9. In _deliberations_ interrupted, as they may be by _diversion_ of other business, or by _sleep_, the last _appetite_ of such part of the deliberation is called _intention_, or _purpose_.
------- CHAPTER XIII.
1. Having spoken of the powers and acts of the mind, both cognitive and motive, considered in every man by _himself, without relation to others_; it will fall fitly into _this_ chapter, to speak of the effects of the same power _one upon another_; which effects are also the signs, by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and intendeth. Of these signs, _some_ are such as _cannot_ easily be _counterfeited_; as actions and gestures, especially if they be sudden, whereof I have mentioned some; (for example, look in chapter IX.) with the several passions whereof they are signs: _others_ there are which _may_ be _counterfeited_; and those are _words_ or _speech_; of the use and effects whereof, I am to speak in this place.
2. The first use of language, is the _expression_ of our _conceptions_, that is, the begetting in one another the same conceptions that we have in ourselves; and this is called _teaching_; wherein, if the _conception_ of him that teacheth continually accompany his words, _beginning_ at something true in _experience_, then it begetteth the like evidence in the hearer that understandeth them, and maketh him to _know_ something, which he is therefore said to _learn_: but if there be _not such evidence_, then such teaching is called _persuasion_, and begetteth no more in the hearer, than what is in the speaker’s bare _opinion_. And the _signs_ of two opinions contradictory one to another; namely, _affirmation_ and _negation_ of the same thing, is called _controversy_: but _both affirmations_, or both _negations, consent in opinion_.
3. The _infallible_ sign of _teaching exactly_, and without error, is this, that _no man_ hath _ever taught_ the _contrary_: not that few, how few soever, if any; for commonly truth is on the side of a few, rather than of the multitude: but when in opinions and questions considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not any one of the men that so discussed them differ from another, then it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach, and that otherwise they do not. And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the divers subjects wherein they have exercised their pens, and the divers ways in which they have proceeded, together with the diversity of the success thereof: for, those men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the comparison of _magnitudes_, _numbers_, _times_, and _motions_, and how their proportions are to one another, have thereby been the authors of all those excellencies by which we differ from such savage people as now inhabit divers places in America; and as have been the inhabitants heretofore of those countries where at this day arts and sciences do most flourish: for, from the studies of these men, have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for ornament by _navigation_, and whatsover we have beneficial to human society by the _division_, _distinction_, and _portraiting the face of the earth_; whatsoever also we have by the _account of times_, and _foresight of the course of heaven_; whatsoever by _measuring distances_, _planes_, and _solids_ of all sorts; and whatsoever either _elegant_ or _defensible_ in _building_: all which supposed away, what do we differ from the wildest of the Indians? Yet to this day was it never heard of, that there was any _controversy_ concerning any conclusion in this subject; the science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the conclusions of most difficult and profound speculation. The _reason_ whereof is apparent to every man that looketh into their writings; for they proceed from most _low_ and _humble_ principles, evident even to the meanest capacity; going on _slowly_, and with most _scrupulous ratiocination_; viz. from the imposition of names, they infer the truth of their _first_ propositions; and from two of the first, a _third_; and from any two of the three, a _fourth_; and so on, according to the steps of science, mentioned chapter VI. section 4. On the other side, those men who have written concerning the faculties, passions, and manners of men, that is to say, of _moral philosophy_, and of _policy_, _government_, and _laws_, whereof there be infinite volumes, have been so _far from removing doubt_ and controversy in the questions they have handled, _that_ they have very much _multiplied the same_: _nor_ doth any man at this day so much as pretend to _know_ more than hath been delivered two thousand years ago by Aristotle: and yet every man thinks that in this subject he knoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no study but that accrueth unto them by natural wit; though they play, or employ their mind otherwise in the purchase of wealth or place. The reason whereof is no other, than that in their writings and discourses they take for principles those opinions which are already vulgarly received, whether true or false; being for the most part false. There is therefore a great deal of _difference_ between _teaching_ and _persuading_; the sign of _this_ being _controversy_; the sign of the _former_, _no controversy_.
4. There be _two sorts_ of men that commonly be called _learned_: one is that sort that proceedeth _evidently_ from humble principles, as is described in the last section; and those men are called _mathematici_: _the other_ are they that _take up_ maxims from their _education_, and from the _authority_ of men, or of custom, and _take the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination_; and these are called _dogmatici_. Now seeing in the last section those we call _mathematici_ are absolved of the crime of breeding controversy, and they that pretend not to learning cannot be accused, the fault lieth altogether in the _dogmatics_, that is to say, those that are imperfectly learned, and with passion press to have their opinions pass everywhere for truth, without any evident demonstration either from experience, or from places of Scripture of uncontroverted interpretation.
5. The expression of those conceptions which _cause_ in us the _experience_ of good while we deliberate, as also of those which cause our expectation of evil, is that which we call _counselling_, and is the internal deliberation of the mind concerning what we ourselves are to do or not to do. The _consequences_ of our actions are our _counsellors_, by _alternate succession_ in the mind. So in the counsel which a man taketh from _other_ men, the _counsellors alternately_ do _make appear the consequences_ of the action, and do not any of them deliberate, but furnish among them all, him that is counselled with arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself.
6. Another use of speech is _expression_ of _appetite_, _intention_, and _will_; as the appetite of knowledge by _interrogation_; appetite to have a thing done by another, as _request_, _prayer_, _petition_: expressions of our purpose or intention, as _promise_, which is the affirmation or negation of some action to be done in the future: _threatening_, which is the promise of evil; and _commanding_, which is that speech by which we signify to another our _appetite_ or desire _to have_ any _thing done_, or _left undone_, for reasons contained in the will itself: for it is not properly said, _Sic volo, sic jubeo_, without that other clause, _Stet pro ratione voluntas_: and when the command is a sufficient reason to move us to action, then is that command called a _law_.
7. Another use of speech is _instigation_ and appeasing, by which we increase or diminish one another’s passion: it is the same thing with _persuasion_; the difference not being real; for, the begetting of _opinion_ and _passion_ is the _same_. But whereas in _persuasion_ we aim at _getting opinion from passion_; _here_, the end is, _to raise passion from opinion_. And as in raising an opinion from passion, any premises are good enough to enforce the desired conclusion; so, in raising passion from opinion, it is no matter whether the opinion be true or false, or the narration historical or fabulous; for, _not_ the _truth_, but the _image_, maketh passion: and a tragedy, well acted, affecteth no less than a murder.
8. Though words be the _signs_ we have of one another’s _opinions_ and intentions, because the _equivocation_ of them is so _frequent according_ to the _diversity of contexture_, and of the company wherewith they go, which, the presence of him that speaketh, our _sight_ of his _actions_, and _conjecture_ of his _intentions_, must help to discharge us of; it must therefore be _extremely hard_ to find the _opinions_ and meaning of those _men_ that are _gone from us long ago_, and have left us no other signification thereof than their books, which cannot possibly be understood without _history_, to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without great prudence to _observe_ them.
9. When it happeneth that a man signifieth unto two _contradictory_ opinions, whereof the _one_ is _clearly_ and directly _signified_, and the _other_ either _drawn_ from that by _consequence_, or not known to be contradictory to it; then, when he is not present to explicate himself better, we are to take the _former_ for his opinion; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly; whereas the other might proceed from error in the deduction, or ignorance of the repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two contradictory expressions of a man’s intention and will, for the same reason.
10. Forasmuch as whosoever _speaketh_ to another, intendeth thereby to _make_ him _understand_ what he saith, if he speak unto him either in a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any word in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that heareth, he _intendeth also not_ to make him understand what he saith; which is a _contradiction_ of himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is addressed.
11. _Silence_, in him that _believeth_ that the same shall be taken for a _sign of his intent_, _is_ a sign thereof indeed: for, if he did not consent, the labour of speaking so much as to declare the same, is so little, as it is to be presumed he would have done it.
CONCLUSION.
CONCLUSION.
Thus have we considered the nature of man so far as was requisite for the finding out the first and most simple elements wherein the compositions of politic rules and laws are lastly resolved; which was my present purpose.
DE CORPORE POLITICO: OR THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, MORAL AND POLITIC, WITH DISCOURSES UPON SEVERAL HEADS: AS OF THE LAW OF NATURE; OF OATHS AND COVENANTS; OF SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENT; WITH THE CHANGES AND REVOLUTIONS OF THEM.
TO THE READER.
------- READER, You may be pleased to take notice, that the first part of this work depends upon a former treatise of Human Nature, written by Mr. Hobbes, and by a friend of his committed to the press for the benefit of mankind. It was thought fit, that nothing of so worthy an author should be left unprinted, especially considering, that this piece is most useful for the society of reasonable creatures, being the grounds and principles of policy, without which there would be nothing but confusion in the world. I am confident, if men’s minds were but truly fixed upon the centre of this discourse, they would not prove such weathercocks, to be turned about with the wind of every false doctrine, and vain opinion. We should then be free from those disorders which threaten distraction to the soul, and destruction to the commonwealth. But let others write never so well, if our practice do not second their instructions, we may be wise enough to foresee our misery, but never know how to prevent it. What pity is it, that such rare conclusions as these are, should produce no other effect, to inform our knowledge, and confute our conversation, whilst we neglect the truth that is apprehended. Yet there is some hope, that such observers, whose wisdom hath received the stamp of goodness, will improve their skill to a real advancement of those benefits, which lie hoarded up in this curious cabinet. To whose use and behoof, these excellent notions are commended, as the best that ever were writ in this kind, and may serve for a general ground and foundation to all regular conceptions, that concern the essence and existence of man, the government of kingdoms and commonwealths, and by consequence our eternal salvation.
DE CORPORE POLITICO.
------- PART THE FIRST.
------- CHAPTER I.
1, 2. Men by nature equal. 3. By vain glory indisposed to allow equality with themselves, to others. 4. Apt to provoke another by comparisons. 5. Apt to encroach one upon another. 6. Right defined. 7. Right to the end, implieth right to the means. 8. Every man his own judge by nature. 9. Every man’s strength and knowledge for his own use. 10. Every man by nature hath right to all things. 11. War and peace defined. 12. Men by nature in the state of war. 13. In manifest inequality might is right. 14. Reason dictateth peace.
[Sidenote: Men by nature equal.]
1. In a former treatise of human nature already printed, hath been set forth the whole nature of man, consisting in the powers natural of his body and mind, and may all be comprehended in these four, _strength of body_, _experience_, _reason_, and _passion_.
2. In this, it will be expedient to consider in what estate of security this our nature hath placed us, and what probability it hath left us, of continuing and preserving ourselves against the violence of one another. And first, if we consider how little odds there is of strength or knowledge, between men of mature age, and with how great facility he that is the weaker in strength or in wit, or in both, may utterly destroy the power of the stronger; since there needeth but little force to the taking away of a man’s life, we may conclude, that men considered in mere nature, ought to admit amongst themselves equality; and that he that claimeth no more, may be esteemed moderate.
[Sidenote: By vain glory indisposed to allow equality with themselves, to others.]
3. On the other side, considering the great difference there is in men, from the diversity of their passions, how some are vainly glorious, and hope for precedency and superiority above their fellows, not only when they are equal in power, but also when they are inferior; we must needs acknowledge that it must necessarily follow, that those men who are moderate, and look for no more but equality of nature, shall be obnoxious to the force of others, that will attempt to subdue them. And from hence shall proceed a general diffidence in mankind, and mutual fear one of another.
[Sidenote: Apt to provoke another by comparisons.]
4. Further, since men by natural passion are divers ways offensive one to another, every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body.
[Sidenote: Apt to encroach one upon another.]
5. Moreover, considering that many men’s appetites carry them to one and the same end; which end sometimes can neither be enjoyed in common, nor divided, it followeth, that the stronger must enjoy it alone, and that it be decided by battle who is the stronger. And thus the greatest part of men, upon no assurance of odds, do nevertheless, through vanity, or comparison, or appetite, provoke the rest, that otherwise would be contented with equality.
[Sidenote: Right defined.]
6. And forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire _bonum sibi_, that which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all, the terrible enemy of nature, death, from whom we expect both the loss of all power, and also the greatest of bodily pains in the losing; it is not against reason, that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbs both from death and pain. And that which is not against reason, men call _right_, or _jus_, or _blameless liberty_ of using our own natural power and ability. It is therefore a right of nature, that every man may preserve his own life and limbs, with all the power he hath.
[Sidenote: Right to the end, implieth right to the means.]
7. And because where a man hath right to the end, and the end cannot be attained without the means, that is, without such things as are necessary to the end, it is consequent that it is not against reason, and therefore right, for a man to use all means, and do whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body.
[Sidenote: Every man his own judge by nature.]
8. Also, every man by right of nature, is judge himself of the necessity of the means, and of the greatness of the danger. For if it be against reason, that I be judge of mine own danger myself, then it is reason, that another man be judge thereof. But the same reason that maketh another man judge of those things that concern me, maketh me also judge of that that concerneth him. And therefore I have reason to judge of his sentence, whether it be for my benefit, or not.
[Sidenote: Every man’s strength and knowledge for his own use.]
9. As a man’s judgment in right of nature is to be employed for his own benefit, so also the strength, knowledge, and art, of every man is then rightly employed, when he useth it for himself; else must not a man have right to preserve himself.
[Sidenote: Every man by nature hath right to all things.]
10. Every man by nature hath right to all things, that is to say, to do whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth, to possess, use, and enjoy all things he will and can. For seeing all things he willeth, must therefore be good unto him in his own judgment, because he willeth them, and may tend to his preservation some time or other, or he may judge so, and we have made him judge thereof, section 8, it followeth, that all things may rightly also be done by him. And for this cause it is rightly said, _Natura dedit omnia omnibus_, that Nature hath given all things to all men; insomuch, that _jus_ and _utile_, right and profit, is the same thing. But that right of all men to all things, is in effect no better than if no man had right to any thing. For there is little use and benefit of the right a man hath, when another as strong, or stronger than himself, hath right to the same.
[Sidenote: War and peace defined.]
11. Seeing then to the offensiveness of man’s nature one to another, there is added a right of every man to every thing, whereby one man invadeth with right, and another man with right resisteth, and men live thereby in perpetual diffidence, and study how to preoccupate each other; the estate of men in this natural liberty, is the estate of war. For _war_ is nothing else but that time wherein the will and contention of contending by force, is either by words or actions sufficiently declared; and the time which is not war, is _peace_.
[Sidenote: Men by nature in the state of war.]
12. The estate of hostility and war being such, as thereby nature itself is destroyed, and men kill one another, (as we know also that it is, both by the experience of savage nations that live at this day, and by the histories of our ancestors the old inhabitants of Germany, and other now civil countries, where we find the people few, and short lived, and without the ornaments and comforts of life, which by peace and society are usually invented and procured) he therefore that desireth to live in such an estate as is the estate of liberty and right of all to all, contradicteth himself. For every man by natural necessity desireth his own good, to which this estate is contrary, wherein we suppose contention between men by nature equal, and able to destroy one another.
[Sidenote: In manifest inequality might is right.]
13. Seeing this right of protecting ourselves by our own discretion and force, proceedeth from danger, and that danger from the equality between men’s forces, much more reason is there, that a man prevent such equality before the danger cometh, and before the necessity of battle. A man therefore that hath another man in his power to rule or govern, to do good to, or harm, hath right, by the advantage of this his present power, to take caution at his pleasure, for his security against that other in time to come. He therefore that hath already subdued his adversary, or gotten into his power any other, that either by infancy, or weakness, is unable to resist him, by right of nature may take the best caution, that such infant, or such feeble and subdued person can give him, of being ruled and governed by him for the time to come. For seeing we intend always our own safety and preservation, we manifestly contradict that our intention, if we willingly dismiss such a one, and suffer him at once to gather strength and be our enemy. Out of which may also be collected, that irresistible might, in the state of nature, is right.
[Sidenote: Reason dictateth peace.]
14. But since it is supposed by the equality of strength, and other natural faculties of men, that no man is of might sufficient, to assure himself for any long time, of preserving himself thereby, whilst he remaineth in the state of hostility and war; reason therefore dictateth to every man for his own good, to seek after peace, as far forth as there is hope to attain the same; and strengthen himself with all the help he can procure, for his own defence against those, from whom such peace cannot be obtained; and to do all those things which necessarily conduce thereunto.
------- CHAPTER II.
1. The law of nature consisteth not in consent of men, but reason. 2. That every man divest himself of the right he hath to all things, is one precept of nature. 3. What it is to relinquish and transfer one’s right. 4. The will to transfer, and the will to accept, both necessary to the passing away of right. 5. Right not transferred by words _de futuro_ only. 6. Words _de futuro_, together with other signs of the will, may transfer right. 7. Free gift defined. 8. Contract, and the sorts of it. 9. Covenant defined. 10. Contract of mutual trust, is of no validity in the estate of hostility. 11. No covenant of men but with one another. 12. Covenant how dissolved. 13. Covenant extorted by fear, in the law of nature valid. 14. Covenant contrary to former covenant, void. 15. An oath defined. 16. Oath to be administered to every man in his own religion. 17. Oath addeth not to the obligation. 18. Covenants bind but to endeavour.
[Sidenote: The law of nature consisteth not in consent of men, but reason.]
1. What it is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon by those, that have hitherto written. For the most part, such writers as have occasion to affirm, that anything is against the law of nature, do allege no more than this, that it is against the consent of all nations, or the wisest and most civil nations. But it is not agreed upon, who shall judge which nations are the wisest. Others make that against the law of nature, which is contrary to the consent of all mankind; which definition cannot be allowed, because then no man could offend against the law of nature; for the nature of every man is contained under the nature of mankind. But forasmuch as all men are carried away by the violence of their passion, and by evil customs do those things which are commonly said to be against the law of nature; it is not the consent of passions, or consent in some error gotten by custom, that makes the law of nature. Reason is no less of the nature of man than passion, and is the same in all men, because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to that which they desire to attain, namely, their own good, which is the work of reason: there can therefore be no other law of nature than reason, nor no other precepts of _natural law_, than those which declare unto us the ways of peace, where the same may be obtained, and of defence where it may not.
[Sidenote: That every man divest himself of the right he hath to all things, is one precept of nature.]
2. One precept of the law of nature therefore is this, _that every man divest himself of the right he hath to all things by nature_. For when divers men having right not only to all things else, but to one another’s persons, if they use the same, there ariseth thereby invasion on the one part, and resistance on the other, which is _war_, and therefore contrary to the law of nature, the sum whereof consisteth in making peace.
[Sidenote: What it is to relinquish and transfer one’s right.]
3. When a man divesteth and putteth from himself his right, he either simply relinquisheth it, or transferreth the same to another man. To _relinquish_ it, is by sufficient signs to declare, that it is his will no more to do that action, which of right he might have done before. To _transfer_ right to another, is by sufficient signs to declare to that other accepting thereof, that it is his will not to resist, or hinder him, according to that right he had thereto before he transferred it. For seeing that by nature every man hath right to every thing, it is impossible for a man to transfer unto another any right that he had not before. And therefore all that a man doth in transferring of right, is no more but a declaring of the will, to suffer him, to whom he hath so transferred his right, to make benefit of the same, without molestation. As for example, when a man giveth his lands or goods to another, he taketh from himself the right to enter into, and make use of the said lands or goods, or otherwise to hinder him of the use of what he hath given.
[Sidenote: The will to transfer, and the will to accept, both necessary to the passing away of right.]
4. In transferring of right, two things therefore are required: one on the part of him that transferreth, which is a sufficient signification of his will therein; the other, on the part of him to whom it is transferred, which is a sufficient signification of his acceptation thereof. Either of these failing, the right remaineth where it was: nor is it to be supposed, that he which giveth his right to one that accepteth it not, doth thereby simply relinquish it, and transfer it to whomsoever will receive it: inasmuch as the cause of transferring the same to one, rather than to another, is in the one, rather than in the rest.
[Sidenote: Right not transferred by words _de futuro_ only.]
5. When there appear no other signs that a man hath relinquished, or transferred his right, but only words, it behoveth that the same be done in words, that signify the present time, or the time past, and not only the time to come. For he that saith of the time to come, as for example, to-morrow I will give, declareth evidently, that he hath not yet given. The right, therefore, remaineth in him to-day, and so continues, till he have given actually. But he that saith, I give, presently, or have given to another anything, to have and enjoy the same to-morrow, or any other time further, hath now actually transferred the said right, which otherwise he should have had at the time that the other is to enjoy it.
[Sidenote: Words _de futuro_, together with other signs of the will, may transfer right.]
6. But because words alone are not a sufficient declaration of the mind, as hath been shown chapter XIII. section 8, words spoken _de futuro_, when the will of him that speaketh them may be gathered by other signs, may be taken very often as if they were meant _de præsenti_: for when it appeareth, that he that giveth, would have his words so understood by him to whom he giveth, as if he did actually transfer his right, then he must needs be understood to will all that is necessary to the same.
[Sidenote: Free gift defined.]
7. When a man transferreth any right of his to another, without consideration of reciprocal benefit, past, present, or to come, this is called _free gift_. And in free gift, no other words can be binding, but those which are _de præsenti_, or _de præterito_: for being _de futuro_ only, they transfer nothing, nor can they be understood, as if they proceeded from the will of the giver; because being a free gift, it carrieth with it no obligation greater than that which is enforced by the words. For he that promiseth to give, without any other consideration but his own affection, so long as he hath not given, deliberateth still, according as the causes of his affections continue, or diminish; and he that deliberateth, hath not yet willed, because the will is the last act of his deliberation. He that promiseth therefore, is not thereby a _donor_, but _doson_; which name was given to that Antiochus, that promised often, but seldom gave.
[Sidenote: Contract, and the sorts of it.]
8. When a man transferreth his right upon consideration of reciprocal benefit, this is not free gift, but mutual _donation_, and is called _contract_. And in all contracts, either both parties presently perform, and put each other into a certainty and assurance of enjoying what they contract for, as when men buy or sell, or barter; or one party performeth presently, and the other promiseth, as when one selleth upon trust; or else neither party performeth presently, but trust one another. And it is impossible there should be any kind of contract besides these three. For either both the contractors trust, or neither; or else one trusteth, and the other not.
[Sidenote: Covenant defined.]
9. In all contracts where there is trust, the promise of him that is trusted, is called a _covenant_. And this, though it be a promise, and of the time to come, yet it doth transfer the right, when that time cometh, no less than an actual donation. For it is a manifest sign, that he which did perform, understood it was the will of him that was trusted, to perform also. Promises therefore, upon consideration of reciprocal benefit, are covenants and signs of the will, or last act of deliberation, whereby the liberty of performing, or not performing, is taken away, and consequently are obligatory. For where liberty ceaseth, there beginneth obligation.
[Sidenote: Contract of mutual trust, is of no validity in the estate of hostility.]
10. Nevertheless, in contracts that consist of such mutual trust, as that nothing be by either party performed for the present, when the contract is between such as are not compellable, he that performeth first, considering the disposition of men to take advantage of every thing for their benefit, doth but betray himself thereby to the covetousness, or other passion of him with whom he contracteth. And therefore such covenants are of none effect. For there is no reason why the one should perform first, if the other be likely not to perform afterward. And whether he be likely or not, he that doubteth, shall be judge himself, as hath been said chap. I. sect. 8, as long as they remain in the estate and liberty of nature. But when there shall be such power coercive over both the parties, as shall deprive them of their private judgments in this point, then may such covenants be effectual, seeing he that performeth first shall have no reasonable cause to doubt of the performance of the other, that may be compelled thereunto.
[Sidenote: No covenant of men but with one another.]