10. These laws of nature, the sum whereof consisteth in forbidding us to be our own judges, and our own carvers, and in commanding us to accommodate one another, in case they should be observed by some, and not by others, would make the observers but a prey to them that should neglect them, leaving the good both without defence against the wicked, and also with a charge to assist them: which is against the scope of the said laws, that are made only for the protection and defence of them that keep them. Reason therefore, and the law of nature over and above all these particular laws, doth dictate this law in general, _That those particular laws be so far observed, as they subject us not to any incommodity, that in our own judgments may arise, by the neglect thereof in those towards whom we observe them_; and consequently requireth no more but the desire and constant intention to endeavour and be ready to observe them, unless there be cause to the contrary in other men’s refusal to observe them towards us. The force therefore of the law of nature, is not _in foro externo_, till there be security for men to obey it, but is always _in foro interno_, wherein the action of obedience being unsafe, the will and readiness to perform, is taken for the performance.
[Sidenote: The right of nature not to be taken away by custom, nor the law of nature abrogated by any act.]
11. Amongst the laws of nature, customs and prescriptions are not numbered. For whatsoever action is against reason, though it be reiterated never so often, or that there be never so many precedents thereof, is still against reason, and therefore not a law of nature, but contrary to it. But consent and covenant may so alter the cases, which in the law of nature may be put, by changing the circumstances, that that which was reason before, may afterwards be against it; and yet is reason still the law. For though every man be bound to allow equality to another, yet if that other shall see cause to renounce the same, and make himself inferior, then, if from thenceforth he consider him as inferior, he breaketh not thereby that law of nature that commandeth to allow equality. In sum, _a mans own consent may abridge him of the liberty which the law of nature leaveth him, but custom not_; nor can either of them abrogate either these, or or any other law of nature.
[Sidenote: Why the dictates of nature are called laws.]
12. And forasmuch as law, to speak properly, is a command, and these dictates, as they proceed from nature, are not commands, they are not therefore called laws, in respect of nature, but in respect of the author of nature, God Almighty.
[Sidenote: Whatsoever is against conscience in a man, that is his own judge, is against the law of nature.]
13. And seeing the laws of nature concern the conscience, not he only breaketh them that doth any action contrary, but also he whose action is conformable to them, in case he think it contrary. For though the action chance to be right, yet in his judgment he despiseth the law.
[Sidenote: Of _malum pœnæ, malum culpæ_; virtue and vice.]
14. Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like manner, that which displeaseth him, evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his preservation, which is the end that every one by nature aimeth at, must also call it good, and the contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason, and the breaking of them evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention to fulfil them good; and the neglect of them evil. And from hence cometh that distinction of _malum pœnæ_, and _malum culpæ_; for _malum pœnæ_ is any pain or molestation of the mind whatsoever; but _malum culpæ_ is that action which is contrary to reason and the law of nature: as also the habit of doing according to these and other laws of nature, that tend to our preservation, is that we call _virtue_; and the habit of doing the contrary, _vice_. As for example, justice is that habit by which we stand to covenants, injustice the contrary vice; equity that habit by which we allow equality of nature, arrogancy the contrary vice; gratitude the habit whereby we requite the benefit and trust of others, ingratitude the contrary vice; temperance the habit by which we abstain from all things that tend to our destruction, intemperance the contrary vice; prudence, the same with virtue in general. As for the common opinion, that virtue consisteth in mediocrity, and vice in extremes, I see no ground for it, nor can find any such mediocrity. Courage may be virtue, when the daring is extreme, if the cause be good, and extreme fear no vice when the danger is extreme. To give a man more than his due, is no injustice, though it be to give him less: and in gifts it is not the sum that maketh liberality, but the reason. And so in all other virtues and vices. I know that this doctrine of mediocrity is Aristotle’s, but his opinions concerning virtue and vice, are no other than those, which were received then, and are still by the generality of men unstudied, and therefore not very likely to be accurate.
[Sidenote: Aptitude to society, fulfilleth the law of nature.]
15. The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and formidable to them that will not. And the same is the sum of the law of nature: for in being sociable, the law of nature taketh place by way of peace and society; and to be formidable, is the law of nature in war, where to be feared is a protection a man hath from his own power: and as the former consisteth in actions of equity and justice, the latter consisteth in actions of honour. And equity, justice, and honour, contain all virtues whatsoever.
------- CHAPTER V.
A Confirmation out of Holy Scripture of the principal points mentioned in the two last Chapters concerning the Law of Nature.
[Sidenote: Confirmation out of Scripture, &c.]
1. The laws mentioned in the former chapters, as they are called the laws of nature, for that they are the dictates of natural reason, and also moral laws, because they concern the manners and conversation of men, one towards another; so are they also divine laws in respect of the author thereof, God Almighty; and ought therefore to agree, or at least, not to be repugnant to the word of God revealed in Holy Scripture. In this chapter therefore, I shall produce such places of Scripture, as appear to be most consonant to the said laws.
2. And first, the word of God seemeth to place the divine law in reason, by all such texts as ascribe the same to the heart and understanding; as Psalm xl. 8: _Thy law is in my heart_. Heb. viii. 10: _After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my laws in their mind_: and Heb. x. 16, the same. Psalm xxxvii. 31, speaking of the righteous man, he saith, _The law of God is in his heart_. Psalm xix. 7, 8: _The law of God is perfect, converting the soul. It giveth wisdom to the simple, and, light unto the eyes_. Jer. xxxi. 33: _I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts_. And (John i.) the lawgiver himself, God Almighty, is called by the name of Λόγος, which is also called (verse 4) _The light of men_; and (verse 9) _The light which lighteth every man, which cometh into the world_. All which are descriptions of natural reason.
3. And that the law divine, for so much as is moral, are those precepts which tend to peace, seemeth to be much confirmed by such places of Scripture as these: Rom. iii. 17, righteousness which is the fulfilling of the law, is called _The way of peace_. And Psalm lxxxv. 10: _Righteousness and peace shall kiss each other_. And Matth. v. 9: _Blessed are the peace-makers_. And Heb. vii. 2, _Melchisedec king of Salem_ is interpreted _king of righteousness_, and _king of peace_. And (verse 21) our Saviour Christ is said to be _a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec_: out of which may be inferred, that the doctrine of our Saviour Christ annexeth the fulfilling of the law to peace.
4. That the law of nature is unalterable, is intimated by this, that the priesthood of Melchisedec is everlasting; and by the words of our Saviour, (Matth. v. 18): _Heaven and earth shall pass away, but one jot or tittle of the law shall not pass till all things be fulfilled_.
5. That men ought to stand to their covenants, is taught Psalm xv, where the question being asked (verse 1), _Lord who shall dwell in thy tabernacle_, &c. It is answered (verse 4), _He that sweareth to his own hindrance, and yet changeth not_. And that men ought to be gratified, where no covenant passeth, Deut. xxv. 4: _Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn_, which St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. 9) interpreteth not of oxen but of men.
6. That men content themselves with equality, as it is the foundation of natural law, so also is it of the second table, of the divine law, Matth. xxii. 39, 40: _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two laws depend the whole law and the prophets_; which is not so to be understood, as that a man should study so much his neighbour’s profit as his own, or that he should divide his goods amongst his neighbours; but that he should esteem his neighbour worthy all rights and privileges that himself enjoyeth; and attribute unto him, whatsoever he looketh should be attributed unto himself: which is no more, but that he should be humble, meek, and content with equality.
7. And that in distributing of right amongst equals, that distribution is to be made according to the proportions of the numbers, which is the giving of _æqualia æqualibus, et proportionalia proportionalibus_; we have Numb. xxvi. 53, 54, the commandment of God to Moses: _Thou shalt divide the land according to the number of names; to many thou shalt give more, to few thou shalt give less, to every one according to his number_. That decision by lot is a means of peace, Prov. xviii. 18: _The lot causeth contention to cease, and maketh partition among the mighty_.
8. That the accommodation and forgiveness of one another, which have before been put for laws of nature, are also law divine, there is no question. For they are the essence of charity, which is the scope of the whole law. That we ought not to reproach, or reprehend one another, is the doctrine of our Saviour, Matth. vii. 1: _Judge not, that ye be not judged_: (verse 3): _Why seest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, and seest not the beam that is in thine own eye?_ Also the law that forbiddeth us to press our counsel upon others further than they admit, is a divine law. For after our charity and desire to rectify one another is rejected, to press it further, is to reprehend him, and condemn him, which is forbidden in the text last recited; as also Rom. xiv. 12, 13: _Every one of us shall give account of himself to God. Let us not therefore judge one another any more, but use your judgment rather in this, that no man put an occasion to fall, or a stumbling block before his brother._ 9. Further, the rule of men concerning the law of nature, _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_, is confirmed by the like, Matth. vii. 12: _Whatsoever therefore you would have men do unto you, that do you unto them: for this is the law and the prophets_. And Rom. ii. 1: _In that thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself_, &c.
10. It is also manifest by the Scriptures, that these laws concern only the tribunal of our conscience; and that the actions contrary to them, shall be no further punished by God Almighty, than as they proceed from negligence, or contempt. And first, that these laws are made to the conscience, appeareth, Matth. v. 20: _For I say unto you, except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven._ Now the Pharisees were the most exact amongst the Jews in the external performance; they therefore must want the sincerity of conscience; else could not our Saviour have required a greater righteousness than theirs. For the same reason our Saviour Christ saith (Luke, xviii. 14): _The publican departed from the temple justified, rather than the Pharisee_. And Christ saith, (Matth. xi. 30): _My yoke is easy, and my burthen light_; which proceedeth from this, that Christ required no more than our best endeavour. And Rom. xiv. 23: _He that doubteth, is condemned, if he eat_. And in innumerable places both in the Old and New Testament, God Almighty declareth, that he taketh the will for the deed, both in good and evil actions. By all which it plainly appears, that the divine law is dictated to the conscience. On the other side it is no less plain, that how many and heinous actions soever a man commit through infirmity, he shall nevertheless, whensoever he shall condemn the same in his own conscience, be freed from the punishments that to such actions otherwise belong. For, _At what time soever a sinner doth repent him of his sins from the bottom of his heart, I will put all his iniquities out of my remembrance, saith the Lord_.
11. Concerning revenge, which by the law of nature ought not to aim, as I have said chapter III. section 10, at present delight, but future profit, there is some difficulty made, as if the same accorded not with the law divine, by such as object the continuance of punishment after the day of judgment, when there shall be no place, neither for amendment, nor for example. This objection had been of some force, if such punishment had been ordained after all sins were past; but considering the punishment was instituted before sin, it serveth to the benefit of mankind, because it keepeth men in peaceable and virtuous conversation by the terror. And therefore such revenge was directed to the future only.
12. Finally, there is no law of natural reason, that can be against the law divine: for God Almighty hath given reason to a man to be a light unto him. And I hope it is no impiety to think, that God Almighty will require a strict account thereof, at the day of judgment, as of the instructions which we were to follow in our peregrination here, notwithstanding the opposition and affronts of supernaturalists now a-days, to rational and moral conversation.
------- CHAPTER VI.
1. That men, notwithstanding these laws, are still in the state of war, till they have security one against another. 2. The law of nature in war, is nothing but honour. 3. No security without the concord of many. 4. That concord of many cannot be maintained without power to keep them all in awe. 5. The cause why concord remaineth in a multitude of some irrational creatures, and not of men. 6. That union is necessary for the maintaining of concord. 7. How union is made. 8. Body politic defined. 9. Corporation defined. 10. Sovereign and subject defined. 11. Two sorts of bodies politic, patrimonial and commonwealth.
[Sidenote: That men, notwithstanding these laws, are still in the state of war, till they have security one against another.]
1. In chapter XII. section 6, of the _Treatise of Human Nature_, it hath been shewed, that the opinions men have of the rewards and punishments which are to follow their actions, are the causes that make and govern the will to those actions. In this estate of man therefore, wherein all men are equal, and every man allowed to be his own judge, the fears they have one of another are equal, and every man’s hopes consist in his own sleight and strength: and consequently when any man by his natural passion, is provoked to break these laws of nature, there is no security in any other man of his own defence but _anticipation_. And for this cause, every man’s right, howsoever he be inclined to peace, of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth with him still, as the necessary means of his preservation. And therefore till there be security amongst men for the keeping of the law of nature one towards another, men are still in the estate of war, and nothing is unlawful to any man that tendeth to his own safety or commodity: and this safety and commodity consisteth in the mutual aid and help of one another, whereby also followeth the mutual fear of one another.
[Sidenote: The law of nature in war, is nothing but honour.]
2. It is a proverbial saying, _inter arma silent leges_. There is a little therefore to be said concerning the laws that men are to observe one towards another in time of war, wherein every man’s being and well-being is the rule of his actions. Yet thus much the law of nature commandeth in war, that men satiate not the cruelty of their present passions, whereby in their own conscience they foresee no benefit to come. For that betrayeth not a necessity, but a disposition of the mind to war, which is against the law of nature. And in old time we read, that rapine was a trade of life, wherein nevertheless many of them that used it, did not only spare the lives of those they invaded, but left them also such things, as were necessary to preserve that life which they had given them; as namely their oxen and instruments for tillage, though they carried away all their other cattle and substance. And as the rapine itself was warranted in the law of nature, by the want of security otherwise to maintain themselves, so the exercise of cruelty was forbidden by the same law of nature, unless fear suggested anything to the contrary. For nothing but fear can justify the taking away of another’s life. And because fear can hardly be made manifest, but by some action dishonourable, that bewrayeth the conscience of one’s own weakness, all men, in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity hath been predominant, have abstained from cruelty; insomuch, that though there be in war no law, the breach whereof is injury, yet there are in war those laws, the breach whereof is dishonour. In one word, therefore, the only law of actions in war, is _honour_; and the right of war, _providence_.
[Sidenote: No security without the concord of many.]
3. And seeing natural aid is necessary for defence, as mutual fear is necessary for peace, we are to consider how great aids are required for such defence, and for the causing of such mutual fear, as men may not easily adventure on one another. And first, it is evident, that the mutual aid of two or three men is of very little security. For the odds on the other side, of a man or two, giveth sufficient encouragement to an assault. And therefore before men have sufficient security in the help of one another, their number must be so great, that the odds of a few which the enemy may have, be no certain and sensible advantage.
[Sidenote: That concord of many cannot be maintained without power to keep them all in awe.]
4. And supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together for their mutual defence, yet shall not the effect follow, unless they all direct their actions to one and the same end; which direction to one and the same end is that which, chap. XII. sect. 7, is called _consent_. This _consent_, or concord, amongst so many men, though it may be made by the fear of a present invader, or by the hope of a present conquest, or booty, and endure as long as that action endureth, nevertheless, by the diversity of judgments and passions in so many men contending naturally for honour and advantage one above another, it is impossible, not only that their consent to aid each other against an enemy, but also that the peace should last between themselves, without some mutual and common fear to rule them.
[Sidenote: The cause why concord remaineth in a multitude of some irrational creatures, and not of men.]
5. But contrary hereunto may be objected, the experience we have of certain living creatures irrational, that nevertheless continually live in such good order and government for their common benefit, and are so free from sedition and war amongst themselves, that for peace, profit, and defence, nothing more can be imaginable. And the experience we have in this, is in that little creature the bee, which is therefore reckoned amongst _animalia politica_. Why therefore may not men, that foresee the benefit of concord, continually maintain the same without compulsion, as well as they? To which I answer, that amongst other living creatures, there is no question of precedence in their own species, nor strife about honour, or acknowledgment of one another’s wisdom, as there is amongst men, from whence arise envy and hatred of one towards another, and from thence sedition and war. Secondly, those living creatures aim every one at peace and food common to them all; men aim at dominion, superiority, and private wealth, which are distinct in every man, and breed contention. Thirdly, those living creatures that are without reason, have not learning enough to espy, or to think they espy, any defect in the government; and therefore are contented therewith. But in a multitude of men, there are always some that think themselves wiser than the rest, and strive to alter what they think amiss, and divers of them strive to alter divers ways, and that causeth war. Fourthly, they want speech, and are therefore unable to instigate one another to faction, which men want not. Fifthly, they have no conception of right and wrong, but only of pleasure and pain, and therefore also no censure of one another, nor of their commander, as long as they are themselves at ease; whereas men that make themselves judges of right and wrong, are then least at quiet, when they are most at ease. Lastly, natural concord, such as is amongst those creatures, is the work of God by the way of nature; but concord amongst men is artificial, and by way of covenant. And therefore no wonder, if such irrational creatures as govern themselves in multitude, do it much more firmly than mankind, that do it by arbitrary institution.
[Sidenote: That union is necessary for the maintaining of concord.]
6. It remaineth therefore still, that consent, by which I understand the concurrence of many men’s wills to one action, is not sufficient security for their common peace, without the erection of some common power, by the fear whereof they may be compelled both to keep the peace amongst themselves, and to join their strengths together, against a common enemy. And that this may be done, there is no way imaginable, but only union, which is defined, chapter XII. section 8, to be the involving, or including the wills of many in the will of one man, or in the will of the greatest part of any one number of men, that is to say, in the will of one man, or of one _council_. For a council is nothing else but an _assembly_ of men deliberating concerning something common to them all.
[Sidenote: How union is made.]
7. The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by covenant oblige himself to some one and the same man, or to some one and the same council, by them all named and determined, to do those actions, which the said man or council shall command them to do, and to do no action, which he or they shall forbid, or command them not to do. And further, in case it be a council, whose commands they covenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every man shall hold that for the command of the whole council, which is the command of the greater part of those men, whereof such council consisteth. And though the will of man being not voluntary, but the beginning of voluntary actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another, he obligeth himself to this, that he resign his strength and means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey. And hereby he that is to command, may by the use of all their means and strength, be able by the terror thereof, to frame the will of them all to unity and concord, amongst themselves.
[Sidenote: Body politic defined.]
8. This union so made, is that which men call now a-days, a _body politic_, or civil society; and the Greeks call it πόλις, that is to say, a city, which may be defined to be a multitude of men, united as one person, by a common power, for their common peace, defence, and benefit.
[Sidenote: Corporation defined.]
9. And as this union into a city or body politic, is instituted with common power over all the particular persons, or members thereof, to the common good of them all; so also may there be amongst a multitude of those members instituted, a subordinate union of certain men, for certain common actions to be done by those men for some common benefit of theirs, or of the whole city; as for subordinate government, for counsel, for trade, and the like. And these subordinate bodies politic are usually called _corporations_; and their power such over the particulars of their own society, as the whole city, whereof they are members, have allowed them.
[Sidenote: Sovereign and subject defined.]
10. In all cities, or bodies politic not subordinate, but independent, that one man, or one council, to whom the particular members have given that common power, is called their _sovereign_, and his power, the sovereign power; which consisteth in the power and the strength, that every of the members have transferrred to him from themselves by covenant. And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that other to receive it; it is to be understood, that to transfer a man’s power and strength, is no more but to lay by, or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it. And every member of the body politic, is called a _subject_, to wit, to the _sovereign_.
[Sidenote: Two sorts of bodies politic, patrimonial and commonwealth.]
11. The cause in general, which moveth a man to become subject to another, is (as I have said already) the fear of not otherwise preserving himself. And a man may subject himself to him that invadeth, or may invade him, for fear of him; or men may join amongst themselves, to subject themselves to such as they shall agree upon for fear of others. And when many men subject themselves the former way, there ariseth thence a body politic, as it were naturally. From whence proceedeth _dominion_, _paternal_ and _despotic_. And when they subject themselves the other way, by mutual agreement amongst many, the body politic they make, is for the most part, called a _commonwealth_, in distinction from the former, though the name be the general name for them both. And I shall speak in the first place of commonwealths, and afterwards of bodies politic, patrimonial, and despotical.
THE SECOND PART.
------- CHAPTER I.
1. Introduction. 2. A multitude before their union, &c. 3. Express consent of every particular, &c. 4. Democratical, aristocratical, and monarchical union may be instituted for ever, or, &c. 5. Without security no private right relinquished. 6. Covenants of government, without power of coercion, are no security. 7. Power coercive, &c. 8. The sword of war, &c. 9. Decision in all debates, &c. annexed to the sword. 10. Laws civil, &c. 11. Appointment of magistrates, &c. 12. Sovereign power includeth impunity. 13. A supposed commonwealth, where laws are made first, and the commonwealth after. 14. The same refelled. 15. Mixed forms of government supposed in sovereignty. 16. That refelled. 17. Mixed government, &c. 18. Reason and experience to prove absolute sovereignty somewhere in all commonwealths. 19. Some principal, &c. marks of sovereignty.
[Sidenote: Introduction.]
1. That _Treatise of Human Nature_, which was formerly printed, hath been wholly spent in the consideration of the natural power, and the natural estate of man, namely, of his cognition and passions in the first eleven chapters, and how from thence proceed his actions; in the twelfth, how men know one another’s minds: in the last, in what estate men’s passions set them. In the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth chapters of the former Part of this Treatise is showed, what estate they are directed unto by the dictates of reason, that is to say, what be the principal articles of the law of nature. And lastly, how a multitude of persons natural, are united by covenants into one person civil, or body politic. In this part therefore shall be considered, the nature of a body politic, and the laws thereof, otherwise called civil laws. And whereas it hath been said in the last chapter, and last section of the former part, that there be two ways of erecting a body politic; one by arbitrary institution of many men assembled together, which is like a creation out of nothing by human wit; the other by compulsion, which is as it were a generation thereof out of natural force; I shall first speak of such erection of a body politic, as proceedeth from the assembly and consent of a multitude.
[Sidenote: A multitude before their union, &c.]
2. Having in this place to consider, a multitude of men about to unite themselves into a body politic, for their security, both against one another, and against common enemies, and that by covenants; the knowledge of what covenants they must needs make, dependeth on the knowledge of the persons, and the knowledge of their end. First, for their persons they are many, and (as yet) not one; nor can any action done in a multitude of people met together, be attributed to the multitude, or truly called the action of the multitude, unless every man’s hand, and every man’s will, (not so much as one excepted) have concurred thereto. For multitude, though in their persons they run together, yet they concur not always in their designs. For even at that time when men are in tumult, though they agree a number of them to one mischief, and a number of them to another; yet, in the whole, they are amongst themselves in the state of hostility, and not of peace; like the seditious Jews besieged in Jerusalem, that could join against their enemies, and fight amongst themselves. Whensoever therefore any man saith, that a number of men hath done any act, it is to be understood, that every particular man in that number hath consented thereunto, and not the greatest part only. Secondly, though thus assembled with intention to unite themselves, they are yet in that estate in which every man hath right to everything, and consequently, as hath been said, chapter I.
section 10, in an estate of enjoying nothing. And therefore _meum_ and _tuum_ hath no place amongst them.
[Sidenote: Express consent of every particular, &c.]