though a scanty one, adapted only to the necessities of nature, there is no great ingenuity required in improving it by the addition of artificial signs to supply the defi- ciency of the natural. These artificial signs must mul- tiply with the arts of life and the improvements of know- ledge. The articulations of the voice, seem to be, of all signs, the most proper for artificial language; and as man- kind have universally used them for that purpose, we may reasonably judge that nature intended them for it. But nature probably does not intend that we should lay aside the use of the natural signs; it is enough that we supply their defects by artificial ones. A man that rides always in a chariot, by degrees loses the use of his legs; and one who uses artificial signs only, loses both the knowledge and use of the natural. Dumb people retain much more of the natural language than others, because necessity obliges them to use it. And for the same reason savages have much more of it than civilized nations. It is by natural signs chiefly that we give force and energy to lan- guage; and the less language has of them, it is the less expressive and persuasive. Thus, writing is less expres- sive than reading, and reading less expressive than speaking without book: speaking without the proper and natural modulations, force, and variations of the voice, is a frigid and dead language, compared with that which is attended with them; it is still more expressive when we add the language of the eyes and features; and is then only in its perfect and natural state, and attended with its proper energy, when to all these we superadd the force of action.
Where speech is natural, it will be an exercise, not of the voice and lungs only, but of all the muscles of the body; like that of dumb people and savages, whose lan- guage, as it has more of nature, is more expressive, and is more easily learned.
Is it not pity that the refinements of civilized life, in- stead of supplying the defects of natural language, should root it out, and plant in its stead dull and lifeless articula- tions of unmeaning sounds, or the scrawling of insignificant characters? The perfection of language is commonly 54 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. IV.
thought to be, to express human thoughts and sentiments distinctly by these dull signs; but if this is the perfection of artificial language, it is surely the corruption of the natural.
Artificial signs signify, but they do not express; they speak to the understanding, as algebraical characters may do, but the passions, the affections, and the will hear them not: these continue dormant and inactive, till we speak to them in the language of nature, to which they are all attention and obedience.
It were easy to show, that the fine arts of the musi- cian, the painter, the actor, and the orator, so far as they are expressive; although the knowledge of them requires in us a delicate taste, a nice judgment, and much study and practice; yet they are nothing else but the language of nature, which we brought into the world with us, but have unlearned by disuse, and so find the greatest diffi- culty in recovering it.
Abolish the use of articulate sounds and writing among mankind for a century, and every man would be a painter, an actor, and an orator. We mean not to affirm that such an expedient is practicable; or, if it were, that the advan- tage would counterbalance the loss; but that, as men are led by nature and necessity to converse together, they will use every mean in their power to make themselves under- stood; and where they cannot do this by artificial signs, they will do it, as far as possible, by natural ones; and he that understands perfectly the use of natural signs must be the best judge in all the expressive arts.
55 CHAP. V. OF TOUCH.
SECT. I.
Of Heat and Cold.
THE senses which we have hitherto considered, are very simple and uniform, each of them exhibiting only one kind of sensation, and thereby indicating only one quality of bodies. By the ear we perceive sounds, and nothing else; by the palate, tastes; and by the nose, odours: these qualities are all likewise of one order, being all secondary qualities: whereas by touch we perceive not one quality only, but many, and those of very different kinds. The chief of them are heat and cold, hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, figure, solidity, motion, and extension. We shall consider these in order.
As to heat and cold, it will easily be allowed that they are secondary qualities, of the same order with smell, taste, and sound. And, therefore, what hath been already said of smell is easily applicable to them; that is, that the words heat and cold have each of them two significa- tions; they sometimes signify certain sensations of the mind, which can have no existence when they are not felt, nor can exist any where but in a mind or sentient being; but more frequently they signify a quality in bodies, which, by the laws of nature; occasions the sensations of heat and cold in us: a quality, which, though connected by custom so closely with the sensation, that we cannot with- out difficulty separate them; yet hath not the least resem- blance to it, and may continue to exist when there is no sensation at all.
The sensations of heat and cold are perfectly known; for they neither are nor can be any thing else than what 56 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V..
we feel them to be; but the qualities in bodies which we call heat and cold are unknown. They are only conceived by us, as unknown causes or occasions of the sensations to which we give the same names. But though common sense says nothing of the nature of these qualities, it plainly dictates the existence of them; and to deny that there can be heat and cold when they are not felt is an absurdity too gross to merit confutation. For what could be more absurd than to say, that the thermometer cannot rise or fall unless some person be present, or that the coast of Guinea would be as cold as Nova Zembla, if it had no inhabitants?
It is the business of philosophers to investigate, by proper experiments and induction, what heat and cold are in bodies. And whether they make heat a particular ele- ment diffused through nature, and accumulated in the heated body, or whether they make it a certain vibration of the parts of the heated body; whether they determine that heat and cold are contrary qualities, as the sensations undoubtedly are contrary, or that heat only is a quality and cold is privation: these questions are within the province of philosophy; for common sense says nothing on the one side or the other.
But whatever be the nature of that quality in bodies which we call heat, we certainly know this, that it cannot iu the least resemble the sensation of heat. It is no less absurd to suppose a likeness between the sensation and the quality than it would be to suppose that the pain of the gout resembles a square or a triangle. The simplest man that hath common sense does not imagine the sensation of heat, or any thing that resembles that sensation, to be in the fire. He only imagines, that there is something in the fire which makes him and other sentient beings feel heat. Yet as the name of heat, in common language, more fre- quently and more properly signifies this unknown some- thing in the fire than the sensation occasioned by it, he justly, laughs at the philosopher who denies that there is any heat in the fire, and thinks that he speaks contrary to common sense.
SECT. II.] OP TOUCH. 57 SECT. II.
Of Hardness and Softness.
LET us next consider hardness and softness; by which words we always understand real properties or qualities of bodies of which we have a distinct conception.
When the parts of a body adhere so firmly that it cannot easily be made to change its figure, we call it hard; when its parts are easily displaced, we call it soft. This is the notion which all mankind have of hardness and softness: they are neither sensations, nor like any sensation; they were real qualities before they were perceived by touch, and continue to be so when they are not perceived: for if any man will affirm that diamonds were not hard till they were handled, who would reason with him?
There is, no doubt, a sensation by which we perceive a body to be hard or soft. This sensation of hardness may easily be had, by pressing one's hand against the table, and attending to the feeling that ensues, setting aside, as much as possible, all thought of the table and its qualities, or of any external thing. But it is one thing to have the sensation, and another to attend to it, and make it a dis- tinct object of reflection. The first is very easy; the last, in most cases, extremely difficult.
We are so accustomed to use the sensation as a sign, and to pass immediately to the hardness signified, that, as far as appears, it was never made an object of thought, either by the vulgar or by philosophers; nor has it a name in any language. There is no sensation more distinct or more frequent; yet it is never attended to, but passes through the mind instantaneously, and serves only to introduce that quality in bodies which, by a law of our constitution, it suggests.
There are indeed some cases, wherein it is no difficult matter to attend to the sensation occasioned by the hard- ness of a body; for instance, when it is so violent as to oc- casion considerable pain: then nature calls upon us to at- 58 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
tend to it, and then we acknowledge that it is a mere sensation, and can only be in a sentient being. If a man runs his head with violence 'against a pillar, I appeal to him, whether the pain he feels resembles the hardness of the stone; or if he can conceive any thing like what he feels, to be an inanimate piece of matter.
The attention of the mind is here entirely turned towards the painful feeling; and, to speak in the common language of mankind, he feels nothing in the stone, but feels a violent pain in his head. It is quite otherwise when he leans his head gently against the pillar; for then he will tell you that he feels nothing in his head, but feels hardness in the stone. Hath he not a sensation in this case as well as in the other? Undoubtedly he hath: but it is a sensation which nature intended only as a sign of something in the stone; and, accordingly, he instantly fixes his attention upon the thing signified; and cannot, without great diffi- culty, attend so much to the sensation as to be persuaded that there is any such thing distinct from the hardness it signifies.
But however difficult it may be to attend to this fugitive sensation, to stop its rapid progress, and to disjoin it from the external quality of hardness, in whose shadow it is apt immediately to hide itself; this is what a philosopher by pains and practice must attain, otherwise it will be im- possible for him to reason justly upon this subject, or even to understand what is here advanced. For the last appeal, in subjects of this nature, must be to what a man feels and perceives in his own mind.
It is indeed strange that a sensation which we have every time we feel a body hard, and which, consequently, we can command as often, and continue as long as wo please, a sensation as distinct and determinate as any other, should yet be so much unknown, as never to have been made an object of thought and reflection, nor to have been honoured with a name in any language; that philoso- phers, as well as the vulgar, should have entirely over- looked it, or confounded it with that quality of bodies which we call hardness, to which it hath not the least SECT. II.] OF TOUCH. 59 similitude. May we not hence conclude, that the know- ledge of the human faculties is but in its infancy? That we have not yet learned to attend to those operations of the mind, of which we are conscious every hour of our lives? That there are habits of inattention acquired very early, which are as hard to be overcome as other habits? For I think it is probable, that the novelty of this sensation will procure some attention to it in children at first; but being in nowise interesting in itself, as soon as it becomes fa- miliar, it is overlooked, and the attention turned solely to that which it signifies. — Thus, when one is learning a lan- guage, he attends to the sounds; but when he is master of it, he attends only to the sense of what he would express. If this is the case, we must become as little children again, if we will be philosophers: we must overcome this habit of inattention which has been gathering strength ever since we began to think; a habit, the usefulness of which, in common life, atones for the difficulty it creates to the phi- losopher, in discovering the first principles of the human mind.
The firm cohesion of the parts of a body is no more like that sensation by which I perceive it to be hard than the vibration of a sonorous body is like the sound I hear: nor can I possibly perceive, by my reason, any connexion be- tween the one and the other. No man can give a reason, why the vibration of a body might not have given the sen- sation of smelling, and the effluvia of bodies affected our hearing, if it had so pleased our Maker. In like manner no man can give a reason, why the sensation of smell, or taste, or sound might not have indicated hardness, as well as that sensation, which, by our constitution, does indicate it. Indeed no man can conceive any sensation to re- semble any known quality of bodies. Nor can any man show, by any good argument, that all our sensations might not have been as they are, though no body nor quality of body had over existed.
Here, then, is a phenomenon of human nature, which comes to be resolved. • Hardness of bodies is a thing that we conceive as distinctly, and believe as firmly, as any 60 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
thing in nature. We have no way of coming to this con- ception and belief, but by means of a certain sensation of touch, to which hardness hath not the least similitude; nor can we, by any rules of reasoning, infer the one from the other. The question is, How we come by this conception and belief?
First, as to the conception: shall we call it an idea of sensation or of reflection? The last will not be affirmed; and as little can the first, unless we call that an idea of sensation which hath no resemblance to any sensation. So that the origin of this idea of hardness, one of the most common and most distinct we have, is not to be found in all our systems of the mind: not even in those which have so copiously endeavoured to deduce all our notions from sensations and reflection.
But, secondly, supposing we have got the conception of hardness, how come we by the belief of it? It is self-evi- dent, from comparing the ideas, that such a sensation could not be felt, unless such a quality of bodies existed? No. Can it be proved by probable or certain arguments? No, it cannot. Have we got this belief, then, by tradition, by education, or by experience? No; it is not got in any of these ways. Shall we then throw off this belief, as having no foundation in reason? Alas! it is not in our power; it triumphs over reason, and laughs at all the arguments of a philosopher. Even the author of the Treatise of Hu- man Nature, though he saw no reason for this belief, but many against it, could hardly conquer it in his speculative and solitary moments; at other times he fairly yielded to it, and confesses that he found himself under a necessity to do so.
What shall we say then of this conception, and this belief, which are so unaccountable and un tractable? I see nothing left but to conclude, that, by an original principle of our constitution, a certain sensation of touch both sug- gests to the mind the conception of hardness and creates the belief of it: or, in other words, that this sensation is a natural sign of hardness. And this I shall endeavour more fully to explain.
OF TOUCH. 61 SECT. III.
Of Natural Signs.
As in artificial signs there is often neither similitude be- tween the sign and thing signified, nor any connexion that arises necessarily from the nature of the things; so it is also in natural signs. The word gold has no similitude to the substance signified by it; nor is it in its own nature more fit to signify this than any other substance: yet, by habit and custom, it suggests this and no other. In like manner, a sensation of touch suggests hardness, although it hath neither similitude to hardness, nor, as far as we can perceive, any necessary connexion with it. The difference betwixt these two signs lies only in this, that, in the first, the suggestion is the effect of habit and custom; in the second, it is not the effect of habit, but of the original con- stitution of our minds.
It appears evident from what hath been said on the sub- ject of language, that there are natural signs, as well as artificial; and particularly, That the thoughts, purposes, and dispositions of the mind have their natural signs in the features of the face, the modulation of the voice, and the motion and attitude of the body: That, without a na- tural knowledge of the connexion between these signs and the things signified by them, language could never have been invented and established among men: and, That the fine arts are all founded upon this connexion, which we may call the natural language of mankind. It is now proper to observe, that there are different orders of natural signs, and to point out the different classes into which they may be distinguished, that we may more distinctly con- ceive the relation between our sensations and the things they suggest, and what we mean by calling sensations signs of external things.
The first class of natural signs comprehends those whose connexion with the thing signified is established by nature, but discovered only by experience. The whole of 62 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
genuine philosophy consists in discovering such connexions, and reducing them to general rules. The great Lord Ve- rulam had a perfect comprehension of this, when he called it an interpretation of nature. No man ever more dis- tinctly understood, or happily expressed, the nature and foundation of the philosophic art. What is all we know of mechanics, astronomy, and optics, but connexions established by nature, and discovered by experience or observation, and consequences deduced from them? All the knowledge we have in agriculture, gardening, che- mistry, and medicine, is built upon the same foundation. And if ever our philosophy concerning the human mind is carried so far as to deserve the name of science, which ought never to be despaired of, it must be by observing facts, reducing them to general rules, and drawing just conclusions from them. What we commonly call natural causes might, with more propriety, be called natural signs, and what we call effects, the things signified. The causes have no proper efficiency or casualty, as far as we know; and all we can certainly affirm is, that nature hath established a constant conjunction between them and the things called their effects; and hath given to mankin^ a disposition to observe those connexions, to confide in their continuance, and to make use of them for the im- provement of our knowledge, and increase of our power.
A second class is that wherein the connexion between the sign and thing signified is not only established by nature, but discovered to us by a natural principle, without reasoning or experience. Of this kind are the natural signs of human thoughts, purposes, and desires, which have been already mentioned as the natural language of mankind. An infant may be put into a fright by an angry countenance, and soothed again by smiles and blandish- ments. A child that has a good musical ear may be put to sleep or to dance, may be made merry or sorrowful, by the modulation of musical sounds. The principles of all the fine arts, and of what we call a fine taste, may be re- solved into connexions of this kind. A fine taste may be improved by reasoning and experience; but if the first SECT. III.] OF TOUCH. C3 principles of it were not planted in our minds by nature, it could never be acquired. Nay, we have already made it appear, that a great part of this knowledge, which we have by nature, is lost by the disuse of natural signs, and the substitution of artificial in their place.
A third class of natural signs comprehends those which, though we never before had any notion or conception oi. the things signified, do suggest it, or conjure it up, as it were, by a natural kind of magic, and at once give us a conception, and create a belief of it. I showed formerly, that our sensations suggest to us a sentient being or mind to which they belong: a being which hath a permanent existence, although the sensations are transient and of short duration: a being which is still the same, while its sensations and other operations are varied ten thousand ways: a being which hath the same relation to all that in- finite variety of thoughts, purposes, actions, affections, en- joyments, and sufferings, which we are conscious of, or can remember. The conception of a mind is neither an idea of sensation nor of reflection; for it is neither like any of our sensations, nor like any thing we are conscious of. The first conception of it, as well as the belief of it, and of the common relation it bears to all that we are con- scious of, or remember, is suggested to every thinking being, we do not know how.
The notion of hardness in bodies, as well as the belief of it, are got in a similar manner; being, by an original principle of our nature, annexed to that sensation which we have when we feel a hard body. And so naturally and necessarily does the sensation convey the notion and be- lief of hardness, that hitherto they have been confounded by the most acute inquirers into the principles of human nature, although they appear, upon accurate reflection, not only to be different things, but as unlike as pain is to the point of a sword.
It may be observed, that as the first class of natural signs I have mentioned is the foundation of true philo- sophy, and the second, the foundation of the fine aits, or of taste; so the last is the foundation of common sense; a part of human nature which hath never been explained.
G4 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
I take it for granted, that the notion of hardness, and the belief of it, is first got by means of that particular sen- sation which, as far back as we can remember, does in- variably suggest it; and that if we had never had such a feeling, we should never have had any notion of hardness. I think it is evident, that we cannot, by reasoning from our sensations, collect the existence of bodies at all, far less any of their qualities. This hath been proved by unan- swerable arguments by the Bishop of Cloyne, and by the author of the Treatise of Human Nature. It appears as evident, that this connexion between our sensations and the conception and belief of external existences, cannot be produced by habit, experience, education, or any principle of human nature that hath been admitted by philosophers. At the same time, it is a fact, that such sensations are in- variably connected with the conception and belief of exter- nal existences. Hence, by all rules of just reasoning, we must conclude, that this connexion is the effect of our con- stitution, and ought to be considered as an original prin- ciple of human nature, till we find some more general prin- ciple into which it may be resolved.
SECT. IV.
Of Hardness, and other Primary Qualities.
FURTHER I observe, that hardness is a quality, of which we have as clear and distinct a conception as of any thing whatsoever. The cohesion of the parts of a body with more or less force is perfectly understood, though its cause is not: we know what it is, as well as how it affects the touch. It is therefore a quality of a quite different order from those secondary qualities we have already taken notice of, whereof we know no more naturally, than that they are adapted to raise certain sensations in us. If hardness were a quality of the same kind, it would be a proper inquiry for philosophers, What hardness in bodies is? and we should have had various hypotheses about it, as well as about colour and heat. But it is evident that SECT. IV.] OF TOUCH. Co any such hypothesis would be ridiculous. If any man should say, that hardness in bodies is a certain vibration of their parts, or that it is certain effluvia emitted by them which affect our touch in the manner we feel; such hypo- thesis would shock common sense? because we all know, that if the parts of a body adhere strongly, it is hard, al- though it should neither emit effluvia, nor vibrate. Yet at the same time, no man can say, but that effluvia, or the vibration of the parts of a body, might have affected our touch in the same manner that hardness now does, if it had so pleased the Author of our nature: and if either of these hypotheses is applied to explain a secondary quality, such as smell, or taste, or sound, or colour, or heat, there appears no manifest absurdity in the supposition.
The distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities hath had several revolutions. Democritus and Epicurus, and their followers, maintained it. Aristotle and the Pe- ripatetics abolished it. Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke, revived it, and were thought to have put it in a very clear light. But Bishop Berkeley again discarded this distinction, by such proofs as must be convincing to those that hold the received doctrine of ideas. Yet, after all, there appears to be a real foundation for it in the prin- ciples of our nature.
What hath been said of hardness is so easily applicable, not only to its opposite, softness, but likewise to roughness and smoothness, to figure and motion, that we may be ex- cused from making the application, which would only be a repetition of what hath been said. All these, by means of certain corresponding sensations of touch, are presented to the mind as real external qualities; the conception and the belief of them are invariably connected with the cor- responding sensations, by an original principle of humau nature. Their sensations have no name in any language; they have not only been overlooked by the vulgar, but by philosophers; or if they have been at all taken notice of, they have been confounded with the external qualities which they suggest.
66 OF THE HUMAN MIND. [CHAP. V.
SECT. V.
Of Extension.
IT is further to be observed, that hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, figure and motion, do all sup- pose extension, and cannot be conceived without it; yet I think it must, on the other hand, be allowed, that if we had never felt any thing hard or soft, rough or smooth, figured or moved, we should never have had a conception of extension: so that, as there is good ground to believe that the notion of extension could not be prior to that of other primary qualities: so it is certain that it could not be posterior to the notion of any of them, being necessarily implied in them all.
Extension, therefore, seems to be a quality suggested to us, by the very same sensations which suggest the other qualities abovementioned. When I grasp a ball in my hand, I perceive it at once hard, figured, and extended. The feeling is very simple, and hath not the least resem- blance to any quality of body. Yet it suggests to us three primary qualities perfectly distinct from one another, as well as from the sensation which indicates them. When I move my hand along the table, the feeling is so simple, that I find it difficult to distinguish it into things of different natures; yet it immediately suggests hardness, smoothness, extension, and motion, things of very dif- ferent natures, and all of them as distinctly understood as the feeling which suggests them.
We are commonly told by philosophers, that we get the idea of extension by feeling along the extremities of a body, as if there was no manner of difficulty in the matter. I have sought, with great pains, I confess, to find out how this idea can be got by feeling, but I have sought in vain. Yet it is one of the clearest and most distinct notions we have; nor is there any thing whatsoever, about which the human understanding can carry on so many long and de- monstrated trams of reasoning.
SECT. V.] OF TOUCH. 67