10. In the former section is showed, that elective kings that exercise their sovereignty for a time, which determines with their life, either are subjects, or not sovereigns; and that it is, when the people in election of them, reserve unto themselves the right of assembling at certain times and places limited and made known; or else absolute sovereigns, to dispose of the succession at their pleasure, and that is, when the people in their election have declared no time nor place of their meeting, or have left it to the power of the elected king, to assemble and dissolve them at such times, as he himself shall think good. There is another kind of limitation of time, to him that shall be elected to use the sovereign power, which whether it hath been practised anywhere, or not, I know not, but it may be imagined, and hath been objected against the rigour of sovereign power; and it is this, that the people transfer their sovereignty upon conditions. As for example, for so long as he shall observe such and such laws, as they then prescribe him. And here as before in elected kings, the question is to be made, whether in the electing of such a sovereign, they reserved to themselves a right of assembling at times and places limited and known, or not; if not, then is the sovereignty of the people dissolved, and they have neither power to judge of the breach of the conditions given him, nor to command any forces for the deposing of him, whom on that condition they had set up, but are in the estate of war amongst themselves, as they were before they made themselves a democracy: and consequently, if he that is elected by the advantage of the possession he hath of the public means, be able to compel them to unity and obedience, he hath not only the right of nature to warrant him, but the law of nature to oblige him thereunto. But if in electing him, they reserved to themselves a right of assembling, and appointed certain times and places to that purpose, then are they sovereign still, and may call their conditional king to account at their pleasure, and deprive him of his government, if they judge he deserve it, either by breach of the condition set him, or otherwise. For the sovereign power can by no covenant with a subject be bound to continue him in the charge he undergoeth by their command, as a burden imposed not particularly for his good, but for the good of the sovereign people.
[Sidenote: The word people equivocal] 11. The controversies that arise concerning the right of the people, proceed from the equivocation of the word. For the word people hath a double signification. In one sense it signifieth only a number of men, distinguished by the place of their habitation; as the _people_ of England, or the _people_ of France, which is no more, but the multitude of those particular persons that inhabit those regions, without consideration of any contracts or covenants amongst them, by which any one of them is obliged to the rest. In another sense, it signifieth a person civil, that is to say, either one man, or one council, in the will whereof, is included and involved the will of every one in particular. As for example, in this latter sense, the lower house of parliament is all the commons, as long as they sit there with authority and right thereto; but after they be dissolved, though they remain, they be no more the people, nor the commons, but only the aggregate, or multitude of the particular men there sitting, how well soever they agree, or concur, in opinions amongst themselves; whereupon, they that do not distinguish between these two significations, do usually attribute such rights to a dissolved multitude, as belong only to the people virtually contained in the body of the commonwealth or sovereignty. And when a great number of their own authority flock together in any nation, they usually give them the name of the whole nation. In which sense they say the people rebelleth, or the people demandeth, when it is no more than a dissolved multitude, of which though any one man may be said to demand or have right to something, yet the heap, or multitude, cannot be said to demand or have right to anything. For where every man hath his right distinct, there is nothing left for the multitude to have right unto: and when the particulars say, this is mine, this is thine, and this is his, and have shared all amongst them, there can be nothing whereof the multitude can say, this is mine; nor are they one body, as behoveth them to be, that demand anything under the name of mine, or his: and when they say ours, every man is understood to pretend in several, and not the multitude. On the other side, when the multitude is united into a body politic, and thereby are a people in the other signification, and their wills virtually in the sovereign, there the rights and demands of the particulars do cease; and he or they that have the sovereign power, doth for them all, demand, and vindicate under the name of his, that which before they called in the plural, theirs.
[Sidenote: Obedience discharged by release, &c.]
12. We have seen how particular men enter into subjection, by transferring their rights; it followeth to consider, how such subjection may be discharged. And first, if he or they that have the sovereign power, shall relinquish the same voluntarily, there is no doubt, but every man is again at liberty to obey, or not. Likewise, if he or they retaining the sovereignty over the rest, do nevertheless exempt some one or more, from their subjection, every man so exempted, is discharged. For he or they to whom any man is obliged, hath the power to release him.
[Sidenote: How such releases are to be understood.]
13. And here it is to be understood, that when he or they that have the sovereign power, give such exemption, or privilege, to a subject, as is not separable from the sovereignty, and nevertheless directly retaineth the sovereign power, not knowing the consequence of the privilege they grant, the person or persons exempted or privileged, are not thereby released. For in contradictory significations of the will (_Human Nature_, chap. XIII. sect. 9), that which is directly signified, is to be understood for the will, before that which is drawn from it by consequence.
[Sidenote: Obedience discharged by exile.]
14. Also exile perpetual, is a release of subjection, forasmuch, as being out of the protection of the sovereignty that expelled him, he hath no means of subsisting but from himself. Now every man may lawfully defend himself, that hath no other defence; else there had been no necessity that any man should enter into voluntary subjection, as they do in commonwealths.
[Sidenote: By conquest.]
15. Likewise a man is released of his subjection by conquest. For when it cometh to pass, that the power of a commonwealth is overthrown, and any particular man thereby lying under the sword of his enemy, yieldeth himself captive, he is thereby bound to serve him that taketh him, and consequently discharged of his obligation to the former. For no man can serve two masters.
[Sidenote: By ignorance of the right of succession.]
16. Lastly, ignorance of the succession dischargeth obedience. For no man can be understood to be obliged to obey he knoweth not whom.
CHAPTER III.
1, 2. Titles to dominion: master and servant, &c. 3. Chains and other, &c. Bonds, &c. Slave defined. 4. Servants have no property against their lord, &c. 5. The master hath right to alienate his servant. 6. The servant of the servant, &c. 7. How servitude is discharged. 8. The middle lord, &c. 9. The title of man, &c. over beasts.
[Sidenote: Titles to dominion; master and servant, &c.]
1. Having set forth in the two preceding chapters, the nature of a commonwealth _institutive_ by the consent of many men together, I come now to speak of dominion, or a body politic by acquisition, which is commonly called a _patrimonial_ kingdom. But before I enter thereinto, it is necessary to make known upon what title one man may acquire right, that is to say, property or dominion, over the person of another. For when one man hath dominion over another, there is a little kingdom. And to be a king by acquisition, is nothing else, but to have acquired a right or dominion over many.
2. Considering men therefore again in the state of nature, without covenants or subjection one to another, as if they were but even now all at once created male and female, there be three titles only, by which one man may have right and dominion over another; whereof two may take place presently, and those are, voluntary offer of subjection, and yielding by compulsion: the third is to take place, upon the supposition of children begotten amongst them. Concerning the first of these three titles, it is handled before in the two last chapters. For from thence cometh the right of sovereigns over their subjects in a commonwealth institutive. Concerning the second title, which is when a man submitteth to an assailant for fear of death, thereby accrueth a right of dominion. For where every man, as it happeneth in this case, hath right to all things, there needs no more for the making of the said right effectual, but a covenant from him that is overcome, not to resist him that overcometh. And thus cometh the victor to have right of absolute dominion over the conquered. By which there is presently constituted a little body politic, which consisteth of two persons, the one sovereign, which is called the _master_, or lord; the other subject, which is called the _servant_. And when a man hath acquired right over a number of servants so considerable, as they cannot by their neighbours be securely invaded, this body politic is a kingdom despotical.
[Sidenote: Chains and other, &c. bonds, &c. slave defined.]
3. And it is to be understood, that when a servant taken in the wars, is kept bound in natural bonds, as chains, and the like, or in prison, there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his master. For those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds of covenant, and they show that the servant is not trusted. But covenant, (Part I. chapter II. section 9,) supposeth trust. There remaineth therefore in the servant thus kept bound, or in prison, a right of delivering himself, if he can, by what means soever. This kind of servant is that which ordinarily and without passion, is called a _slave_. The Romans had no such distinct name, but comprehended all under the name of _servus_; whereof such as they loved and durst trust, were suffered to go at liberty, and admitted to places of office, both near to their persons, and in their affairs abroad; the rest were kept chained, or otherwise restrained with natural impediments to their resistance. And as it was amongst the Romans, so it was amongst other nations, the former sort having no other bond but a supposed covenant, without which the master had no reason to trust them; the latter being without covenant, and no otherwise tied to obedience, but by chains, or other like forcible custody.
[Sidenote: Servants have no property against their lord, &c.]
4. A master therefore is to be supposed to have no less right over those, whose bodies he leaveth at liberty, than over those he keepeth in bonds and imprisonment, and hath absolute dominion over both, and may say of his servant, that he is his, as he may of any other thing. And whatsoever the servant had, and might call his, is now the master’s; for he that disposeth of the person, disposeth of all the person could dispose of: insomuch, as though there be _meum_ and _tuum_ amongst servants distinct from one another by the dispensation, and for the benefit of their master; yet there is no _meum_ and _tuum_ belonging to any of them against the master himself, whom they are not to resist, but to obey all his commands as law.
[Sidenote: The master hath right to alienate his servant.]
5. And seeing both the servant and all that is committed to him, is the property of the master, and every man may dispose of his own, and transfer the same at his pleasure, the master may therefore alienate his dominion over them, or give the same by his last will to whom he list.
[Sidenote: The servant of the servant, &c.]
6. And if it happen, that the master himself by captivity or voluntary subjection, become servant to another, then is that other master _paramount_; and those servants of him that becometh servant, are no further obliged, than their master paramount shall think good; forasmuch as he disposing of the master subordinate, disposeth of all he hath, and consequently of his servants, so that the restriction of absolute power in masters, proceedeth not from the law of nature, but from the political law of him that is their master supreme or sovereign.
[Sidenote: How servitude is discharged.]
7. Servants immediate to the supreme master, are discharged of their servitude, or subjection, in the same manner that subjects are released of their allegiance in a commonwealth institutive. As first, by release. For he that captiveth, which is done by accepting what the captive transferreth to him, setteth again at liberty, by transferring back the same. And this kind of release is called _manumission_. Secondly, by exile. For that is no more but manumission given to a servant, not in the way of benefit, but punishment. Thirdly, by a new captivity, where the servant having done his endeavour to defend himself, hath thereby performed his covenant to his former master, and for the safety of his life, entering into new covenant with the conqueror, is bound to do his best endeavour to keep that likewise. Fourthly, ignorance of who is successor to his deceased master, dischargeth him of obedience: for no covenant holdeth longer than a man knoweth to whom he is to perform it. And lastly, that servant that is no longer trusted, but committed to his chains and custody, is thereby discharged of the obligation _in foro interno_, and therefore if he can get loose, may lawfully go his way.
[Sidenote: The middle lord, &c.]
8. But servants subordinate, though manumitted by their immediate lord, are not thereby discharged of their subjection to their lord paramount. For the immediate master hath no property in them, having transferred his right before to another, namely, to his own and supreme master. Nor if the chief lord should manumit his immediate servant, doth he thereby release his servants of their obligation to him that is so manumitted. For by this manumission, he recovereth again the absolute dominion he had over them before. For after a release, which is the discharge of a covenant, the right standeth as it did before the covenant was made.
[Sidenote: The title of man, &c. over beasts.]
9. This right of conquest, as it maketh one man master over another, so also maketh it a man to be master of the irrational creatures. For if a man in the state of nature be in hostility with men, and thereby have lawful title to subdue or kill, according as his own conscience and discretion shall suggest unto him for his safety and benefit, much more may he do the same to beasts; that is to say, save and preserve for his own service, according to his discretion, such as are of nature apt to obey, and commodious for use; and to kill and destroy, with perpetual war, all other, as fierce, and noisome to him. And this dominion is therefore of the law of nature, and not of the divine law positive. For if there had been no such right before the revealing of God’s will in the Scripture, then should no man, to whom the Scripture hath not come, have right to make use of those his creatures, either for his food or sustenance. And it were a hard condition of mankind, that a fierce and savage beast should with more right kill a man, than a man a beast.
------- CHAPTER IV.
1. The dominion over the child, &c. 2. Pre-eminence of sex giveth not the child to the father, rather than to the mother. 3. The title of the father or mother, &c. 4. The child of a woman-servant, &c. 5. The right to the child given from the mother, &c. 6. The child of the concubine, &c. 7. The child of the husband and the wife, &c. 8. The father, or he or she that bringeth up the child, have absolute power over him. 9. Freedom in subjects what it is. 10. A great family is a patrimonial kingdom. 11. Succession of the sovereign power, &c. 12. Though the successor be not declared, yet there is always one to be presumed. 13. The children preferred to the succession, &c. 14. The males before the females. 15. The eldest before the rest of the brothers. 16. The brother next to the children. 17. The succession of the possessor, &c.
[Sidenote: The dominion over the child, &c.]
1. Of three ways by which a man becometh subject to another, mentioned section 2, chapter the last, namely, voluntary offer, captivity and birth, the former two have been spoken of, under the name of subjects, and servants. In the next place, we are to set down the third way of subjection, under the name of children, and by what title one man cometh to have propriety in a child, that proceedeth from the common generation of two; to wit, of male and female. And considering men again dissolved from all covenants one with another, and that (Part I. chap. IV. sect. 2) every man by the law of nature, hath right or propriety to his own body, the child ought rather to be the propriety of the mother, of whose body it is part, till the time of separation, than of the father. For the understanding therefore of the right that a man or woman hath to his or their child, two things are to be considered; first, what title the mother, or any other, originally hath, to a child new born: secondly, how the father, or any other man, pretendeth by the mother.
[Sidenote: Pre-eminence of sex giveth not the child to the father, rather than to the mother.]
2. For the first, they that have written of this subject, have made generation to be a title of dominion over persons, as well as the consent of the persons themselves. And because generation giveth title to two, namely, father and mother, whereas dominion is indivisible, they therefore ascribe dominion over the child to the father only, _ob præstantiam sexûs_; but they show not, neither can I find out by what coherence, either generation inferreth dominion, or advantage of so much strength, which, for the most part, a man hath more than a woman, should generally and universally entitle the father to a propriety in the child, and take it away from the mother.
[Sidenote: The title of the father or mother, &c.]
3. The title to dominion over a child, proceedeth not from the generation, but from the preservation of it; and therefore in the estate of nature, the mother, in whose power it is to save or destroy it, hath right thereto by that power, according to that which hath been said, Part I. chapter I. sect. 13. And if the mother shall think fit to abandon, or expose her child to death, whatsoever man or woman shall find the child so exposed, shall have the same right which the mother had before; and for this same reason, namely, for the power not of generating, but preserving. And though the child thus preserved, do in time acquire strength, whereby he might pretend equality with him or her that hath preserved him, yet shall that pretence be thought unreasonable, both because his strength was the gift of him, against whom he pretendeth, and also because it is to be presumed, that he which giveth sustenance to another, whereby to strengthen him, hath received a promise of obedience in consideration thereof. For else it would be wisdom in men, rather to let their children perish, while they are infants, than to live in their danger or subjection, when they are grown.
[Sidenote: The child of a woman servant, &c.]
4. For the pretences which a man may have to dominion over a child by the right of the mother, they be of divers kinds. One by the absolute subjection of the mother; another, by some particular covenant from her, which is less than a covenant of such subjection. By absolute subjection, the master of the mother, hath right to her child, according to section 6, chapter III, whether he be the father thereof, or not. And thus the children of the servant are the goods of the master _in perpetuum_.
[Sidenote: The right to the child given from the mother, &c.]
5. Of covenants that amount not to subjection between a man and woman, there be some which are made for a time; they are covenants of cohabitation, or else of copulation only. And in this latter case, the children pass by covenants particular. And thus in the copulation of the Amazons with their neighbours, the fathers by covenant had the male children only, the mothers retaining the females.
[Sidenote: The child of the concubine, &c.]
6. And covenants of cohabitation are either for society of bed, or for society of all things; if for society of bed only, then is the woman called _a concubine_. And here also the child shall be his or hers, as they shall agree particularly by covenant. For although for the most part, a concubine is supposed to yield up the right of her children to the father, yet doth not concubinate enforce so much.
[Sidenote: The child of the husband and the wife, &c.]
7. But if the covenants of cohabitation be for society of all things, it is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of all that is common to them both; without which, as hath been often said before, society cannot last. And therefore the man, to whom for the most part the woman yieldeth the government, hath for the most part, also, the sole right and dominion over the children. And the man is called the husband, and the woman the wife. But because sometimes the government may belong to the wife only, sometimes also the dominion over the children shall be in her only. As in the case of a sovereign queen, there is no reason that her marriage should take from her the dominion over her children.
[Sidenote: The father, or he or she that bringeth up the child, have absolute power over him.]
8. Children therefore, whether they be brought up and preserved by the father, or by the mother, or by whomsoever, are in most absolute subjection to him or her, that so bringeth them up, or preserveth them. And they may alienate them, that is, assign his or her dominion, by selling, or giving them, in adoption or servitude to others; or may pawn them for hostages, kill them for rebellion, or sacrifice them for peace, by the law of nature, when he or she, in his or her conscience, think it to be necessary.
[Sidenote: Freedom in subjects what it is.]
9. The subjection of them who institute a commonwealth amongst themselves, is no less absolute, than the subjection of servants. And therein they are in equal estate. But the hope of those is greater than the hope of these. For he that subjecteth himself uncompelled, thinketh there is reason he should be better used, than he that doth it upon compulsion; and coming in freely, calleth himself, though in subjection, a _freeman_; whereby it appeareth, that liberty is not any exemption from subjection and obedience to the sovereign power, but a state of better hope than theirs, that have been subjected by force and conquest. And this was the reason, that the name which signifieth children in the Latin tongue, is _liberi_, which also signifieth _freemen_. And yet in Rome, nothing at that time was so obnoxious to the power of others, as children in the family of their fathers. For both the state had power over their life without consent of their fathers, and the father might kill his son by his own authority, without any warrant from the state. Freedom therefore in commonwealths is nothing but the honour of equality of favour with other subjects, and servitude the estate of the rest. A freeman therefore may expect employments of honour, rather than a servant. And this is all that can be understood by the liberty of the subject. For in all other senses, liberty is the state of him that is not subject.
[Sidenote: A great family is a patrimonial kingdom.]
10. Now when a father that hath children, hath servants also, the children, not by the right of the child, but by the natural indulgence of the parents, are such freemen. And the whole, consisting of the father or mother, or both, and of the children, and of the servants, is called a _family_, wherein the father or mother of the family is sovereign of the same, and the rest, both children and servants equally, subjects. The same family, if it grow by multiplication of children, either by generation, or adoption; or of servants, either by generation, conquest, or voluntary submission, to be so great and numerous, as in probability it may protect itself, then is that family called a _patrimonial kingdom_, or monarchy by acquisition, wherein the sovereignty is in one man, as it is in a monarch made by _political institution_. So that whatsoever rights be in the one, the same also be in the other. And therefore I shall no more speak of them as distinct, but of monarchy in general.
[Sidenote: Succession of the sovereign power, &c.]
11. Having showed by what right the several sorts of commonwealths, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, are erected, it followeth, to show by what right they are continued. The right by which they are continued, is called the right of succession to the sovereign power; whereof there is nothing to be said in a democracy, because the sovereign dieth not, as long as there be subjects alive: nor in an aristocracy, because it cannot easily fall out, that the _optimates_ should every one fail at once; and if it should so fall out, there is no question, but the commonwealth is thereby dissolved. It is therefore in a monarchy only, that there can happen a question concerning the succession. And first, forasmuch as a monarch, which is absolute sovereign, hath the dominion in his own right, he may dispose thereof at his own will. If therefore by his last will, he shall name his successor, the right passeth by that will.
[Sidenote: Though the successor be not declared, yet there is always one to be presumed.]
12. Nor if the monarch die without any will concerning the succession declared, it is not therefore to be presumed, it was his will, his subjects, which are to him as his children and servants, should return again to the state of anarchy, that is, to war and hostility. For that were expressly against the law of nature, which commandeth to procure peace, and to maintain the same. It is therefore to be conjectured with reason, that it was his intention to bequeath them peace, that is to say, a power coercive, whereby to keep them from sedition amongst themselves; and rather in the form of a monarchy, than any other government; forasmuch as he, by the exercise thereof in his own person, hath declared, that he approveth the same.
[Sidenote: The children preferred to the succession, &c.]
13. Further, it is to be supposed, his intention was, that his own children should be preferred in the succession, when nothing to the contrary is expressly declared, before any other. For men naturally seek their own honour, and that consisteth in the honour of their children after them.
[Sidenote: The males before the females.]
14. Again, seeing every monarch is supposed to desire to continue the government in his successors, as long as he may; and that generally men are endued with greater parts of wisdom and courage, by which all monarchies are kept from dissolution, than women are; it is to be presumed, where no express will is extant to the contrary, he preferreth his male children before the female. Not but that women may govern, and have in divers ages and places governed wisely, but are not so apt thereto in general, as men.
[Sidenote: The eldest before the rest of the brothers.]
15. Because the sovereign power is indivisible, it cannot be supposed, that he intended the same should be divided, but that it should descend entirely upon one of them, which is to be presumed, should be the eldest, assigned thereto by the lot of nature, because he appointed no other lot for the decision thereof. Besides, what difference of ability soever there may be amongst the brethren, the odds shall be adjudged to the elder, because no subject hath authority otherwise to judge thereof.
[Sidenote: The brother next to the children.]
16. And for want of issue in the possessor, the brother shall be presumed successor. For by the judgment of nature, next in blood is next in love; and next in love is next to preferment.
[Sidenote: The succession of the possessor, &c.]
17. And as the succession followeth the first monarch, so also it followeth him or her that is in possession; and consequently, the children of him in possession, shall be preferred before the children of his father, or predecessor.
------- CHAPTER V.
1. The utility of the commonwealth, &c. 2. The loss of liberty, &c. 3. Monarchy approved by, &c. 4. Monarchy less subject to passion, &c. 5, 6. Subjects in monarchy, &c. 7. Laws in monarchy less changeable, &c. 8. Monarchies less subject to dissolution.
[Sidenote: The utility of the commonwealth, &c.]
1. Having set forth the nature of a Body Politic, and the three sorts thereof, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy; in this chapter shall be declared, the _conveniences_, and _inconveniences_, that arise from the same, both in general, and of the said several sorts in particular. And first, seeing a body politic is erected only for the ruling and governing of particular men, the benefit and damage thereof, consisteth in the benefit or damage of being ruled. The benefit is that for which a body politic was instituted, namely, the peace and preservation of every particular man, than which it is not possible there can be a greater, as hath been touched before, Part I. chapter I. section 12. And this benefit extendeth equally both to the _sovereign_, and to the _subjects_. For he or they that have the sovereign power, have but the defence of their persons, by the assistance of the particulars; and every particular man hath his defence by their union in the sovereign. As for other benefits, which pertain not to their safety and sufficiency, but to their well and delightful being, such as are superfluous riches, they so belong to the sovereign, as they must also be in the subject; and so to the subject, as they must also be in the sovereign. For the riches and treasure of the sovereign, is the dominion he hath over the riches of his subjects. If therefore the sovereign provide not so as that particular men may have means, both to preserve themselves, and also to preserve the public; the common or sovereign treasure can be none. And on the other side, if it were not for a common and public treasure belonging to the sovereign power, men’s private riches would sooner serve to put them into confusion and war, than to secure and maintain them. Insomuch, as the profit of the sovereign and subject goeth always together. That distinction therefore of government, that there is one government for the good of him that governeth, and another for the good of them that be governed; whereof the former is _despotical_, that is lordly; the other, a government of _freemen_, is not right. No more is the opinion of them that hold it to be no city, which consisteth of a master and his servants. They might as well say, it were no city, that consisted in a father and his own issue, how numerous soever they were. For to a master that hath no children, the servants have in them all those respects, for which men love their children. For they are his strength and his honour. And his power is no greater over them, than over his children.
[Sidenote: The loss of liberty, &c.]