piness, which is the contemplation of God, is the sub- wrong, and all compromise or blending of these two jefiive last end (finis quo). opposite opinions impossible. Be this said to stimulate t In this conclusion St Thomas stands by Aristotle, inquiry. A reader ought to be told when he is brought and is contradicted by Scotus and all his school. It face to face with a great issue, has ever been the translator's intimate conviction that GOD THE END OF CREATURES the first object of will cannot be any sheer aCt of willing, but some other good. But the first objeCt of will to an intelligent nature is happiness: for it is for the sake of happiness that we will whatever we do will. Happiness therefore cannot possibly consist essentially in any aCt of will.
4. Everything has the truth of its nature by having the constituents of its substance: for a real man differs from a painted one by the constituents of the substance of man. But true happiness does not differ from false happi- ness in respeCt of the aCt of will: for the will is in the same attitude of desire, or love, or delight, whatever the object proposed to it for its sovereign good, true or false: but whether the object so proposed be the true sove- reign good or a counterfeit, that difference is decided by intellect. Happiness therefore consists essentially in intellect rather than in any aCt of will.
5. If any aft of will were happiness itself, that aCt would be either desire or love or delight. Now it is impossible for desire to be the last end: for desire obtains inasmuch as the will tends to something which it has not yet got: but such straining after the absent is inconsistent with the idea of an achieved last end. Love again cannot be the last end: for good is loved not only in its presence but also in its absence: for it is from love that good not possessed is sought for by desire. And though the love of good already attained is more perfect, that access of perfection is to be ascribed to the attainment and established possession of the good loved. The attainment of good then, which is the end, is a different thing from the love of good, which love is imperfeCt before attainment, and perfeCt after attainment. In like manner neither is delight the last end: for the very possession of good is the cause of delight, while we either feel the good now possessed, or remember the good possessed before, or hope for the good to be possessed in future: delight therefore is not the last end. No aCt of will therefore can be the substance of happiness.
6. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable of itself. But that is false: for it makes a difference what delight is desired, considering the object from which delight ensues: for the delight which follows upon good and desirable activities is good and desirable: but that which follows upon evil a6tivities is evil and to be shunned. Delight therefore has its goodness and desirability from something beyond itself. Therefore it is not itself the final end, happiness.
7. The right order of things coincides with the order of nature, for natural things are ordained to their end without mistakes. But in natural things delight is for activity, and not the other way about: for we see that nature has attached delight to those activities of animals which are manifestly or- dained to necessary ends, as in the use of food, which is ordained to the preservation of the individual, and in the intercourse of the sexes, which is ordained to the preservation of the species: for if delight were not in attend- ance, animals would abstain from the aforesaid necessary aCts. It is impossible therefore for delight to be the final end.
8. Delight seems to be nothing else than a rest of the will in some be- fitting good, as desire is an inclination of the will to the gaining of some good. Now it is ridiculous to say that the end of movement is not the coming to be in one's proper place, but the satisfaction of the inclination whereby one tended to go there. If the principle aim of nature were the satisfaction of the inclination, it would never give the inclination. It gives the inclination, that thereby one may tend to one's proper place: when that end is gained, there follows the satisfaction of the inclination: thus the satisfaction of the inclina- tion is not the end, but a concomitant of the end.
9. If any exterior thing is to be any one's end, we must assign the title of last end to that activity whereby the thing is first gained: thus to people who make money their end, the getting of the money is the end, not the love or desire of.it. But the last end of a subsistent intelligence is God. That activity then in man makes the substance of his happiness, whereby he first attains to God. But that is the activity of understanding: for we cannot will what we do not understand. The final happiness of man then substantially consists in knowing God by the understanding, and not in any act of the will.
From what has been said we may solve the objections to the contrary. The fact of the sovereign good being the object of the will does not necessi^t that sovereign good being substantially the act of the will itself, as was the tenor of the argument first proposed: nay, from the fact of its being the first object, it follows that it is not the act.
Arg. 2. The last perfection of activity is delight, which perfects activity as beauty does youth.* If then any perfect activity is the last end, it seems that the last end is rather in the activity of the will than of the intellect.
Reply. There are two ways of being a perfection to a thing. In one way there is a perfection to a thing already complete in its species: in another way there is a perfection going to make up the species. Thus the perfection of a house, considered as complete in its species, is that use for which the house is intended, namely, being inhabited: hence this should be put in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be adequate. A perfection going to make up the species of a house may be one of the constituents and sub- stantial principles of the species: or it may be something that goes to the preservation of the species, as the buttresses made to prop the house up: lastly, under this head we must count whatever makes the house more comely for use, as its beauty. That therefore which is the perfection of a thing, con- sidered as already complete in its species, is the end of a thing, as being inhabited is the end of a house. And in like manner the proper activity of each thing, which is a sort of use of it, is the end of the thing. But the per- fections which go to make up the species are not the end of the thing: rather the thing is their end. Thus matter and form are for the species. In like manner the perfections that preserve a thing in its species, as health and nutri- tion, though they perfect the animal, are not the end of its existence, but rather the other way about/Those perfections also whereby a thing is fitted to dis- charge the proper activities of its species and gain its due end more becom- ingly, are not the end of the thing, but rather the other way about, e.g., a man's beauty and bodily strength, and other accomplishments, of which the philosopher says that they minister to happiness instrumen tally. f Now when we say that delight is the perfection of activity, we do not mean that activity specifically considered is directed to the purpose of delight, — the fact is, it is ordained to other ends, as eating is ordained to the preservation of the indi- vidual,— we mean that delight ranks among the perfections which go to make * The reference is to the celebrated EtL Nic. X, nature, that fun&ion is primary and pleasure only iv, 8: " Pleasure makes activity perfedl, not as a habit attendant," — which is the real refutation of this obof skill perfects the skilful ad, but as a sort of efflores- jeftion and of hedonism in all its forms, cence marking completeness, as bloom perfects ma- t "It is impossible, or not easy to do nobly withturity," or as we might say, like the bloom on ripe out supplies: for many things require to be done grapes or peaches. So Professor Stewart (Notes on through instruments" (Eth. Nk. I, ix, 15). Nicomacbean Ethics, ii, 418) speaks of "the law of our GOD THE END OF CREATURES up the species of a thing: for through the delight that we take in any action we apply ourselves to it more attentively and becomingly.
Arg. 3. Delight seems to be so desired for its own sake as never to be desired for the sake of anything else: for it is foolish to ask of any one why he wishes to be delighted.* But this is the condition of the last end, to be desired for its own sake. Therefore the last end is rather in an aft of the will than of the understanding, so it seems.
Reply. Delight, though it is not the last end, is still a concomitant of the last end, since from the attainment of the last end delight supervenes.
Arg. 4. In the desire of the last end there is the greatest agreement amongst all men, because it is natural. But more seek delight than knowledge. Therefore it seems that delight is the end rather than knowledge.
Reply. There are not more seekers of the delight that there is in knowing than there are seekers of knowledge: but there are more seekers after sensible delights than there are seekers of intellectual knowledge and the delight thence ensuing; and the reason is because external things are more known to the majority of men, as human knowledge starts from objefts of sense.
Arg. 5. The will seems to be a higher power than the understanding: for the will moves the understanding to its end: for when there is the will so to do, then it is that the understanding actually considers the knowledge which it habitually possesses. The aftion therefore of the will seems to be nobler than the aftion of the understanding; and therefore the final end of happiness seems in the aft of will rather than in the aft of understanding.
'Reply- It is manifestly false to say that the will is higher than the under- standing as moving it; for primarily and ordinarily the understanding moves the will. The will, as such, is moved by its objeft, which is the good appre- hended: but the will moves the understanding, we may say, incidentally, inasmuch as the aft of understanding itself is apprehended as good and so is desired by the will. Hence it follows that the understanding aftually under- stands, and in this has the start of the will; for never would the will desire to understand, unless first the understanding apprehended the aft of understanding itself as good. And again the will moves the understanding to aftual aftivity in the way in which an efficient cause is said to move: but the understanding moves the will in the way in which a final cause moves, for good understood is the end of the will. Now the efficient cause is posterior in motion to the final cause, for the efficient cause moves only for the sake of the final cause. Hence it appears that, absolutely speaking, the understanding is higher than the will, but the will is higher than the understanding accidentally and in a qualified sense.
CHAPTER XXVlI-TAat the Happiness of Man does not consist in Bodily Pleasures ACCORDING to the order of nature, pleasure is for the sake of aftivity, and not the other way about. If therefore certain aftivities are not the final end, the pleasures ensuing upon these aftivities are neither the final end nor accessories of the final end. But certainly die aftivities on which bodily pleasures follow are not the final end: for they are directed to other obvious ends, the preservation of the body and the begetting of offspring. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the final end, nor accessories of the final end, and happiness is not to be placed in them.
• So Aristotle, Eth. Nk. X, ii, 2.
3. Happiness is a good proper to man: dumb animals cannot be called happy except by an abuse of language.* But bodily pleasures are common to man and brute: happiness therefore cannot consist in them.f 4. The final end of a thing is noblest and best of all that appertains to the thing. J But bodily delights do not appertain to a man in respeft of what is noblest in him.
5. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being conjoined with things lower than himself, but in his conjunction with something above him.
7. In all things that are said to be 'ordinarily' (per se), 'more* follows upon ' more/ if ' absolutely ' goes with 4 absolutely.' If then bodily pleasures were good in themselves,§ to take them to the utmost would be the best way of taking them. But this is manifestly false: for excessive use of such things is accounted a vice, injures the body, and bars further enjoyments of the same sort.|| 8. If human happiness consisted in bodily pleasures, it would be a more praiseworthy aft of virtue to take such pleasures than to abstain from them.^f But this is manifestly false, for it is the special praise of the a6t of temperance to abstain from such pleasures.** 9. The last end of everything is God (Chap. XVIII). That then must be laid down to be the last end of man, whereby he most closely approaches to God. But bodily pleasures injure a man from any close approach to God: for God is approached by contemplation, and the aforesaid pleasures are a hindrance to contemplation.
Hereby is excluded the error of the Epicureans, who placed the happi- ness of man in these pleasures: in whose person Solomon says: This seemed to me goody that man should eat and drin\ and maJ^e merry on the fruit of his toil (Eccles v, 17). Everywhere let us leaJte behind us signs of mirth^for this is our portion and this our lot (Wisd. ii, 9). Also the error of the followers of Cerinthus is excluded, who spread the fable of a thousand years of the pleasures of the belly as an element in the kingdom of Christ after the resur- * "With reason we refuse to pronounce either ox wishing to secure it to the utmost; but the means not or horse or any other animal tyappy: for none of them to infinity, for the end in view limits all arts".(Ariis able to take part in such activity as makes happi- stotle, Tolitics, I, ix, 13).
ness 99 (Etk. Nie. I, ix, 9). ## In Ethics and Natural Lata, p. 91, it is shown t It is to be considered however that bodily plea- why the whole business of temperance is to restrain, sures in man commonly are not merely bodily, they There is however an Epicurean temperance, which, are coloured by imagination, art, sentiment, poetry, taking pleasure to be happiness and the last end of man, t e.g., the final end of oxen, to be eaten by man. at the same time recognises it to be attainable only Oxen however do not exist for themselves. SicVos non under limitations, and so economises what it takes to W« fertis aratra, bitpes. In man at least his final end to be the good wine of life, that it may not run out ought to be the realisation of his noblest attribute. too fast. Temperance is quite intelligible even in the § That is to say, if they were good 'absolutely,' enjoyment of the last end, on the assumption that the irrespectively of limiting conditions. If pleasure were last end is attainable only in small amounts, and may 'absolutely* and 'ordinarily' one thing with goodness, be exhausted by greediness. This view allows that the more pleasure one got, the better would he be for the last end is in itself and in the abstract desirable it; and the most pleasant pleasure would be the best etc axcipoi', but only in the abstract; there being limits pleasure. Pressed by this argument, some utilitarians, to its practical attainability. It is a point not to betaken c-g«> ]' S. Mill, have admitted a difference of kind, or for granted, that happiness, adequate to desire, is atquality, in pleasures, a concession fatal to hedonism, and tainable at all. The attainability of perfect happiness thereby ultimately to utilitarianism. is a theorem requiring proof; and proof of it is impos- So does excessive contemplation and study in- sible, if the life of the world to come is not to enter jure the body, but not so fearfully: it does not make into the discussion. See Chap. XL VIII: also Ethics such a wreck of the whole man. But, it must be owned, and Natural Law, pp. 1 3-20. Waiving that discussion, in this world contemplation is not absolutely the end however, the previous arguments, nn. 1, 3, 4, 5, avail of man. to show that bodily pleasures are not the chief ingre- 11 The rule of the golden mean does not apply to dientof the limited happiness possible to man on earth, the last end. " Every art seeks the end to infinity, GOD THE END OF CREATURES re&ion, hence they are called Chiliasts, or Millennarians. Also the fables of the Saracens, who place the rewards of the just in the aforesaid pleasures.
CHAPTERS XXVIII, XXIX-T/iat Happiness does not consist in Honours nor in Human Glory THE last end and happiness of man is his most perfect activity (Chap. XXVI). But the honour paid to a man does not consist in any a6t of his own, but in the a6t of another towards him.* 2. That is not the last end, which is good and desirable on account of something else. But such is honour: for a man is not rightly honoured except for some other good thing existing in him.
4. Even bad men may be honoured. It is better then to become worthy of honour than to be honoured. Therefore honour is not the highest good of man.
Hence it appears that neither does man's chief good consist in glory, or celebrity of fame. For glory, according to Cicero, is " a frequent mention of a man with praise"; or according to St Augustine, "brilliant notoriety with praise" (c/ara notitia cum laude). So then men wish for notoriety, attended with praise and a certain brilliance, that they may be honoured by those to whom they become known. Glory then is sought for the sake of honour. If then honour is not the highest good, much less is glory.
CHAPTER XXX-That Mati *s Happiness does not consist in Riches RICHES are not desired except for the sake of something else: for of themselves they do no good, but only as we use them. But the highest good is desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else.
2. The possession or preservation of those things cannot be the highest good, which benefit man most in being parted with. But such is the use of riches, to spend.
3. The a6t of liberality and munificence, the virtues that deal with money, is more praiseworthy, in that money is parted with, than that money is got. Man's happiness therefore does not consist in the possession of riches.f 4. That in the gaining of which man's chief good lies must be some- thing better than man. But man is better than his riches, which are things ordained to his use.
5. The highest good of man is not subject to fortune: for fortuitous events happen without effort of reason, whereas man must gain his proper end by reason. But fortune has great place in the gaining of riches. \ * It may be pleaded that happiness consists, not presupposes possession. Not in the spending of them in the payment, but in the reception of honours, such for the mere sake of spending, which is called 'throw- reception involving an adl of the individual's own con- ing money away/ And if they are spent for a purpose, sciousness. This would come near to the doclrine that in that purpose rather than in the spending must happiness consists in self-satisfadtion, a Stoic position. happiness lie.
t But perhaps in the spending of them, which t Especially in persons ' born to fortune.9 CHAPTER XXXI- That Happiness does not consist in Worldly Power A MAN is called good inasmuch as he attains to the sovereign good. But inasmuch as he has power he is not called either good or evil: for he is not good who can do good things, nor is a man evil jfcA being able to do evil things. Therefore the highest good does not consist in being powerful.* 3. All power is over another {ad alterum). But the highest good is not over another.
CHAPTER XXXII— That Happiness does not consist in the Qoods of the Body THE soul is better than the body. Therefore the good of the soul, as understanding and the like, is better than the good of the body. The good of the body therefore is not the highest good of man.
3. These goods are common to man and other animals: but happiness is the proper good of man alone.
4. For goods of the body, many animals are better off than man: some are swifter, some are stronger, and so of the rest. If in these things the highest good consisted, man would not be the most excellent of animals.
CHAPTER XXXIV- That the Final Happiness of Man does not consist in AEls of the Moral Virtues HUMAN happiness, if it is final, is not referable to any further end. But all moral acts are referable to something further: thus acts of fortitude in war are directed to securing vidtory and peace: afts of justice to the preservation of peace amongst men by every one remaining in quiet possession of his own.
2. Moral virtues aim at the observance of the golden mean in passions and in the disposal of external things. But the moderation of the passions or of external things cannot possibly be the final end of human life, since these very passions and external things are referable to something else.
3. Man is man by the possession of reason; and therefore happiness, his proper good, must regard what is proper to reason. But that is more proper to reason which reason has in itself than what it does in another. Since then the good of moral virtue is something which reason establishes in things other than itself, moral virtue cannot be the best thing in man, which is happiness.f # And therefore not in riches, for to a thinking base of a tower is presupposed to the spire. Moral mind the chief good of riches is the power that they virtue is more indispensable, but happiness is better, give. But the privation of happiness is a less evil than the t See Ethics and 'Natural Law, p. 8, n. 4; and p. 76, privation of moral virtue. So it is less evil to have the n. 4. When Milton says in the Comus, spire blown down than to have the tower on which Virtue alone is happiness below, k f?ts "ow" UP' £houf h ^ sPire i$ hi*her and rr ' nobler than the substructure.
he cannot reasonably mean that moral virtue is for- The doctrine of this chapter is in Aristotle, NU.
mally and precisely happiness, but only that it is Eth. X, viii.
indispensable to happiness, and presupposed, as the 2IO CHAPTER XXXVII- That the Final Happiness of Man consists in the Contemplation of God IF then the final happiness of man does not consist in those exterior advan- tages which are called goods of fortune, nor in goods of the body, nor in goods of the soul in its sentient part, nor in the intellectual part in respeft of the moral virtues, nor in the virtues of the practical intellect, called art and prudence, it remains that the final happiness of man consists in the contem- plation of truth. This a<5t alone in man is proper to him, and is in no way shared by any other being in this world. This is sought for its own sake, and is directed to no other end beyond itself. By this a6t man is united in like- ness with pure spirits, and even comes to know them in a certain way. For this a<5t also man is more self-sufficient, having less need of external things.* Likewise to this a<5t all other human activities seem to be directed as to their end. For to the perfection of contemplation there is requisite health of body;t and all artificial necessaries of life are means to health. Another requisite is rest from the disturbing forces of passion: that is attained by means of the moral virtues and prudence. Likewise rest from exterior troubles, which is the whole aim of civil life and government. Thus, if we look at things rightly, we may see that all human occupations seem to be ministerial to the service of the con templa tors of truth. J Now it is impossible for human happiness to consist in that contempla- tion which is by intuition of first principles, — a very imperfeCt study of things, as being the most general, and not amounting to more than a potential know- ledge: it is in fact not the end but the beginning of human study: it is sup- plied to us by nature, and not by any close investigation of truth. Nor can happiness consist in the sciences, the object-matter of which is the meanest things, whereas happiness should be an activity of intellect dealing with the noblest objects of intelligence. Therefore the conclusion remains that the final happiness of man consists in contemplation guided by wisdom to the study of the things of God. Thus we have reached by way of induction the same conclusion that was formerly established by deductive reasoning, § that the final happiness of man does not consist in anything short of the contemplation of God.
* Through all this reasoning we readily discern (A) is further suggestive of Chap. XXXVIII, in the famous chapter of Aristotle, Nic. Etb. X, vii. which it is shown that the plain man's rational knowt Compare Plato's saying, that athletics have their ledge of God is not happiness: while (B) and (C) place in education chiefly for the sake of the soul together suggest Chap. XXXIX, which shows that {Rep. Ill, 410 C). the philosopher's knowledge of God is not happiness I I have pointed out this subordination of prac- either. Chapter XL proves the same of the Christian's tice to theory in Political and Moral Essays, pp. 154, knowledge of God by faith. Chapter XLVII shows 1 55> cf. $ 10, pp. 1 1- 1 3. that we enjoy no vision of God on earth. Chapter St Thomas proceeds to instance three kinds of XLVII I, that happiness is not on earth. Finally, contemplation. (A) Intuition of first principles. This is Chap. L argues that nothing short of the immediate enjoyed by every man, educated and uneducated, who vision of God makes the happiness of angels and of has the ordinary use of reason. Needless to say, it is human souls in heaven.
not happiness, or all men would be happy. (B) Scien- § The 'deduclive reasoning' (ration i If us probatum) tific Knowledge, the property of the educated. But the seems to be the arguments alleged in Chap. XXV. objects of science are creatures; and man requires for What St Thomas here calls * induction ' is the noted his happiness to contemplate something higher and induHio per enumerationem simplicem. He has enumera- nobler. (C) Wisdom, which is defined (in B. I, Ch. 1) ted all other alternatives and shown that this alone "The knowledge of things by their highest causes." In remains tenable. We might call it the 'method of this wisdom, taken for the contemplation of God, first residues.' beginning and last end of all, human happiness will be found to consist.
CHAPTER XXXVIll-That Human Happiness does not consist in such Knowledge of God as is common to the majority of ^Mankind THERE is a certain general and vague knowledge of God in the minds of, practically, all men, whether it be by the fact of God's existence being a self-evident truth, as some think (B. I, Chap. X); or, as seems more likely, because natural reasoning leads a man promptly to some sort of knowledge of God: for men seeing that natural things follow a certain course and order, and further considering that order cannot be without an ordaincr, they perceive generally that there is some ordainer of the things which we see. But who or what manner of being the ordainer of nature is, and whether He be one or many, cannot be gathered off-hand from this slight study. Thus, seeing a man move and do other acts, we perceive that there is in him a cause of these activities, which is not in other things; and this cause we call the soul; and still we do not yet know what the soul is, whether it is anything corporeal or not, or how it performs the aforesaid acts. Now such knowledge as this cannot possibly suffice for happiness.
i. For happiness must be an activity without defect. But this knowledge is susceptible of admixture of many errors: thus some have believed that the ordainer of mundane events is no other than the heavenly bodies: hence they have affirmed the heavenly bodies to be gods. Others have said the same of the elements, thinking that their natural movements and activities come not from any controlling power outside them, but that they control other things. Others, believing that human acts are not subject to any other than human control, have called those men who control other men gods. Such knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness.
3. No one is blameworthy for not possessing happiness: nay, men who have it not, and go on tending to it, are praised. But lack of the aforesaid knowledge of God renders a man particularly blameworthy. It is a great indication of dulness of perception in a man, when he perceives not such manifest signs of God; just as any one would be counted lacking in perception, who, seeing a man, did not understand that he had a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalms (xiii and lii): The fool said in his heart: There is no God.