This is the light of which it is said: In thy light we shall see light (Ps. xxxv, 10), to wit, of the divine substance; and, The city needeth not sun nor moon, for the brightness of Cjod illuminateth it (Apoc. xxi, 23); and, No more shall there be sun to shine on thee by day, nor brightness of moon to enlighten thee, but the Lord shall be to thee an everlasting light, and thy God shall be thy glory (Isaias lx, 19). And because in God being and understanding are the same, and He is to all the cause of understanding, He is on that account called 'light*: He Was the true light, that enlighteneth every man coming into this world (John i, 8)*: Qod is light (1 John i, 5): Clad in light as in a garment (Ps. ciii, 2). And therefore also as well God as the angels in Holy Scripture are described in figures of fire, because of the brightness of fire.
CHAPTER LIV- Arguments against the aforesaid statements, and their Solutions ARG. 1. No access of light to the eye can elevate the sight to see things that transcend the natural faculty of bodily vision. But the divine substance transcends the entire capacity of created intelligence, even more than intellect transcends the capacity of sense. Therefore no light can supervene upon any created intelligence, to elevate it to the capacity of seeing the divine substance.
Reply. The divine substance is not beyond the capacity of created intel- ligence as though it were something altogether alien from it, as sound is alien • Is the light, spoken of in this context, natural or supernatural? Is it intelligence or faith?
from sight, or an immaterial substance from sense, — for the divine substance is the prime object of intelligence, and the beginning of all intellectual know- ledge,— but it is beyond the capacity of created intelligence as exceeding its power, as the more excellent sensible objects are beyond the capacity of sense.* zArg. 2. That light which is received in the created intelligence is itself created., and therefore falling infinitely short of God. Therefore no such light can raise the creature to the vision of the divine substance.
Reply. This light raises the creature to the vision of God, not that there is no interval between it and the divine substance, but it does so in virtue of the power which it receives from God to such effect, although in its own being it falls infinitely short of God. For this created light does not conjoin the intelligence with God in point of being, but only in point of understanding. f Arg. 4. What is created, may very well be connatural with some created thing. If then that light is created, there may be some created intelligence, which by its own connatural light will see the divine substance, contrary to what has been shown (Chap. XLII).
Reply. The vision of the divine substance exceeds all natural faculty: hence the light whereby a created intelligence is perfected to the vision of the divine substance must be supernatural.
Arg. 6. There must be proportion between the intelligence and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between a created intelligence, per- fected in the aforesaid light, and the divine substance, since the distance between them still remains infinite.
Reply. So there is a proportion between a created intelligence and God as an object of understanding, not a proportion implying any commensurate- ness of being, but a proportion implying a reference of one to the other, as matter is referred to form, or cause to effect. Thus there may well be a pro- portion between the creature and God, as the understanding is referred to the understood, or the effect to the cause. J Some have been moved by these and the like arguments to lay down the statement that God is never to be seen by any created intelligence. But this position, besides taking away the true happiness of the rational creature, which cannot be except in the vision of the divine substance, as has been shown (Chap. LI), is also in contradiction with the authority of Holy Scripture, and is to be rejected as false and heretical.§ • But not so entirely beyond the capacity of dims (St Thomas's phrase here), sed non existentut. I telescopes, spectroscopes and photographic plates. — have written elsewhere: — "There is an analogy Can we then say that the difference between a created between the paper plan of the building and the intelligence and the divine is more like a difference building as it exists...It is obvious that plan of degree than of kind? Can we say that created and and building do not receive the same name in the divine differ only as finite and infinite in the same same sense: yet there is some connexion and relation kind? We cannot say that: for God is not in any between the two, a relation of the less to the in- kind (B. I, Chap. XXV), and the same name is comparably greater which it somehow exhibits and predicable of God and His creature only in an represents" {Oxford and Cambridge Conferences, second analogous sense (B. I, Chapp. XXXII, XXXIV). series, pp. 132, 1 33). Another, and possibly a more The difference between Creator and creature is not apt illustration, might be supplied by modern 'graphs/ a difference of degree, and is deeper than any differ- I mean one of those ' curves of temperature,' or the ence of kind. I do not venture to dissent from St like, which correspond to, but do not (except in Thomas's solution, and I have no other. But to me a very indirect or highly generic fashion) resemble, the difficulty remains, still outstanding, and apparently the facts which they truly represent, insoluble. § In this chapter St Thomas labours to dispel the t Non propter ejus indistantiam a divino intelUftu, difficulties of ittisa/, — that conjunction of the human sed propter pirtutem, etc. The light then does not mind with a superior intelligence, which Averroes reach the object, and still has the power of carrying and the Arabian school dreamt of, and thought to the mind's eye to the object. To say so is to confess see fulfilled in this life (B. II, Chapp. LIX sq.); that the metaphor of light has broken down. which is fulfilled, although in a different manner, by X This is called in the schools proportio babitu- Christian faith and charity, sanctifying grace and GOD THE END OF CREATURES CHAPTER LV-That the Qreated Intelligence does not comprehend the Divine Substance THE aforesaid light is a principle of divine knowledge, since by it the created intelligence is elevated to see the divine substance. Therefore the mode of divine vision must be commensurate with the intensity of the aforesaid light. But the aforesaid light falls far short in intensity of the brightness of the divine understanding. It is impossible therefore for the divine substance to be seen by such light so perfectly as the divine under- standing sees it. The divine understanding sees that substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible: for the truth of the divine substance and the clearness of the divine understanding are equal, nay are one. It is impossible therefore for created intelligence through the aforesaid light to see the divine substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible. But everythiyg that is comprehended by any knowing mind is known by it as perfectly as it is knowable. Thus he who knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, taking it as a matter of opinion on probable grounds because wise men say so, does not yet comprehend that truth: he alone comprehends it, who knows it as matter of science, through the medium of a demonstration showing cause. It is impossible therefore for any created intelligence to comprehend the divine substance.
2. Finite power cannot compass in its activity an infinite object. But the divine substance is infinite in comparison with every created intellect, since every created intellect is bounded within the limits of a certain species.
When it is said that the divine substance is seen but not comprehended by created intelligence, the meaning is not that something of it is seen and something not seen, since the divine substance is absolutely simple: what is meant is that it is not seen perfectly so far as it is visible. In the same way he who holds a demonstrable conclusion as a matter of opinion, is said to know it but not to comprehend it, because he does not know it perfectly, that is, scientifically, though there is no part of it that he does not know.* CHAPTER LVI-That no Qreated Intelligence in seeing God sees all things that can be seen in Him THEN only does the knowledge of a principle necessitate the know- ledge of all its effects, when the principle is thoroughly comprehended by the understanding: for so a principle is known to the whole extent of its power, all its effects being known as caused by it. But through the divine essence other things are known as effects from their cause. Since then created intelligence cannot know the divine substance so as to comprehend it, there is no necessity for it in seeing the divine substance to see all things that can be known thereby.
3. The extent of any power is measured by the objects to which it reaches. To know then all the objects to which any power reaches is to comprehend the power itself. But the divine power, being infinite, can be "comprehended sacraments; which has its perfect fulfilment in the Blessed in heaven Ytdent Deum totum, sed non totaJiter.
beatific vision. It is a white counter, inscribed with A further illustration, suggested by Cardinal Newa new name, which none knoweth but him who receive th man's Grammar of Assent, is the case of two men both (Apoc. ii, 17). I mean, there are difficulties in the knowing the same proposition, the one with a explanation of it, beyond the power of mortal facul- ' notional,' the other with a ' real ' assent: only the ties to solve. latter can be said fully to grasp or comprehend the • This is commonly expressed by saying that the truth.
by no created intelligence, as neither can the divine essence (Chap. LV). Neither then can any created intelligence know all the objects to which the divine power extends.
5. No cognitive faculty knows anything except under the aspect of its proper object: thus by sight we know things only as coloured. Now the proper object of intelligence is whatever is in the substance of a thing.* Therefore whatever the intelligence knows of a thing, it knows by a know- ledge of the substance of the thing. If ever we know the substance of a thing by its accidents, that happens accidentally, inasmuch as our intellectual knowledge arises from sense, and thus we need to arrive at an intellectual view of substance through a knowledge of accidents: wherefore this does not take place in mathematics, but in the natural sciences only. Whatever therefore in a thing cannot be known by a knowledge of its substance, must remain unknown to the knowing mind. But what a voluntary agent wishes cannot be known by a knowledge of his substance: for the will does not tend to its objects altogether by natural necessity: hence ' will* and 4 nature ' are counted two distinct active principles.f What therefore a voluntary agent wills is not knowable except haply through certain effects, as,, when we see one acting voluntarily, we know what he has willed: or it may be known in its cause, as God knows our wills, as He knows other effects of His production, by the fact of His being to us the cause of willing (B. I, Chap. LXVIII ad Jin.): or it may be known by one intimating his will to another, as when one ex- presses his desire by speech. Since then many things depend on the absolute will of God, as has been partly shown already, and will hereafter appear, a created intelligence, even though seeing the substance of God, does not for all that see all that God sees by his substance. J It may be objected that God's substance is something greater than all that He can make, or understand, or will beyond Himself; and that therefore, if a created intelligence can see the substance of God, much more can it know all that God through Himself either understands or wills or can do. But on careful study we see that it is not one and the same thing for an object to be known in itself and known in its cause. There are things easy enough to know in themselves, but not easily known in their causes. Though it is true that it is a grander thing to have understanding of the divine substance than to understand anything else, knowable in itself, away from that substance, still it is more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance, and in it to see its effects, than to know the divine substance without seeing its effects. Now the seeing of the divine substance may be without comprehension of it: but to have all things rendered intelligible through that substance and actually known, that cannot come about without comprehension.
• Thus I have an ocular presentation of a large % To apply to Almighty God the principle that head, fierce eyes, wide, whiskered mouth, and gleam- " what a voluntary agent wishes, cannot be known ing teeth: these phenomena, or accidents, are reported by a knowledge of his substance," lays one open to by sense: my intelligence asks, What is that? (thus the objection that, at that rate, the divine volitions raising the question of quiddity, or substance), and are something over and above the divine substance, t The distinction is that which we draw between pose St Thomas would reply that a perfe8 compre- ' moral ' and ' physical.' bension of God's substance would reveal His volitions.
CHAPTER 1N\\-That every Intelfigence of every grade can be partaker of the Vision of God SINCE it is by supernatural light that a created intelligence is raised to the vision of the divine substance, there is no created intelligence so low in its nature as to be incapable of being raised to this vision. For that light cannot be connatural to any creature (Chap. LIV), but transcends the faculty of every created nature. But what is done by supernatural power is not hindered by diversity of nature, since divine power is infinite.* Hence in the miraculous healing of the sick it makes no difference whether one be very ill or slightly indisposed. Therefore diversity of grade in intelligent nature is no hindrance to the lowest subject of such a nature being raised by that light to that vision.
2. The distance from God of the intelligence highest in order of nature is infinite in respect of perfection and goodness: whereas the distance of that intelligence from the very lowest intelligence is finite, for between finite and finite there cannot be infinite distance. The distance therefore between the lowest created intelligence and the highest is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the highest created intelligence and God. But what is as nothing can make no sensible variation, as the distance between the centre of the earth and our point of vision is as nothing in comparison with the distance between our point of vision and the eighth sphere, compared with which the whole earth counts as a point;f and therefore no sensible error follows from our astronomers in their calculations taking their point of obser- vation for the centre of the earth. J Whatever intellect then is raised to the vision of God by the above mentioned light, — be it highest, or lowest, or middlemost, — it makes no difference.
3. Every intelligence naturally desires the vision of the divine substance (Chapp. XXV, L). But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Any and every created intelligence then can arrive at the vision of the divine substance; and inferiority of nature is no impediment.
Hence the Lord promises to man the glory of the angels: They shall be as the angels of God in beaten (Matt, xxii, 30); and in the Apocalypse the same measure is said to be of man and angel: the measure of a many that /j, oj an angel (Apoc. xxi, 17). Therefore often in Holy Scripture the angels are described in the form of men, either entirely so, as with the angels who appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii), or partially, as with the living creatures of whom it is said that the hand of a man was under their wings (Ezech. i, 8).
• There is some limit to the application of this from east to west carried round the inferior spheres, principle. A dumb animal could not be raised to the This is called the Ptolemaic system, but the eight supernatural order. Short of intellectual soul, there spheres already figure in Plato, Rep. x, 6i6d, 617. can be no sanctifying grace. Unless the mind's eye t Disregarding parallax, — but the reckoning is' be naturally open to intellectual truth, there is no with the ' eighth sphere,' ad quant tota terra comparata means of opening it to the vision of God. obtinet locum pun&i. St Thomas had some inkling of t The eighth sphere of solid crystal carried all the magnitude of the heavens. But what he calls tota the fixed stars, set in it like stones in a ring. Beyond terra in this relation is a vaster quantity, the orbit of that was a ninth: and the tenth and outermost sphere the earth, was the primum mobile, the daily rotation of which CHAPTER INlll-That one may see God more perfeffly than another THE light of glory raises to the vision of God in this, that it is a certain likeness to the divine understanding (Chap. LIII). But a thing may be likened to God with more or less of closeness. Therefore one may see the divine substance with more or less of perfeftion.
4. The end must correspond to the means taken to gain it. But not all subsistent intelligences are equally prepared for their end, which is the vision of the divine substance: for some are of greater virtue, some of less, virtue being the way to happiness. Therefore there must be a diversity in their vision of God.
Hence it is said: In my Father 's house there are many mansions (John xiv, 2).
In the mode of vision then there appear diverse grades of glory among the Blessed, but in respedt of the objeft of vision their glory is the same. Hence to all the labourers in the vineyard, though they have not laboured equally, the Lord tells us that the same reward, or pennyy is to be given, because the same obje6t is given to all to see and enjoy, namely, God.
CHAPTER LIX-How they who see the Divine Substance see all things SINCE the vision of the divine substance is the final end of every sub- sistent intelligence, and the natural desire of every being is at rest when it has attained to its final end, the natural desire of every intelligence that sees the divine substance must be perfedtiy set at rest. But it is the mind's natural desire to know the genera and species and capabilities of all things and the whole order of the universe, as is shown by the zeal of mankind in trying to find out all these things.* Every one therefore of those who see the divine substance will know all the above-mentioned objefts.
2. In this is the difference between sense and intelleft, as shown in De anima, III, iv, that sense is spoilt or impaired by brilliant or intense sensible objefts, so that afterwards it is unable to appreciate similar objedts of lower degree: but intelleft, not being spoilt or checked by its objeft, but simply perfefted, after understanding an objeft in which there is more to understand, is not less but better able to understand other objefts which afford less scope for understanding. But the highest in the category of intelligible beings is the divine substance. When then an understanding is raised by divine light to see the substance of God, much more is it perfefted by the same light to under- stand all other objefts in nature.
4. Though of those who see God one sees Him more perfeftly than an- other, every one nevertheless sees Him with such perfeftion as to fill all his natural capacity, nay, the vision transcends all natural capacity (Chap. LII). Every one therefore, seeing the divine substance, must know in that sub- stance all things to which his natural capacity extends. But the natural capa- city of every intelligence extends to the knowledge of all genera and species and the order of creation. These things therefore every one of those who see God will know in the divine substance.
Hence to Moses asking for a sight of the divine substance the Lord replied: / will show thee all good (Exod. xxxiii, 19); and Gregory says • By the keen pursuit of physical science.
GOD THE END OF CREATURES {Dialogues iv, 33): " What is it that they do not know, who know Him who knows all things?"
But on careful refleftion upon what has been said it appears that they who see the divine substance in one way know all things, and in one way they do not. If by 4 all things ' is meant whatever belongs to the perfeftion of the universe, the arguments alleged prove that they do see all things.* To the perfeftion of natural being belong specific natures, with their pro- perties and powers: for the intention of nature fixes on specific natures: as for individuals, they are for the species. t It belongs then to the perfeftion of a subsistent intelligence, that it should know the natures and capabilities and proper accidents of all species. And by the knowledge of natural species individuals also existing under these species are known by the intelligence that sees God. J But if by 4 all things * is meant all things that God knows by seeing His essence, no created intelligence sees all things in the substance of God, as has been shown above (Chap. LVI).§ This may be verified in various respedts. First, as regards things that God can do, but neither does nor ever means to do. All such things cannot be known without a thorough compre- hension of His power, which is not possible to any created intelligence (Chap. LV). Hence it is said: Perchance thou wilt seize upon the footprints of God and perfeftly discover the Almighty. He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and whence shalt thou {now? Longer than the earth is bis measure, and broader than the sea (Job xi, 7-9). Secondly, as regards the plans of things made, no intelligence can know them all without comprehending the divine goodness. For the plan of every thing made is taken from the end which the maker intends; and the end of all things made by God is the divine goodness: the plan therefore of things made is the diffusion of the divine goodness in creation. To know then all the plans of things made, one would have to know all the good things that can come about in creation according to the order of the divine wisdom: which would mean comprehending the divine goodness and wisdom, a thing that no created intelligence can do. Hence it is said: I understood that of all the Works of God man cannot find out the plan (Eccles viii, 17). Thirdly, as regards things that depend on the mere will of God, as predestination, election, •By* seeing all things that belong to the perfection quately there: my individualising accidents are not of the universe,' St Thomas would mean, in modern contained in the species. Even if they were, I should terminology, * having a comprehensive scientific view not be known as an existing, but only as a possible of the universe as a whole ': this would include a being. No knowledge of the specific type of Julius knowledge of the constitution of matter, and of its Caesar could tell you that a Julius Caesar ever actually working arrangements, molar and molecular; an lived and died. This cannot be denied except by one understanding of electricity, of gravitation, of vege- who is prepared to break down all distinction betable and animal life, of the genesis of nebulae and tween the a priori scientific order and the a posteriori stars, of the origin of species, animal and vegetable, historical order of things, and to make all beings and of the workings of the mind, such as free will. A very events ultimately a priori, as part of the inevitable wonderful knowledge, but much less wonderful than evolution of the Absolute. He who will go this length the vision of God. # may march with Hegel, or, if he will, with Hobbes: t The ' intention of nature' is for corn to grow, but St Thomas, with Aristotle, distinguishes the con- but not for every grain to germinate. The ' waste of tingent from the necessary. You cannot, no one nature,' noticed by Bishop Butler, is a waste of indi- possibly can, read the contingent in the necessary, viduals, but not usually of species. But all individual existence, except that of God, is t Yes, if the intelligence sees in the substance of ultimately contingent; while the specific ratio is neces- God His decree for the creation of these and those sary. Cf. B. II, Chap. C.
individuals. But St Thomas makes a difficulty about § It is important to attend to these explanations, the vision of the divine substance extending to a since the headings of Chapp. LVI, LIX, seem at first vision of the divine decrees: see Chap. LVI, n. 4, sight contradictory. The power, goodness and will of and the last words of this chapter. One of the Blessed God remain beyond the full comprehension of the can see me in God, if he can read in God the divine Blessed, and consequently many of their possible volition to create and conserve me in being. He can- effects in creation, not see me in the species ' man,' for I am not adejustification, and the like, which belong to the sandtification of the creature, it is said: The things that are in man none knowetb but the spirit of man that is in bim: in like manner the things that are of God none \nowetb but the Spirit of CHAPTER LX-That they who see God see all things in Him at once SINCE it has been shown that a created intelligence in seeing the divine substance understands therein all the species of things; since moreover all things that are seen by one presentation must be seen together by one vision; it necessarily follows that the intelligence which sees the divine sub- stance views all things, not successively, but simultaneously. Hence Augustine says (De Trinitate XV, xvi): " Our thoughts will not then be unstable, coming and going from one thing to another, but we shall see all our knowledge together at one glance."* CHAPTER LXl-That by the Sight of God one is Partaker of Life Everlasting ETERNITY differs from time in this, that time has being in succession, but the being of eternity is all present together. But in the sight of God there is no succession: all things that are seen in that vision are seen at one glance. That vision therefore is accomplished in a certain participa- tion of eternity. That vision also is a certain life: for activity of intellect is a life. Therefore by that sight the created intelligence is partaker of life everlasting.