3. The Saints in our Fatherland are said to be the equals of the Angels.[286] But the Angels are not always heard in their prayers to God, as is evident from Daniel[287]: _I am come for thy words. But the Prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days._ But the Angel who spoke had not come to Daniel's assistance without asking his freedom from God; yet none the less the fulfilment of his prayer was hindered. In the same way, then, neither are the prayers of other Saints to God for us always heard.
But this contest of the good Angels is not to be understood in the sense that they put forth contrary prayers before God, but that they set before the Divine scrutiny conflicting merits on either hand, and awaited the Divine decision. Thus S. Gregory, expounding the above words of Daniel, says: "These sublime Spirits who rule over the nations in no sense strive for those who do evil, but they scrutinize their deeds and judge justly; hence, when the faults or the merits of any nation are submitted to the Council of the Supreme Court, he who is set over that particular nation is described as either losing or failing in the contest. But the sole victory for all of them is the supreme will of his Creator above him; and since they ever look towards that Will, they never desire what they cannot obtain,"[288] and hence never ask for it. Whence it is clear that their prayers are always heard.
4. Whoever obtains something by prayer in a certain sense merits it. But the Saints who are in our Fatherland are no longer capable of meriting.
Therefore they cannot obtain anything for us from God by their prayers.
But although the Saints when once they are in our Fatherland are not capable of meriting for themselves, they are still capable of meriting for others, or rather of helping others by reason of their own previous merits. For when alive they merited from God that their prayers should be heard after death. Or we might say that in prayer merit and the power to obtain what we ask do not rest on the same basis. For merit consists in a certain correspondence between an act and the end towards which it is directed and which is given to it as its reward; but the impetratory power of prayer rests upon the generosity of him from whom we ask something. Consequently prayer sometimes wins from the generosity of him to whom it is made what perhaps was not merited either by him who asked nor by him for whom he asked. And thus, though the Saints are no longer capable of meriting, it does not follow that they are incapable of winning things from God.
5. Again, the Saints conform their will in all things to the Divine Will. Therefore they can only will what they know God wills. But no one prays save for what he wishes. Consequently they only pray for what they know God wills. But what God wills would take place whether they prayed or not. Consequently their prayers have no power to obtain things.
But, as is evident from the passage of S. Gregory quoted above in reply to the third difficulty, neither the Saints nor the Angels will anything save what they see in the Divine Will. And consequently they ask for nothing else save this. But it does not follow that their prayers are without fruit, for, as S.
Augustine says in his treatise, _On the Predestination of the Saints_,[289] and S. Gregory in his _Dialogues_,[290] the prayers of the Saints avail for the predestinate, because perhaps it was pre-ordained that they should be saved by the prayers of those who interceded for them. And so, too, God wills that by the prayers of the Saints should be fulfilled what the Saints see that He wills.
6. Lastly, the prayers of the entire Court of Heaven should, if they can gain anything at all, be far more efficacious than all the suffrages of the Church on earth. But if all the suffrages of the Church on earth were to be accumulated upon one soul in Purgatory, it would be entirely freed from punishment. Since, then, the Saints who are in our Fatherland have the same reason for praying for the souls in Purgatory as they have for praying for us, they would by their prayers, if they could obtain anything for us, wholly deliver from suffering those who are in Purgatory. But this is false, for if it were true, then the suffrages of the Church for the dead would be superfluous.
But the suffrages of the Church for the dead are, as it were, satisfactions offered by the living in place of the dead, and thus they free the dead from that debt of punishment which they have not paid. But the Saints who are in our Fatherland are not capable of making satisfaction. And thus there is no parity between their prayers and the Church's suffrages.
FOOTNOTES: [267] xiv. 21.
[272] _Of the Heavenly Hierarchy_, iii.
[273] lxiii. 16.
[276] _Of the Heavenly Hierarchy_, vii.; and _Of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy_, vi.
[277] v. 1.
[279] Rom. xv. 30.
[281] Dan. ix. 14.
[283] Apoc. vi. 11.
[284] vi. 10.
[285] xv. 1.
[287] x. 12-13.
[290] i. 8.
QUESTION CLXXIX OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO THE ACTIVE AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE I. May Life be fittingly divided into the Active and the Contemplative?
II. Is this division of Life into the Active and the Contemplative a sufficient one?
I May Life be fittingly divided into the Active and the Contemplative?
S. Gregory the Great says[291]: "There are two kinds of lives in which Almighty God instructs us by His Sacred Word--namely, the active and the contemplative."
Those things are properly said to live which move or work from within themselves. But what especially accords with the innermost nature of a thing is that which is proper to it and towards which it is especially inclined; consequently every living thing shows that it is living by those very acts which are especially befitting it and towards which it is especially inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist in their growing and in their producing seed; the life of animals in their feeling and moving; while that of man consists in his understanding and in his acting according to reason.
Hence among men themselves each man's life appears to be that in which he takes special pleasure, that with which he is particularly occupied, that, in fine, in which each one wishes to live with a friend, as is said in the _Ethics of Aristotle_.[292] Since, then, some men are especially occupied with the contemplation of the truth while others are especially-occupied with external things, man's life may be conveniently divided into the active and the contemplative.
* * * * * Some, however, repudiate this division, thus: 1. The soul is by its essence the principle of life; thus the Philosopher says[293]: "For living things, to live is to be." But the same soul with its faculties is the principle both of action and of contemplation. Hence it would seem that life cannot be suitably divided into the active and the contemplative.
But the peculiar nature of every individual thing--that which makes it actually be--is the principle of its own proper action; consequently _to live_ is said to be the very _being_ of living things, and this because living things--by the very fact that they exist through such a nature--act in such a way.
2. Again, when one thing precedes another it is unfitting to divide the former by differences which find place in the latter. But action and contemplation, like speculation and practice, are distinctions in the intellect, as is laid down by the Philosopher.[294] But we live before we understand; for life is primarily in living things by their vegetative soul, as also the Philosopher says.[295] Therefore life is not fittingly divided according to contemplation and action.
But we do not say that life universally considered is divided into the active and the contemplative, but that man's life is so divided. For man derives his species from his intellect, hence the same divisions hold good for human life as hold good for the intellect.
3. Lastly, the word "life" implies motion, as is clear from Denis the Areopagite.[296] But contemplation more especially consists in repose, according to the words: _When I go into my house I shall repose myself with her (Wisdom)_.[297] But while contemplation implies a certain repose from external occupations, it is still a certain motion of the intellect in the sense that every operation is a motion; in this sense the Philosopher says that to feel and to understand are certain motions in the sense that motion is said to be the act of a perfect thing.[298] It is in this sense, too, that Denis[299] assigns three movements to the soul in contemplation: the direct, the circular, and the oblique.[300] * * * * * _S. Augustine:_ Two virtues are set before the human soul, the one active, the other contemplative; the former shows the path, the latter shows the goal; in the one we toil that so the heart may be purified for the Vision of God, in the other we repose and we see God; the one is spent in the practice of the precepts of this temporal life, the other is occupied with the teachings of the life that is eternal. Hence it is that the one is a life of toil and the other a life of rest; for the former is engaged in purging away its sins, the latter already stands in the light of the purified. Hence, too, during this mortal life the former is occupied with the works of a good life, whereas the latter rather stands in faith, and, in the case of some few, sees _through a mirror in a dark manner_, and enjoys _in part_ a certain glimpse of the Unchangeable Truth (_De Consensu Evangelistarum_, I., iv. 8).
"The Lord is the portion of my inheritance and of my cup; it is Thou that wilt restore my inheritance to me. The lines are fallen unto me in goodly places; for my inheritance is goodly to me."[301] _S. Augustine:_ There is another life, the life of immortality, and in it there are no ills; there we shall see face to face what we now see _through a glass and in a dark manner_ even when we have made great advance in our study of the Truth. The Church, then, knows of two kinds of life Divinely set before Her and commended to Her; in the one we walk by faith, in the other by sight; the one is the pilgrimage of time, the other is the mansion of eternity; the one is a life of toil, the other of repose; in the one we are on the way, in the other in Our Father's Home; the one is spent in the toil of action, the other in the reward of contemplation; the one _turneth away from evil and doth good_, the other hath no evil from which to turn away, but rather a Great Good Which it enjoys; the one is in conflict with the foe, the other reigns--conscious that there is no foe; the one is strong in adversity, the other knows of no adversity; the one bridles the lusts of the flesh, the other is given up to the joys of the Spirit; the one is anxious to overcome, the other is tranquil in the peace of victory; the one is helped in temptations, the other, without temptation, rejoices in its Helper; the one succours the needy, the other dwells where none are needy; the one condones the sins of others that thereby its own sins may be condoned, the other suffers naught that it can pardon nor does ought that calls for pardon; the one is afflicted in sufferings lest it should be uplifted in good things, the other is steeped in such fulness of grace as to be free from all evil that so, without temptation to pride, it may cling to the Supreme Good; the one distinguishes between good and evil, the other sees naught save what is good; the one therefore is good--yet still in miseries, the other is better--and in Blessedness (_Tractatus_, cxxiv.
5, _in Joannem_).
"Jesu nostra Redemptio Amor et Desiderium!
Deus Creator omnium, Homo in fine temporum!"
II Is this division of Life into the Active and the Contemplative a sufficient one?
These two kinds of life are signified by the two wives of Jacob--namely, the active life by Lia, the contemplative by Rachel. They are also signified by those two women who afforded hospitality to the Lord: the contemplative, namely, by Mary, the active by Martha, as S. Gregory says.[302] But if there were more than two kinds of life, these significations would not be fitting.
As we have said above, the division in question concerns human life regarded as intellectual. And the intellect itself is divided into the contemplative and the active, for the aim of intellectual knowledge is either the actual knowledge of the truth--and this belongs to the contemplative intellect, or it is some external action--and this concerns the practical or active intellect. Hence life is quite sufficiently divided into the active and the contemplative.
But some argue that this division is not a sufficient one, thus: 1. The Philosopher[303] says that there are three specially excellent kinds of life: the pleasurable, the civil--which seems to be identified with the active--and the contemplative.
But the pleasurable life makes its end consist in the pleasures of that body which we have in common with the brute creation.
Hence, as the Philosopher says in the same place, this is a bestial life. Consequently it is not comprised in our division of life into the active and the contemplative.
2. Again, S. Augustine[304] speaks of three different kinds of life: the life of leisure, which is referred to the contemplative; the busy life, which is referred to the active life; and he adds a third composed of these two.
But things which hold a middle course are compounded of the extremes, and hence are virtually contained in them, as the tepid in the hot and the cold, the pallid in the white and the black. And similarly, under the active and the contemplative lives is comprised that kind of life which is compounded of them both. But just as in every mixture one of the simple elements predominates, so in this mixed kind of life now the contemplative, now the active predominates.
3. Lastly, men's lives are diversified according to their various occupations. But there are more than two classes of human occupations.
But all classes of human occupations are, if they are concerned with the necessities of this present life, and in accordance with right reason, comprised under the active life which, by properly regulated acts, takes heed for the needs of the present life. But if these actions minister to our concupiscences, then they fall under the voluptuous life which is not comprised in the active life. But human occupations which are directed to the consideration of the truth are comprised under the contemplative life.
* * * * * _S. Augustine: Your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ shall appear, Who is your life, then you also shall appear with Him in glory_;[305] but until that shall come to pass _we see now through a glass in a dark manner_--that is, in images as it were--_but then face to face_.[306] This, indeed, is the contemplation that is promised to us, the goal of all our actions, the eternal perfection of all our joys.
For _we are the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be; we know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is_.[307] And as He said to His servant Moses: _I am Who am...thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He Who is hath sent me to you_,[308] even that shall we contemplate when we live in eternity. Thus, too, He says: _This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only True God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent_.[309] And this shall be when the Lord shall come and _bring to light the hidden things of darkness_,[310] when the gloom of our mortal corruption shall have passed away. Then will be our "morning," that "morning" of which the Psalmist says: _In the morning I will stand before Thee and I will see_.[311]...Then, too, will come to pass that which is written: _Thou shall fill me with joy with Thy countenance_.[312] Beyond that joy we shall seek for nothing, for there is naught further to be sought. The Father will be shown to us, and that will suffice for us. Well did Philip understand this when he said to the Lord: _Show us the Father, and it is enough for us!_[313]...Such contemplation, indeed, is the reward of faith, and for this reward's sake are our hearts purified by faith, as it is written: _Purifying their hearts by faith_[314] (_De "Remember, O Lord, Thy bowels of compassion; and Thy mercies that are from the beginning of the world. The sins of my youth and my ignorances do not remember. According to Thy mercy remember Thou me; for Thy goodness' sake, O Lord. The Lord is sweet and righteous; therefore He will give a law to sinners in the way. He will guide the mild in judgment; He will teach the meek His ways. All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth to them that seek after His covenant and His testimonies. For Thy Name's sake, O Lord, Thou wilt pardon my sin; for it is great."[315] FOOTNOTES: [292] IX., xii. 21.
[296] _Of the Divine Names_, vi.
[297] Wisd. viii. 16.
[300] For a commentary on this passage of S. Denis, see Qu. CLXXX., Art.
6, pp. 203-210.
[301] Ps. xv. 5-6.
[304] _Of the City of God_, xix. 2 and 19.
[305] Col. iii. 3-4.
[308] Exod. iii. 14.
[310] 1 Cor. iv. 5.
[311] Ps. v. 5.
[312] Ps. xv. 11.
[314] Acts xv. 9.
[315] Ps. xxiv. 6-11.
QUESTION CLXXX OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE I. Is the Contemplative Life wholly confined to the Intellect, or does the Will enter into it?
_ad 3m_ II. Do the Moral Virtues pertain to the Contemplative Life?
S. Augustine, _Of the City of God_, xix. 19 III. Does the Contemplative Life comprise many Acts?
S. Augustine, _Of the Perfection of Human IV. Does the Contemplative Life consist solely in the Contemplation of God, or in the Consideration of other Truths as well?
S. Augustine, _Sermon_, CLXIX., xiv. 17 V. Can the Contemplative Life attain, according to the State of this Present Life, to the Contemplation of the Divine Essence?
S. Augustine, _Of the Sermon on the Mount_, II., ix. 35 VI. Is the Act of Contemplation rightly distinguished according to the three kinds of Motion--Circular, Direct, and Oblique?
VII. Has Contemplation its Joys?
VIII. Is the Contemplative Life lasting?
I Is the Contemplative Life wholly confined to the Intellect, or does the Will enter into it?
S. Gregory the Great says[316]: "The contemplative life means keeping of charity towards God and our neighbour, and fixing all our desires on our Creator." But desire and love belong to the affective or appetitive powers; consequently the contemplative life is not confined to the intellect.
* * * * * When men's thoughts are principally directed towards the contemplation of the truth, their life is said to be "contemplative." But to "intend" or direct is an act of the will, since "intention" or direction is concerned with the end in view, and the end is the proper object of the will. Hence contemplation, having regard to the actual essence of it, is an act of the intellect; but if we consider that which moves us to the exercise of such an act, then contemplation is an act of the will; for it is the will which moves all the other faculties, including the intellect, to the exercise of their appropriate acts.
But the appetitive faculty--the will, that is--moves us to consider some point either sensibly or intellectually, that is, sometimes out of love for the thing itself--for _Where thy treasure is there is thy heart also_,--and sometimes out of love of that very knowledge which follows from its consideration. For this reason S. Gregory[317] makes the contemplative life consist in the love of God, since from love of God a man yearns to look upon His beauty. And since we are delighted when we obtain what we love, the contemplative life consequently results in delight, and this resides in the affective powers, from which, too, love took its rise.
* * * * * Some, however, urge that the contemplative life lies wholly in the intellect, thus: 1. The Philosopher says[318]: "The end of contemplation is truth." But truth belongs wholly to the intellect.
But from the very fact that truth is the goal of contemplation it derives its character of a desirable and lovable and pleasing good, and in this sense it comes under the appetitive powers.
2. Again, S. Gregory says[319]: "Rachel, whose name is interpreted 'the Beginning seen,' signifies the contemplative life." But the vision of a principle, or beginning, belongs to the intellect.
But it is love of God which excites in us desire of the vision of the First Principle of all--viz., God Himself--and hence S.
Gregory says[320]: "The contemplative life, trampling underfoot all cares, ardently yearns to look upon the face of the Creator."
3. S. Gregory says[321]: "It belongs to the contemplative life to rest from all exterior action." But the affective or appetitive powers tend towards external action. Hence it would seem that the contemplative life does not come under them.
But the appetitive powers not only move the bodily members to the performance of external acts, but the intellect, too, is moved by them to the exercise of contemplation.
"Hear, you that are far off, what I have done, and you that are near, know My strength. The sinners in Sion are afraid, trembling hath seized upon the hypocrites. Which of you can dwell with devouring fire? which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? He that walketh in justices, and speaketh truth, that casteth away avarice by oppression, and shaketh his hands from all bribes, that stoppeth his ears lest he hear blood, and shutteth his eyes that he may see no evil. He shall dwell on high, the fortifications of rocks shall be his highness: bread is given him, his waters are sure. His eyes shall see the King in His beauty, they shall see the land far off."[322] * * * * * _S. Thomas:_ We do not enjoy all the things that we have; and this is either because they do not afford us delight, or because they are not the ultimate goal of our desires, and so are incapable of satisfying our yearnings or affording us repose. But these three things the Blessed have in God: for they see Him, and seeing Him they hold Him ever present to them, for they have it in their power always to see Him; and holding Him, they enjoy Him, satisfying their yearnings with That Which is The "As the hart panteth after the fountains of water: so my soul panteth after Thee, O God. My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God; when shall I come and appear before the face of God? My tears have been my bread day and night, whilst it is said to me daily: Where is thy God? These things I remembered, and poured out my soul in me; for I shall go over into the place of the wonderful tabernacle, even to the house of God. With the voice of joy and praise; the noise of one feasting. Why art thou sad, O my soul? and why dost thou trouble me? Hope in God, for I will still give praise to Him: the salvation of my countenance, and my God."[323] II Do the Moral Virtues pertain to the Contemplative Life?
The moral virtues are directed towards external actions, and S. Gregory says[324]: "It belongs to the contemplative life to abstain from all external action." Hence the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life.
A thing may pertain to the contemplative life either essentially or by way of disposition towards it. Essentially, then, the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life; for the goal of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth. "Knowledge," says the Philosopher, "which pertains to the consideration of truth, has little to do with the moral virtues."[325] Hence he also says[326] that moral virtues pertain to active, not to contemplative happiness.
But dispositively the moral virtues do belong to the contemplative life.
For actual contemplation, in which the contemplative life essentially consists, is impeded both by the vehemence of the passions which distract the soul from occupation with the things of the intellect, and divert it to the things of sense, and also by external disturbances. The moral virtues, however, keep down the vehemence of the passions, and check the disturbance that might arise from external occupations.
Consequently the moral virtues do pertain to the contemplative life, but by way of disposition thereto.
* * * * * But some maintain that the moral virtues do pertain to the contemplative life, thus: 1. S. Gregory says[327]: "The contemplative life means keeping charity towards God and our neighbour with our whole soul." But all the moral virtues--acts of which fall under precept--are reduced to love of God and of our neighbour; for _Love is the fulfilling of the Law_.[328] Consequently it would seem that the moral virtues do pertain to the contemplative life.
But, as we have already said, the contemplative life is motived by the affective faculties, and consequently love of God and of our neighbour are required for the contemplative life. Impelling causes, however, do not enter into the essence of a thing, but prepare for it and perfect it. Hence it does not follow that the moral virtues essentially pertain to the contemplative life.
2. Again; the contemplative life is especially directed towards the contemplation of God, as S. Gregory says: "The soul, trampling all cares underfoot, ardently yearns to see its Creator's face." But no one can attain to this without that cleanness of heart which the moral virtues procure: _Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God_,[329] and again: _Follow peace with all men with holiness, without which no man shall see God_.[330] But holiness--that is, cleanness of heart--is produced by those virtues which have to do with those passions which hinder the purity of the reason. And peace is produced by justice--the moral virtue which is concerned with our works: _The work of justice shall be peace_[331] inasmuch, that is, as a man, by refraining from injuring others, removes occasions of strife and disturbance.
3. Lastly, S. Gregory says[332]: "The contemplative life is something beautiful in the soul," and it is for this reason that it is said to be typified by Rachel, for _She was well-favoured and of a beautiful countenance_.[333] But the beauty of the soul, as S. Ambrose remarks, depends upon the moral virtues and especially on that of temperance.[334] But beauty consists in a certain splendour combined with a becoming harmony. Both of these points are radically to be referred to the reason, for to it belongs both the light which manifests beauty, and the establishment of due proportion in others. Consequently in the contemplative life--which consists in the act of the reason--beauty is necessarily and essentially to be found; thus of the contemplation of Wisdom it is said: _And I became a lover of her beauty_.[335] But in the moral virtues beauty is only found by a certain participation--in proportion, namely, as they share in the harmony of reason; and this is especially the case with the virtue of temperance whose function it is to repress those desires which particularly obscure the light of reason. Hence it is, too, that the virtue of chastity especially renders a man fit for contemplation, for venereal pleasures are precisely those which, as S. Augustine points out, most drag down the mind to the things of sense.[336] * * * * * _S. Augustine:_ While it is true that any one of these three kinds of life--the leisurely, the busy, and the life commingled of them both--may be embraced by anybody without prejudice to his faith, and may be the means of leading him to his eternal reward, it is yet important that a man should take note of what it is that he holds to through love of the truth, and should reflect on the nature of the work to which he devotes himself at the demand of charity. For no man should be so addicted to leisure as for its sake to neglect his neighbour's profit; neither should any man be so devoted to the active life as to forget the thought of God. For in our leisured life we are not to find delight in mere idle repose, but the seeking and finding of the truth must be our aim; each must strive to advance in that, to hold fast what he finds, and yet not to grudge it to his neighbour. Similarly, in the life of action: we must not love honour in this life, nor power; for _all things are vain under the sun_. But we must love the toil itself which comes to us together with such honour or power if it be rightly and profitably used--as tending, that is, to the salvation under God of those under us...Love of truth, then, seeks for a holy leisure; the calls of charity compel us to undertake the labours of justice. If no one lays on us this burden, then must we devote our leisure to the search after and the study of the truth; but if such burden be imposed upon us, we must shoulder it at the call of charity; yet withal we must not wholly abandon the delights of the truth, lest while the latter's sweetness is withdrawn from us, the burden we have taken up overwhelm us (_Of the City of God_, xix. 19).
"O expectation of Israel, the Saviour thereof in time of trouble: why wilt Thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge? Why wilt Thou be as a wandering man, as a mighty man that cannot save? but Thou, O Lord, art among us, and Thy Name is called upon us, forsake us not."[337] III Does the Contemplative Life comprise many Acts?
By "life" is here meant any work to which a man principally devotes himself. Hence if there were many acts or works in the contemplative life, it would not be one life, but several.
It must be understood that we are speaking of the contemplative life as it concerns man. And between men and Angels there is, as S. Denis says,[338] this difference--that whereas an Angel knows the truth by one simple act of intelligence, man, on the contrary, only arrives at a knowledge of the simple truth by arguing from many premises. Hence the contemplative life has only a single act in which it finds its final perfection--namely, the contemplation of the truth--and from this one act it derives its oneness. But at the same time it has many acts by means of which it arrives at this final act. Of these various acts, some are concerned with the establishment of principles from which the mind proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others, again, are concerned with deducing from these principles that truth the knowledge of which is sought. But the ultimate act, the complement of the foregoing, is the contemplation of truth.
Some, however, maintain that many acts pertain to the contemplative life, thus: 1. Richard of S. Victor[339] distinguishes between contemplation, meditation, and thought. But these all seem to belong to the contemplative life.
But _thought_, according to Richard of S. Victor, seems to signify the consideration of many things from which a man intends to gather some single truth. Consequently, under the term _thought_ may be comprised perceptions by the senses, whereby we know certain effects--imaginations, too, as well as investigation of different phenomena by the reason; in a word, all those things which conduce to a knowledge of the truth we are in search of. At the same time, according to S.
Augustine,[340] every operation of the intellect may be termed _thought_. _Meditation_, again, seems to refer to the process of reasoning from principles which have to do with the truth we desire to contemplate. And _contemplation_, according to S.
Bernard,[341] means the same thing, although, according to the Philosopher,[342] every operation of the intellect may be termed "consideration." But _contemplation_ is concerned with the simple dwelling upon the truth itself. Hence Richard of S.
Victor says[343]: "_Contemplation_ is the soul's clear, free, and attentive dwelling upon the truth to be perceived; _meditation_ is the outlook of the soul occupied in searching for the truth; _thought _ is the soul's glance, ever prone to distraction."
2. Further, the Apostle says: _But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory._[344] But this refers to the contemplative life; therefore, besides the three things already mentioned--namely, contemplation, meditation and thought,--_speculation_, too, enters into the contemplative life.
But _speculation_, as S. Augustine's Gloss has it,[345] "is derived from _speculum_, a 'mirror,' not from _specula_, a 'watch-tower.'" To see a thing in a mirror, however, is to see a cause by an effect in which its likeness is shown; thus _speculation_ seems reducible to _meditation_.
3. Again, S. Bernard says[346]: "The first and chiefest contemplation is