Upon this view it would follow that numerically the same aftive power was now a vegetative soul only, and afterwards a sentient soul; and so the substantial form itself was continually more and more perfefted: it would further follow that a substantial form was educed from potentiality to actua- lity, not instantaneously, but successively; and further that generation was a continuous change, as is alteration, — all so many physical impossibilities. There would ensue even a still more awkward consequence, that the rational soul was mortal. For no formal constituent added to a perishable thing makes it naturally imperishable: otherwise the perishable would be changed into the imperishable, which is impossible, as the two differ in kind. But the substance of the sentient soul, which is supposed to be incidentally generated when the body is generated in the process above described, is necessarily perishable with the perishing of the body. If therefore this soul becomes * " What is in potentiality to life is not the [dead takes place the moment the female (Ppum is fertilised, body], which has parted with its soul (to airofiefikrjKos X In the phrase which he constantly repeats, de- ify yfvxQv), but that [living body] which retains it: cisio seminis, St Thomas interprets decisions any scholar as for seed and fruit, it is potentially the particular would interpret it, to be a derivative of decido (I cut body [into which it will develope]," De anima, II, i. off). Still, I suspedt, whoever first used the phrase St Thomas's explanation of to cwro/3c/3Xi7Kos is inge- meant decisio to come from decido (I fall dorm), which nious, but mistaken. would yield a more natural sense. To decisio, as meant No one now supposes this, but what is sup- ing a 'cutting off,' is due the false analogy of the posed is that the infusion even of the rational soul divided earthworm.
rational by the bringing in of some manner of light from without * to be a formal constituent of the soul, it necessarily follows that the rational soul perishes when the body perishes, contrary to which has been shown (Chap. LXXIX) and to the teaching of Catholic faith.
Therefore the adlive power which is cut off, or emitted, with the male semen from the body, and is called 4 formative,' f is not itself the soul, nor ever becomes the soul in the process of generation. But the frothy substance of the male semen contains gas (spiritus), and this gas is the subject on which the formative power rests, and in which it is inherent. J So the formative power works out the formation of the body, a&ing in virtue of the soul of the father, the prime author of generation, not in virtue of the soul of the offspring, even after the offspring comes to have a soul: for the offspring does not generate itself, but is generated by the father. § This is clear by enumeration of the several powers of the soul. The formation is not attri- butable to the soul of the embryo itself on the score of that soul's generative power: for that power puts forth no activity till the work of nutrition and growth is complete; and besides, its work is not directed to the perfection of the individual, but to the preservation of the species. Nor can it be assigned to the embryo's nutritive power, the work of which is to assimilate nourish- ment to the body nourished: for in this case there is no room for such a work; since nourishment taken while the body is in formation is not applied to assume the likeness of a pre-existent body, but goes to the production oT a more perfedt form and a nearer approach to the likeness of the father. Nor is the development of the embryo attributable to its own power of growth: for to power of growth there does not belong change of form, but only change in bulk. And as for the sensitive and intellectual powers, it is clear that theirs is no office bearing on such a development. It follows that the formation of the body, particularly of its earliest and principal parts, does • Read fit ratumaTts for ///; and for intrinsecus read the female, — but the sentient soul: c/iroui yap rovro extrinsecus, answering to the celebrated BvpaOiy of (to &pf*y) r)v nlvOifruciiv \frvx$y h ^^ov S the passage just quoted from De gen. animal., II, iii. yon^. A sentient soul, he adds, is necessary from t According to Aristotle, T>e gen. animal., and the first, for the formation of what is to be not a therefore according to St Thomas, no bodily matter mere vegetative but a sentient body, of the male semen ever becomes a constituent of the t This crude morphology takes up a chapter in body of the embryo: that is entirely taken from Aristotle, T>e gen. animal., II, ii, e.g., fort /j<V olv rd the mother. What the male semen furnishes is a cer- inrippa icotvov irvtvparo* teal £oaroc,To &k wytvpA imv tain motive power, Ivvapus «ai ruoprtc, which causes Otpfws Mip hia vypov n)r <t>v<rty or* # tfoaroc, conception and carries the embryo through the stages & koI \cv*6> &a to pAplyOai wvtvpa...alnov 8e nyt of its development. This is the 'formative power' XtvKtrrjro* rov ewtpparoc 6ri tarty h for) a+p6c, 6 here spoken of. Offspring is said to be of father and & <tyf>oc \twc6r. In the following chapter (chap, iii) mother, " as a couch is of carpenter and timber" (De wc rea<* that the heat of this 1 gas * (wvivpia), or 'hot gen. animal., I, xxi), the male semen being as the tool, air " (0*PW d», " contained in the frothy mass of which, wielded by the carpenter, makes the couch, semen (i^rtpiXafifiavofityoy iy t$ dfpwtu) is the but is not the material of which the couch is made, generative element, — rom y6ytpa ra vrippaT*. The So(I,xxii):"Themale//»i/»isnopartoftheembryo: neat "is not fire, nor any such elemental power, but but nature uses it as an instrument and aaually »* analogous to the element of which the stars are efficient cause, as is the efficiency of tools in produces made." It is otherwise described as " the quality in of art." Pursuant to this doctrine, Aristotle expresses g**>" h i* rf wytvfiart +wrtc: it is once more the himself in a way not unfavourable to traducianism in tisformativa, or yirtus seminis of St Thomas. Whether regard of the sentient soul:— "The body is from the this seminal power, supplied by the male, is (or female, but the soul is from the male, for the soul becomes) the sentient soul, according to the opinion gives formal being to a certain body"; iarl St to fiiv just refuted, or rather leads to the sentient soul awpa U rov OrjXtocj & ifrxh iK™ &Pf*wh yap 1^ being produced, as St Thomas now proceeds to argue, obaia <n»fiar6\ Ttvfc itrn (II, iv): which is explained makes the question discussed in the text. Aristotle (II, v), " the female supplies the material, but the male comes not far short of saying that it // the sentient soul, the principle of motion ":vXiyv /i*v olv irapix" to QrjXv, $ How if the father happen to be dead? Answer rrfyb^apx^yrr^Kty^e^b&ppriy. In the same Vegen. that the reference is not to the soul as it is in the animal., II, v, Aristotle goes on to say that the soul Other's body, but as the virtue of it is somehow which the male parent imparts is not the vegetative carried by the genetic element that has come from soul, — for that is already in the material supplied by him and has been taken up by the embryo.
not proceed from the engendered soul, nor from any formative power afting in virtue thereof, but from a formative power a<5ting in virtue of the genera- tive soul of the father, the work of which is to make another like in species to the progenitor. This formative power therefore remains the same in the subject aforesaid* from the beginning of the formation even to the end. But the appearance of the being under formation does not remain the same: for first it has the appearance of semen, afterwards of blood, and so on until it arrives at its final completeness.
Nor need we be uneasy in admitting the generation of an intermediate produ6t, the existence of which is presently after broken off, because such transitional links are not complete in their species, but are on the way to a perfe£t species; and therefore they are not engendered to endure, but as stages of being, leading up to finality in the order of generation. The higher a form is in the scale of being, and the further it Js removed from a mere material form, the more intermediate forms and intermediate generations must be passed through before the finally perfect form is reached. f There- fore in the generation of animal and man, — these having the most perfeft form, — there occur many intermediate forms and generations, and conse- quently destructions, because the generation of one being is the destruction of another. The vegetative soul therefore, which is first in the embryo, while it lives the life of a plant, is destroyed, and there succeeds a more perfeCt soul, which is at once nutrient and sentient, and for that time the embryo lives the life of an animal: upon the destruction of this, there succeeds the rational soul, infused from without, whereas the preceding two owed their existence to the virtue of the male semen.\ * In spiritu pra ditto, which I render 'in the afore- ' segmentation nucleus* results. Thus the male elesaid subject': because the spiritus, icvevfia, or 'gas/ ment and the female element seem to take an equal that made according to Aristotle to h t$ cnreppum part in the formation of the embryo: for immediately tfypwSc's rc kcli \tvic6y, has been declared by St after the combined nucleus is formed, the work of Thomas to be the ' proper subject ' in which the segmentation and formation of the tissues goes on.
* formative power ' inheres. Spiritus was a vague word Though fertilisation is effected by quite a microto a mediaeval writer: it was fraught with suggestions scopic quantity, one single spermatozoon entering high and divine. St Thomas would have shrunk the ovum, we must observe that an equally microfrom reducing spiritus, the mysterious vehicle of the scopic part of the ovum is fertilised: for the great vis firmativa seminis, to the banality of gas. But bulk of what we call the ovum is made up of nutrithe wvevpa of Ve gen. animal., II, ii, the authority tive material, food-yolk, etc."
on which he relied, is gas pure and simple. So far, so clear, much in advance of St Thomas.
As a piece of morphology, all this speculation But concerning any tisformatfya, directrix of this wonabout wvevpa, a</>p6c, spiritus, spuma, gas and foam, derful process of conception and development; and must be swept away. It is false, as we have seen about the origin and function of soul, vegetative, the analogy of a bisected Annelid to be false. The sentient, and intelligent; we remain shrouded in the cutting of a worm in two is no example of the gene- darkness of the thirteenth century. We want a new rative process; and there is no such thing in any treatise T>e anima, to be written by some Aquinas semen as this genetic gas. Chemical and microscopic modernus, who shall be at once a profound Aristoexamination of the mammalian semen reveal quite telian and an expert biologist, and shall consecrate another structure and composition. his life to this one study of soul. He should not So far as biology sees it, what actually happens in neglect the mistaken biology of the original Aquinas conception is this: — "Wherever they meet the female and Aristotle. The mistakes of great minds are sugovum, the male spermatozoa surround it, often in gestive: they are far-reaching in the history of thought, dense masses. Only one spermatozoon however effects Thus, as one reads Aristotle, *De gen. anima/., II, ii, an entrance into the ovum, after the following the memory is carried to St John's Gospel, iii, 5; fashion. The tail is left behind, and the nucleated vi, 63; and his first Epistle, v, 8: lav pii tic ytwrfli^ head with the centrosome passes into the ovum, gene- |£ voaro? kcu Trvev/iaros — to irvevpd tort to (bKnroiovy rally at a place called the 'micropyle.' Certain changes — to wvcvfia kbI to vooip kcli to alfia.
have been going on in the ovum to anticipate this t A suggestion of evolution, event, and the renewed nucleus of the ovum is await- t It will be remembered (p. 167) that Aristotle, ing developments. This is known as the 'female pro- De gen. anima/., II, v, ascribes the vegetative soul to nucleus.' Certain changes prepare the nucleated head the female, and the sentient to the male. I am apt of the spermatozoon for action, and what is known to think that St Thomas knew the work De geneas the 'male pronucleus' results. The male pronucleus ratione anima/ium only through some Mahommedan proceeds to fuse with the female pronucleus, and a commentator, — not Averroes, for the Commentator new nucleus, the result of the combination, the always gives the full Aristotelian text. This doctrine GOD THE ORIGIN OF CREATURES With these principles recognised, it is easy to answer the objedlions, Arg. i. Man being an animal by the possession of a sentient soul, and the notion of ' animal ' befitting man in the same sense as it befits other animals, it appears that the sentient soul of man is of the same kind as the souls of other animals. But things of the same kind have the same manner of coming to be. Therefore the sentient soul of man, as of other animals, comes to be by the adlive power that is in the male semen. But the sentient and the intelligent soul in man is one in substance (Chap. LVIII). It appears then that even the intelligent soul is produced by the a&ive power of the semen.
Reply. Though sensitive soul in man and brute agree generically, yet they differ specifically. As the animal, man, differs specifically from other animals by being rational, so the sentient soul of a man differs specifically from the sentient soul of a brute by being also intelligent. The soul there- fore of a brute has sentient attributes only, and consequently neither its being nor its activity rises above the order of the body: hence it must be generated with the generation of the body, and perish with its destruction. But the sentient soul in man, over and above its sentient nature, has intelledlual power: hence the very substance of this soul must be raised above the bodily order both in being and in activity; and therefore it is neither generated by the generation of the body, nor perishes by its destruction.
Arg. 2. As Aristotle teaches, in point of time the foetus is an animal before it is a man.* But while it is an animal and not yet a man, it has a sentient and not an intelligent soul, which sentient soul beyond doubt is produced by the aftive power of the male semen. Now that self-same sentient soul is potentially intelligent, even as that animal is potentially a rational animal: unless one chooses to say that the intelligent soul which supervenes is another substance altogether, a conclusion rejected above (Chap. LVIII). It appears then that the substance of the intelligent soul comes of the adtive power that is in the semen.f Reply. The sentient soul, whereby the human foetus was an animal, does not last, but its place is taken by a soul that is at once sentient and intelligent.
Arg. 3. The soul, as it is the form of the body, is one being with the body. But unity of thing produced, unity of produ&ive aftion, and unity of producing agent, all go together. Therefore the one being of soul and body must be the result of one produ&ive action of one productive agent. But confessedly the body is produced by the productive aCtion of the power that is in the male semen. Therefore the soul also, as it is the form of the body, is produced by the same productive aCtion, and not by any separate agency.
Reply. The principle of corresponding unity of produced, production, and producer, holds good to the exclusion of a plurality of productive agents not aCting in co-ordination with one another. Where they are co-ordinate, several agents have but one effeCt. Thus the prime efficient cause aCts to the production of the effeCt of the secondary efficient cause even more vigorously of three successive souls in man, two perishable and etc., p. 175. St Thomas would not allow that the one permanent, is noteworthy; and though not now first sentient soul, which he supposes to be infused generally accepted, there is still something to say into man, the human foetus, and afterwards to perish, for it. is "potentially intelligent." He holds that it does not * " A creature is not man as soon as it is animal, turn into a rational soul, but simply ceases to be, nor horse as soon as it is animal: it comes to be when the rational soul comes in. "The intelligent afterwards that which it is finally to be (©/ gen. soul which supervenes is another substance altoanimaLy II, 3). gcther" from the sentient soul which perishes: but t It will be seen that the body of this argument, that intelligent soul is also sentient, and therefore though not the conclusion, is the doctrine combated not " another substance " from the sentient soul in by St Thomas above, " Nor again can it be said," the mature and intelligent man (Chap. LVIII).
than that secondary cause itself; and we see that the efFeft produced by a principal agent through the agency of an instrument is more properly attributed to the principal agent than to the instrument. Sometimes too the a£tion of the principal agent reaches to some part of the thing done, to which the a<5tion of the instrument does not reach. Since then the whole aftive power of nature stands to God as an instrument to the prime and principal agent, we find no difficulty in the produ£tive a<5tion of nature being terminated to a part only of that one term of generation, man, and not to the whole of what is produced by the a£tion of God. The body then of man is formed at once by the power of God, the principal and prime agent, and by the power of the semen, the secondary agent. But the ajftion of God produces the human soul, which the power of the male semen cannot pro- duce, but only disposes thereto.* zArg. 4. Man generates his own specific likeness by the power that is in the detached semen \ which generation means causing the specific form of the generated. The human soul therefore, the specific form of man, is caused by the power in the semen.
cRkeply- Man generates his specific likeness, inasmuch as the power of his semen operates to prepare for the coming of the final form which gives the species to man.
Arg. 5. If souls are created by God, He puts the last hand to the engen- dering of children born sometimes of adultery.
Reply. There is no difficulty in that. Not the nature of adulterers is evil, but their will: now the effect which their semen produces is natural, not voluntary: hence there is no difficulty in God's co-operating to that effedt and giving it completeness.
In a book ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa f there are found further argu- ments, as follows: *Arg. 6. Soul and body make one whole, that is, one man. If then the soul is made before the body, or the body before the soul, the same thing will be prior and posterior to itself. Therefore body and soul are made to- gether. But the body begins in the cutting off, or emission, of the semen. Therefore the soul also is brought into being by the same.
Reply. Allowing that the human body is formed before the soul is created, or conversely, still it does not follow that the same man is prior to himself: for man is not his body nor his soul. It only follows that one part of him is prior to another part; and in that there is no difficulty: for matter is prior in time to form, — matter, I mean, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to form, not inasmuch as it is actually perfe£ted by form, for so it is together with form. The human body then, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to soul, as not yet having the soul, is prior in time to the soul: but, for that time, it is not a6hi- ally human, only potentially so: but when it is a<5tually human, as being perfected by a human soul, it is neither prior nor posterior to the soul, but together with it.
A rg. 7. An agent's a6livity seems to be imperfeft, when he does not pro- duce and bring the whole thing into being, but only half makes it. If then God brought the soul into being, while the body was formed by the power of the male semen, body and soul being the two parts of man, the a&ivities # The * human soul ' means the rational soul, tented with the reply, that the soul which first in- This reply avails also for the modern theory, that the forms the body is produced by the virtue of the rational soul is infused at conception. On the theory semen.
which St Thomas adopts, he might have been con- t Really, Eunapius. See p. 1 54.
of God and of the seminal power would be both imperfedt. Therefore the body and soul of man are both produced by the same cause. But certainly the body of man is produced by the power of the semen: therefore also the soul.
Reply. Body and soul are both produced by the power of God, though the formation of the body is of God through the intermediate instrumenta- lity of the power of the natural semen, while the soul He produces immediately. Neither does it follow that the a&ion of the power of the semen is imperfedt, since it fulfils the purpose of its existence.
*Arg. 8. In all things that are engendered of seed, the parts of the thing engendered are all contained together in the seed, though they do not actually appear: as we see that in wheat or in any other seed the green blade and stalk and knots and grains and ears are virtually contained in the original seed; and afterwards the seed gathers bulk and expansion by a process of natural con- sequence leading to its perfection, without taking up any new feature from without. But the soul is part of man. Therefore in the male semen of man the human soul is virtually contained, and it does not take its origin from any exterior cause.
'Reply* In seed are virtually contained all things that do not transcend corporeal power, as grass, stalk, knots, and the like: from which there is no concluding that the special element in man which transcends the whole range of corporeal power is virtually contained in the seed.
Arg. 9. Things that have the same development and the same consum- mation must have the same first origin. But in the generation of man we find the same development and the same consummation: for as the configuration and growth of the limbs advances, the aftivities of the soul show themselves more and more: for first appears the activity of the sentient soul, and last of all, when the body is complete, the aftivity of the intelligent soul. Therefore body and soul have the same origin. But the first origin of the body is in the emission of the male semen: such therefore also is the origin of the soul Reply. All that this shows is that a certain arrangement of the parts of the body is necessary for the activity of the soul.
Arg. 10. What is conformed to a thing, is set up according to the plan of that to which it is conformed, as wax takes the impress of a seal. But the body of man and of every animal is conformed to its own soul, having such disposition of organs as suits the a&ivities of the power to be exercised through those organs. The body then is formed by the adlion of the soul: hence also Aristotle says that the soul is the efficient cause of the body.* This could not be, if the soul were not in the male semen: for the body is formed by the power that is in that semen: therefore the soul has its origin in the emission of it.
'Reply* That the body is conformed and fashioned according to the soul, and that therefore the soul prepares a body like unto itself, is a statement partly true and partly false. Understood of the soul of the generator, it is true: understood of the soul of the generated, it is false. The formation of the body in its prime and principal parts is not due to the soul of the generated, but to the soul of the generator, as has been shown.
Arg. 1 1. Nothing lives except by a soul. But the male semen is alive, of which fadt there are three indications. In the first place, the semen is cut off • Reference is made to De anima, II, iv. But the the primary soul nourishes the body, i.e. presides over statement is not there, nothing nearer to it than this, and directs the process of nourishment, that the soul is the principle of local motion, and that and detached from a living being: secondly, there appears in it vital heat and a6tivity: thirdly, the seeds of plants, committed to earth, could never warm to life from the lifeless earth, had they not life in themselves.
Reply. The semen is not alive actually, but potentially, and has a soul, not actually, but virtually.* In the process of generation the embryo comes to have a vegetative and a sentient soul by the virtue of the semen, which souls do not endure, but pass away and are succeeded by a rational soul.
Arg. 1 2. If the soul is not before the body (Chap. LXXXIII), nor begins with the liberation of the semen, it follows that the body is first formed, and afterwards there is infused into it a soul newly created. But if this is true, it follows further that the soul is for the body: for what is for another appears after it, as clothes are for men and are made after them. But that is false: rather the body is for the soul, as the end is ever the more noble. We must say then that the origin of the soul is simultaneous with the emission of the semen, f Reply. There are two ways of one thing being c for another.' A thing may be to serve the aftivity, or secure the preservation, or otherwise promote the good of another, presupposing its being; and such things are posterior to that for which they are, as clothes for the person, or tools for a mechanic. Or a thing may be 4 for another ' in view of that other's being: what is thus c for another ' is prior to it in time and posterior to it in nature. In this latter way the body is for the soul, as all matter is for its form. The case would be otherwise, if soul and body did not make one being, as they say who take the soul not to be the form of the body. J CHAPTER XCI— That there are Subsistent Intelligences not united with Bodies % WHEN human bodies perish in death, the substance of the intelli- gence remains in perpetuity (Chap. LXXIX). Now if the substance of the intelligence that remains is one for all, as some say, it follows necessarily that it has being apart from body; and thus our thesis is proved, that some subsistent intelligence exists apart from a body. But if a multitude of intelligent souls remain after the destruction of their bodies, then some subsistent intelligences will have the property of subsisting without bodies, all the more inasmuch as it has been shown that souls do not pass from one body to another (Chap. LXXXIII). But the property of subsisting apart from bodies is an incidental property in souls, since naturally they are the forms of bodies. But what is ordinary must be prior to what is incidental. There must then be some subsistent intelligences naturally prior to souls; and to these intelligences the ordinary property must attach of subsisting without bodies.
3. The higher nature in its lowest manifestation touches the next lower nature in its highest. But intelligent nature is higher than corporeal, and at the same time touches it in some part, which is the intelligent soul. As then the body perfected by the intelligent soul is highest in the genus of bodies, * Query, whose soul? Apparently, that of the gestion in the text is evidently absurd, where there father: for, according to St Thomas, the 'formative is no conception.
virtue ' of the semen'n the father's, and his it remains X My best thanks are due to Reginald Horsley, all throughout the process of formation of the body M.D., formerly resident physician at Stonyhurst of the embryo. College, for his trouble in reading through these t Why not say, t simultaneous with conception '? chapters LXXXVI-LXXXIX, and supplying me with Perhaps that is what the objicient meant. The sug- such biological details as appear in the notes.
§ In other words, there are angels.
GOD THE ORIGIN OF CREATURES so the intelligent soul united to the body must be lowest in the genus of subsistent intelligences- There are then subsistent intelligences not united with bodies, superior in the order of nature to the soul.* 7. The substance of a thing must be proportionate to its a&ivity, becaase activity is the aftualisation and perfection of an a&ive substance. But under- standing is the proper activity of an intelligent substance. Therefore an intelligent substance must be competent for such activity. But understanding is an activity not exercised through any bodily organ, and not needing the body except in so far as objects of understanding are borrowed from obje&s of sense. But that is an imperfect mode of understanding: the perfect mode of understanding is the understanding of those obje&s which are in them- selves intelligible: whereas it is an imperfect mode of understanding when those things only are understood, which are not of themselves intelligible, but are rendered intelligible by intellect, t If then before everything imper- fect there must be something perfect in that kind, J there must be antecedently to human souls, which understand what they gather from phantasms, sundry subsistent intelligences which understand things in themselves intelligible, not gathering their knowledge from sensible obje&s, and therefore in their nature separate from everything corporeal.
CHAPTER XCIII- That Intelligences subsisting apart are not more than one in the same Species §