation to God, as when it is said that they have their being from God and depend on Him. God therefore must be made a subject of pre- dication in relation to creatures.
3. Likeness is a relation. But God, as other agents, a6ts to the produ6tion of His own likeness.
4. Knowledge is predicated in relation to the thing known. But God has knowledge of other beings.
5. Whatever is first and sovereign, is so in relation to others. But God is the first being and the sovereign good.
CHAPTER Xll-That the Relations, predicated of Qod in regard of Creatures, are not really in Qod* THESE relations cannot be in God as accidents in a subject, seeing that in God there is no accident (B. I, Chap. XXIII). Nor again can they be the very substance of God: for then the substance of God in its very essence would be referred to another; but what is referred to another for its very essence, in a manner depends on that other, as it can neither be nor be understood without it; but this would make the substance of God depen- dent on another being, foreign to itself.
2. God is the first measure of all beings (B. I, Chap. XXVIII). He is to them as the obje6t is to our knowledge, that is to say, its measure. But though the obje6t is spoken of in relation to the knowledge of it, nevertheless the relation really is not in the obje6t known, but only in the knowledge of it. The obje6t is said to be in relation, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it.
3. The aforesaid relations are predicated of God, not only in respe6t of things that a6tually are, but also in respe6t of things that potentially are, because of them also He has knowledge, and in respe6t of them He is called both first being and sovereign good. But what actually is bears no real rela- tions to what is not a6tually but potentially. Now God is not otherwise related to things that a6tually are than to things that potentially are, because He is not changed by producing anything.f # It is the general doctrine of the school, that Can it be then that God has no more love for while the relations of creatures to God are real (re- me, now that He has created me, than He would lationes reales), those of God to creatures are only have had for me as a mere possible creature never to conceptual (relationes rationts). The meaning, is that be realised? no more hatred of the sin that I have any change wrought by divine action is in creatures, committed than of the sin that I might commit? Not not in God. so, for God loves more where He sees more of His t This doctrine is not devoid of difficulties. own, and hates more that which is in greater opposi- Love and hatred are certain relative affections. tion to Himself. There is more of God in an existing 82 4. To whatsoever is added anything fresh, the thing receiving that addi- tion must be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now sundry fresh relations are predicated of God, as that He is lord or ruler of this thing newly come into being. If then any relation were predicated as really existing in God, it would follow that something fresh was added to God, and therefore that He had suffered some change, either essential or accidental, contrary to what was shown above (B. I, Chapp. XXIII, XXIV).* CHAPTER XlII-How the aforesaid Relations are predicated of God IT cannot be said that the aforesaid relations are things existing outside of God.f For sinceGod is first of beings and highest of excellencies, we should have to consider other relations of God to those relations, supposing them to be things; and if the second relations again were things, we should have to invent again a third set of relations, and so to infinity. J Again, there are two ways in which a denomination may be predicated. A thing is denomi- nated from what is outside it, as from place a man is said to be Somewhere/ and from time 'once'; and again a thing is denominated from what is within it, as 4 white* from whiteness. But from relation nothing is found to bear a denomination as from something outside itself, but only as from something within itself: thus a man is not called father* except from the paternity that is in him. It is impossible therefore for the relations, whereby God has rela- tion to the creature, to be anything outside God. Since then it has been shown that they are not in Him really and yet are predicated of Him, the only possible conclusion is that they are attributed to Him merely by our mode of thought, inasmuch as other beings are in relation to Him: for when our understanding conceives that A is related to B, it further conceives that B is related to A, even though sometimes B is not really so related.
Hence it is also clear that the aforesaid relations are not predicated of God in the same way that other things are predicated of God: for all other things, as wisdom or will, are predicated of His essence, while the aforesaid relations are by no means so predicated, but only according to our mode of thought. And yet our thought is not at fault: for, by the very fact of our mind knowing that the relations of cffe&s of divine power have God Him- self for their term it predicates some things of Him relatively.
CHAPTER XlV-Thatthe Predication of many Relations of God is no prejudice to the Simplicity and Singleness of His Being IT is no prejudice to the simplicity of God's being that many relations are predicated of Him, not as denoting anything affe&ing His essence, but according to our mode of thought. For our mind, understanding many things, may very well be related in manifold ways to a being that is in itself reality than in a possible one; and sin is in greater ceptual, not real; but also to some extent in His opposition to God for being actually committed, absolute attributes of omnipotence, wisdom, good- Hence greater love and greater hatred. Is not God ness, intelligence and will, attributes which are then more closely related to actualities than to realities in God, and are by us imperfectly apprepotentialities? But, St Thomas would contend, the hended as such.
relation, even though closer, still remains conceptual. t It is not difficult to recognise as combated here God is not really affected by my existing, or by any- the sequel of a theory rejected already (B. I, Chap. LI), thing of my doing. the theory of Aviccnna.
• From the following chapter (XIII) it appears t This is the celebrated rptros avOpamos arguthat we not only know God in His relations to us of ment, originated by Plato himself against his own Creator, Lord, etc., relations which in Him are con- theory of Ideas, Tarmenides, 132.
83 simple; and so it comes to view that simple being under manifold relations. Indeed the more simple anything is, the greater is its power, and the more numerous the effects whereof it is the principle; and thus it is viewed as coming into relation in more manifold ways. The fadt then that many things are predicated of God relatively is an attestation of the supreme simplicity and singleness of His being.
CHAPTER XV-That God is to all things the Qause of their being