He bath Jhcwed thee, 0 Man, what is good. MiCAH.
EDINBURGH: Printed FOR JOHN BELL, Parliament-Squar£, And G. G. J. & J. ROBINSON, London.
M,DCC,LXXX\III.
CONTENTS ESSAY I. OF ACTIVE POWER IN GENERAL.
Chap. i. Of the Notion of yl^ive Power ^ - - 5 ■ 3. Of Mr Locke's Account of our Idea of Power y 22 4. OfMx Hume's Opinion of the Idea of Power, - 26 5. Whether Beings that have no Will nor Under/landing may have ABive Power? - - ~ 33 6. Of the efficient Caufes of the Phanomena of Nature y 41 7. Of the Extent of Human Power, - - 48 ESSAY n. OF THE WILL.
Chap. i. Obfervations concerning the Will, " - - 59 2. 0/ the Influence of Incitements and Motives upon the — 3. Of Operations of Mind which may be called Voluntary, 78 ESSAY III. OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. PARTI. Of the Mechanical Principles of Jaion. '^ Chap. t. Of the Principles of jl£lion in general, - 97 a 2 ESSAY % vi CONTENTS.
ESSAY III. PART II. Of Animal Principles of AB'ion.
Page 3. Of Benevolent Affedion in general, - - I41 4. Of the particular Benevolent Affe^ions, - 148 ESSAY III. PART III. Of the Rational Principles of ASiion.
Chap. i. 'There are Rational Principles of A6lion in Man, -' 205.
2. Of Regard to our Good on the Whole, - - 208 3. The Tendency of this Principle, - 215 ■ 5* Of the Notion of Duty, Redlitude. moral Obligation, 227 6. Of the Senfe of Duty, - - - 236 7. Of moral Approbation and Difapprobation^ - 244 ESSAY IV. OF THE LIBERTY OF MORAL AGENTS.
Chap. i. The Notions of Moral Liberty and Necefity fated, 267 2. Of the Words Caufe and EjfeSl, A£lion, and AElive ' — — 3. Canfes of the Ambiguity of thofe Words, - 281 Chap.
CONTENTS.
vu ^ Page Chap. 4. Of the Influence of Motives, - - 291 II. Of the PermiJJion of Evil, - - 3f5 ESSAY V. OF MORALS.
Chap. I. Of the Firjl Principles of Morals, - 369 3. Of Syjlems of Natural Jurifprudence, - 387 4. Whether an ASiion deferving Moral Approbation, mujl be done ivith the Belief of its being morally good, 39 c 5. Whether Jttjiice be a Natural or an Artifcial Virtue, 409 6. Of the Nature and Obligation of a Contrary • 44 c 7. That Moral Approbation implies a real Judgment, 467 ESSAYS ON THE ACTIVE POWERS of the HUMAN MIND, INTRODUCTION.
TH E divifion of the faculties of the human mind into Un- derjlanding and Will is very ancient, and has been very ge- nerally adopted ^ the former comprehending all our fpeculative, the latter all our a<flive Powers.
It is evidently the intention of our Maker, that man fhould be an adlive and not merely a fpeculative being. For this purpofe, certain adtive powers have been given him, limited indeed in many refpeds, but fuited to his rank and place in the creation.
Ouv bufinefs is to manage thefe powers, by propofing to our- felves the beft ends, planning the moft proper fyftem of condud that is in our power, and executing it with induftry and zeal. This is true wifdom; this is the very intention of our being.
Every thing virtuous and praife-worthy muft lie in the right ufeof our power; every thing vicious and blameable in the abufe of it. What is not within the fphere of our power cannot be imputed to us either for blame or praife. Thefe are felf-evident A truths, INTRODUCTION.
truths, to which every unprejudiced mind yields an immediate and invincible afTent.
Knowledge derives its value from this, that it enlarges our power, and direds us in the application of it. For in the right employment of our ad;ive power confifts all the honour, digni- ty and worth of a man, and, in the abufe and perverfion of it, all vice, corruption and depravity.
We are diflinguiflied from the brute-animals, not lefs by our active than by our fpeculative powers.
The brutes are Simulated to various adlions by their inftinds, by their appetites, by their paflions. But they feem to be ne- ceflarily determined by the flrongeft impulfe, without any capa- city of felf-government. Therefore we do not blame them for what they do; nor have we any reafon to think that they blame themfelves. They may be trained up by difcipline, but cannot be governed by law. There is no evidence that they have the conception of a law, or of its obligation.
Man is capable of ading from motives of a higher nature. He perceives a dignity and worth in one courfe of condudl, a de- merit and turpitude in another, which brutes have not the capa- city to difcern.
He perceives it to be his duty to a<5l the worthy and the ho- nourable part, whether his appetites and paflions incite him to it, or to the contrary. When he facrifices the gratification of the flrongeft appetites or paflions to duty, this is fo far from dimi- niftiing the merit of his condud, that it greatly increafes it, and affords, upon refledlion, an inward fatisfadion and triumph, of which brute-animals are not fufceptible. When he ads a contrary part, he has a confcioufnefs of demerit, to which they are no lefs ftrangers.
Since, INTRODUCTION.
Since, therefore, the active powers of man make fo important a part of his conftitution, and diftinguifh him fo eminently from his fellow-animals, they defer%'e no lefs to be the fubje<^ of phi- lofophical difquifition than his intellectual powers.
A jufl: knowledge of our powers, whether intelledual or ac- tive, is fo far of real importance to us, as it aids us in the ex- ercife of them. And every man mufl acknowledge, that to adl properly is much more valuable than to think juftly or reafon acutely.
A 2 ESSAY ESSAY L A 2 ESSAY ESSAY L OF ACTIVE POWER IN GENERAL.
Of the Notion of A&ive Power.
TO confider gravely what Is meant by Adtive Power, may feem altogether unneceflary, and to be mere trifling. It is not a term of art, but a common word in our language, ufed every day in difcourfe, even by the vulgar. We find words of the fame meaning in all other languages; and there is no reafon to think that it is not perfectly underftood by all men who un- derftand the Englllh language.
I believe all this is true, and that an attempt to explain a word fo well underftood, and to ftiow that it has a meaning, re- quires an apology.
The apology is. That this term, fo well underftood by the vul- gar, has been darkened by philofophers, who, in this as in many other inftances, have found great difficulties about a thing which, to the reft of mankind, feems perfed:ly clear.
This has been the more eafily effeifted, becaufe Power is a thing fo much of its own kind, and fo fimple in its nature, as not to admit of a logical definition.
It is well known, that there are many things perfedly under- ftood, and of which we have clear and diftindt conceptions, which CHAP. L which cannot be logically defined. No man ever attempted $o define magnitude; yet there is no word whofe meaning is more difl:indly or more generally underftood. We cannot give a logi- cal definition of thought, of duration, of number, or of motion.
When men attempt to define fuch things, they give no light. They may give a fynonymous word or phrafe, but it will proba- bly be a worfe for a better. If they will define, the definition will either be grounded upon a hypothefis, or it will darken the fubjed: rather than throw light upon it.
The Ariftotelian definition of motion, that it is " A&us entis in " potentia^quatenus in potentta,^'' has beenjuftly cenfured by modern Philofophers; yet I think it is matched by what a celebrated mo- dern Philofopher has given us, as the moft accurate definition of belief, to wit, " That it is a lively idea related to or aflbciated " with a prefent impreflion." Treatife of Human Nature, vol. i. p. 172. " Memory," according to the fame Philofopher, " is " the faculty by which we repeat our impreflions, fo as that " they retain a confiderable degree of their firfl vivacity, and " are fomewhat intermediate betwixt an idea and an Imprelllon."
Euclid, if his editors have not done him injuftice, has at- tempted to define a right line, to define unity, ratio and number. But thefe definitions are good for nothing. We may indeed fufped: them not to be Euclid's; becaufe they are never once quoted in the Elements, and are of no ufe.
I fhall not therefore attempt to define adive power, that I may not be liable to the fame cenfure; but fliall offer fome oblerva- tions that may lead us to attend to the conception we have of it in our own minds.
I. Power is not an objed of any of our external fenfes, nor even an objed of confcioufhefs.
That OF THE NOTION OF ACTIVE POWER. 7 That it is not feen, nor heard, nor touched, nor tafted, nor chap, i.^ fmclt, needs no proof. That we are not confcious of it, in the proper fenfe of that word, will be n6 lefs evident, if we re- flect, that confcioufnefs is that power of the mind by which it has an immediate knowledge of its own operations. Po\Ver is not an operation of the mind, and therefore no objed of cbn- fcioufneis. Indeed every operation of the mind is the exertion of fome power of the mind; but we are confcious of the ope- ration only, the power lies behind the fcene; and though we may juftly infer the power from the operation, it muft be re- membered, that inferring is not the province of confcioufnefs, but of rcaion.
I acknowledge, therefore, that our having ahy conception of idea of power is repuguant to Mr Locke's theory, that all our Am- ple ideas are got either by the external fenfes, or by confcioufnefs. Both cannot be true. Mr Hume perceived this repugnancy, and confiftently maintained, that we have no idea of power. Mr Locke did not perceive it. If he had, it might have led him to fufped his theory j for when theory is repugnant to facfl, it is eafy to fee which ought to yield. I am confcious that I have a conception or iJea of power, but, ftriclly fpeaking, I am not confcious that 1 have power.
I fliall have occafion to (hew, that we have very early, from our conftitution, a convic'liou or belief of fome degree of adive power in ourfelves. This belief, however, is not confcioufnefs: For we may be deceived in it; but the teftimony of confciouf- nefs can never deceive. Thus, a man who is (truck with a palfy in the night commonly knows not that he has loft the power of fpeech till he attempts to fpeak; he knows not whether he can move his hands and arms till he makes the trial; and if, with- out making trial, he confults his confcioufnefs ever fo attentive- ly, it will give him no information whether he has loft thefe powers, or iUll retains them.
From ^ From ^ ESSAY I.
CHAP. I. From this we muft conclude, that the powers we have are not an objed of confcloufnefs, though it would be foolifh to cenfure this way of fpeaking in popular difcourfe, which requires not accurate attention to the different provinces of our various fa- culties. The teftimony of confcloufnefs is always unerring, nor was it ever called in queflion by the greateft fceptics, ancient or modem.
2. A fecond obfervation is. That as there are fome things of which we have a dired, and others of which we have only a re- lative conception, power belongs to the latter clafs.
As this diftindion is overlooked by moft writers In logic, I fliall beg leave to Illuflrate it a little, and then fhall apply It to the prefent fubjed.
Of fome things we know what they are in themfelves; our conception of fuch things I call direB. Of other things, we know not what they are in themfelves, but only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things; of thefe oui* conception is only relative.
To Illuftrate this by fome examples: In the unlverfity-library, I call for the book, prefs L, fhelf lo. No. lo.; the library- keeper muft have fuch a conception of the book I want, as to be able to dlftlngulfh it from ten thoufand that are under his care. But what conception does he form of it from my words? They inform him neither of the author, nor the fubjed, nor the lan- guage, nor the fize, nor the binding, but only of its mark and place. His conception of it is merely relative to thefe clrcum- ftances; yet this relative notion enables him to diftinguifli it from every other book in the library.
There are other relative notions that are not taken from ac- cidental relations, as in the example juft now mentioned, but from qualities or attributes eflential to the thing.
Of OF THE NOTION OF ACTIVE POWER. < Of this kind are our notions both of body and mind. What CHAP, r. is body? It is, fay Phllofophers, that which is extended, folid and divifible. Says the querift, 1 do not afk what the properties of body arc, but what is the thing itfelf ^ let me firft know diredly what body is, and then confider its properties? To this demand I am afraid the querift will meet with no fatisfadory anfwer; becaufe our notion of body is not diredl but relative to its qua- lities. We know that it is fomething extended, folid and divi- fible, and we know no more.
Again, if It fhould be afked, What Is mind? It is that which thinks. I afk not what it does, or what its operations are, but what it is? To this I can find no anfwer j our notion of mind being not dired, but relative to its operations, as our notion of body Is relative to its qualities.
There are even many of the qualities of body, of which we have only a relative conception. What Is heat In a body? It is a quality which affeds the fenfe of touch In a certain way. If you want to know, not how It affeds the fenfe of touch, but what It Is In Itfelf; this I confefs I know not. My conception of it Is not dired, but relative to the effed It has upon bodies. The notions we have of all thofe qualities which Mr Locke calls fecondary, and of thofe he calls powers of bodies, fuch as the power of the magnet to attrad iron, or of fire to burn wood, are relative.
Having given examples of things of which our conception is only relative, it may be proper to mention fome of which It Is dired. Of this kind, are all the primary qualities of body; fi- gure, extenfion, folidlty, hardnefs, fluidity, and the like. Of thefe we have a dired and Immediate knowledge from our fenfes. To this clafs belong alfo all the operations of mind of which we are confcious. I know what thought Is, what memory, what a purpofe, what a promife.
B There 10 ESSAY I.
CHAP. I. There are fome things of which we can have both a direcft and a relative conception. I can diredlly conceive ten thoufand men or ten thoufand pounds, becaufe both are objeds of fenfe, and may be feen. But whether I fee fuch an objed:, or dire(5lly con- ceive it, my notion of it is indiflind; it is only that of a great multitude of men, or of a great heap of money; and a fmall addition or diminution makes no perceptible change in the no- tion I form in this way. But I can form a relative notion of the fame number of men or of pounds, by attending to the re- lations which this number has to other numbers, greater or lefs. Then I perceive that the relative notion is diftin(St and fcientific. For the addition of a fingle man, or a fingle pound, or even of a penny, is ealily perceived.
In like manner, I can form a diredl notion of a polygon of a thoufand equal fides and equal angles. This direct notion can- not be more diflintfl, when conceived in the mind, than that which I get by fight, when the objedl is before me; and I find it fo indiftind:, that it has the fame appearance to my eye, or to my dired conception, as a polygon of a thoufand and one, or of nine hundred and ninety-nine fides. But when I form a rela- tive conception of it, by attending to the relation it bears to polygons of a greater or lefs number of fides, my notion of it becomes diftind and fcientific, and I can demonfl;rate the pro- perties by which it is diftinguifhed from all other polygons. From thefe inflances it appears, that our relative conceptions of things are not always lefs difi;ind, nor lefs fit materials for accu- rate reafoning, than thofe that are dired j and that the con- trary may happen in a remarkable degree.
Our conception of power Is relative to its exertions or effeds. Power is one things its exertion is another thing. It is true, there can be no exertion without power; but there may be power that is not exerted. Thus a man may have power to fpeak when he is filentj he may have power to rife and walk when he fits flill.
But But OF THE NOTION OF ACTIVE POWER. n But though it be one thing to fpeak, and another to have the CHAI'. i.^ power of fpeaking, I apprehend we conceive of the power as fomething which has a certain relation to the efled. And of every power we form our notion by the effed which it is able to produce.
3. It is evident that power is a quality, and cannot exifl with- out a fubjed to which it belongs.
That power may exiil: without any being or fubjed to which that power may be attributed, is an abfurdity, fhocking to every man of common underllanding.
It is a quality which may be varied, not only in degree, but alfo in kind; and we diftinguifli both the kinds and degrees by the effedts which they are able to produce.
Thus a power to fly, and a power to reafon, are different kinds of power, their effeds being different in kind. But a power to carry one hundred weight, and a power to carry two hundred, are different degrees of the fame kind.
4. We cannot conclude the want of power from its not being exerted; nor from the exertion of a lefs degree of power, can we conclude that there is no greater degree in the fubjed. Thus, though a man on a particular occafion faid nothing, we cannot conclude from that circumflance, that he had not the power of fpeech; nor from a man's carrying ten pound weight, can we conclude that he had not power to carry twenty.
5. There are fome qualities that have a contrary, others that have not; power is a quality of the latter kind.
Vice is contrary to virtue, mifery to happinefs, hatred to love, negation to affirmation; but there is no contrary to power. Weak- B 2 nefs CHAP. I. nefs or impotence are defeds or privations of power, but not contraries to it.
If what has been faid of power be ealily underftood, and rea- dily aflented to, by all who underftand our language, as I believe it is, we may from this juflly conclude. That we have a diftind notion of power, and may reafon about it with underltanding, though we can give no logical definition of it..
If power were a thing of which we have no idea, as fome Philofophers have taken much pains to prove, that is, if power were a word without any meaning, we could neither affirm nor deny any thing concerning it with underftanding. We fhould have equal reafon to fay that it is a fubftance, as that it is a qua- lity; that it does not admit of degrees as that it does. If the underftanding immediately aflents to one of thefe affertions, and revolts from the contrary, we may conclude with certainty, that we put fome meaning upon the word power, that is, that we have fome idea of it. And it is chiefly for the fake of this con- clufion, that I have enumerated fo many obvious things concern- ing it.
The term adive power is ufed, I conceive, to diftinguifh it from fpeculative powers. As all languages diflinguifh adlion from fpeculation, the fame difl;ind:ion is applied to the powers by which they are produced. The powers of feeing, hearing, remembering, diftinguifhing, judging, reafoning, are fpeculative powers; the power of executing any work of art or labour is adive power.
There are many things related to power, in fuch a manner, that we can have no notion of them if we have none of power.
The exertion of adlive power we call aEl'ion; and as every adion produces fome change, fo every change muft be caufed by fome OFTHENOTIONOFACTIVEPOWER. 13 fome exertion, or by the ceflation of fome exertion of power. That chap. ii. which produces a change by the exertion of its power, we call the caufe of that change ', and the change produced, the effeEl of that caufe.
When one being, by its adive power, produces any change upon another, the lall is faid to be pqffive, or to be aded upon. Thus we fee that adion and paffion, cuufe and effed, exertion and operation, have fuch a relation to adive power, that if it be underftood, they are underftood of confequence; but if power be a word without any meaning, all thofe words which are related to it, nuift be words without any meaning. They are, however, common words in our language j and equivalent words have always been common in all languages.
It would be very ftrange indeed, if mankind had always ufed thefe words fo familiarly, without perceiving that they had no meaning; and that this difcovery fliould have been firft made by a Philofophcr of the prefent age.
With equal reafon it might be maintained, that though there are words in all languages to exprefs fight, and words to fignify the various colours which are objeds of fight; yet that all man- kind from the beginning of the world had been blind, and never had an idea of fight or of colour. But there are no abfurdities fo grofs as thofe which Philofophers have advanced concerning ideas.
The fame Subje£l.
THERE are, I believe, no abftrad notions, that are to be found more early, or more univerfally, in the minds of men, than thofe of ading, and being aded upon. Every child that underftands *4 ESSAY I.
CHAP. II. underftands the difllndlon between ftriking and being flruck, mufl have the conception of adlion and pailion.
We find accordingly, that there Is no language fo Imperfed, but that it has adive and paffive verbs, and participles; the one fig- nifying fome kind of adionj the other the being aded upon. This diftindion enters into the original contexture of all lan- guages.
Adive verbs have a form and conftrudtlon proper to them- felves; paffive verbs a different fonn and a different conflru6lion. In all languages, the nominative to an adlive verb is the agent; the thing aded upon is put in an oblique cafe. In paffive verbs, the thing adted upon is the nominative, and the agent, if expreC- fed, muit be in an oblique cafe; as in this example: Raphael drew the Cartoons j the Cartoons were drawn by Raphael.
Every diftindlon which we find m the ftrufture of all lan- guages, mufl: have been familiar to thofe who framed the lan- guages at firft, and to all who fpeak them with underftanding.
It may be objeded to this argument, taken from the ftrudure of language, in the ufe of a6tive and paffive verbs, that adive verbs are not always ufed to denote an ad:ion, nor is the nomina- tive before an active verb, conceived in all cafes to be an agent, in the ftridl fenfe of that word j that there are many paffive verbs which have an adlive fignification, and adlive verbs which have a paffive. From thefe fadts, it may be thought a jufl: con- clufion, that in contriving the different forms of adllve and paf- five verbs, and their different conftruClion, men have not been governed by a regard to any diftindlion between adlion and paf- fion, but by chance, or fome accidental caufe.
In anfwer to this objedion, the fad an which it Is founded, mufl OF THE NOTION OF ACTIVE POWER. 15 mud be admitted; hut I think the conclufion not juftly drawn chap, il from it, for the following reafons: 1. It feems contrary to reafon, to attribute to chance or acci- dent, what is fubjed to rules, even though there may be excep- tions to the rule. The exceptions may, in fuch a cafe, be attri- buted to accident, but the rule cannot. There is perhaps hard- ly any thing in language fo general, as not to admit of excep- tions. It cannot be denied to be a general rule, that verbs and participles have an adive and a pallive voice; and as this is a general rule, not in one language only, but in all the languages we are acquainted with, it fhews evidently that men, in the ear- lieft ftages, and in all periods of fociety, have diftinguifhedadlion from paflion.
2. It is to be obferved, that the forms of language are often ap- plied to purpofes different from thofe for which they were ori- ginally intended. The varieties of a language, even the moft perfect, can never be made equal to all the variety of human conceptions. The forms and modifications of language mull be confined within certain Imiits, that they may not exceed the ca- pacity of human memory. Therefore, in all languages, there muft be a kind of frugality ufed, to make one form of expref- fion ferve many different purpofes, like Sir Hudibras' dagger, which, though made to ftab or break a head, was put to many other ufes. Many examples might be produced of this frugali- ty in language. Thus the Latins and Greeks had five or fix cafes of nouns, to exprefs the various relations that one thing could bear to another. The genitive cafe muff have been at firft intended to exprefs fome one capital relation, fuch as that of poiTeflion or of property; but it would be very difficult to enumerate all the relations which, in the progrefs of language, it was ufed to exprefs. The fame obl'crvatioa may be applied to other cafes of nouns.
The The CHAP. II. The flighteft fimilltude or analogy is thought fufficlent to juf^ tify the extenfion of a form of fpeech beyond its proper mean- ing, whenever the language does not afford a more proper form. In the moods of verbs, a few of thofe which occur moll fre- quently are diftinguifhed by different forms, and thefe are made to fupply all the forms that are wanting. The fame obferva- tion may be applied to what is called the voices of verbs. An adiive and a paiUve are the capital ones; fome languages have more, but no language fo many as to anfwer to all the variations of human thought. We cannot always coin new ones, and there- fore muft ufe fome one or other of thofe that are to be found in the language, though at firft intended for another purpofe.
3. A third obfervation in anfwer to the objedlion is. That we can point out a caufe of the frequent mifapplication of adive verbs, to things which have no proper adlivity: A caufe which extends to the greater part of fuch mifapplications, and which confirms the account I have given of the proper intention of adive and pallive verbs.
As there is no principle, that appears to be more univerfally ac- knowledged by mankind, from the fii'ft dawn of reafon, than, that every change we obferve in nature mufl have a caufe; fo this is no fooner perceived, than there arifes in the human mind, a flrong defire to know the caufes of thofe changes that fall within our obfervation. Felix qui potuit rerum cognofccre catifas, is the voice of nature in all men. Nor is there any thing that more early di- Itinguiflies the rational from the brute creation, than this avidi- ty to know the caufes of things, of which I fee no fign in brute- animals.
■It muft furely be admitted, that in thofe periods wherein lan- guages are formed, men are but poorly furniftied for carrying on this invelHgation with fuccefs. We fee, that the experience of thoufands of years is neceflary to bring men into the right track in OF THE NOTION OF ACTIVE POWER. 17