CHAPTER XCW-Ofthe Certainty of Divine Providence\ IT will be necessary now to repeat some of the things that have been said before, to make it evident that (a) nothing escapes divine providence, and the order of divine providence can nowise be changed; and yet (b) it does not follow that the events which happen under divine providence all happen of necessity.
# OrdinattOy the Greek rafic, an ever-recurring term in St Thomas, for which no one constant equiva- lent can be found in English. The word onfinatio, , better perhaps than any other, sums up St Thomas's life and marks his genius.
t Importing 'horoscopes,' 'nativities," and other baubles of astrology.
X In reading this chapter, which I have not trans- lated in full, one feels like an observer at work with a telescope out of focus. The thought of the Angelic Doctor is blurred by that fatal misconception which it was reserved for Newton to dissipate, that, in the heavens above, physical nature works necessarily and uniformly, but, on the earth beneath, contingently (so that the effect might be otherwise) and with some anomaly and irregularity. We must say boldly that the case is not so; that throughout all time and all space physical nature works necessarily and uniformly. The difference between astronomy and such sciences as chemistry and biology comes merely to this, that the elementary phenomena of astronomy, the orbits of the planets, and the rotation of the earth, depend, at first approximation, upon an ex- tremely simple combination of causes, and there- fore are readily calculable: whereas in the rest of na- ture complexity of causes and intermingling of effects is enormous, and our reckonings are continually thrown out by our ignorance of coexistences. The heavens are seen from a distance, and to the naked eye are visible only in their most general outlines. The earth would be a simple body enough to study with the naked eye ninety million miles away. Such an effect as the death by lightning of a sheep in a thunderstorm, which St Thomas would call * contin- gent,' is really a complex physical effect, as necessary a part of the pre-established order of physical causa- (a) Our first point of study is this, that as God is the cause of all existing things, conferring being on them all, the order of His providence must embrace all things: for He must grant preservation to those to whom He has granted existence, and bestow on them perfe&ion in the attainment of their last end. In the case of every one who has to provide for others there are two things to observe, the pre-arranging of the order intended and the setting of the pre-arranged order on foot. The former is an exercise of intel- ledtual ability, the latter of pradtical. The difference between the two is this, that in the pre-arrangement of order the providence is more perfedt, the further the arrangement can be extended even to the least details: there would be not many parts of prudence in him who was competent only to arrange generalities: but in the carrying of the order out into efFeft the providence of the ruler is marked by greater dignity and completeness the more general it is, and the more numerous the subordinate functionaries through whom he fulfils his design, for the very marshalling of those func- tionaries makes a great part of the foreseen arrangement. Divine providence, therefore, being absolutely perfeft (B. I, Chap. XXVIII), arranges all things by the eternal forethought of its wisdom, down to the smallest details, no matter how trifling they appear. And all agents that do any work a£t as instruments in His hands, and minister in obedience to Him, to the unfold- ing of that order of providence in creation which He has from eternity devised. But if all things that aft must necessarily minister to Him in their adtion, it is impossible for any agent to hinder the execution of divine provi- dence by adting contrary to it. Nor is it possible for divine providence to be hindered by the defedt of any agent or patient, since all a<5tive or passive power in creation is caused according to the divine arrangement. Again it is impossible for the execution of divine providence to be hindered by any change of providence, since God is wholly unchangeable (B. I, Chap. XV). The conclusion remains, that the divine provision cannot be annulled.
(b) Now to our second point of study. Every agent intends good, and better so far as it can (Chap. III). But good and better do not have place in the same way in a whole and in its parts. In the whole the good is the entire effect arising out of the order and composition of the parts: hence it is better for the whole that there should be inequality among the parts, — without which inequality the order and perfection of the whole cannot be, — than that all the parts should be equal, every one of them attaining to the rank of the noblest part. And yet, considered by itself, every part of lower rank would be better if it were in the rank of some superior part. Thus in the human body the foot would be a more dignified part of man if it had the beauty and power of the eye; but the whole body would be worse off for lacking the office of the foot. The scope and aim therefore of the particular agent is not the same as that of the universal agent. The particular agent tends to the good of the part absolutely, and makes the best of it that it can; but the universal agent tends to the good of the whole: hence a defe<5t may be beside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent. It is the intention of the particular agent that its effedt should be perfedt to the utmost possible in its kind: but it is the intention of the universal agent that this effedt be carried to a certain degree tion as the alternation of day and night. Positis ponen- rise to-morrow: the only difference between the two dis, and leaving man out of the case, it is as impossible cases is the multitude of pontnda. Cf. Chap. LXXIII, for that sheep to escape death as for the sun not to with notes, p. 244.
of perfedtion and no further. Now between the parts of the universe the first apparent difference is that of contingent and necessary. Beings of a higher order are necessary and indestru&ible and unchangeable: from which condi- tion beings fall away, the lower the rank in which they are placed; so that the lowest beings suffer destruction in their being and change in their con- stitution, and produce their effedts, not necessarily, but contingently. Every agent therefore that is part of the universe endeavours, so far as it can, to abide in its being and natural constitution, and to establish its effedt: but God, the governor of the universe, intends that of the effedts which take place in it one be established as of necessity, another as of contingency; and with this view He applies different causes to them, necessary causes to these effedts, contingent causes to those. It falls under divine providence therefore, not only that this effefi be, but also that this effedt be necessarily, that other contingently. Thus, of things subjedt to divine providence, some are neces- sary, and others contingent, not all necessary.
Hence it is clear that this conditional proposition is true: c If God has foreseen this thing in the future, it will be/ But it will be as God has provided that it shall be; and supposing that He has provided that it shall be con- tingently, it follows infallibly that it will be contingently, and not necessarily.
Cicero (De drvinatione ii, 8) has this argument: 'If all things are fore- seen by God, the order of causes is certain; but if so, all things happen by fate, nothing is left in our power, and there is no such thing as free will.' A frivolous argument, for since not only effects are subject to divine provi- dence, but also causes, and modes of being, it follows that though all things happen by divine providence, some things are so foreseen by God as that they are done freely by us.
Nor can the defectibility of secondary causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, take away the certainty of divine provi- dence: for since God works in all things, it belongs to His providence some- times to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to keep them from failing.
The Philosopher shows* that if every effect has a proper cause {causam per se)y every future event may be reduced to some present or past cause. Thus if the question is put concerning any one, whether he is to be slain by robbers, that effect proceeds from a cause, his meeting with robbers; and that effect again is preceded by another cause, his going out of his house; and that again by another, his wanting to find water; the preceding cause to which is thirst, and this is caused by eating salt meat, which he either is doing or has done. If then, positing the cause, the effect must be posited of necessity, he must neces- sarily be thirsty, if he eats salt meat; and he must necessarily will to seek water, if he is thirsty; and he must necessarily go out of the house, if he wills to seek water; and the robbers must necessarily come across him, if he goes out of the house; and if they come across him, he must be killed. Therefore from first to last it is necessary for this man eating salt meat to be killed by robbers, f The philosopher concludes that it is not true that, positing the * St Thomas refers to Aristotle, {Metaphysics, V, stitute a terrier and a rabbit, and the chain of physi- 3, a brief and obscure passage which he expands. cal causation, from eating salt vegetables to being t St Thomas evidently considers this conclusion worried by a dog, is necessary, so long as all the re- absurd. The only absurdity that I see in it arises from levant antecedents in the case, positive and negative, free will entering in as an element in some portion remain unaltered, of the conduct of the robbers and their victim. Subcause, the effect must be posited, because there are some causes that may fail.* Nor again is it true that every effeft has a proper cause: for any accidental effeft, e.g., of this man wishing to look for water and falling in with robbers, has no cause, t CHAPTERS XCV, XCVl-That the Immutability of Divine Providence does not bar the Utility of Prayer AS the immutability of divine providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it bar the utility of prayer. For prayer is not poured out to God that the eternal arrangement of providence may be changed, — that is impossible, — but that man may gain what he desires of God. It is fitting for God to assent to the pious desires of His rational creatures, not that our desires move the immutability of God, but it is an outcome of His goodness suitably to carry out what we desire.
4. It is proper for friends to will the same thing. Now God loves His creature (B. I, Chap. XCI) and every creature all the more that the said creature has a share in His goodness, which is the prime and principal object of God's love. But, of all creatures, the rational creature most perfe6tly par- takes in the divine goodness. God therefore wills the fulfilment of the desires of the rational creature. And His will is effective of things.
5. The goodness of the creature is derived in point of likeness from the goodness of God. But it is a point of special commendation in men, not to deny assent to just requests: thereupon they are called 'liberal/ 4 clement,' 4 merciful and kind.' This therefore is a very great function of divine good- ness, to hear pious prayers. J Hence it is said: He will do the will of them that fear himy and hear their prayers and save them (Ps. cxliv, 9): Every one that asketh recehethy and be that seeJ(eth fndeth, and the door shall be opened to him that knoc{eth (Matt, §From what has been said it appears that prayers and pious desires are causes of some things that are done by God. It has been shown above (Chap.
* * Fail,' some of their conditions not being pre- consequently nothing in existence higher than man, sent, as when a pistol misses fire; or a counteracting is atheism. To make out a God, all intellect and no cause being present, as medical skill (or miraculous will, all law and no love, a being admirable indeed, power), to save a patient who must otherwise have but unloving and unlovable, is to make God less good died. than man, — as though what Holy Writ calls Movingt * No cause,' when you consider the case in the kindness ' were a sort of 4 bend sinister,' a shade of abstract, but how if it be taken in the concrete, — inferiority in being. The argument in the text, — by a man going to look for water in a region infested adversaries dubbed 'anthropomorphic,' — goestoestabwith robbers? lish what present-day philosophers call * a personal In speaking of a * necessary cause ' St Thomas is God,' meaning a God who has in Him something corin fact thinking of a physical cause which is not responding to what in man are called ' feelings,' and likely to be counteracted, or to have any of its requi- that something not ineffective or impotent in this site conditions fail, e.g., the rotation of the earth pro- world of law; a God consequently whom there is ducing sun-rise. In speaking of a ' contingent cause,' some use in praying to.
far as the phrase may be used without bringing $ What follows is the second part of Chap. XCVI.
free will into the field, — he has in view a physical I have appended it to Chap. XCV, to which in sub- cause, the action of which may readily be counter- ject-matter it belongs, and without which it is in- acted by the interference of other physical causes, or complete as leaving the most serious difficulty unre- may fail of effect because some one of its many requi- solved. Indeed, seeing how the Bergamo autograph site conditions is not present. A contingent physical in the Vatican consists of loose parchments tied to- cause, uninterfered with and having all its conditions gether, I suspect that the order of them has got de- present, works as a necessary cause. ranged, and that what follows was meant by the I To say that in man nature attains its highest Saint to belong to Chap. XCV. perfection, that there is nothing beyond nature, and LXXVII) that divine providence does not bar the working of other causes, nay, rather it directs them in the work of imposing upon creation the order which providence in its own counsels has determined upon. Thus secondary causes are not inconsistent with providence, but rather carry providence into effedt. Thus then prayers are efficacious with God, not however as breaking through the order of divine providence, because this very arrangement, that such a concession be made to such a petitioner, falls under the order of divine providence. Therefore to say that we should not pray to gain any- thing of God, because the order of His providence is unchangeable, is like saying that we should not walk to get to a place, nor eat to support life.
Thus a twofold error concerning prayer is excluded. Some have said that there is no fruit of prayer. This was said as well on the part of those who denied divine providence, as the Epicureans did; as also on the part of those who withdrew human affairs from divine providence, as some of the Peripatetics did; as also on the part of those who thought that all things happen of necessity, as the Stoics did. From all these tenets it would follow that prayer is fruitless, and consequently all divine worship in vain:* which error is referred to in Malachy iii, 14: Te ha*)>e said: He laboureth in vain that serveth God, and what profit is it that we have kept his ordinances, and that we have walked sad before the Lord of hosts?
There were others on the contrary who said that the divine arrangement was reversible by prayer. And the prima facie rendering of certain texts of scripture seems to favour this view. Thus, after Isaias by divine command had said to King Ezechias: Put thine house in order, for thou shalt die and not live; yet upon Ezechias's prayer the word of the Lord came to Isaias ', saying: Go and tell Ezechias: 1 have heard thy prayer ', lo I will add to thy days fifteen years (Isa. xxxviii, 1-5). Again it is said in the person of the Lord: I Kill suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and pull down and destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the eJ>il that I have thought to do to them (Jer. xviii, 7, 8); Turn to the Lord your God \ for he is gracious and merciful: who knoweth but be will turn and forghe? (Joel ii, 13, 14.) But against construing these texts to mean that the will of God is changeable, or that anything happens to God in time, or that temporal events in creation are the cause of anything coming to exist in God, there are other authorities of Holy Writ, containing infal- lible and express truth. Thus it is said: God is not as man, that he should lie, nor as the son of man, that he should change. Has he said then and shall not do? has he spoken and shall not fulfil? (Num. xxiii, 1 9): The *i>i£iorious one in Israel will not spare, and 'Will not be moved to repentance: for he is not a man that he should repent (1 Kings xv, 29): / am the Lord and change not (Malach. iii, 6).
On careful consideration it will appear that all mistakes in this matter arise from failing to note the difference between the system of the universe and any particular system (universalem ordinem et particularem). There is nothing to hinder any particular system being changed, whether by prayer or by any other means; for there is that existing beyond the bounds of the system which is capable of changing it. But beyond the system that embraces all things nothing can be posited whereby such system could possibly be changed, depending as it does on the universal cause. Therefore the Stoics laid it down * The prayer of petition would be fruitless, cer- operatic purposes. Who would ' give thanks ' to the tainly; and that is the prayer, the cry of distress, law of gravitation, or ' bless' Maclauren's theorem, which bursts most fervently from heart and lips: but or 'glorify ' Boyle's law, or 'adore ' the whole con- even the chant of praise would die away except for catenation of the laws of thought and things?
that the system established by God could nowise be changed. But they failed in a right appreciation of this general system in supposing that prayers were useless, which was taking for granted that the wills of men, and their desires whence their prayers proceed, are not comprehended in that general system. For when they say that the same effect follows whether prayers are put up or not, — follows, that is, as part of the universal system of things, — they manifestly reserve and except prayers as not entering into that general system. Supposing prayers included in the system, then effects will follow from them by divine appointment as from other causes. One might as well exclude the effefts of other every-day causes as exclude the effedl of prayer. And if the immutability of the divine plan does not withdraw the effects of other causes, neither does it take away the efficacy of prayer.
Prayers then avail, not as changing a system arranged from eternity, but as being themselves part of that system. And there is no difficulty in the efficacy of prayer changing the particular system of some inferior cause, by the doing of God, who overpasses all causes, and who consequently is not bound by the necessity of any system depending on any cause; but on the contrary every necessity of system dependent on any inferior cause is checked by Him, as having been instituted by Him.* Inasmuch then as pious prayers avail to alter some points of the system of inferior causes that was established by God, God is said to 'turn,' or Repent.* Hence Gregory says that God does not change His counsel, though He sometimes changes His sentence, not the sentence which declares His eternal arrangements, but the sentence which declares the order of inferior causes, according to which Ezechias was to die, or some nation to be punished for its sins. Such change of sentence is called in meta- phorical language Repentance,' inasmuch as God behaves like one repentant, to whom it belongs to change what He has done. In the same way God is said metaphorically to be 'angry/ inasmuch as by punishing He produces the efFed of anger. (B. I, Chap. XCI ad Jin) CHAPTER XCVl-That God does not hear all Prayers THERE is no anomaly in the prayers of petitioners being sometimes not granted by God. For God fulfils the desires of His rational creature inasmuch as that creature desires good: but sometimes it happens that what is asked is not true but seeming good, which is simply evil: such a prayer is not within the hearing of God. Hence it is said: Ye as{ and receive noty because ye ask amiss (James iv, 3).
2. It is suitable that God should fulfil our desires in so far as He moves us to desire. If therefore the movement of desire on our part is not kept up by earnestness in prayer, there is nothing to be surprised at if the prayer does not gain its due effefl. Hence the Lord [St Luke] says: We ought always to pray and not to faint (Luke xviii, 1); and the Apostle, Pray without ceasing 3. It befits God to hear the prayer of the rational creature inasmuch as * In the above passage, inadvertently perhaps, St system,' on the hypothesis of that system being. The Thomas admirably hits off the real meaning of what killing of a sheep by lightning (see note, p. 254) is a he and Aristotle called 4 contingent ' events, crv^/fc- contingency unprovided for in ovine economy, but firfKora. An event is 4 contingent ' in reference to a pre-arranged in the general system of the universe, * particular system,' but (apart from the doings of in which general system it is an hypothetical necesfree will) every event is * necessary' in the 'general sity: it must be, if the system is to stand as it is.
that creature draws nigh to Him. But one draws nigh to God by contempla- tion and devout affection and humble and firm intention. That prayer therefore which does not so draw nigh to God is not within God's hearing. Hence it is said: He hath regarded the prayer of the humble (Ps. ci, 1 8); and, Let him ask in faith, debating not within himself (James i, 6).
4. God hears the prayers of the pious on the ground of friendship. He then who turns away from the friendship of God is not worthy to have his prayer heard.* Hence it is said: Whosoever turns away his ear from bearing the law, his prayer shall be abominable (Prov. xxviii, 9): Though ye multiply prayers, J will not hear: for your hands are full of blood (Isai. i, 15). This is why sometimes a friend of God is not heard, when he prays for those who are not God's friends, as it was said: Do not thou pray for this people, nor ta{e unto thee praise and supplication for them, and do not withstand me: for I will not hear thee (Jerem. vii, 16).
It happens sometimes that for very friendship one denies his friend's peti- tion, knowing it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him, as a physician refuses what his patient asks for. No wonder then if God, who fulfils the desires put before Him by His rational creature for the love that He bears to that creature, fails sometimes to fulfil the petition of those whom He singularly loves, that He may fulfil it otherwise with something more helpful to the salvation of the petitioner, as we read in 2 Cor. xii, 7-9; and the Lord says to some: Te know not what ye ask (Matt, xx, 22). Therefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Paulin. et Theras.): " The Lord is good in often not giving what we will, to give instead what we should prefer."
CHAPTER XCVU-How the Arrangements of Trovidence follow a Plan GOD by His providence directs all things to the end of the divine goodness, not that anything accrues as an addition to His goodness by the things that He makes, but His aim is the impression of the likeness of His goodness so far as possible on creation. But inasmuch as every created substance must fall short of the perfection of the divine goodness, it was needful to have diversity in things for the more perfect communication of the divine goodness, that what cannot perfedtly be represented by one created exemplar, might be represented by divers such exemplars in divers ways in a more perfect manner. Thus man multiplies his words to express by divers expressions the conception of his mind, which cannot all be put in one word.f And herein we may consider the excellence of the divine per- fection shown in this, that the perfedt goodness which is in God united and simple, cannot be in creatures except according to diversity of modes and in many subjedts. Things are different by having different forms, whence they take their species. Thus then the end of creation furnishes a reason for the diversity of forms in things.
From the diversity of forms follows a difference of activities, and further a diversity of agents and patients, properties and accidents.
* That is, not until there is in him some first 4 vocal to them that understand.' There is a message breath of desire of going back to God. The wicked of God to man in nature, a message unconsidered man ma/ pray for himself: but, praying for others, by those theologians, who will not attend to physics; he is less likely to be heard than the just man. and neglected by those physicists, who will hear of t Thus creation is a kind of divine language, no theology.
Evidently then it is not without reason that divine providence distributes to creatures different accidents and actions and impressions aqd allocations. Hence it is said: 7 he Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, hath established the heavens in prudence. <By his wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thic\ with dew (Prov. iii, 19, 20).
As it is necessary for one wishing to build a house to look out for timber, but his looking out for pitch-pine (ligna abietina) depends on his mere will, not on his plan of building a house; so it is necessary for God to love His own goodness, but it does not thence necessarily follow that He should wish to have that goodness represented by creatures, since the divine goodness is perfedt without that. Hence the bringing of creatures into being depends on the mere will of God, although it is done in consideration of the divine good- ness. Supposing however that God wishes to communicate His goodness by way of similitude as far as possible, it logically follows thence that there should be creatures of different sorts: but it does not follow of necessity that creatures should be of this or that grade of perfedtion, or exist in this or that number. But supposing that it is in the divine will to wish this number in creation, and this grade of perfection in each creature, it thence follows logi- cally that creation be in such and such form, and such and such matter; and so of further consequences. Manifestly then providence disposes of things according to a certain plan, and yet this plan presupposes the divine will.
What has been said shuts out two errors, the error of those who believe that all things follow mere will without reason, which is the error of sundry Doctors of the Mohammedan law, as Rabbi Moses says; according to whose teaching, the only difference between fire warming and fire freezing is God's so willing the former alternative;* and again the error is shut out of those who say that the order of causes springs from divine providence by way of necessity.
There are certain words of Holy Scripture which appear to put down all things to the mere will of God. Their meaning is not to take away all ratio- nal character from the dispensations of Providence, but to show that the will of God is the first principle of all things. Such texts are: All things, whatso- ever he hath willed, the Lord hath done (Ps. cxxxiv, 6:) Who can say to him, Why doth thou so? (Job ix, 12:) Who resisteth his will? (Rom. ix, 19.) And Augustine (De Trin. Ill:) "Nothing but the will of God is the prime cause of health and sickness, of rewards and punishments, of graces and recompenses."