t A notable pronouncement against the Nomi- and the matter removed from every-day experience, nalists. as in many Old Testament difficulties.
X A reference to the Aristotelian 'demonstration ' § The "first truth of faith" is God, not only by strict logical reasoning from necessary truths, as that He is (His existence), but also vtbat He is (His laid down in the Posterior Analytics. This chapter essential nature).
7 knowledge of the truth of faith, which can only be thoroughly known to those who behold the substance of God, human reason stands so conditioned as to be able to argue some true likenesses to it: which likenesses however are not sufficient for any sort of demonstrative or intuitive comprehension of the afore- said truth. Still it is useful for the human mind to exercise itself in such reason- ings, however feeble, provided there be no presumptuous hope of perfect com- prehension or demonstration. With this view the authority of Hilary agrees, who says (De Trinitate, ii, 10), speaking of such truth: "In this belief start, run, persist; and though I know that you will not reach the goal, still I shall congratulate you as I see you making progress. But intrude not into that sanc- tuary, and plunge not into the mystery of infinite truth; entertain no pre- sumptuous hope of comprehending the height of intelligence, but understand that it is incomprehensible."
CHAPTER IX-Tbe Order and Mode of Procedure in this Work THERE is then a twofold sort of truth in things divine for the wise man to study: one that can be attained by rational enquiry, another that transcends all the industry of reason. This truth of things divine I do not call twofold on the part of God, who is one simple Truth, but on the part of our knowledge, as our cognitive faculty has different aptitudes for the knowledge of divine things. To the declaration therefore of the first sort of truth we must proceed by demonstrative reasons that may serve to convince the adversary. But because such reasons are not forthcoming for truth of the second sort, our aim ought not to be to convince the adversary by reasons, but to refute his reasonings against the truth, which we may hope to do, since natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. The special mode of refutation to be employed against an opponent of this second sort of truth is by alleging the authority of Scripture confirmed from heaven by miracles. There are however some probable reasons available for the declara- tion of this truth, to the exercise and consolation of the faithful, but not to the convincing of opponents, because the mere insufficiency of such reasoning would rather confirm them in their error, they thinking that we assented to the truth of faith for reasons so weak.* According then to the manner indicated we will bend our endeavour, first, to the manifestation of that truth which faith professes and reason searches out, alleging reasons demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the books of philosophers and saints, for the establish- ment of the truth and the confutation of the opponent. Then, to proceed from what is more to what is less manifest in our regard, we will pass to the manifestation of that truth which transcends reason, solving the arguments of opponents, and by probable reasons and authorities, so far as God shall en- able us, declaring the truth of faith.
Taking therefore the way of reason to the pursuit of truths that human reason can search out regarding God, the first consideration that meets us is of the attributes of God in Himself; secondly of the coming forth of crea- tures from God; thirdly of the order of creatures to God as to their last end.f * I invite the reader, especially if he be an * ad- stration, as their author was well aware, who was versary,' carefully to read this sentence and bear it often content with probabilities, in mind throughout the book. 7 he arguments al- t These three divisions answer to Books I, II, leged are never fanciful or frivolous, if you under- III respectively. Book IV is devoted to that truth of stand them, except where they involve some medi- God which transcends reason, and is known only, or aeval ignorance of physics, cases usually omitted in this principally, by faith. These first nine chapters form translation. But they frequently fall short of demon- the introduction to the work.
8 CHAPTER X-Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God cannot be proved \ being a Self evident Truth THIS opinion rests on the following grounds:* i. Those truths arc self-evident which are recognised at once, as soon as the terms in which they are expressed are known. Such a truth is the assertion that God exists: for by the name 'God* we understand some- thing greater than which nothing can be thought. This notion is formed in the understanding by whoever hears and understands the name 4 God,' so that God must already exist at least in the mind. Now He cannot exist in the mind only: for what is in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only; but nothing is greater than God, as the very meaning of the name shows: it follows that the existence of God is a self- evident truth, being evidenced by the mere meaning of the name.
2. The existence of a being is conceivable, that could not be conceived not to exist; such a being is evidently greater than another that could be conceived not to exist. Thus then something greater than God is conceivable if He could be conceived not to exist; but anything 'greater than God' is against the meaning of the name 'God.* It remains then that the existence of God is a self-evident truth.
3. Those propositions arc most self-evident which are either identities, as 'Man is man/ or in which the predicates are included in the definitions of the subje&s, as c Man is an animal.' But in God of all beings this is found true, that His existence is His essence, as will be shown later (Chap. XXII); and thus there is one and the same answer to the question 4 What is He? ' and 4 Whether He is.'f Thus then, when it is said 'God is,' the predicate is either the same with the subject or at least is included in the definition of the subject; and thus the existence of God will be a self-evident truth.
4. Things naturally known are self-evident: for the knowledge of them is not attained by enquiry and study. But the existence of God is naturally known, since the desire of man tends naturally to God as to his last end, as will be shown further on (B. Ill, Chap. XXV).
5. That must be self-evident whereby all other things are known; but such is God; for as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual percep- tion, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual cognition.
CHAPTER Xl-Reje&ion of the aforesaid Opinion^ and Solution of the aforesaid Reasons THE above opinion arises partly from custom, men being accustomed from the beginning to hear and invoke the name of God. Custom, especially that which is from the beginning, takes the place of na- ture; hence notions wherewith the mind is imbued from childhood are held as firmly as if they were naturally known and self-evident. Partly also it owes its origin to the negleft of a distinction between what is self-evident of itself absolutely and what is self-evident relatively to us. Absolutely indeed the exis- tence of God is self-evident, since God's essence is His existence. But since we cannot mentally conceive God's essence, his existence is not self-evident rela- tively to us.
* This opinion is St Anselm's, and the first two tural Theology, pp. 24-29 (Manuals of Catholic arguments alleged for it are his "Ontological Philosophy).
argument for the existence of God," revived by t The answer is that given in Exodus iii, 14: / Descartes, rejected by Kant. See Fr Bodder's Na- am vho am.
9 1. Nor is the existence of God necessarily self-evident as soon as the meanr- ing of the name 4 God ' is known. First, because it is not evident, even to all who admit the existence of God, that God is something greater than which nothing can be conceived, since many of the ancients said that this world was God. Then granting that universal usage understands by the name 4 God ' something greater than which nothing can be conceived, it will not follow that there exists in rerum natura something greater than which nothing can be conceived. For c thing ' and " notion implied in the name of the thing " must answer to one another. From the conception in the mind of what is de- clared by this name 'God' it does not follow that God exists otherwise than in the mind. Hence there will be no necessity either of that something, greater than which nothing can be conceived, existing otherwise than in the mind; and from this it does not follow that there is anything in rerum natura greater than which nothing can be conceived. And so the supposition of the non- existence of God goes untouched. For the possibility of our thought out- running the greatness of any given object, whether of the actual or of the ideal order, has nothing in it to vex the soul of any one except of him alone who already grants the existence in rerum natura of something than which nothing can be conceived greater.* 2. Nor is it necessary for something greater than God to be conceivable, if His non-existence is conceivable. For the possibility of conceiving Him not to exist does not arise from the imperfeftion or uncertainty of His Being, since His Being is of itself most manifest, but from the infirmity of our under- standing, which cannot discern Him as He is of Himself, but only by the efFefts which He produces; and so it is brought by reasoning to the knowledge of Him.
3. As it is self-evident to us that the whole is greater than its part, so the existence of God is most self-evident to them that see the divine essence, in- asmuch as His essence is His existence. But because we cannot see His es- sence, we are brought to the knowledge of His existence, not by what He is in Himself but by the effects which He works.f 4. Man knows God naturally as he desires Him naturally. Now man de- sires Him naturally inasmuch as he naturally desires happiness* which is a cer- tain likeness to the divine goodness. Thus it is not necessary that God, con- sidered in Himself, should be naturally known to man, but a certain likeness of God. Hence man must be led to a knowledge of God through the like- nesses of Him that are found in the effects which He works.
5. God is that wherein all things are known, not as though other things could not be known without His being known first, as happens in the case of self-evident principles, but because through His influence all knowledge is caused in us.
* St Thomas means: 'If I form a notion of a ' But is such actuality possible?' 'It is conceivable, thing, and then get a name to express that notion, it therefore possible.' ' It may be conceivable, only be- does not follow that the thing, answering to such cause it is conceived inadequately, without insight name and notion, exists.' St Anselm's disciples reply: into the inconsistencies which it involves.' ' You have ' True of the notions of all other things, as islands or no right to assume inconsistencies where you discern dollars, which may or may not be; but not true of none,' rejoins Leibnitz. And so this * ontological the notion of that one thing, whereof existence is a argument ' will be tossed up and down, as an apple very part of the notion.' In other words, whereas St of discord, to the end. Thomas denies the lawfulness of the transition from the ideal to the adhial order, they maintain that the t ' Is a conceptual view of His essence a sufficient transition is lawful in arguing the existence of that argument of His existence?' That is the question one Being, who is the actuality of all that is ideal, which St Anselm raises.
10 CHAPTER XII— Of the Opinion of those who say that the Existence of God is a Tenet of Faith alone and cannot be demonstrated THE falseness of this opinion is shown to us as well by the art of de- monstration, which teaches us to argue causes from effects, as also by the order of the sciences, — for if there be no knowable substance above sensible substances, there will be no science above physical science; as also by the efforts of philosophers, directed to the proof of the existence of God; as also by apostolic truth asserting: The invisible things of (jod are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom. i, 20).* The axiom that in God essence and existence are the same is to be under- stood of the existence whereby God subsists in Himself, the manner of which is unknown to us, as also is His essence; not of the existence which signifies an affirmative judgement of the understanding. For in the form of such affirma- tive judgement the fact that there is a God falls under demonstration; as our mind is led by demonstrative reasons to form such a proposition declaratory of the existence of God.f In the reasonings whereby the existence of God is demonstrated it is not necessary to assume for a premise the essence or quid- dityl of God: but instead of the quiddity the effedt is taken for a premise, as is done in demonstrations a posteriori from efFeft to cause. All the names of God are imposed either on the principle of denying of God Himself certain effe&s of His power, or from some habitude of God towards those effe6ts.§ Although God transcends sense and the objefts of sense, nevertheless sensible effects are the basis of our demonstration of the existence of God. Thus the origin of our own knowledge is in sense, even of things that transcend sense.
CHAPTER Xlll-Reasons in Proof of the Existence of God WE will put first the reasons by which Aristotle proceeds to prove the existence of God from the consideration of motion as follows. Everything that is in motion is put and kept in motion by some other thing. It is evident to sense that there are beings in motion. A thing is in motion because something else puts and keeps it in motion. That mover therefore either is itself in motion or not. If it is not in motion, our point is gained which we proposed to prove, namely, that we must posit something which moves other things without being itself in motion, and this we call God. But if the mover is itself in motion, then it is moved by some other mover. Either then we have to go on to infinity, or we must come to some mover which is motionless; but it is impossible to go on to infinity, therefore we must posit some motionless prime mover. In this argument there are two propositions to be proved: that everything which is in motion is put and kept in motion by something else; and that in the series of movers and things moved it is impossible to go on to infinity. || # As also by the Vatican Council defining: " If § Uncreated, as a name of God, would be an exany one says that the one and true God, our Creator ample of the first; Father, of the second, and Lord, cannot be known with certitude by the || I refrain from translating the rest of this lengthy natural light of reason through the things that are argument, based upon the treacherous foundation of made, let him be anathema" (Sess. 3, can. 1 De HfteL) Aristotelian Physics. See Aristotle, Physics, vii, viii; t Compositionem intelleilus. In the language of the (Metaphysics, xi, 7. Whoever will derive an argument schoolmen, compmere et divider e, 'to put together or put for the divine existence from the mechanism of the asunder notions,' means to make judgements, affirma- heavens must take his principles from Newton, not tive and negative. from Aristotle. Besides Motion he must take account X Quiddity, quidditas, the answer to the question of Force and Energy, not to say of Cosmic Evoluquid est? — * What is the thing essentially? ' tion. He must know not only the motion of impact, II The Philosopher also goes about in another way to show that it is im- possible to proceed to infinity in the series of efficient causes, but we must come to one first cause, and this we call God. The way is more or less as follows. In every series of efficient causes, the first term is cause of the in- termediate, and the intermediate is cause of the last. But if in efficient causes there is a process to infinity, none of the causes will be the first: therefore all the others will be taken away which are intermediate. But that is mani- festly not the case; therefore we must posit the existence of some first efficient cause, which is God.* Another argument is brought by St John Damascene (DeFu/. Orthod. 1, 3), thus: It is impossible for things contrary and discordant to fall into one har- monious order always or for the most part, except under some one guidance, assigning to each and all a tendency to a fixed end. But in the world we see things of different natures falling into harmonious order, not rarely and for- tuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore there must be some Power by whose providence the world is governed; and that we call God. f as when a row of ninepins knock one another down beginning, nebular or otherwise, is doe to an intellifrom a push given to the first, but also the motion that is set up by gravitation. Aristotle knew nothing of gravitation; and only half knew the inertia of mat- ter declared by Newton's first law of motion. He sup- posed that motion, of its own nature, not only needed starting but also needed continual keeping up by some continually acting cause. He did not know that the question with a moving body is, not what there is to keep it in motion, but what there is to stop it.
It would be a mistake to represent the Aristotelian argument of the Prime Mover as referring to some primitive push, or some rotary motion started in the primitive nebula, at the first creation of matter. Mat- ter, to Aristotle, to Plato, and to the Greeks gene- rally, is eternal, not created. I need hardly add that between an immovable Prime Mover and a Personal God a wide gulf intervenes which Aristotle does not bridge over. See however Chapter XXIII of this Book.
The whole idea of a Prime Mover has vanished from modern physics. The whole universe, as we know it, is a congeries of sun-and-planet systems — some of them apparently still in process of formation — ar- ranged possibly in the shape of a huge convex lens. These bodies act and react on each other. And besides these molar motions there are also molecular motions quite as real. The causes of these motions are in- numerable forces. The study of them carries us back to consider the 'primitive collocation* of the forces of the universe, a collocation whereby they were arranged in a 'position of advantage,' so that out of their interaction has ensued this orderly world, and in it our earth, fit habitation for living things. On this 'primitive collocation,' Father Bodder writes (Natural Theology, p. 56): "Although we have no- thing to say against the assumption made by astrono- mers, that our cosmic system resulted from the con- densation and division of a primitive rotating nebula; yet we cannot admit this nebula without observing that there must have been a first arrangement of the ma- terial elements which constituted it, one which already contained the present system, or else the said system could never have resulted from it. Now this first arrangement was neither the effect of the forces of mat- ter, nor was it essential to matter...Therefore if we would explain the origin of that system without violation of reason, we are forced to say that its first gent cause." To this effect he adds this quotation from Huxley {Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, II, 201, 202): "The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclu- sive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe are consequences, and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not in- tended to evolve the phenomena of the universe."
Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, I translate: " Everything in motion is put and kept in motion by another": such is the sense of St Thomas and of Aristotle. The ab alio however is not in Aristotle. His words are: " Everything in motion must be put and kept in motion by something" (Thys. vii, 1); and he adds: " Everything in local motion is moved either by itself or by another" (Physics, vii, 2). Things that had souls he thought were moved by themselves, and especially the heavenly bodies, which were guided by some sort of animating soul in per- petual circular motion. St Thomas (B. Ill, Chap. LXXXVII, in the Latin) has his doubts as to the heavenly bodies being animated. He considers how- ever (B. Ill, Chap. LXXXII) "that sublunary bodies are ruled by God through the heavenly bodies."
Taking 'movement' for 'local motion,' the argu- ment of the Prime Mover, for a modern mind, re- solves itself into the question of ' primitive colloca- tion.' Some collocation is presupposed to every mechanical problem. 'Why this collocation rather than that? " is a question answerable only either by a regressus in infinitum (Q.E.A.) or by an invocation of Mind and Design. The argument however may avail itself of a wider meaning of motus, namely, change; and contend that, at the back of the changes apparent everywhere, there must be some Change- less Being, author and guide of this changing uni- verse. So presented, it is sometimes called the ' argu- ment from contingent to necessary being.'
* A rough outline of the argument of the First Cause. There is some trace of it in the (Metaphysics of Aristotle, ii, 3.
t The argument from Design, on which see Bod- der, Nat. TheoL, pp. 46-61.
12 OF GOD AS HE IS IN HIMSELF CHAPTER XI V-That in order to a Knowledge of God we must use the Method of Negative Differentiation * AFTER showing that there is a First Being, whom we call God, we must enquire into the conditions of His existence. We must use the method of negative differentiation, particularly in the consideration of the divine substance. For the divine substance, by its immensity, trans- cends every form that our intelledt can realise; and thus we cannot appre- hend it by knowing what it is, but we have some sort of knowledge of it by knowing what it is not.f The more we can negatively differentiate it, or the more attributes we can strike off from it in our mind, the more we approach to a knowledge of it: for we know each thing more perfectly, the fuller view we have of its differences as compared with other things; for each thing has in itself a proper being, distinct from all others. Hence in dealing with things that we can define, we first place them in some genus, by which we know in general what the thing is; and afterwards we add the differentias whereby the thing is distinguished from other things; and thus is achieved a com- plete knowledge of the substance of the thing. But because in the study of the divine substance we cannot fix upon anything for a genus (Chap. XXV), nor can we mark that substance off from other things by affirmative diffej^ntias, we must determine it by negative differentias. In affirmative differentias one limits the extension of another, and brings us nearer to a com- plete designation of the thing under enquiry, inasmuch as it makes that thing differ from more and more things. And the same holds good also of negative differentias. For example, we may say that God is not an accident^ in that He is distinguished from all accidents; then if we add that He is not a bodyy we shall further distinguish Him from some substances; and so in order by such negations He will be further distinguished from everything besides Himself; and then there will be a proper notion of His substance, when He shall be known as distinft from all. Still it will not be a perfe6l knowledge, because He will not be known for what He is in Himself. J To proceed therefore in the knowledge of God by way of negative diffe- rentiation, let us take as a principle what has been shown in a previous chapter, that God is altogether immovable, which is confirmed also by the authority of Holy Scripture. For it is said \ I am the Lord and change not (Mai. iii, 6); With whom there is no change (James i, 17); God is not as many that he should change (Num. xxiii, 1 9).§ * 'Negative differentiation/ the chapter will ex- signifies it imperfectly, as creatures also represent it plain the phrase. In St Thomas it is remotio. imperfectly."
t St Gregory Nazianzen, in one of his poems, t Not every notion can be absolutely denied of calls God "one and all things and nothing." God, as 'spirit,' 'power,' 'wise,' 'just.' Although He In the Summa Tfoologica, B. I, q. 1 3, art. 2, St is none of these things in a purely human sense, He is Thomas guards his statement thus: " Of the names all of them in a more excellent way. that are predicated of God absolutely and affirma- $ St Thomas passes from ' immovable ' to ' im- tively, as 'good," wise,' and the like, some have said mutable/ Aristotle (TAysics, vii, 2), distinguishes that all such names are invented rather to remove three sorts of ' motion ': ' local motion ' (now the something from God than to posit anything in Him. subject matter of dynamics); 'change,' or 'motion...But this account is unsatisfactory...And in quality' (now the matter of chemistry); 'growth therefore we must say otherwise, that such names do and decay,' or 'motion in quantity' (matter of signify the divine substance...but fail to repre- biology). Thus three incongruous things were la- sent it perfectly...None of them is a perfect ex- belled with one name, to the prejudice of science for pression of the substance of God, but each of them many centuries.