18. Forasmuch as all _knowledge_ beginneth from _experience_, therefore also _new experience_ is the beginning of _new knowledge_, and the increase of experience the beginning of the increase of knowledge. Whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a man, giveth him matter of _hope_ of _knowing_ somewhat that he knew _not before_. And this hope and expectation of future knowledge from anything that happeneth new and strange, is that passion which we commonly call _admiration_; and the same considered as appetite, is called _curiosity_, which is appetite of knowledge. As in the discerning of faculties, _man leaveth_ all community with _beasts_ at the faculty of _imposing names_; so also doth he surmount their nature at this _passion_ of _curiosity_. For when a beast seeth anything new and strange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: whereas man, who in most events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh for the cause and beginning of everything that ariseth new unto him. And from this passion of admiration and curiosity, have arisen not only the invention of names, but also supposition of such causes of all things as they thought might produce them. And from this beginning is derived all _philosophy_; as _astronomy_ from the admiration of the course of heaven; _natural philosophy_ from the strange effects of the elements and other bodies. And from the degrees of curiosity, proceed also the degrees of knowledge amongst men: for, to a man in the chase of riches or authority, (which in respect of knowledge are but sensuality) it is a diversity of little pleasure, whether it be the motion of the sun or the earth that maketh the day, or to enter into other contemplations of any strange accident, otherwise than whether it conduce or not to the end he pursueth. Because _curiosity_ is _delight_, therefore also _novelty_ is so, but especially that novelty from which a man conceiveth an _opinion_ true or false of _bettering_ his own estate; for, in such case, they stand affected with the hope that all gamesters have while the cards are shuffling.
[Sidenote: Of the passion of them that flock to see danger.]
19. Divers other passions there be, but they want names: whereof some nevertheless have been by most men observed: for example; from what passion proceedeth it, that men take _pleasure_ to _behold_ from the shore the _danger_ of them that are at sea in a tempest, or in fight, or from a safe castle to behold two armies charge one another in the field? It is certainly, in the whole sum, _joy_; else men would never flock to such a spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it both _joy_ and _grief_: for as there is novelty and remembrance of our own security present, which is _delight_; so there is also _pity_, which is grief; but the delight is so far predominant, that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends.
[Sidenote: Of magnanimity and pusillanimity.]
20. _Magnanimity_ is no more than _glory_, of the which I have spoken in the first section; but _glory well grounded_ upon certain experience of a power sufficient to attain his end in open manner. And _pusillanimity_ is the _doubt_ of that. Whatsoever therefore is a sign of _vain glory_, the same is also a sign of _pusillanimity_: for sufficient power maketh glory a spur to one’s end. To be _pleased_ or _displeased_ with _fame true_ or _false_, is a _sign_ of that same, because he that relieth on fame hath not his success in his own power. Likewise _art_ and _fallacy_ are signs of pusillanimity, because they depend not upon our own power, but the ignorance of others. Also _proneness_ to _anger_, because it argueth difficulty of proceeding. Also _ostentation_ of _ancestors_, because all men are more inclined to make shew of their own power when they have it, than of another’s. To be at _enmity_ and contention with _inferiors_, is a sign of the same, because it proceedeth from want of power to end the war. To _laugh_ at others, because it is an affectation of glory from other men’s infirmities, and not from any ability of their own. Also _irresolution_, which proceedeth from want of power enough to contemn the little difficulties that make deliberations hard.
[Sidenote: A view of the passions represented in a race.]
21. The comparison of the life of man to a race, though it hold not in every part, yet it holdeth so well for this our purpose, that we may thereby both see and remember almost all the passions before mentioned. But this _race_ we must suppose to have no other _goal_, nor other _garland_, but being foremost, and in it: To endeavour, is _appetite_. To be remiss, is _sensuality_. To consider them behind, is _glory_. To consider them before, is _humility_. To lose ground with looking back, _vain glory_. To be holden, _hatred_. To turn back, _repentance_. To be in breath, _hope_. To be weary, _despair_. To endeavour to overtake the next, _emulation_. To supplant or overthrow, _envy_. To resolve to break through a stop foreseen, _courage_. To break through a sudden stop, _anger_. To break through with ease, _magnanimity_. To lose ground by little hindrances, _pusillanimity_. To fall on the sudden, is disposition to _weep_. To see another fall, is disposition to _laugh_. To see one out-gone whom we would not, is _pity_. To see one out-go whom we would not, is _indignation_. To hold fast by another, is to _love_. To carry him on that so holdeth, is _charity_. To hurt one’s-self for haste, is _shame_. Continually to be out-gone, is _misery_. Continually to out-go the next before, is _felicity_. And to forsake the course, is to _die_.
1. Having shewed in the precedent chapters, that sense proceedeth from the action of external objects upon the _brain_, or some internal _substance_ of the _head_; and that the _passions_ proceed from the alteration there made, and continued to the _heart_: it is consequent in the next place, seeing the diversity of degrees in knowledge in divers men, to be greater than may be ascribed to the divers _tempers_ of their brain, to declare _what other causes_ may produce such _odds_, and excess of _capacity_, as we daily observe in one man above another. As for that difference which ariseth from _sickness_, and such accidental distempers, I omit the same, as impertinent to this place, and consider it only in such as have their _health_, and _organs_ well disposed. If the difference were in the natural temper of the brain, I can imagine no reason why the same should not appear first and most of all in the senses, which being equal both in the wise and less wise, infer an equal temper in the common organ (namely the brain) of all the senses.
2. But we see by experience, that _joy_ and _grief_ proceed _not_ in _all_ men from the same _causes_, and that men differ very much in the constitution of the body; whereby, that which helpeth and furthereth _vital constitution_ in one, and is therefore delightful, hindereth it and crosseth it in another, and therefore causeth grief. The _difference_ therefore of _wits_ hath its original _from_ the _different passions_, and from the _ends_ to which the appetite leadeth them.
3. And first, those men whose ends are _sensual_ delight, and generally are addicted to _ease_, _food_, _onerations_ and _exonerations_ of the body, must needs be the _less_ thereby delighted with those _imaginations_ that _conduce not_ to those ends, such as are imaginations of _honour_ and _glory_, which, as I have said before, have respect to the future: for sensuality consisteth in the pleasure of the senses, which please only for the present, and take away the inclination to observe such things as conduce to honour, and consequently maketh men less curious, and less ambitious, whereby they less consider the way either to knowledge or other power; in which two consisteth all the excellency of power cognitive. And this is it which men call _dulness_, and proceedeth from the appetite of sensual or bodily delight. And it may well be conjectured, that such passion hath its beginning from a _grossness_ and _difficulty_ of the _motion_ of the _spirit_ about the _heart_.
4. The contrary hereunto, is that _quick ranging_ of mind described, chapter IV. section 3, which is joined with _curiosity_ of comparing the things that come into the mind, one with another: in which comparison, a man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected _similitude_ of things, otherwise much unlike, in which men place the excellency of _fancy_, and from whence proceed those grateful similies, metaphors, and other tropes, by which both _poets_ and _orators_ have it in their power to make things please or displease, and shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else in discerning suddenly _dissimilitude_ in things that otherwise appear the same. And this virtue of the mind is that by which men attain to exact and perfect _knowledge_; and the pleasure thereof consisteth in continual instruction, and in distinction of places, persons, and seasons, and is commonly termed by the name of _judgment_: for, to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern: and both _fancy_ and _judgment_ are commonly comprehended under the name of _wit_, which seemeth to be a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that restiness of the spirits supposed in those that are dull.
5. There is another defect of the mind, which men call _levity_, which betrayeth also _mobility_ in the spirits, but in excess. An example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious discourse, have their minds diverted to every little jest or witty observation; which maketh them depart from their discourse by a parenthesis, and from that parenthesis by another, till at length they either lose themselves, or make their narration like a dream, or some studied nonsense. The passion from whence this proceedeth, is _curiosity_, but with _too much equality_ and indifference: for when all things make equal impression and delight, they equally throng to be expressed.
6. The virtue opposite to this defect is _gravity_, or steadiness; in which the end being the great and master-delight, directeth and keepeth in the way thereto all other thoughts.
7. The _extremity_ of dullness is that _natural folly_ which may be called _stolidity_: but the extreme of _levity_, though it be natural folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every man’s observation, I know _not_ how to call it.
8. There is a fault of the mind called by the Greeks Ἀμαϑια, which is _indocibility_, or _difficulty_ of being taught; the which must needs arise from a _false opinion_ that they _know already_ the truth of that is called in question: for certainly men are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as the _evidence_ is unequal between what is taught by the mathematicians, and what is commonly discoursed of in other books: and therefore if the minds of men were all of white paper, they would almost equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right method, and by right ratiocination delivered to them: but when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentical records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men, than to write legibly upon a paper already scribbled over. The immediate _cause_ therefore of _indocibility_, is _prejudice_; and of prejudice, false opinion of our own knowledge.
9. Another, and a principal defect of the mind, is that which men call _madness_, which appeareth to be nothing else but some _imagination_ of some such _predominancy_ above the _rest_, that we have _no passion but from it_; and this conception is nothing else but excessive _vain glory_, or _vain dejection_; which is most probable by these examples following, which proceed in appearance every one of them from _pride_, or some _dejection_ of mind. As first, we have had the example of one that preached in Cheapside from a cart there, instead of a pulpit, that he himself was Christ, which was _spiritual_ pride or madness. We have had also divers examples of learned madness, in which men have manifestly been distracted upon any occasion that hath put them in remembrance of their own ability. Amongst the learned men, may be remembered, I think also, those that determine of the time of the world’s end, and other such the points of prophecy. And the gallant madness of Don Quixote is nothing else but an expression of such height of vain glory as reading of _romance_ may produce in pusillanimous men. Also rage and madness of love, are but great indignations of them in whose brains is predominant contempt from their enemies, or their mistresses. And the _pride_ taken in _form_ and _behaviour_, hath made divers men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the name of fantastic.
10. And as these are the examples of extremities, so also are there examples too many of the degrees, which may therefore be well accounted follies; as it is a degree of the _first_, for a man, without certain evidence, to think himself to be _inspired_, or to have any other effect of God’s holy spirit than other godly men have. Of the _second_, for a man continually to speak his mind in a _cento_ of other men’s Greek or Latin sentences. Of the _third_, much of the present gallantry in love and duel. Of _rage_, a degree is _malice_; and of _fantastic_ madness, _affectation_.
11. As the former examples exhibit to us madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding from the excess of self-opinion; so also there be other examples of madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding from _too much vain fear_ and _dejection_; as in those melancholy men that have imagined themselves brittle as glass, or have had some other like imagination: and degrees hereof are all those exorbitant and causeless fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy persons.
------- CHAPTER XI.
1. Hitherto of the knowledge of things _natural_, and of the passions that arise naturally from them. Now forasmuch as we give names not only to things natural, but also to _supernatural_; and by all names we ought to have some meaning and conception: it followeth in the next place, to consider what thoughts and imaginations of the mind we have, when we take into our mouths the most blessed name of GOD, and the names of those _virtues_ we attribute unto him; as also, what _image_ cometh into the mind at hearing the name of _spirit_, or the name of _angel_, good or bad.
2. And forasmuch as God Almighty is _incomprehensible_, it followeth, that we can have _no_ conception or _image_ of the _Deity_, and consequently, all _his attributes_ signify our _inability_ and defect of power to _conceive_ any thing concerning his nature, and not any conception of the same, excepting only this, that _there is a God_: for the effects we acknowledge naturally, do include a power of their producing, before they were produced; and that power presupposeth something existent that hath such power: and the thing so existing with power to produce, if it were not eternal, must needs have been produced by somewhat before it, and that again by something else before that, till we come to an eternal, that is to say, the first power of all powers, and first cause of all causes: and this is it which all men conceive by the name of GOD, implying eternity, incomprehensibility, and omnipotency. And thus all that will consider, may know _that_ God is, though not _what_ he is: even a man that is born blind, though it be not possible for him to have any imagination what kind of thing fire is; yet he cannot but know that somewhat there is that men call fire, because it warmeth him.
3. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty, _seeing_, _hearing_, _speaking_, _knowing_, _loving_, and the like, by which names we understand something in _men_ to whom we attribute them, we understand _nothing_ by them in the nature of God: for, as it is well reasoned, _Shall not the God that made the_ _eye, see; and the ear, hear?_ So it is also, if we say, shall God, which made the eye, not see without the eye; or that made the ear, not hear without the ear; or that made the brain, not know without the brain; or that made the heart, not love without the heart? The _attributes_ therefore given unto the _Deity_, are such as _signify_ either _our incapacity_ or our _reverence_: our incapacity, when we say incomprehensible and infinite; our reverence, when we give him those names, which amongst us are the names of those things we most magnify and commend, as omnipotent, omniscient, just, merciful, &c. And when God Almighty giveth those names to himself in the Scriptures, it is but ἀνϑρωποπαθῶς, that is to say, by descending to our manner of speaking; without which we are not capable of understanding him.
4. By the name of _spirit_, we understand a _body natural_, but of such _subtilty_, that it worketh not upon the senses; but that filleth up the place which the image of a visible body might fill up. Our conception therefore of spirit consisteth of _figure without colour_; and in figure is understood dimension, and consequently, to conceive a spirit, is to conceive something that hath dimension. But _spirits supernatural_ commonly signify some _substance without_ dimension; which two words do flatly contradict one another: and therefore when we attribute the name of spirit unto God, we attribute it not as the name of anything we conceive, no more than we ascribe unto him sense and understanding; but as a signification of our reverence, we desire to abstract from him all corporal grossness.
5. Concerning other things, which some men call _spirits incorporeal_, and some _corporeal_, it is not _possible_ by _natural_ means only, to come to _knowledge_ of so much, as that _there are such_ things. We that are Christians _acknowledge_ that there be angels good and evil, and that there are spirits, and that the soul of a man is a spirit, and that those spirits are immortal: _but_, to _know_ it, that is to say, to have natural evidence of the same, it is _impossible_: for, all _evidence_ is _conception_, as it is said, chap. VI. sect. 3, and all conception is imagination, and proceedeth from _sense_, chap. III. sect. 1. And _spirits_ we suppose to be those substances which work _not_ upon the _sense_, and therefore not conceptible. But though the Scripture acknowledges spirits, yet doth it nowhere say, that they are incorporeal, meaning thereby, without dimension and quality; nor, I think, is that word incorporeal at all in the Bible; but it is said of the spirit, that it abideth in men; sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh; and that spirits are angels, that is to say messengers: all which words do imply _locality_; and locality is _dimension_; and whatsoever hath dimension, is _body_, be it never so subtile. To me therefore it seemeth, that the Scripture favoureth them more, that hold angels and spirits corporeal, than them that hold the contrary.
And it is a plain _contradiction_ in natural discourse, to say of the soul of man, that it is _tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte corporis_, grounded neither upon reason nor revelation, but proceeding from the ignorance of what those things are which are called _spectra_, images, that appear in the dark to children, and such as have strong fears, and other strange imaginations, as hath been said, chapter III. sect. 5, where I call them phantasms: for, taking them to be things real, without us, like bodies, and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do, unlike to _bodies_; what could they call them else, but _incorporeal bodies_? which is not a name, but an absurdity of speech.
6. It is true, that the heathens, and all nations of the world, have acknowledged that there be _spirits_, which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal; whereby it might be thought, that a man by natural reason, may arrive, without the Scriptures, to the knowledge of this, _that spirits are_: but the erroneous collection thereof by the heathens, may proceed, as I have said before, from the ignorance of the cause of ghosts and phantasms, and such other apparitions. And from thence had the Grecians their number of gods, their number of _dæmons_ good or bad, and for every man his _genius_; which is not the acknowledging of this truth, _that spirits are_; but a false opinion concerning the force of imagination.
7. And seeing the _knowledge_ we have of _spirits_, is _not natural_ knowledge, but _faith_ from supernatural revelation given to the holy writers of the Scriptures; it followeth, that of inspirations also, which is the operation of spirit in us, the knowledge which we have, must all proceed from Scripture. The _signs_ there set down of _inspiration_, are _miracles_, when they be great, and manifestly above the power of men to do by imposture: as for example, the inspiration of Elias was known by the miraculous burning of the sacrifice. But the _signs_ to _distinguish_ whether a _spirit_ be _good_ or _evil_, are the same by which we distinguish whether a man or a tree be good or evil, namely, _actions_ and _fruit_: for there are _lying_ spirits, wherewith men are inspired sometimes, as well as with _spirits_ of _truth_. And we are commanded in Scripture, to judge of the spirits by their doctrine, and not of the doctrine by the spirits. For miracles, our Saviour (_Matth._ xxiv. 24) hath forbidden us to rule our faith by them. And Saint Paul saith, (_Gal._ i. 8): _Though an angel from heaven preach to you otherwise_, &c. _let him be accursed_. Where it is plain, that we are not to judge whether the doctrine be true or not, by the angel; but whether the angel say true or no, by the doctrine. So likewise, (_1 Joh._ iv. 1): _Believe not every spirit: for false prophets are gone out into the world_. Verse 2: _Hereby shall ye know the spirit of God_. Verse 3: _Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God: and this is the spirit of Antichrist_. Verse 15: _Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the Son of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God_. The _knowledge_ therefore we have of _good_ and _evil_ inspiration, cometh _not_ by _vision_ of an angel that may teach it, _nor_ by a _miracle_ that may seem to confirm it; _but_ by _conformity_ of doctrine with this article and fundamental point of Christian faith, which also Saint Paul (_1 Cor._ iii. 11) saith is the sole foundation, _That Jesus Christ is come in the flesh_.
8. But if _inspiration_ be discerned by _this_ point, and _this_ point be acknowledged and believed upon the _authority_ of the _Scriptures_; _how_ (may some men ask) know we that the _Scripture deserveth_ so great _authority_, which must be no less than that of the lively voice of God; that is, how do we know the _Scriptures_ to be the _word of God_? And first, it is manifest, that if by knowledge we understand science infallible and natural, as is defined, chap. VI. sect. 4, proceeding from sense, we cannot be said to know it, because it proceedeth not from the conceptions engendered by sense. And if we understand knowledge as supernatural, we cannot have it but by inspiration: and of that _inspiration_ we cannot judge, but by the _doctrine_: it followeth, that we have not any way, natural or supernatural, of the _knowledge_ thereof, which can properly be called _infallible science_ and _evidence_. It remaineth, that the knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are the word of God, is only _faith_, which faith therefore is also by Saint Paul (_Heb._ xi. 1) defined to be _the evidence of things not seen_; that is to say, not otherwise evident but by faith: for, whatsoever either is evident by natural reason, or revelation supernatural, is not called faith; else should not faith cease, no more than charity, when we are in heaven; which is contrary to the doctrine of the Scripture. And, we are _not_ said to _believe_, _but_ to _know_ those things that be _evident_.
9. Seeing then the acknowledgment of Scriptures to be the word of God, is not evidence, but faith, and faith (chapter VI. sect. 7) consisteth in the trust we have of other men, it appeareth plain, that the men so trusted, are the holy men of God’s church succeeding one another from the time of those that saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh. Nor doth this imply that God is not the worker or efficient cause of faith, or that faith is begotten in man without the spirit of God: for, all those good opinions which we admit and believe, though they proceed from hearing, and hearing from teaching, both which are natural, yet they are the work of God: for, all the works of nature are his, and they are attributed to the Spirit of God: as for example, _Exod._ xxviii. 3: _Thou shalt speak unto all cunning men, whom I have filled with the_ SPIRIT _of wisdom, that they may make Aaron’s garments for his consecration, that he may serve me in the priest’s office_. Faith therefore, wherewith we believe, is the work of the Spirit of God in that sense, by which the Spirit of God giveth to one man wisdom and cunning in workmanship more than another; and by which he effecteth also in other points pertaining to our ordinary life, that one man believeth that, which, upon the same grounds, another doth not; and one man reverenceth the opinion, and obeyeth the commands of his superior, and others not.
10. And seeing our faith, that the Scriptures are the word of God, began from the confidence and trust we repose in the _church_; there can be no doubt but that their _interpretation_ of the same Scriptures (when any doubt or controversy shall arise, by which this fundamental point, _that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh_, may be called in question) is _safer_ for any man to trust to, than his _own_, whether _reasoning_ or _spirit_, that is to say, his own _opinion_.
11. Now concerning men’s _affections_ to _Godward_, they are not the same always that are described in the chapter concerning passions. There, for to love, is to be delighted with the image or conception of the thing loved; but God is unconceivable: _to love God_ therefore, in the Scripture, is to _obey his commandments_, and to _love one another_. Also to _trust God_, is different from our _trusting_ one _another_: for, when a man trusteth a man, (chap. IX. sect. 9) he layeth aside his own endeavours: but if we do so in our trust to God Almighty, we disobey him; and how shall we trust to him whom we know we disobey? To _trust_ to _God Almighty_ therefore, is to _refer_ to his _good pleasure_ all that is _above our_ own power to effect: and this is _all one_ with _acknowledging one_ only God, which is the first commandment. And to trust _in Christ_, is no more but to acknowledge him for God; which is the fundamental article of our Christian faith: and consequently, to trust, rely, or, as some express it, to cast and roll ourselves on Christ, is the same thing with the fundamental point of faith, namely, that _Jesus Christ is the son of the living God_.
12. To _honour_ God internally in the heart, is the same thing with that we ordinarily call honour amongst men: for it is nothing but the _acknowledging_ of his _power_; and the signs thereof, the same with the signs of the honour due to our superiors, mentioned chapter VIII. section 6, viz. to _praise_, to _magnify_, to _bless_, to pray to him, to thank him, to give oblations and sacrifices to him, to give attention to his word, to speak to him in prayer with consideration, to come into his presence with humble gesture, and in decent manner, and to adorn his worship with magnificence and cost: and these are natural signs of our honouring him internally: and therefore the contrary hereof, to neglect prayer, to speak to him _extempore_, to come to church slovenly, to adorn the place of his worship worse than our own houses, to take up his name in every idle discourse, are the manifest signs of contempt of the Divine Majesty. There be other signs which are arbitrary; as, to be uncovered, as we be here, to put off their shoes, as Moses at the fiery bush, and some other of that kind, which in their own nature are indifferent, till, to avoid indecency and discord, it be otherwise determined by common consent.
------- CHAPTER XII.
1. It hath been declared already, how _external_ objects cause _conceptions_, and conceptions, _appetite_ and _fear_, which are the _first unperceived beginnings of our actions_: for _either_ the actions immediately follow the first appetite, as when we do anything upon a sudden; _or else_ to our first appetite there succeedeth some conception of evil to happen to us by such actions, which is fear, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that fear may succeed a new appetite, and to that appetite another fear alternately, till the action be either done, or some accident come between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate appetite and fear ceaseth. This _alternate succession of appetite and fear_ during all the time the action is in our power to do or not to do, is that we call _deliberation_; which name hath been given it for that part of the definition wherein it is said that it lasteth so long as the action, whereof we deliberate, is in our power: for, so long we have liberty to do or not to do; and deliberation signifieth a taking away of our own liberty.
2. _Deliberation_ therefore requireth in the action deliberated _two conditions_; one, that it be _future_; the other, that there be _hope_ of doing it, or possibility of not doing it; for, _appetite_ and _fear_ are _expectations_ of the future; and there is no expectation of good, without hope; or of evil, without possibility: of _necessaries_ therefore there is _no deliberation_. In deliberation, the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called _will_, viz. the last appetite, will to do, or will to omit. It is all one therefore to say _will_ and _last will_: for, though a man express his present inclination and appetite concerning the disposing of his goods, by words or writings; yet shall it not be counted his will, because he hath still liberty to dispose of them otherways: but when death taketh away that liberty, then it is his will.
3. _Voluntary_ actions and omissions are such as have beginning in the _will_; all other are _involuntary_, or _mixed voluntary_; _involuntary_, such as he doth by necessity of nature, as when he is pushed, or falleth, and thereby doth good or hurt to another: _mixed_, such as participate of both; as when a man is carried to prison, going is voluntary, to the prison, is involuntary: the example of him that throweth his goods out of a ship into the sea, to save his person, is of an action altogether voluntary: for, there is nothing therein involuntary, but the hardness of the choice, which is not his action, but the action of the winds: what he himself doth, is no more against his will, than to flee from danger is against the will of him that seeth no other means to preserve himself.
4. _Voluntary_ also are the actions that proceed from sudden _anger_, or _other_ sudden _appetite_ in such men as can discern good or evil: for, in them the time precedent _is_ to be judged deliberation: for then also he deliberateth in what cases it is good to strike, deride, or do any other action proceeding from anger or other such sudden passion.
5. _Appetite_, _fear_, _hope_, and the rest of the passions are _not_ called _voluntary_; for they proceed _not from, but are the will_; and the will is not voluntary: for, a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word [_will_]; which is absurd, and insignificant.
6. Forasmuch as _will to do_ is _appetite_, and _will to omit_, _fear_; the _cause_ of _appetite_ and _fear_ is the _cause_ also of our _will_: but the propounding of the benefits and of harms, that is to say, of reward and punishment, is the cause of our appetite, and of our fears, and therefore also of our wills, so far forth as we believe that such rewards and benefits as are propounded, shall arrive unto us; and consequently, our _wills_ follow our _opinions_, as our _actions_ follow our _wills_; in which sense they say truly, and properly, that say the world is governed by opinion.
7. When the wills of many concur to one and the same action and effect, this _concourse_ of their _wills_ is called _consent_; by which we must not understand one will of many men, for every man hath his several will, but many wills to the producing of one effect: but when the _wills_ of two divers men _produce_ such actions as are reciprocally _resistant_ one to the other, this is called _contention_; and, being upon the persons one of another, _battle_: whereas actions proceeding from _consent_, are mutual _aid_.
8. When many wills are involved or included in the will of one or more consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared) then is that involving of many wills in one or more, called _union_.