Since eating and the intercourse of the sexes are not things in themselves unlawful, and exterior possessions are necessary for getting food, for rearing and supporting a family, and other bodily wants, it follows that neither is the possession of wealth in itself unlawful, provided the order of reason be ob- served,— I "mean, provided the man possesses justly the things that he has, and does not fix the final end of his will in them,§ and uses them duly for his own and others* profit.
Hereby is excluded the error of some, who, as Augustine says, " most arrogantly called themselves Apostolics, because they did not receive into their communion married men and proprietors, such as are many monks and clerks whom the Catholic Church now contains: these people are heretics, because, separating themselves from, the Church, they think that there is no hope for other persons who make use of what they do without " {De hare- * " The male kine, if clean, and the male calves, are used for sacrifice by the Egyptians universally; but the females they are not allowed to sacrifice, since they are sacred to Isis" (Herodotus, ii, 41). Rawlinson says, "in order to prevent the breed of cattle being diminished: but some mysterious reason being assigned for it, the people were led to respedt an ordinance which might not otherwise have been attended to." He quotes Porphyry, De abstin. ii, 11, who doubtless was St Thomas's authority. The sacri- fice and eating of bull beef in Egypt is described by Herodotus, ii, 40.
t Such rules are the Church laws of fasting and abstinence, and the rules of several religious orders. They are positive enactments only, not inherent in the nature of things, and therefore dispensable.
X See further 1 Cor. viii: 1 Cor. x, 19-28: Rom. xiv: I Tim. iv, 3, 4. These passages are interesting to the moralist, as showing the incidental binding force of public sentiment, creating a new obligation.
There are some remarks on the value of sentiment m ethics in ToRtical and (Moral Essays, pp. 279-281.
§ According to Aristotle, Politics, i, 9, whatever we desire as a final end, and not merely as a means, we desire without end or measure. Thus to desire wealth is to make a god of Mammon, as some do of pleasure (Matt, vi, 24: Phil, iii, 18), and conse- quently to stick at nothing that can safely procure it: it is to be the slave of money. Cf. St Paul's expres- sions, Rom. vi, 16-20, and the phrase in Thucydides i, 8 1, hovktvtiv rjj yj}, 'to be the slaves of one's land,' i.e., to be ready to make any unpatriotic sacrifice to save one's estates.
II This curious passage is in the Liber de lutresilm, printed as the genuine work of St Augustine in Tom. viii of the Maurist edition. St Athanasius, Ep. ad Dracont., mentions married monks, though they probably were the exception. The enforcement of clerical celibacy originally went no further than a prohibition of marriage subsequent to ordination.
CHAPTER CXXVIII-How the Law of God relates Man to his Neighbour [£f. Chap. CXVII) OF all things that man makes use of, the chief arc other men. Man is naturally a social animal, needing many things that the individual cannot procure by himself. The divine law therefore must needs in- struct man to live according to the order of reason in his relations with other men.
2. The end of the divine law is to bring man to cleave to God. Now man is aided thereto by his fellow-man, as well in point of knowledge as in point of affeCtion: for men help one another in the knowledge of the truth, and one incites another to good and restrains him from evil. Hence it is said: Iron is sharpened by iron, and man sharpens the face of his friend (Prov. xxvii, 1 7): Better two together than one, etc. (Eccles iv, 9-12).
There is then orderly concord amongst men, when to each there is ren- dered his own, which is the aCt of justice; and therefore it is said: The work of justice is peace (Isa. xxxii, 17). To the observance of this justice man is inclined both by an interior and an exterior principle. By an interior prin- ciple, in so far as a man has a will to observe the precepts of the divine law, which is done by his bearing love to God and to his neighbour: for whoever loves another renders him his due spontaneously and with pleasure, and even adds more by liberality: hence the whole fulfilment of the law hinges upon love (Rom. xiii, 10: Matt, xxii, 40). But because some are not so inwardly disposed as to do of their own accord what the law commands, they have to be dragged by an exterior force to the fulfilment of the justice of the law; and so they fulfil the law under fear of penalties, not as freemen but as slaves. Hence it is said: When thou shalt do thy judgements upon the earth by punishing the wicked, the inhabitants of earth shall learn justice (Isa. xxvi, 9). Others are so disposed as to do of their own accord what the law bids them. They are a law to themselves, having charity, which bends their wills in place of a law to generous conduCt. There was no need of an exterior law being enaCted for them: hence it is said: The law was not made for the just, but for the unjust: which is not to be taken to mean that the just are not bound to fulfil the law, as some have misunderstood the text, but that the just are inclined of them- selves to do justice even without a law.
CHAPTER CXXIX-That the things commanded by the Divine Law are right^ not only because the Law enacts themy but also according to Nature BY the precepts of the divine law the human mind is subordinated to God, and all the rest of man is subordinated to reason. But this is just what natural order requires, that the inferior be subject to the superior. Therefore the things commanded by the divine law are in themselves naturally right.
2. Divine providence has endowed men with a natural tribunal of reason (naturale judicatorium rationis), to be the ruling principle of their proper activities. But natural principles are ordained to natural purposes. There are Such a marriage came readily to fall under the prohi- otifer things in the Church, clerical and monastic bition of a second marriage, which underlies the celibacy developed in time from a gospel germ (Matt, phrase husband of one wife, 1 Tim. iii, 2. Like some xix) and apostolic practice (1 Cor. vii, 7).
certain activities naturally suited to man, and these activities are in themselves right, and not merely by positive law.* 3. Where there is a definite nature, there must be definite activities proper to that nature: for the proper activity of every nature is consequent upon the nature. Now it is certain that men's nature is definite.f There must therefore be certain activities that in themselves befit man.
4. Wherever a thing is natural to any one, any other thing also is natural, without which the first thing cannot be had, for nature fails not in necessities. But it is natural to man to be a social animal. Those things therefore naturally befit man, without which the maintenance of human society would be im- possible. Such things are the securing to every man of his own, and abstinence from wrongdoing. Some points therefore of human conduct are naturally right.
5. The use of lower creatures to meet the need of human life is a natural property of man. Now there is a certain measure in which the use of the aforesaid creatures is helpful to human life. If this measure is transgressed, as in the disorderly taking of food, it results in harm to man. There are therefore certain human acts naturally appropriate, and others naturally inappropriate.
6. In the natural order man's body is for his soul, and the lower powers of the soul for reason. It is therefore naturally right for man so to manage his body and the lower faculties of his soul as that the aft and good of reason may l^ast of all be hindered, but rather helped. Mismanagement in this regard must naturally be sinful. -We count therefore as things naturally evil carousings and revellings and the disorderly indulgence of the sexual instinct, whereby the act of reason is impeded and subjected to the passions, which do not leave the judgement of the reason free.
7. To every man those things are naturally befitting, whereby he tends to his natural end; and the contraries are naturally unbefitting. But God is the end to which man is ordained by nature (Chap. CXV). Those things there- fore are naturally right, whereby man is led to the knowledge and love of God; and the contraries are naturally evil for man.
Hence it is said: The judgements of the Lord are righteous \ having their justi- fication in themselves (Ps. xviii, 10).
Hereby is excluded the tenet of those who say that things just and right are the creation of positive law.
# The term right may be taken in two senses: (1) as revealed. Right in this chapter is right in the second as the contradictory of wrong, thus it means not wrong, sense of the term.
but permissible. So it is right to wear a red waistcoat. t This is precisely what Nominalism denies, or Positive laws can command nothing which is not right ignores. Nominalism eradicates the conception of to begin with, in this sense. (2) Right may mean requi- * nature ' (^v<ric), and reduces everything to 'conven- site, incumbent upon human nature as such, and requir- tion' (vtyzos). This chapter, an admirable one, con- ing- to he made obligatory upon all, e.g., sobriety and the taining the very pith and marrow of moral philsophy, payment of debts. This sense of right includes the is written against the Nominalists. It tells against former sense and adds to it. The law commanding Hobbes. For its importance see notes, pp. 261, 286, such right is not called positive, but natural law. St with the text corresponding. Thomas calls it divine law, meaning the natural law GOD THE END OF CREATURES CHAPTER CXXX-That the Divine Government of Men is after the manner of Paternal Government THE father has care of the child, not only in his relations with other men, as the king has care of him, but also in his individual con- cerns, as has been shown above of God (Chap. XCIII). And this with good reason, for a parent is like God in giving natural origin to a human being. Hence divine and paternal government extend to the individual, not merely as a member of society, but as a person subsisting in his own nature by himself. The two governments differ however in this, that paternal government can extend only to the things that appear in man externally, but divine government reaches also to interior afts and dispositions. For no man can take cognisance of things hidden from him: the secrets of hearts are hidden from men, though open to God (B. I, Chap. LIX). God therefore takes account of man not only as to his exterior behaviour, but also as to his inward affections, what he means to do, and what he intends to gain by doing it. OFsuch points man takes no cognisance, except so far as by out- ward a<5ts the inward disposition is shown.* Every one has care of things according as they belong to him: for solici- tude about things that are no affair of yours is blamed as meddlesomeness. But one man belongs to another's charge otherwise than as he belongs to God. One man belongs to another either by natural origin and bodily descent, or by some combination in external works. But man belongs to God inasmuch as he has his origin from Him, which origin means a certain likeness to God: for every being afls to the production of its own likeness. Now man has more of the likeness of God in his soul than in his body, and most of all in his mind.f Clearly therefore, in the origin of man as coming from God, the main thing intended is the mind, and for the mind's sake the other (sentient) parts of the soul are produced by God; and for the soul the body is produced: so God's principal care is for the mind of man, — first, for the mind; then for the other parts of the soul, and after them for the body. Hence it is by the mind that man attains his last end, which is human happiness (Chap. XXXVII). Other things in man serve as instruments for the securing of happiness. Hence we may observe that human government takes cognisance of interior a£ts so far as they are direCted to external conduct and are thereby unfolded to view: J but God contrariwise takes cognisance of external conduct so far as it points to interior dispositions, particularly in regard of the mind, whereby man is capable of happiness, — human happi- ness consisting, as has been said, in the fruition of God. The whole care therefore that God has of man is in view of preparing his mind for the fruition of God, whereunto the mind is prepared by faith, hope and charity:§ * St Thomas's words exactly define what is called § In other words, man lives under a supernatural in English law an 4 overt acV Overt a6b apart, the providence; or, as St Augustine was fond of repeating maxim holds, *De inttrnis nmjudicat prator. A godless to his people at Hippo: "Not for this world are you morality relieves a man of responsibility for all the a Christian." Not that the interests of this world are secret workings of his will, — not that it declares them to be disregarded, but they are to be kept subordiall right, but it removes them from the province of nate. A momentous utterance, indicative of the whole law and legal sanction. policy of the Christian Church, and of the Church's t The intellectual part of the soul, spoken of by abiding quarrel with secularism, utilitarianism, greed Aristotle as 'divine,' is in the natural order the most of markets, and other aberrations from the eternal godlike thing in man; and of that St Thomas here goal, and even from the true notion of happiness on speaks. earth, as that consists in content of mind and heart X Pofitkal and Moral Essays, pp. 57, 145, on the and social charity; in lieu of which we have taken in question how far the State teaches virtue. exchange our ever growing armaments, our thousands for by faith man's mind is disposed to recognise God as a Being above him- self: by hope it is strengthened to reach out to Him and see in Him man's true good: by charity it fixes upon Him so as immovably to adhere to Him. All things that God requires of man in this life are referable to these three virtues.
Hence it is siid: sAnd now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God as\ of thee, except that thou fear the Lord thy God and walk in bis ways? (Deut. x, 12.) Now there remain faith, hope and charity, these three (1 Cor. xiii, 13).
But because the human mind is naturally more imperfeft than other intelledtual natures; and the more perfeft a thing is, the more energy it shows in tending to its end; it appears that the human mind is naturally weaker in tending to God, the end of all, than are the higher minds of the angels. This weakness shows itself on two points. First, in the deficiency of intellectual power in the human soul, as compared with higher intelligences, so that it cannot go straight to intellectual truth as it is in itself (Chapp. XLI, CXIX). Secondly, in the obstacles that keep it back from throwing itself with all its force upon God; obstacles on the part of the body, which claims care for sustenance and repose; and again obstacles on the part of the lower powers of the soul, inasmuch as the excitements of phantasy and the perturbations of passion trouble that interior peace, which is so necessary for the mind freely to throw itself upon God. These obstacles cannot be wholly removed by man from his path, so long as he lives in this mortal body: for he has to attend to the things necessary for this mortal life, and is thereby hindered from always actually tending to God. But the aforesaid hindrances should be so far got under that there should be in man's mind an intention at least, direfted to God without interruption;* and the more the mind can be even actually fixed on God, the more perfeCt will man's life be, as keeping nearer to its last end. And this aCtual fixing of the mind upon God will go to strengthen the intention direfted towards Him, which intention must needs come to naught unless at times the mind be fixed upon Him actually. All the precepts and counsels therefore of the divine law go to furnish man with aids for fixing his mind on God and removing obstacles to such attention.
For both these purposes man needs to live at peace and concord with his fellow-men. For man needs to be aided by man, as well to the preservation of life and limb, as also to the end that one man may inflame and incite and instruct another to yearn after God. In the absence of peace and concord, man's mind must be disquieted by contentions and fighting, and hindered from aspiring to God. And therefore the divine law has made provision for the preservation of peace and concord amongst men by the practice of justice. It commands that to every man be rendered his due, as honour to parents: that none be harmed or hindered in the enjoyment of the good that belongs to him, whether by word, — hence the prohibition of false witness,— or by deed touching his own person, — hence the prohibition of murder,— or by deed touching a person allied to him, — hence the prohibition of adultery, — of unemployed, the degradation of our poor, our ina- attention. A&ual attention can no more be continous nities and frivolities, our mental unrest and unsatisfied than a&ual intention; and attention is nothing, if it soul-hunger. is not actual; there is no virtual attention. Thus in # Such an uninterrupted intention will not be no way can attention to God be continuous under adlual but virtual; that is to say, once made, it will ordinary conditions of humanity. We have to be satiscontinue to motive conduct without further express fied with the virtual continuity of our intention to advertence, as the consideration of wages motives a please God. workman's toil. From intention St Thomas distinguishes Rir GOD THE END OF CREATURES or by deed touching his property, — hence the prohibition of theft. And be- cause God takes cognisance not only of the public but also of the domestic behaviour of men, the divine law has forbidden negledt of wife, servants, etc., which is no concern of human law.
But it is not enough for peace and concord to be preserved among men by precepts of justice, unless there be a further consolidation of mutual love. Justice provides for men to the extent that one shall not get in the way of another, but not to the extent of one helping another in his need. One may happen to need another's aid in cases in which none is bound to him by any debt of justice, or where the person so bound does not render any aid. Thus there came to be need of an additional precept of mutual love amongst men, so that one should aid another even beyond his obligations in justice.
Hence it is said: This commandment we bate received, that whoever loveth God should also loJ>e his brother ( i John iv, 21): This is my commandment, that ye lote one another as I bafre lo^ed you (John xv, 1 2).
It is evident that love suffices for the fulfilment of the works of justice. Hence it is said: LoJ>e is the fulfilment of the law (Rom. xiii, 10): to commend which fulfilment there are given us precepts and counsels of God concerning works of mercy, love and succour of enemies, and the like deeds of kindness, which overflow and run over the measures of justice.
But because the aforesaid precepts of justice require their completion in the love of one's neighbour, and that depends on the love of God; and when love is gone, and faith and charity are also gone, the human mind cannot duly tend to God; it follows that the observance of the precepts of the afore- said virtues is necessarily required of man, and by the negleft of them man is entirely thrown out of his subordination to God. Now human life takes its denomination from the end to which it is direfted. They who constitute their last end in pleasures are said to lead a life of pleasure. They who con- stitute their last end in the contemplation of truth are said to lead a contem- plative life: hence whosoever constitute their last end in the enjoyment of God, their life is an adherence to God, which is absolutely the life of man, for to that end man is naturally ordained (Chap. XXXVII). On other ends man's life is dependent only in a qualified sense, inasmuch as such ends are not imposed on man by nature, but by his own choice.* Death then being the opposite of life, it is a sort of death to a man to drop out of the order which has its last term in God.f Hence the sins whereby a man breaks away from such order are called 4 mortal,' or ' deadly 9 sins; and those instructions of the law whereby men are held to their engagements of justice, charity, hope, and faith, are called 4 commandments,' or c prohibitions,' because they are to be of necessity observed.
As one necessary condition for the flight of the mind to God is peace with neighbours, with whom man has to live in society and be aided by them, so another necessary condition is peace and good order of the elements within man himself. We observe that there are two ways in which the free flight of the mind to God may be hindered. One way is by the intensification of the a£ts of the lower powers. When one power comes vigorously into action, it draws to itself the interest of man, which cannot be scattered over many objects simultaneously: hence another power must be either stopped from * There is a usual Aristotelian distinction between t Man is made for God as a watch is made to keep what a man is * by nature/ i.e. in the ordinary course time. Estranged from God, man is like a watch with of his development, and what he ' chooses ' to make the main-spring broken, which is a sort of dead watch, himself more or less arbitrarily and eccentrically.
acting or have its activity diminished. By the lower powers I mean the sen- tient powers, as well apprehensive, namely, the external and internal senses, the phantasy and other attendant powers,* as also appetitive, as the irascible and concupiscible faculties.f Hence when there is strong delight in sense, or much excitement of phantasy, or an inclination of the concupiscible or of the irascible faculty to their several objects, the mind must necessarily be impeded in its act of ascent to God.
In another way the movement of the mind to God may be hindered on the part of the mind itself, by its occupation with other things: for one power cannot be in perfeft aftivity over several objects simultaneously.
But since the mind at times uses the inferior powers as obedient instru- ments, and can occupy itself with several objects, when they all bear upon one and all help to apprehend that one, we must understand that the mind is then only hindered from its flight to God by the lower powers, or by its own occupation with other obje&s, when those powers or those objects bear not at all on the mind's movement to God: otherwise, far from being hindrances, they may be positive helps to the free flight of man's mind to his Creator.
Indeed man cannot altogether avoid occupying his mind about other things, by the fa6t that he must be solicitous about the necessaries of his bodily life. There are however among men various degrees of this solicitude. The first degree of solicitude extends just so far as the common measure of human life requires. It involves the providing of necessaries for self, wife, children, and other persons belonging to oneself according to one's state. This degree of solicitude is lawful, and may be said to be connatural to man.§ The second degree is reached when a man is more solicitous about the aforesaid things of the body than the common measure of human life requires according to his state, without however this solicitude going so far as to with- draw him from his subordination to God, or making him transgress the com- mandments of justice and charity. There is evidently sin in this, since the man exceeds his proper measure; yet not mortal sin, since he undertakes nothing contrary to the precepts of justice and charity. His sin is called 4 venial,' as being readily 4 pardonable,' — as well because, for one who keeps his face set towards his last end, any error that he may make is easily put Straight, — thus in speculative sciences any one who has a true conception of principles may thereby easily correfl such errors as he may fall into in drawing conclusions; and the end in view in the things of adtion is like the first principle in things of speculation, — as also because to one steady in friendship any delinquency is readily forgiven, — as also because it is no easy matter absolutely to observe due measure and exceed in nothing. Hence whoever does not cast away from his heart the rule of reason, which is laid down by the end in view, even though he does not altogether observe rectitude in the things which have to be regulated by that rule, is not over-much to be blamed, but deserves pardon. || The third degree is when the solicitude for temporals grows so great as # The "other attendant powers" are the cogitative Aristotle and St Thomas {Aquinas Ethicus, II, 96, 97), faculty (B. II, Chap. LX) and the memory. now become the mainspring of human society? Such t The0v/4<fcand hridvfirfrucdv of Plato's 'Republic. solicitude is not wrong in itself, but sin finds an easy X Thus good church music is an aid to prayer. passage under cover of it, as St Thomas goes on to say, § What of the solicitude 'writ large' in advertise- with St Paul, 1 Tim. vi, 9, 10; cf. Luke viii, 14. ments, the eagerness to outstrip rivals and to make a || A venial sin must always be some particular aft fortune, the "endless money-making" rebuked by Now it is not easy to specify and put one's finger on GOD THE END OF CREATURES to withdraw the soul from subordination to God, and bring it to transgress the commandments of justice and charity, faith and hope, without which man's mind cannot remain in due relation with God; and this is manifest mortal sin.
The fourth degree is when contrariwise man's solicitude for worldly things stops short of the common measure of human life. If this is owing to remissness and flabbiness of mind, or to any undue eagerness,* it is to be held for a base proceeding: for the transgression of the golden mean in either direction is blameworthy. But if lower things are negle&ed that better things may be attended to, to wit, that the mind may take a free flight to the things of God, this is a virtue more perfeft than human. To teach man such perfe&ion, there have not been given him commandments, but rather counsels to draw him forth and incite him.f CHAPTER CXXXI-Ofthe Counsels that are given in the Divine Law BECAUSE the best part for man is to fix his mind on God and divine things, and it is impossible for man to busy himself with intense ardour in a number of different direflions, there are given in the divine law counsels for enabling the human mind to take a more free flight to God. These counsels withdraw men from the occupations of the present life, so far as is possible for men still living on earth. Such withdrawal is not so necessary to justice as that justice cannot be without it: for virtue and justice is not done away with by man's making use of corporeal and earthly things according to the order of reason: therefore these admonitions of the divine law are called counsels, and not commandments, inasmuch as they advise a man to drop things less good for things that are better.