consequently religion does not include bodily acts.
But idolaters are so called because they offer to their idols things belonging to men, and this not as outward signs which may excite in them spiritual affections, but as being acceptable by those idols for their own sake. And especially because they offered them empty and vile things.
* * * * * _S. Augustine:_ When men pray, they, as becomes suppliants, make use of their bodily members, for they bend the knee, they stretch forth their hands, they even prostrate on the ground and perform other visible acts.
Yet all the while their invisible will and their heart's intention are known to God. He needs not these signs for the human soul to be laid bare before Him. But man by so doing stirs himself up to pray and groan with greater humility and fervour. I know not how it is that whereas such bodily movements can only be produced by reason of some preceding act on the part of the soul, yet when they are thus visibly performed the interior invisible movement which gave them birth is thereby itself increased, and the heart's affections--which must have preceded, else such acts would not have been performed--are thereby themselves increased.
Yet none the less, if a man be in some sort hindered so that he is not at liberty to make use of such external acts, the interior man does not therefore cease to pray; in the secret chamber of his heart, where lies compunction, he lies prostrate before the eyes of God (_Of Care for the Dead_, v.).
VIII Is Religion the Same as Sanctity?
In S. Luke's Gospel[71] we read: _Let us serve Him in holiness and justice._ But to serve God comes under religion. Hence religion is the same as sanctity.
The word "sanctity" seems to imply two things. First, it seems to imply _cleanness_; and this is in accordance with the Greek word for it, for in Greek it is _hagios_,[72] as though meaning "without earth."
Secondly, it implies _stability_, and thus among the ancients those things were termed _sancta_ which were so hedged about with laws that they were safe from violation; similarly a thing is said to be _sancitum_ because established by law. And even according to the Latins the word _sanctus_ may mean "cleanness," as derived from _sanguine tinctus_, for of old those who were to be purified were sprinkled with the blood of a victim, as says S. Isidore in his _Etymologies_.[73] And both meanings allow us to attribute sanctity to things which are used in the Divine worship; so that not men only, but also temples and vessels and other similar things are said to be sanctified by reason of their use in Divine worship. _Cleanness_ indeed is necessary if a man's mind is to be applied to God. For the mind of man is stained by being immersed in inferior things, as indeed all things are cheapened by admixture with things inferior to them--silver, for instance, when mixed with lead. And for our minds to be knit to the Supreme Being they must needs be withdrawn from inferior things. Without cleanness, then, the mind cannot be applied to God. Hence in the Epistle to the Hebrews[74] it is said: _Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God._ _Stability_ is also required if the mind is to be applied to God. For the mind is applied to Him as to the Ultimate End and First Principle, and consequently must be immovable. Hence the Apostle says: _For I am sure that neither death nor life shall separate me from the love of God._[75] Sanctity, then, is said to be that whereby man's mind and its acts are applied to God. Hence sanctity does not differ from religion essentially, but in idea only. For by religion we mean that a man offers God due service in those things which specially pertain to the Divine worship--sacrifices, for example, and oblations, etc.; but by sanctity we mean that a man not only offers these things, but also refers to God the works of the other virtues, and also that a man disposes himself by good works for the Divine worship.
* * * * * Some, however, deny the identity of religion and sanctity, thus: 1. Religion is a certain special virtue. But sanctity is called a general virtue, for according to Andronicus,[76] sanctity is that which "makes men faithful observers of what is justly due to God." Hence sanctity is not the same as religion.
But sanctity is in its essence a special virtue, and as such is, in a sort, the same as religion. It has, however, a certain general aspect in that, by its commands, it directs all the acts of the virtues to the Divine Good. In the same way legal justice is termed a general virtue in that it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.
2. Sanctity seems to imply cleanness, for S. Denis says[77]: "Sanctity is freedom from all impurity; it is perfect and stainless cleanness."
Cleanness, however, seems to come under temperance, for this it is which precludes bodily defilement. Since, then, religion comes under justice, sanctity cannot be identified with religion.
Temperance indeed worketh cleanness, but this has not the ratio of sanctity except it be referred to God. Hence S. Augustine says of virginity itself that "not because it is virginity is it held in honour, but because it is consecrated to God."[78] 3. Lastly, things that are contradistinguished are not identical. But in all enumerations of the parts of justice sanctity is set against religion.
But sanctity is set against religion because of the difference aforesaid; they differ indeed in idea, not in substance.
* * * * * _Cajetan:_ Religion is directly concerned with those things which specially pertain to the Divine worship--ceremonies, for example, sacrifices, oblations, etc. Whereas sanctity directly regards the mind, and through the mind the other virtuous works, including those of religion...for it makes use of them so as thereby to apply the mind--and by consequence all acts that proceed from the human mind--to God. Thus we see that many religious people are not saints, whereas all saints are religious. For people who devote themselves to ceremonies, sacrifices, etc., can be termed religious; but they can only be called saints in so far as by means of these things they give themselves FOOTNOTES: [36] _Of the True Religion_, lv.
[40] Gal. v. 13.
[41] The objection and its solution turn upon the Latin words _cultus_ and _colere_, which cannot be consistently rendered in English; "reverence" is perhaps the most appropriate translation here.
[43] Gal. iv. 14.
[44] Rom. viii. 31.
[45] Ps. xv. 5.
[46] Ps. lxxvi. 1.
[47] _Of the Nature of Good_, iii.
[48] _Fear_ is one of the "Gifts" of the Holy Ghost.
[50] II., vi. 15.
[51] iv. 5-6.
[52] i. 6.
[53] The Latin word _ordinare_ means "to set in due order"; there is no precise English equivalent which can be consistently employed.
[55] II. x. 31.
[56] VIII. viii. 1.
[59] xliii. 33.
[60] xx. 1-17.
[61] _Ethics_, II. vi.
[62] lviii. 7.
[63] Ps. xv. 2.
[64] 1 Cor. ix. 16.
[65] See p. 30.
[66] i. 20.
[67] Ps. xlix. 13.
[70] Ps. xciv. 3.
[71] i. 74-75.
[72] Thus Origen, _Hom._ XI, i. _in Leviticum_, where, however, he is not really giving an etymology.
[74] xii. 14.
[75] Rom. viii. 38-39.
[77] _Of the Divine Names_, xii.
QUESTION LXXXII OF DEVOTION I. Is Devotion a Special Kind of Act?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Meaning of the Term "Devotion" S. Augustine, _Confessions_, XIII. viii. 2 II. Is Devotion an Act of the Virtue of Religion?
III. Is Contemplation, that is Meditation, the Cause of Devotion?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Causes of Devotion " " On the Devotion of Women IV. Is Joy an Effect of Devotion?
Cardinal Cajetan, On Melancholy I Is Devotion a Special Kind of Act?
It is by our acts that we merit. But devotion has a peculiarly meritorious character. Consequently devotion is a special kind of act.
Devotion is so termed from "devoting" oneself. Hence the "devout" are so named because they "devote" themselves to God and thus proclaim their complete subjection to Him. Thus, too, among the heathen of old those were termed "devout" who for the army's sake "devoted" themselves to their idols unto death, as Livy[79] tells us was the case with the two Decii. Hence devotion seems to mean nothing else than "the will to give oneself promptly to those things which pertain to God's service"; thus it is said in Exodus[80]: _The multitude of the children of Israel...offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind._ It is clear, however, that a wish to do _readily_ what belongs to God's service is a special act. Hence devotion is a special act of the will.
But some argue that devotion is not a special kind of act, thus: 1. That which serves to qualify other acts cannot be itself a special act. But devotion appears to qualify certain other acts; thus it is said that _all the multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout mind_.[81] But that which moves another gives a certain measure to the latter's movement. The will, however, moves the other faculties of the soul to their respective acts; and, moreover, the will, as aiming at an end in view, moves itself to the means towards that end. Consequently, since devotion is the act of a man who offers himself to serve Him Who is the Ultimate End, it follows that devotion gives a certain measure to human acts--whether they be the acts of the will itself with regard to the means to an end, or the acts of the other faculties as moved by the will.
2. Again, no act which finds a place in different kinds of acts can be itself a special kind of act. But devotion is to be found in acts of different kinds, both in corporal acts, for example, and in spiritual; thus a man is said to meditate devoutly, for instance, or to genuflect devoutly.
But devotion does not find a place in different kinds of acts as though it were a _species_ coming under different _genera_, but in the same sense as the motive power of a moving principle is virtually discoverable in the movements of the things it sets in motion.
3. Lastly, all special kinds of acts belong either to the appetitive or to the cognoscitive faculties. But devotion comes under neither of these--as will be evident to anyone who will reflect upon the various acts of these faculties respectively.
But devotion is an act of the appetitive powers of the soul, and is, as we have said above, a movement of the will.
_Cajetan:_ With regard to the proper meaning of the term _devotion_, note that since _devotion_ is clearly derived from _devoting_, and since _to devote_--derived in its turn from _to vow_--means to promise something spontaneously to God: it follows that the principle in all such promises is the will; and further, not the will simply as such, but the will so affected as to be prompt. Hence in Latin those are said to be _devoted_ to some superior whose will is so affected towards him as to make them prompt in his regard. And this seems to refer especially to God and to those who in a sense stand in His place, as, for instance, our rulers, our fatherland, and our principles of action. Hence in the Church's usage the term _devotion_ is especially applied to those who are so affected towards God as to be prompt in His regard and in all that concerns Him. And so _devotion_ is here taken to signify the act of a will so disposed, the act by which a man shows himself prompt in the Divine service...Thus, then, _devotion_, the principal act of the virtue of religion, implies first of all the prompt desire of the Divine honour in our exercise of Divine worship; and hence comes the prompt choice of appropriate means to this end, and also the prompt carrying out of what we see to be suitable to that end. And the proof of possession of such _devotion_ is that truly devout souls, the moment they perceive that some particular thing (or other) ought to be done for the service of God, are so promptly moved towards it that they rejoice in having to do or in actually doing it (_on_ 2. 2. 82. 1).
_S. Augustine:_ Give me, O Lord, Thyself; grant Thyself to me! For Thee do I love, and if my love be but weak, then would I love Thee more. For I cannot measure it so as to know how much my love falls short of that love which shall make my life run to Thy embraces nor ever turn away from Thee till I be hid in the hiding-place of Thy countenance. This only do I know: that it fares ill with me when away from Thee; and this not merely externally, but within me; for all abundance which is not my God is but penury for me! (_Confessions_, XIII. viii. 2).
II Is Devotion an Act of the Virtue of Religion?
Devotion is derived from "devoting oneself" or making vows. But a vow is an act of the virtue of religion. Consequently devotion also is an act of the virtue of religion.
It belongs to the same virtue to wish to do a thing and to have a prompt will to do it, for the object of each of these acts is the same. For this reason the Philosopher says[82]: "Justice is that by which men will and perform just deeds." And it is clear that to perform those things which pertain to the Divine worship or service comes under the virtue of religion. Consequently it belongs to the same virtue of religion to have a prompt will to carry out these things--in other words, to be devout.
Whence it follows that devotion is an act of the virtue of religion.
But some argue that devotion is not an act of the virtue of religion, thus: 1. Devotion means that a man gives himself to God. But this belongs to the virtue of charity, for, as S. Denis says[83]: "Divine love causes ecstasy since it permits not that those who love should belong any more to themselves, but to those things which they love." Whence devotion would seem to be rather an act of charity than of the virtue of religion.
It is indeed through charity that a man gives himself to God, clinging to Him by a certain union of soul; but that a man should give himself to God and occupy himself with the Divine service, is due directly to the virtue of religion, though indirectly it is due to the virtue of charity, which is the principle of the virtue of religion.
2. Again, charity precedes the virtue of religion. But devotion seems to precede charity; for charity is signified in Scripture by fire, and devotion by the fat of the sacrifices--the material on which the fire feeds. Consequently devotion is not an act of the virtue of religion.
But while the fat of the body is generated by the natural digestive heat, that natural heat finds its nourishment in that same fat. Similarly charity both causes devotion--since it is by love that a man becomes prompt to serve his friend--and at the same time charity is fed by devotion; just as all friendship is preserved and increased by the practice of friendly acts and by meditating upon them.
3. Lastly, by the virtue of religion a man turns to God alone. But devotion extends to men as well; people, for instance, are said to be devoted to certain Saints, and servants are said to be devoted to their masters, as S. Leo says of the Jews,[84] that being devoted to the Roman laws, they said: _We have no king but Cæsar._[85] Consequently devotion is not an act of the virtue of religion.
But the devotion which we have to the Saints of God, whether living or dead, does not stop at them, but passes on to God, since we venerate God in God's ministers. And the devotion which subjects have to their temporal masters is of a different kind altogether, just as the service of temporal masters differs from the service of the Divine Master.
III Is Contemplation, that is Meditation, the Cause of Devotion?
In Ps. xxxviii. 4 it is said: _And in my meditation a fire shall flame out._ But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore meditation causes devotion.
The extrinsic and principal cause of devotion is God Himself; thus S.
Ambrose says[86]: "God calls those whom He deigns to call; and whom He wills to make religious He makes religious; and had He willed it He would have made the Samaritans devout instead of indevout."
But the intrinsic cause of devotion on our part is meditation or contemplation. For, as we have said, devotion is a certain act of the will by which a man gives himself promptly to the Divine service. All acts of the will, however, proceed from consideration, since the will's object is good understood. Hence S. Augustine says[87]: "The will starts from the understanding." Meditation must, then, be the cause of devotion inasmuch as it is from meditation that a man conceives the idea of giving himself up to God.
And two considerations lead a man to do this: one is the consideration of the Divine Goodness and of His benefits, whence the words of the Psalmist: _But for me it is good to cling close to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God._[88] And this consideration begets love, which is the proximate cause of devotion. And the second is man's consideration of his own defects which compel him to lean upon God, according to the words: _I have lifted up mine eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me; my help is from the Lord Who made Heaven and earth._[89] This latter consideration excludes all presumption which, by making him lean upon himself, might prevent a man from submitting himself to God.
Some, however, argue that contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion, thus: 1. No cause hinders its own effect. But subtle intellectual meditations often hinder devotion.
But it is the consideration of those things which naturally tend to excite love of God which begets devotion; consideration of things which do not come under this head, but rather distract the mind from it, are a hindrance to devotion.
2. Again, if contemplation were the real cause of devotion, it should follow that the higher the matter of our contemplation the greater the devotion it begot. But the opposite is the case. For it frequently happens that greater devotion is aroused by the contemplation of the Passion of Christ and of the other mysteries of His Sacred Humanity than by meditation upon the Divine excellences.
It is true that things which concern the Godhead are of themselves more calculated to excite in us love, and consequently devotion, since God is to be loved above all things; yet it is due to the weakness of the human mind that just as it needs to be led by the hand to the knowledge of Divine things, so also must it be lead to Divine love by means of the things of sense already known to it; and the chief of these things is the Humanity of Christ, as is said in the _Preface_ of the Mass: _So that knowing God visibly in the flesh, we may thereby be carried away to the love of things invisible._ Consequently the things that have to do with Christ's Humanity lead us, as it were, by the hand and are thus especially suited to stir up devotion in us; though, none the less, devotion is principally concerned with the Divinity.
3. Lastly, if contemplation were the real cause of devotion, it ought to follow that those who are the more fitted for contemplation are also the more fitted for devotion; whereas the contrary is the case, for greater devotion is often found among simple folk and in the female sex, where contemplation is wanting.
But knowledge, as indeed anything which renders a person great, occasions a man to trust in Himself, and hence he does not wholly give himself to God. It is for this reason that knowledge and suchlike things are sometimes a hindrance to a man's devotion, whereas among women and simple folk devotion abounds by the suppression of all elation. But if a man will only perfectly subject to God his knowledge and any other perfection he may have, then his devotion will increase.
* * * * * _Cajetan:_ Note these two intrinsic causes of devotion: one, namely, which arises from meditation upon God and His benefits, the other from meditation on our own defects. Under the first head I must consider God's goodness, mercy, and kindness towards mankind and towards myself; the benefits, for instance, of creation according to His own Likeness, of Redemption, of Baptism, of His inspirations, of His invitations-- whether directly or through the medium of others; His patient waiting till I do penance; His Holy Eucharist; His preserving me from so many perils both of body and soul; His care of me by means of His Angels; and His other individual benefits. Under the second head come all my faults and the punishments due to me, whether in the past or now in the present; my proneness to sin; my misuse of my own powers by habituating my thoughts and desires--as well as the inclinations of my other various faculties--to evil; my sojourning in a region far away from His Friendship and from His Divine conversation[90]; my perverted affections which make me think far more of temporal than of spiritual advantages or disadvantages; my utter lack of virtue; the wounds of my ignorance, of my malice, of my weakness, of my concupiscence; the shackles on my hands and feet, on my good works, that is; the shackles, too, on my affections, so that I dwell amidst darkness and rottenness and bitterness, and shrink not from it! My deafness, too, to the inner voice of my Shepherd; and, what is far worse, that I have chosen God for my enemy and my adversary as often as I have chosen mortal sin, and that I have thus offered Him the grievous insult of refusing to have Him for my God, and choosing instead my belly, or money, or false delights--and called them my God!
Meditations such as these should be in daily use among spiritual and religious people, and for their sake they should put aside the "much-speaking" of vocal prayer, however much it may appeal to them. And it is of such meditations that devotion and, by consequence, other virtues, are begotten. And they who do not give themselves to this form of prayer at least once in the day cannot be called religious men or women, nor even spiritual people. There can be no effect without a cause, no end without means to it, no gaining the harbour on the island save by a voyage in a ship; and so there can be no real religion without repeated acts regarding its causes, the means to it, and the vehicle that is to bring us thither (_on_ 2. 2. 82. 3).
_Cajetan:_ Just as he who removes an obstacle is the occasion of the resulting effect--a man, for instance, who pulls down a pillar is the occasion of the resulting fall of what it supported, and a man who removes a water-dam is the occasion of the consequent flood--so in the same way have women and simple folk a cause of devotion within themselves, for they have not that obstacle which consists in self-confidence. And because God bestows His grace on those who put no obstacle to it, the Church therefore calls the female sex "devout."
Hence we are not to find fault with the learned for their knowledge, nor are we to praise women for womanly weakness; but that abuse of knowledge which consists in self-exaltation is blameworthy, just as the right use of women's weakness in not being uplifted is praiseworthy (_on_ 2. 2.
82. 3).
IV Is Joy an Effect of Devotion?
In the Church's _Collect_ for the Thursday after the Fourth Sunday of Lent we say: _May holy devotion fill with joy those whom the fast they have undertaken chastises._ Of itself indeed, and primarily, devotion brings about a spiritual joy of the mind; but as an accidental result it causes sorrow. For, as we have said above, devotion arises from two considerations. Primarily it arises from the consideration of the Divine Goodness, and from this thought there necessarily follows gladness, in accordance with the words: _I remembered God and was delighted._[91] Yet, as it were accidentally, this consideration begets a certain sadness in those who do not as yet fully enjoy God: _My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God_,[92] and he immediately adds: _My tears have been my bread._ Secondarily, however, devotion arises from the consideration of our own defects, for we thus reflect upon that from which a man, by devout acts of the will, turns away, so as no longer to dwell in himself, but to subject himself to God.
And this consideration is the converse of the former: for of itself it tends to cause sadness since it makes us dwell upon our defects; accidentally, however, it causes joy, for it makes us think of the hope we have of God's assistance.
Hence joy of heart primarily and of itself follows from devotion; but secondarily and accidentally there results a sadness which is unto God.
Some, however, argue that joy is not an effect of devotion, thus: 1. Christ's Passion, as said before, is especially calculated to cause devotion. But from dwelling on it there follows a certain affliction of soul: _Remember my poverty...the wormwood and the gall_[93]--that is, the Sacred Passion; and then follows: _I will be mindful, and remember, and my soul shall languish within me._ In meditation on the Passion of Christ there is food for sadness--viz., the thought of the sins of men, and to take these away Christ had need to suffer. But there is also food for joy--viz., the thought of God's merciful kindness towards us in providing us such a deliverance.
2. Again, devotion principally consists in the interior sacrifice of the heart: _A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit_;[94] consequently affliction, rather than pleasure or joy, is the outcome of devotion.
But the soul which is on the one hand saddened because of its shortcomings in this present life, is on the other hand delighted at the thought of the goodness of God and of the hope of Divine assistance.
3. Lastly, S. Gregory of Nyssa says[95]: "Just as laughter proceeds from joy, so are sorrow and groaning signs of sadness." But out of devotion some burst into tears.
Yet tears spring not from sadness alone, but also from a certain tenderness of feeling: and especially is this the case when we reflect on something that, while pleasant, has in it a certain admixture of sadness; thus men are wont to weep from loving affection when they recover their children or others dear to them whom they had thought lost. And it is in this sense that tears spring from devotion.
* * * * * _Cajetan:_ Notice the proof here afforded that those are not devout persons who are habitually sad and gloomy, and who cannot mingle with others without getting into difficulties or dissolving into tears. For devout folk are cheerful, and are full of joy in their souls; and this not solely by reason of the principal cause, as is stated in the text, but also by reason of a secondary cause--the thought, namely, of their own failings. For the sadness of devout folk is _according to God_, and joy accompanies it; whence S. Augustine's remark: "Let a man grieve, but let him rejoice at his grief."[96] Therefore it is that we read of the Saints that they were joyful and bright; and rightly so, for they had _S. Augustine:_ For Thee do I yearn, Justice and Innocence, Beautiful and Fair in Thy beauteous light that satisfies and yet never sates! For with Thee is repose exceedingly and life without disquiet! He that enters into Thee enters into the joy of his Lord; he shall know no fear, and in the Best shall be best. But I have deserted Thee and have wandered away, O Lord, my God! Too far have I wandered from Thee, the Steadfast One, in my youth, and I have become to myself a very land of want! (_Confessions_, II. x.).
FOOTNOTES: [80] xxxv. 20-21.
[83] _Of the Divine Names_, chap. iv., part i., lect. 10.
[84] _Sermon VIII.: On the Passion of Our Lord._ [88] Ps. lxxii. 28.
[89] Ps. cxx. 1, 2.
[91] Ps. lxxvi. 4.
[92] Ps. xli. 3.
[93] Lam. iii. 19.
[94] Ps. i. 19.
[96] _De Vera et Falsa Poenitentia_, xiii.
[97] Phil. iii. 20.
QUESTION LXXXIII OF PRAYER I. Is Prayer an Act of the Appetitive Powers?
Cardinal Cajetan, On Prayer based on Friendship II. Is it Fitting to Pray?
Cardinal Cajetan, On Prayer as a True Cause S. Augustine, _On the Sermon on the Mount_, II. iii. 14 " _On the Gift of Perseverance_, vii. 15 III. Is Prayer an Act of the Virtue of Religion?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Humility of Prayer " _Of the Gift of Perseverance_, xvi. 39 IV. Ought We to Pray to God Alone?
V. Should We in our Prayers ask for anything Definite from God?
VI. Ought We in our Prayers to ask for Temporal Things from God?
S. Thomas is miraculously relieved from Toothache VII. Ought We to Pray for Others?
VIII. Ought We to Pray for our Enemies?
S. Augustine, _Sermon_, xv., on _Psalm_ xxv. 8 IX. On the Seven Petitions of the Lord's Prayer Cardinal Cajetan, On the Grouping of these Petitions " _Of the City of God_, xix. 27 X. Is Prayer Peculiar to Rational Creatures?
XI. Do the Saints in Heaven Pray for Us?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Saints in Limbo XII. Should Prayer be Vocal?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Conditions of Vocal Prayer S. Augustine, _Confessions_, IX. iv. 8 XIII. Must Prayer necessarily be Attentive?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Varieties of Attention at Prayer S. Thomas, _On Distractions, Com. on 1 Cor._ xiv. 14 XIV. Should our Prayers be Long?
XV. Is Prayer Meritorious?
XVI. Do Sinners gain Anything from God by their Prayers?
XVII. Can We rightly term "Supplications," "Prayers," "Intercessions," and "Thanksgivings," parts of Prayer?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the Prayer of the Consecration S. Augustine, _Of Divers Questions_, iv.
I Is Prayer an Act of the Appetitive Powers?
S. Isidore says[98]: "To pray is the same thing as to speak." Speaking, however, belongs to the intellect. Hence prayer is not an act of the appetitive, but of the intellectual faculties.
According to Cassiodorus, on those words of the Psalmist: _Hear my prayer, O Lord, and my supplication, give ear to my tears_,[99] prayer means "the lips' reasoning." Now there is this difference between the speculative and the practical reason, that the speculative reason merely apprehends things, while the practical reason not only apprehends things, but actually causes them. But one thing is the cause of another in two ways: in one way, perfectly--namely, as inducing a necessity--as happens when the effect comes entirely under the power of a cause; in another way, imperfectly--namely, by merely disposing to it--as happens when an effect is not entirely under the power of a cause.
And so, too, reason is in two ways the cause of certain things: in one way as imposing a necessity; and in this way it belongs to the reason to command not merely the lower faculties and the bodily members, but even men who are subject to us, and this is done by giving commands. In another way as inducing, and in some sort disposing to, an effect; and in this way the reason asks for something to be done by those who are subject to it, whether they be equals or superiors.
But both of these--namely, to command something, or to ask or beg for something to be done--imply a certain arrangement--as when a man arranges for something to be done by somebody else. And in this respect both of these acts come under the reason whose office it is to arrange.
Hence the Philosopher says[100]: "Reason asks for the best things."
Here, then, we speak of prayer as implying a certain asking or petition, for, as S. Augustine says[101]: "Prayer is a certain kind of petition"; so, too, S. John Damascene says[102]: "Prayer is the asking of fitting things from God."
Hence it is clear that the prayer of which we are here speaking is an act of the reason.
Some, however, think that prayer is an act of the appetitive powers, thus: 1. The whole object of prayer is to be heard, and the Psalmist says that it is our desires which are heard: _The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor._[103] Prayer, then, is desire; but desire is an act of the appetitive powers.
But the Lord is said to hear the desires of the poor either because their desire is the reason why they ask--since our petitions are in a certain sense the outward expression of our desires; or this may be said in order to show the swiftness with which He hears them--even while things are only existing in the poor man's desire; God hears them even before they are expressed in prayer. And this accords with the words of Isaias: _And it shall come to pass that before they shall call I will hear, as they are yet speaking I will hear._[104] 2. Again, Denis the Areopagite says: "But before all things it is good to begin with prayer, as thereby giving ourselves up to and uniting ourselves with God."[105] But union with God comes through love, and love belongs to the appetitive powers; therefore prayer, too, would seem to belong to the appetitive powers.