MY OPINION ABOUT LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.
First I conceive, that when it cometh into a man’s mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to _deliberate_, the doing it or abstaining _necessarily_ follow the _present_ thought he hath of the _good_ or _evil_ consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in sudden _anger_, the _action_ shall follow the thought of _revenge_; in sudden _fear_, the thought of _escape_. Also when a man hath time to _deliberate_, but deliberates not, because never anything appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the _action_ follows his opinion of the _goodness_ or _harm_ of it. These actions I call VOLUNTARY, my Lord, if I understand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them _voluntary_, because those _actions_ that follow immediately the _last_ appetite, are _voluntary_, and here where is one only appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a _rash_ action, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were _voluntary_. For no _action_ of a man can be said to be without _deliberation_, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to _deliberate_ all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of _anger_, shall nevertheless be justly put to _death_, because all the time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual _deliberation_, and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from _election_.
Secondly, I conceive when a man _deliberates_ whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to _consider_ an action, is to imagine the _consequences_ of it, both _good_ and _evil_. From whence is to be inferred, that _deliberation_ is nothing else but _alternate_ imagination of the _good_ and _evil_ sequels of an _action_, or, which is the same thing, alternate _hope_ and _fear_, or alternate _appetite_ to do or quit the action of which he _deliberateth_.
Thirdly, I conceive that in all _deliberations_, that is to say, in all alternate _succession_ of contrary _appetites_, the last is that which we call the WILL, and is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other _appetites_ to do, and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called _intentions_ and _inclinations_, but not _wills_, there being but one _will_, which also in this case may be called the _last will_, though the _intentions_ change often.
Fourthly, I conceive that those _actions_, which a man is said to do upon _deliberation_, are said to be _voluntary_, and done upon _choice_ and _election_, so that _voluntary_ action, and action proceeding from _election_ is the same thing; and that of a _voluntary agent_, it is all one to say, he is _free_, and to say, he hath not made an end of _deliberating_.
Fifthly, I conceive _liberty_ to be rightly defined in this manner: _Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent_. As for example, the water is said to descend _freely_, or to have _liberty_ to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the _liberty_ to ascend, but the _faculty_ or _power_, because the impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied, wants the _liberty_ to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself.
Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from _itself_, but from the _action_ of some other immediate _agent_ without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an _appetite_ or _will_ to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the _cause_ of his _will_, is not the _will_ itself, but _something_ else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of _voluntary_ actions the _will_ is the _necessary_ cause, and by this which is said, the _will_ is also _caused_ by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that _voluntary_ actions have all of them _necessary_ causes, and therefore are _necessitated_.
Seventhly, I hold that to be a _sufficient cause_, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the _effect_. The same also is a _necessary_ cause. For if it be possible that a _sufficient_ cause shall not bring forth the _effect_, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the _cause_ was not _sufficient_; but if it be impossible that a _sufficient_ cause should not produce the _effect_, then is a _sufficient_ cause a _necessary_ cause, for that is said to produce an effect _necessarily_ that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced _necessarily_; for whatsoever is produced hath had a _sufficient_ cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also _voluntary_ actions are _necessitated_.
Lastly, that ordinary _definition_ of a _free agent_, namely, _that a_ free agent _is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the_ effect, _can nevertheless not produce it_, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be _sufficient_, that is to say, _necessary_, and yet the _effect_ shall not follow.
------- MY REASONS.
For the first five points, wherein it is explicated I, what _spontaneity_ is; II, what _deliberation_ is; III, what _will_, _propension_, and _appetite_ are; IV, what a _free agent_ is: V, what _liberty_ is; there can no other proof be offered but every man’s own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what he useth in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is _spontaneous_, a man _deliberates_; such is his _will_, that _agent_ or that _action_ is _free_. Now he that reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that _deliberation_ is the _consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come_; that by _spontaneity_ is meant _inconsiderate action_, or else nothing is meant by it; that _will_ is the _last act of our deliberation_; that a _free agent_ is he _that can do if he will_, and _forbear if he will_; and that _liberty is the absence of external impediments_. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient, because _experience_ and _matter of fact_ are not verified by other men’s arguments, but by every man’s own _sense_ and _memory_. For example, how can it be proved that to _love_ a thing and to think it _good_ is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that _eternity_ is not _nunc stans_, to a man that says those words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing in his mind?
Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine anything to begin _without a cause_, can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was _eternal_.
For the seventh point, which is, that all _events_ have _necessary_ causes, it is there proved, in that they have _sufficient_ causes. Further let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing, for example, _ames ace_ upon a pair of dice, and see, if it must not have been _necessary_ before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a _beginning_, and consequently a _sufficient_ cause to produce it, consisting partly in the _dice_, partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the _hand_, the measure of _force_ applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the _table_, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been _sufficient_. In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident, how _contingent_ soever it seem, or how _voluntary_ soever it be, is produced _necessarily_, which is that that my Lord Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. _It is necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain._ If therefore it be not _necessary_ it shall rain, it is _necessary_ it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, _it shall rain or not rain_, should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much to say, _one_ of them is _necessary_, yet neither of them is _necessary_; and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true _determinate_, but _indeterminate_; which distinction either signifies no more but this, one of them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, one of them is true _Titirice_, but neither of them, _Tu patulice_.
The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy, namely that there is no such thing as an agent, _which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it_; or, which is all one, that there is no such thing as _freedom from necessity_, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it be an _agent_, it can _work_; and if it _work_, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the _action_, and consequently the cause of the action is _sufficient_; and if _sufficient_, then also _necessary_, as hath been proved before.
And thus you see how the _inconveniences_, which his Lordship objecteth must follow upon the holding of _necessity_, are avoided, and the _necessity_ itself _demonstratively_ proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good logic, the _inconvenience_ of denying _necessity_, as that it destroyeth both the _decrees_ and the _prescience_ of God Almighty; for whatsoever God hath _purposed_ to bring to pass by _man_, as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass; a man, if he have _liberty_, such as his Lordship affirmeth, from _necessitation_, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass, and God should either not _foreknow_ it, and not _decree_ it, or he should _foreknow_ such things shall be, as shall never be, and _decree_ that which shall never _come to pass_.
This is all that hath come into my mind touching this question since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it only to my Lord Bishop. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designs, I take leave, and am, My most noble and most obliging Lord, Your most humble servant, THOMAS HOBBES.
Footnote A: In the first edition of 1654 this date is 1646.
AN ANSWER TO A BOOK PUBLISHED BY DR. BRAMHALL, LATE BISHOP OF DERRY; CALLED THE “CATCHING OF THE LEVIATHAN.”
TOGETHER WITH AN HISTORICAL NARRATION CONCERNING HERESY, AND THE PUNISHMENT THEREOF.
TO THE READER.
------- As in all things which I have written, so also in this piece, I have endeavoured all I can to be perspicuous; but yet your own attention is always necessary. The late Lord Bishop of Derry published a book called _The Catching of the Leviathan_, in which he hath put together divers sentences picked out of my _Leviathan_, which stand there plainly and firmly proved, and sets them down without their proofs, and without the order of their dependance one upon another; and calls them atheism, blasphemy, impiety, subversion of religion, and by other names of that kind. My request unto you is, that when he cites my words for erroneous, you will be pleased to turn to the place itself, and see whether they be well proved, and how to be understood. Which labour his Lordship might have saved you, if he would have vouchsafed as well to have weighed my arguments before you, as to have shown you my conclusions. His book containeth two chapters, the one concerning Religion, the other concerning Politics. Because he does not so much as offer any refutation of any thing in my _Leviathan_ concluded, I needed not to have answered either of them. Yet to the first I here answer, because the words _atheism_, _impiety_, and the like, are words of the greatest defamation possible. And this I had done sooner, if I had sooner known that such a book was extant. He wrote it ten years since, and yet I never heard of it till about three months since; so little talk there was of his Lordship’s writings. If you want leisure or care of the questions between us, I pray you condemn me not upon report. To judge and not examine is not just.
Farewell. T. HOBBES.
------- AN ANSWER, ETC.
------- THAT THE HOBBIAN PRINCIPLES ARE DESTRUCTIVE TO CHRISTIANITY AND ALL RELIGION.
_J. D._ The image of God is not altogether defaced by the fall of man, but that there will remain some practical notions of God and goodness; which when the mind is free from vagrant desires, and violent passions, do shine as clearly in the heart, as other speculative notions do in the head. Hence it is, that there was never any nation so barbarous or savage throughout the whole world, which had not their God. They who did never wear clothes upon their backs, who did never know magistrate but their father, yet have their God, and their religious rights and devotions to him. Hence it is, that the greatest atheists in any sudden danger do unwittingly cast their eyes up to heaven, as craving aid from thence, and in a thunder creep into some hole to hide themselves. And they who are conscious to themselves of any secret crimes, though they be secure enough from the justice of men, do yet feel the blind blows of a guilty conscience, and fear Divine vengeance. This is acknowledged by T. H. himself in his lucid intervals. _That we may know what worship of God natural reason doth assign, let us begin with his attributes, where it is manifest in the first place, that existency is to be attributed to him._ To which he addeth, _infiniteness_, _incomprehensibility_, _unity_, _ubiquity_. Thus for attributes; next for actions. _Concerning external actions, wherewith God is to be worshipped, the most general precept of reason is, that they be signs of honour_; under which are contained _prayers, thanksgivings, oblations, and sacrifices_.
_T. H._ Hitherto his Lordship discharges me of atheism. What need he to say that _all nations, how barbarous soever, yet have their Gods and religious rites, and atheists are frighted with thunder, and feel the blind blows of conscience_? It might have been as apt a preface to any other of his discourses as this. I expect therefore in the next place to be told, that I deny again my afore-recited doctrine.
_J. D._ Yet, to let us see how inconsistent and irreconcileable he is with himself, elsewhere reckoning up all the laws of nature at large, even twenty in number, he hath not one word that concerneth religion, or hath the least relation in the world to God. As if a man were like the colt of a wild ass in the wilderness, without any owner or obligation. Thus in describing the laws of nature, this great clerk forgetteth the God of nature, and the main and principal laws of nature, which contain a man’s duty to his God, and the principal end of his creation.
_T. H._ After I had ended the discourse he mentions of the laws of nature, I thought it fittest in the last place, once for all, to say they were the laws of God, then when they were delivered in the word of God; but before, being not known by men for any thing but their own natural reason, they were but theorems, tending to peace, and those uncertain, as being but conclusions of particular men, and therefore not properly laws. Besides, I had formerly in my book _De Cive_, cap. IV, proved them severally, one by one, out of the Scriptures: which his Lordship had read and knew. It was therefore an unjust charge of his to say, I had not one word in them that concerns religion, or that hath the least relation in the world to God; and this upon no other ground than that I added not to every article, _this law is in the Scripture_. But why he should call me (ironically) a great clerk, I cannot tell. I suppose he would make men believe, I arrogated to myself all the learning of a great clerk, bishop, or other inferior minister. A learned bishop, is that bishop that can interpret all parts of Scripture truly, and congruently to the harmony of the whole; that has learnt the history and laws of the Church, down from the apostles' time to his own; and knows what is the nature of a law civil, divine, natural, and positive; and how to govern well the parochial ministers of his diocese, so that they may both by doctrine and example keep the people in the belief of all articles of faith necessary to salvation, and in obedience to the laws of their country. This is a learned bishop. A learned minister, is he that hath learned the way by which men may be drawn from avarice, pride, sensuality, profaneness, rebellious principles, and all other vices, by eloquent and powerful disgracing of them, both from Scripture and from reason; and can terrify men from vice, by discreet uttering of the punishments denounced against wicked men, and by deducing, rationally, the damage they receive by it in the end. In one word, he is a learned minister that can preach such sermons as St. Chrysostom preached to the Antiochians, when he was presbyter in that city. Could his Lordship find in my book, that I arrogated to myself the eloquence or wisdom of St. Chrysostom, or the ability of governing the church? It is one thing to know what is to be done, another thing to know how to do it. But his Lordship was pleased to use any artifice to disgrace me in any kind whatsoever.
_J. D._ Perhaps he will say that he handleth the laws of nature there, only so far as may serve to the constitution or settlement of a commonwealth. In good time, let it be so. He hath devised us a trim commonwealth, which is founded neither upon religion towards God, nor justice towards man; but merely upon self-interest, and self-preservation. Those rays of heavenly light, those natural seeds of religion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man, are more efficacious towards preservation of a society, whether we regard the nature of the thing, or the blessing of God, than all his _pacts_, and _surrenders_, and _translations of power_. He who unteacheth men their duty to God, may make them eye-servants, so long as their interest doth oblige them to obey; but is no fit master to teach men conscience and fidelity.
_T. H._ He has not yet found the place where I contradict either the existence, or infiniteness, or incomprehensibility, or unity, or ubiquity of God. I am therefore yet absolved of atheism. But I am, he says, inconsistent and irreconcileable with myself; that is, I am (though he says not so) he thinks, a forgetful blockhead. I cannot help that: but my forgetfulness appears not here. Even his Lordship, where he says, “those rays of heavenly light, those seeds of religion, which God himself hath imprinted in the heart of man (meaning natural reason), are more efficacious to the preservation of society, than all the _pacts, surrenders_, and _translating of power_,” had forgotten to except the old pact of the Jews, and the new pact of Christians. But pardoning that, did he hope to make any wise man believe, that when this nation very lately was an anarchy, and dissolute multitude of men, doing every one what his own reason or imprinted light suggested, they did again out of the same light call in the king, and peace again, and ask pardon for the faults, which that their illumination had brought them into, rather than out of fear of perpetual danger and hope of preservation?
_J. D._ Without religion, societies are like but soapy bubbles, quickly dissolved. It was the judgment of as wise a man as T. H. himself, though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to it, that Rome owed more of its grandeur to religion, than either to strength or stratagems. _We have not exceeded the Spaniards in number, nor the Gauls in strength, nor the Carthaginians in craft, nor the Grecians in art, &c. but we have overcome all nations by our piety and religion._ _T. H._ Did not his Lordship forget himself here again, in approving this sentence of Tully, which makes the idolatry of the Romans, not only better than the idolatry of other nations; but also better than the religion of the Jews, whose law Christ himself says he came not to destroy but to fulfil? And that the Romans overcame both them and other nations by their piety, when it is manifest that the Romans overran the world by injustice and cruelty, and that their victories ought not to be ascribed to the piety of the Romans, but to the impiety as well of the Jews as of other nations? But what meant he by saying “Tully was as wise a man as T. H. himself, though perhaps he will hardly be persuaded to it?” Was that any part of the controversy? No: then it was out of his way. God promiseth to assist good men in their way, but not out of their way. It is therefore the less wonder that his Lordship was in this place deserted of the light, which God imprints in the hearts of rudest savages.
_J. D._ Among his laws he inserteth _gratitude_ to men as the third precept of the law of nature; but of the gratitude of mankind to their Creator, there is a deep silence. If men had sprung up from the earth in a night, like mushrooms or excrescences, without all sense of honour, justice, conscience, or gratitude, he could not have vilified the human nature more than he doth.
_T. H._ My Lord discovers here an ignorance of such method as is necessary for lawful and strict reasoning, and explication of the truth in controversy. And not only that, but also how little able he is to fix his mind upon what he reads in other men’s writings. When I had defined ingratitude universally, he finds fault that I do not mention ingratitude towards God, as if his Lordship knew not that an universal comprehends all the particulars. When I had defined equity universally, why did he not as well blame me for not telling what that equity is in God? He is grateful to the man of whom he receives a good turn, that confesseth, or maketh appear he is pleased with the benefit he receiveth. So also gratitude towards God is to confess his benefits. There is also, in gratitude towards men, a desire to requite their benefits; so there is in our gratitude towards God, so far to requite them, as to be kind to God’s ministers, which I acknowledged in making sacrifices a part of natural divine worship; and the benefit of those sacrifices is the nourishment of God’s ministers. It appears therefore, that the bishop’s attention in reading my writings, was either weak in itself, or weakened by prejudice.
_J. D._ From this shameful omission or preterition of the main duty of mankind, a man might easily take the height of T. H. his religion. But he himself putteth it past all conjectures. His principles are brim full of prodigious impiety. _In these four things, opinions of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion to what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consisteth the natural seed of religion_; the culture and improvement whereof, he referreth only to _policy_. Human and divine politics, are but politics. And again, _mankind hath this from the conscience of their own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, that the most part of men believe that there is an invisible God, the maker of all visible things_. And a little after he telleth us, that _superstition proceedeth from fear without right reason, and atheism from an opinion of reason without fear_; making atheism to be more reasonable than superstition. What is now become of that divine worship which natural reason did assign unto God, the honour of existence, infiniteness, incomprehensibility, unity, ubiquity? What is now become of that dictate or precept of reason, concerning _prayers_, _thanksgivings_, _oblations_, _sacrifices_, if uncertain opinions, ignorance, fear, mistakes, the conscience of our own weakness, and the admiration of natural events, be the only seeds of religion?
He proceedeth further, that _atheism itself, though it be an erroneous opinion, and therefore a sin, yet it ought to be numbered among the sins of imprudence or ignorance_. He addeth, that _an atheist is punished not as a subject is punished by his king, because he did not observe laws: but as an enemy, by an enemy, because he would not accept laws_. His reason is, because _the atheist never submitted his will to the will of God, whom he never thought to be_. And he concludeth that man’s obligation to obey God proceedeth from his weakness, (De Cive, XV. 7: vol. II. p. 336): _Manifestum est obligationem ad prestandam ipsi_ (Deo) _obedientiam, incumbere hominibus propter imbecilitatem_. First, it is impossible that should be a sin of mere ignorance or imprudence, which is directly contrary to the light of natural reason. The laws of nature need no new promulgation, being imprinted naturally by God in the heart of man. _The law of nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God, without our assent_; or rather, _the law of nature is the assent itself_. Then if nature dictate to us that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped in such and such a manner, it is not possible that atheism should be a sin of mere ignorance.
Secondly, a rebellious subject is still a subject _de jure_, though not _de facto_; by right, though not by deed: and so the most cursed atheist that is, ought by right to be the subject of God, and ought to be punished not as a just enemy, but as a disloyal traitor. Which is confessed by himself: _this fourth sin_ (that is, of those who do not by word and deed confess one God, the supreme King of Kings) _in the natural kingdom of God is the crime of high treason, for it is a denial of Divine power, or atheism_. Then an atheist is a traitor to God, and punishable as a disloyal subject, not as an enemy.
Lastly, it is an absurd and dishonourable assertion, to make our obedience to God to depend upon our weakness, because we cannot help it, and not upon our gratitude, because we owe our being and preservation to him. _Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? And who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?_ And again, _Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honour and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created_. But it were much better, or at least not so ill, to be a downright atheist, than to make God to be such a thing as he doth, and at last thrust him into the Devil’s office, to be the cause of all sin.
_T. H._ Though this bishop, as I said, had but a weak attention in reading, and little skill in examining the force of an argument, yet he knew men, and the art, without troubling their judgments, to win their assents by exciting their passions. One rule of his art was to give his reader what he would have him swallow, a part by itself, and in the nature of news, whether true or not. Knowing that the unlearned, that is most men, are content to believe, rather than be troubled with examining, therefore, a little before, he put these words, _T. H. no friend to religion_, in the margin. And in this place, before he offer at any confutation, he says my principles are brim full of _prodigious impieties_. And at the next paragraph, in the margin, he puts that _I excuse atheism_. This behaviour becomes neither a bishop, nor a Christian, nor any man that pretends to good education. Fear of invisible powers, what is it else in savage people, but the fear of somewhat they think a God? What invisible power does the reason of a savage man suggest unto him, but those phantasms of his sleep, or his distemper, which we frequently call ghosts, and the savages thought gods; so that the fear of a God, though not of the true one, to them was the beginning of religion, as the fear of the true God was the beginning of wisdom to the Jews and Christians? Ignorance of second causes made men fly to some first cause, the fear of which bred devotion and worship. The