in Himself and by His power bestows being on all things that are, should be the ruler of all beings, Himself ruled by none: nor is there anything exempt from His government, as there is nothing that does not derive being from Him. He is then perfect in government, as He is perfect in being and causation.
The effeft of this government appears variously in various natures according to the difference between them. Some creatures are brought into being by God to possess understanding, to bear His likeness and present His image. They not only are direfted, but also direft themselves by proper aftions of their own to their due end. If in the direction of themselves they remain subject to the divine guidance, they are admitted in course of that guidance to the attainment of their last end: if they behave otherwise in the direction of themselves, they are rejected. Other beings, devoid of understanding, do not dire6t themselves to their own end, but are directed by another. Some of these are imperishable; and as they can suffer no defedt in their natural being, so in their proper a&ions they never defle6t one whit from the path that leads to the end prefixed to them, but are indefedtibly subje6t to the rule of the prime ruler.* Other creatures are perishable, and liable to * St Thomas instances " the heavenly bodies, the that the materials of our earth, or sundry of them, movements of which ever proceed uniformly." So enter into the composition of the stars. The same men from Plato's time to Newton's contrasted the instrument reveals stars still in process of formation, vicissitudes of the sublunary world with the uni- stars even colliding and exploding. There is uni- formity of the heavens above. Newton showed that formity in the heavens above and on the earth be- the same forces are at work in the starry heavens as neath: not more in one than in the other. The on this earth. In our day the spectroscope has shown ancients under-estimated the regularity and uniformity the failure of their natural being, which however is compensated by the gain of another: for the perishing of one is the engendering of another. In like manner in their proper aftions they swerve from the natural order, from which swerving however there accrues some compensatory good. Hence it appears that even apparent irregularities and departures from the order of the first rule escape not the power of the first ruler. These perish- able bodies, created as they are by God, are perfe6tly subje6t to His power.
The Psalmist, filled with God's spirit, considering this truth, and wishing to point out to us the divine government of things, first describes to us the perfeftion of the first ruler,— of His nature, when he says God; of His power, when he says, // a great Lord* needing no co-operation to work the effe6t of His power; of His authority, when he says, a great king above all gods, because, though there be many rulers, all are subje6t to His rule. Secondly he describes to us the manner of government, — as well in respe6t of intelli- gent beings, which follow His rule and gain from Him their last end, which is Himself, and therefore he szy$> for the Lord will not rejeB his people, — as also in respe6t of perishable beings, which, however they sometimes depart from their proper modes of a<5tion, still are never let go beyond the control of the prime ruler: hence it is said, in his hands are all the ends of the earth, — likewise in respe6t of the heavenly bodies, which exceed all the height of the earth and of perishable bodies, and always observe the right order of divine rule: hence he says, and the heights of the mountains he beholdeth. Thirdly he assigns the reason of this universal control, which is, because things created by God needs must be ruled by Him: hence he says, For the sea is bis, etc.
Since then in the first Book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and in the second of the perfection of God's power, it remains for us in this third Book to treat of His perfe6t authority, or dignity, in as much as He is the last end and ruler of all things. This therefore will be our order of procedure, to treat first of God, as the final end of all things: secondly of His universal control, whereby He governs every creature: thirdly of the special control which He exercises in the government of creatures endowed with understanding.
of nature on earth. Their gaze was fixed on catas- that if he could have altered the point of view of his trophes befalling living creatures and man in par- eye by some millions of miles, he would have beheld ticular. Yet even in catastrophes nature is still our planet Earth, the native region of generation and uniform, although working to an effect which we corruption, turned into a corpus cceleste, serenely re- had not expected. What crosses our expectations, that splendent as Venus and Mars, sweeping out its orbit we call evil. But what right have we to expect? Man with the same accuracy, neither morning star nor is not the measure of all things, nor is human expec- evening star more wonderful. Yet the reader of St tation a law to nature. Thomas will find him not altogether credulous of The * heavenly body/ corpus cctkste, built of the popular astronomy of his time. He attributes less matter fully actuated by its form, and therefore im- to the corpus cakste than many of his contemporaries, perishable and unchangeable (B. II, Chap. XXX, * 0£<$c ftcya? wpioc (LXX), where Kvpws repre- n. I, with note, p. 96: Sum. TheoL 2-2, q. 24, art. 1 1, sents Adonai, and Adonai is for Yaks/teh, clearly the corp.), played a great part in the metaphysics and subject, not the predicate. *Deus magnus <D minus then psychology of the Middle Ages. See Chapp. LXXXII- means Yabvnh is a great Qod. LXXXVII of this Book. Little did St Thomas think GOD THE END OF CREATURES CHAPTER W-That every Agent a&s to some End IN the case of agents that manifestly a6t to some end, we call that the end to which the effort of the agent tends. Gaining that, he is said to gain his end; and missing that, he is said to miss his intended end. Nor on this point does it make any difference whether the end be tended to with knowledge or not: for as the target is the end of the archer, so is it also the end of the path of the arrow.* The effort of every agent tends to some certain end. Not any and every action can proceed from any and every power. Aftion is sometimes terminated to some produdt, sometimes not. When aftion is terminated to some produft, the effort of the agent tends to the same. When aftion is not terminated to any produ6t, the effort of the agent tends to the action itself. Every agent therefore must intend some end in his aftion, sometimes the adtion itself, sometimes something produced by the aftion.
3. It is impossible for the chain of aftions to extend to infinity: there must then be something, in the getting of which the effort of the agent comes to rest. Therefore every agent adts to some end.
6. Actions are open to criticism only so far as they are taken to be done as means to some end. It is not imputed as a fault to any one, if he fails in effecting that for which his work is not intended. A physician is found fault with if he fails in healing, but not a builder or a grammarian. We find fault in points of art, as when a grammarian does not speak corre6Uy; and also in points of nature, as in monstrous births. Therefore both the natural agent, and the agent who a6ts according to art and with a conscious purpose, a6b for an end.
7. To an agent that did not tend to any definite effedt, all efledts would be indifferent. But what is indifferent to many things, does not do one of them rather than another: hence from an agent open to both sides of an alternative {a contingente ad utrumque) there does not follow any effect, unless by some means it comes to be determined to one above the rest: otherwise it could not aft at all Every agent therefore tends to some definite effe6t, and that is called its end.
Still there are actions that do not seem to be for any end, as things done for sport, and a£ts of contemplation, and things done without advertence, as the stroking of the beard and the like: from which instances one may suppose that there is such a thing as an agent acting not for any end. But we must observe that though adts of contemplation are not for any other end, they > are an end in themselves: as for things done in sport, sometimes they are their own end, as when one plays solely for the amusement that he finds in play; sometimes they are for an end, as when we play that afterwards we may resume work more vigorously: while things done without advertence proceed not from the understanding, but from some phantasy or physical # What is the end of the path of a snow-flake? this, that physical agents work definitely and uni- St Thomas would probably have said that its end formly: or as Aristotle puts it (De part, animal. I, i, was to find the proper place of the element of water, 34, 37, 38): "Nature does all things for something: which is below air and above earth. But in this...everywhere we say, this for that, wherever there chapter he returns a more scientific answer: "Every appears an end in which the motion terminates, pro- agent tends to some definite effect, and that is called vided nothing comes in the way: wherefore it is its end." Speaking then of physical agencies, and evident that there is such a thing as what we call remaining in the mere physical order, all that the nature: for it is not anything and everything that statement at the head of this chapter comes to is comes out of every germ, but this out of that."
principle; yet even these a6ts tend to certain ends, though beyond the scope of the intelledt of the agent.
Hereby is banished the error of certain ancient natural philosophers (Empedocles and Democritus, mentioned in Aristotle, Physics II, ii, 6) who supposed all things to happen by necessity of matter, and eliminated final causes from the universe.
CHAPTER \W-That every Agent a&s to some Good THAT to which an agent definitely tends must be suited to it: for it would not tend to the thing except for some suitability to itself. But what is suitable to a thing is good for it. Therefore every agent a6ts to some good.
6. An intelledtual agent afts for an end by determining its own end. A physical agent, though adting for an end, does not determine its own end, having no idea of an end, but moves in the dire<5tion of an end determined for it by another. Now an intelle6tual agent does not fix for itself an end except under some aspe<5t of good: for a term of intelle<5t is a motive only under an aspe6t of good, which is the objeft of will. Therefore a physical agent also does not move or aft to any end except inasmuch as it is good. Such an agent has its end determined by some natural appetite or tendency.* 7. It is part of the same plan of a<5tion to shun evil and to seek good. But all things are found to shun evil. Intelleftual agents shun a thing for this reason, that they apprehend it as evil: while all physical agents, to the full extent of the power that is in them, resist destruction, because that is the evil of everything. All things therefore a6t to some good.
CHAPTER IV- That Evil in things is beside the Intention of the Agent WHAT follows from an a6lion different from what was intended by the agent, manifestly happens beside his intention. But evil is different from good, which every agent intends. Therefore evil happens beside the intention.
2. Failure in effeft and a<5tion follows upon some defeft in the principles of a<5tion, as a halting gait follows upon crookedness of legs. Now an agent a<5ts by whatever of a<5tive power he has, not by what defeCl of a<5tive power he suffers; and according as he a<5ts, so does he intend his end. He intends therefore an end answering to his power. Anything therefore that ensues answering to defeft of power will be beside the intention of the agent. But such is evil.
4. In agents that a<5t by intellect, or by any sort of judgement,! intention follows apprehension: for intention tends to that which is apprehended as an end. If then experience lights upon something not of the species appre- hended, the event will be beside the intention: thus if one intends to eat honey, and eats gall, taking it for honey, that will be beside the intention. But every intelle<5tual agent intends a thing according as he takes it for something good: if then it turns out not to be good but evil, that will be beside the intention.
* A conative nisus, analogous to will, but of course, t ALstimationem. The reference is to the Yts astt- below the animal kingdom, unconscious, was sup- mativa, found in the higher irrational animals (B. II, posed by Aristotle and Aristotelians to pervade all Chap. LX), whereby, e.g., a dog judges of the dis- A. s nature. tance by which he can escape the wheels of a carriage.
GOD THE END OF CREATURES CHAPTERS V, V\-Arguments against the Truth of the Conclusion last drawn, with Solutions of the same CHAPTER VI FOR the clearer solution of the arguments alleged we must observe that evil may be considered either in a substance or in some a6tion of a substance. Evil in a substance consists in its lack of something which it is naturally apt to have and ought to have. It is no evil to a man not to have wings, because he is not by nature apt to have them; nor not to have yellow hair, because, though his nature is apt to have such hair, still that colour of hair is not due to his nature. But it is an evil to him not to have hands, because he is apt by nature to have them, and ought to have them, if he is to be perfe6t; and yet the same is no evil to a bird. Every privation, properly and striftly speaking, is of something which one is naturally apt to have and ought to have. The essence of evil consists in privation, thus understood. Primordial matter, being in potentiality to all forms, is naturally apt to have them all, but no one of them is due to it, since it may be perfect in actuality without any one particular form that you like to mention.* But some particular form is due to each of the things that are constituted out of such matter. The privation therefore of such a form, in regard of primordial matter, is no evil to the nature of primordial matter; but in regard of the compound whereof it is the form, it is an evil to that compound thing: thus it is evil to incandescent gas {ignis) to be deprived of the form of incande- scent gas. And since privations are not said to 4 be ' except so far as they are in a subje6l, a privation will be * simply evil/ when it is evil in regard of the subjedt in which it is: otherwise, it will be 'evil relatively to something* {malum alicujus), but not 'simply evil.* So for man to be deprived of a hand is 4 simply evil but for matter to be deprived of the form of oxygen {aeris) is not fc simply evil/ but is the evil of oxygen. — Coming to adtion, the privation of due order or commensurateness in an aftion is the evil of the action; and because to every a<5tion there is due some order and some commensurateness, such privation in an attion must be 4 simply evil.'
Arg. i (Chap. V). What happens beside the intention of the agent is said to be * matter of luck and chance and rare occurrence.' f But evil is not said to be matter of luck and chance, or rare occurrence, but to happen continually, or for the most part: thus in the physical order the unmaking of one thing is always attached to the making of another; and in the moral order sin is of usual occurrence.! This does not look like evil arising contrary to intention.
Reply (Chap. VI). Not everything that is beside the intention of the * In the scholastic theory, materia prima, or pri- He tells us (I.e. vi): " Matter of luck is all matter mordial matter, is never found, as the chemistry of chance, but not all the latter is matter of luck...books speak, ' free,' but always in composition with No inanimate thing, nor beast, nor child, ever does some form or other: it cannot be ' isolated.' Still no anything by lucfa because it is incapable of deliberate one form can be mentioned with which it must be choice...In things done for an end, when the compounded, if it is to be at all. If I must eat fruit, aclion of some external cause was not done to bring I need not eat peaches. about what actually happened, we say that the thing t These are three technical terms of Aristotelian happened by chance: but those things happen by luck, philosophy. They refer to the category of coexistence, which happen by chance, and at the same time rank or coincidence, not to sequence. They are explained as objects of choice to persons having the faculty of by Aristotle, Physics, II, iv, v, vi: choice."
Matter of \mc\l, firtuitum, to A*o rv^i^c. t Aristotle somewhere makes the cynical remark, Matter of chance, casuale, to &to tov aWoparov. that things generally go wrong, and that most men Matter of rare occurrence, */ in paucioribus accident, do evil where they get a chance.
GOD & HIS CREATURES BOOK III doer need be the result of luck or chance. For if what is beside the intention follows upon what is intended either always or frequently, it cannot be said to happen by luck or chance. Thus in him who intends to enjoy the * pleasantness of wine, if from his drinking wine drunkenness follows always or frequently, it will be no matter of bad luck or chance: but it would be by chance, if it were quite the exception. Although then the evil of one thing perishing in course of nature follows beside the intention of him who brings the other thing into being, such evil nevertheless follows invariably: for invariably to the positing of one form there is annexed the privation of another:* hence this perishing does not happen by chance, nor as the exception, though the privation is sometimes not evil simply, but only a relative evil, as has been said. But if it be such a privation as to deprive the new being produced of what is due to it, it will be matter of chance and simply evil, as in the case of monstrous births: for such a mishap does not follow of necessity upon what is intended, but is contrary to it, since the agent intends the perfeftion of the being that he engenders. — Evil affe&ing a<5tion happens in physical agents for want of aftive power: hence, if the agent's power is defective, this evil happens contrary to intention, yet not by chance, because it necessarily follows upon such an agent, when such agent suffers this failure of power either always or frequently: but it will be by chance, if the failure rarely accompanies such an agent. — Coming to voluntary agents, intention in them must be of some particular good, if a<5lion is to follow: for universal considerations of themselves do not move the will, unless there be added the consideration of the particular circum- stances under which the a<5lion is to take place. If then the good that is intended has conjoined with it the privation of rational good either always or frequently, there follows moral evil, and that not by chance, as is clear in his case who wishes to cohabit with a woman for pleasure, while the inordination of adultery is annexed to that pleasure: in that case the evil of adultery does not ensue by chance: but it would be an evil happening by chance, if upon the thing intended there followed some exceptional misadventure, as when one aiming at a bird kills a man. That goods of this sort, upon which privations of rational good follow, are so generally Intended, arises from the practice of most men living according to sense, which they do because sensible things are more manifest to us,f and make more effectual motives in the particular circumstances in which our a<5lion is cast; and many such goods are attended with privation of rational good.
Arg. 2. Aristotle (Eth. Nic, III, vii) expressly says that wickedness is voluntary, and proves it from the fa<5t that men do unjust a6ts voluntarily: but, he adds, it is irrational to pretend that a man voluntarily adting unjustly does not wish to be unjust, or voluntarily committing rape does not wish to be incontinent; and that is why legislators punish wicked men as voluntary evil-doers. It seems then that evil is not irrespective of will or intention.
Reply. Though evil be beside the intention, it is still voluntary, not as it is in itself, but incidentally. The object of intention is the final end, willed for its own sake: but the objeft of Volition is also that which is willed for the sake of something else, though absolutely it would not be willed,! — as one * Read farnut unius positioni adjunfta est privatio and without whom my friend would not have come, alterius. I have supplied positioni. is to me an object of mll9 but not of intention. I should t Read magis sunt nobis manisfesta. not have invited that gentleman by himself. FoRtion X The presence of a dear friend as a guest at my then extends to three acts: — tableistomeanobjeclatonceofw/7/andof/»/«f/rw.The (a) Intention9 fiovXrjtris {Eth. Nic. Ill, iv, 7-9), of presence of a stranger who accompanies my friend, the twilled for its own sake: observe, this use is throws cargo into the sea to save the ship, not intending the casting away of the cargo, but the safety of the vessel; and yet willing the casting away of the cargo, not simply and absolutely, but for the sake of safety. In like manner, for the gaining of some sensible good, one wills to do an inordinate action, not intending the inordinateness, nor willing it simply, but for that purpose. And therefore in this way wickedness and sin are said to be voluntary, like the casting away of cargo at sea.
Arg. 3. Every process of nature serves an end intended by nature. But destruction is as much a natural change as production: therefore its end, which is a privation and counts as evil, is intended by nature as much as form and goodness, which are the end of production.
Reply. From what has been said it appears that what is simply evil is altogether contrary to intention in the works of nature, as are monstrous births: but what is not simply evil, but only evil in a particular relation, is not intended by nature in itself, but incidentally.
CHAPTER V\\-That Evil is not a Nature or Essence* EVIL is nothing else than a privation of that which a thing is naturally apt to have and ought to have. But a privation is not an essence, but a negation in a substance.
5. Every essence is natural to some thing. If the essence ranks as a sub- stance, it is the very nature of the thing. If it ranks as an accident, it must be caused by the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance, though perhaps not natural to some other substance. But what is in itself evil cannot be natural to anything: for the essence of evil is privation of that which is naturally apt to be in a thing and is due to it. Evil then, being a privation of what is natural, cannot be natural to any- thing. Hence whatever is naturally in a thing is good, and the want of it an evil. No essence then is in itself evil.f 6. Whatever has any essence is either itself a form or has a form, \ for by form everything is assorted in some genus or species. But form, as such, has a character of goodness, being the principle of aCtion and the end which every maker intends, and the actuality whereby every subjeCt of form is* perfected. Whatever therefore has any essence, as such, is good.
7. Being is divided into aCtuality and potentiality. Actuality, as such, quite apart from the distinction made in English "embossed carbuncle in my flesh." He allows that philosophy between intention and motile. there are evil attributes, or vices, as the next chapter (b) Choke, irpoatpttri* (Eth. Nic. Ill, iv, 9) of will explain. But a vice is a good quality over- tneans to the end. strained, or perverted. Pride is an inordinate reaching (c) Acceptance of circumstances attached to the out to high things: but to reach out to high things end, or more usually to the means, but not in them- in itself is a good point in a man. Cowardice is an selves regarded either as good, as is the end, or useful, inordinate care of one's own safety, a thing that one as are the means. is bound to have some care of.
I have endeavoured to bring out the practical t St Thomas here speaks, as philosophers always importance of these distinctions in my Ethics and speak, in the universal, not of this individual and Natural Law, pp. 31-35, 203-208, 222-224. that. No natural kind or class, as such, either is evil • St Thomas in this and the next two chapters or is the subject of evil qualities, i.e., of privations of is not arguing that there is no evil in the world, but what is due to nature. The kind, as such, has all that evil has no substantial being, no, nor positive things that it is proper for its members to have, accidental being either: there is no evil substance, though sundry members of the kind are wanting in there is no positive attribute essentially evil: there is some of those things. There are one-eyed men, but good at the bottom of everything, even of things mankind has two eyes: there are invalids, but the evil: there is a right use of everything, and a place race is healthy.
for all positive being in the scheme of creation. He t Or, as we might say, 4 is either an attribute or allows that there may be substance much out of place, a substance.' as a bull in a china shop, a bad man in power, an is good, because everything is perfe&ed by that whereby it actually is. Potentiality too is something good: for potentiality tends to a<5tuality, and is proportionate to actuality, not contrary to it; and is of the same genus with actuality; and privation does not attach to it except accidentally.* Everything therefore that is, in whatsoever way it is, in so far as it is a being, is good.
8. All being, howsoever it be, is from God (B. II, Chap. VI). But God is perfett goodness (B. I, Chap. XLI). Since then evil cannot be the effett of goodness, it is impossible for any being, as being, to be evil, f Hence it is said: God saw all things that be bad made, and they were very good (Gen. i, 3 1): He bath made all things good in his own time (Eccles. iii, 11): Every creature of God is good (1 Tim. iv, 4).
CHAPTERS VIII, \X~Arguments against the aforesaid Conclusion, with Answers to the same ARG. 1. Evil is a specific difference in certain kinds of things, namely, in moral habits and afts: for as every virtue in its species is a good habit, so the contrary vice in its species is an evil habit; and simi- larly of a<5ts. Evil therefore is something that gives species to certain things: it is therefore an essence, and natural to some things.
Reply. The reason why good and evil are reckoned specific differences in moral matters, is because moral matters depend on the will: for a thing enters into the sphere of morality inasmuch as it ^Voluntary. But the objedt of the will is the end in view and good: hence moral aftions are specified by the end for which they are done, as physical a<5tions are from the form of their adtive principle. Since then good and evil are designated according to due bearing on the end, or the lack of such due bearing, good and evil must be the first difFerentias marking species in moral matters. But the measure of morality is reason. Therefore things must be called morally good or evil according as they bear on the end which reason determines. Whatever there- fore in moral matters derives its species from an end which is according to reason, is said to be good in its species: while what derives its species from an end contrary to reason, is said to be evil in its species. But that end, though inconsistent with the end which reason assigns, is nevertheless some sort of good, as being pleasurable according to sense, or the like: hence such ends are good in some animals, and even in man when they are moderated