Whether the affedlion Ije to a college or to a cloifter, to a clan or to a profefTion, to a party or to a nation, it is public fpirit, Thefe affedlions differ, not in kind, but in the extent of their objed;.
The objedl extends as our connedions extend j and a fenfe of the OF PARTICULAR BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS. i5i the connection carries the affcdlon along with It to every com- CHAT, iv.^ munity to which we can apply the pronouns we and our.
Friend, parent, neighbour, firfl it will embrace, His country next, and then all human race. Pope.
Even in the mifanthrope, this afFcdlon Is not extlngulflied. It is overpowered by the apprehenfjon he has of the worthlefs- nefs, the bafenefs, and the ingratitude of mankind. Convince him, that there is any amiable quality in the fpecies, and imme- diately his philanthropy revives, and rejoices to find an objedl on which it can exert Itfelf.
Public rpirit has this in common with every fubordinate prin- ciple of adion, that, when It is not under the government of reafon and virtue, it may produce much evil as well as good. Yet, where there is leaft of reafon and virtue, to regulate it, its good far overbalances its ill.
It foraetlmes kindles or inflames animofitles between commu- nities, or contending parties, and makes them treat each other •with little regard to juftice. It kindles wars between nations, and makes them deftroy one another for trifling caufes. But, without it, fociety could not fublift, and every community would be a rope of fand.
When under the diredion of reafon and virtue, It is the very image of God in the foul. It difTufes its benign influence as far as its power extends, and participates in the happinefs of God, and of the whole creation.
Thefe are the benevolent affedions which appear to me to be parts of the human conflitiition.
If any one thinks the enumeration incomplete, and that there X are i62 ESSAY III.
CHAP. IV. are natural benevolent affections, which are not included under any of thoie that have been named, I fliall very readily liften to fuch a corredion, being fenfible that fuch enumerations are very often incomplete.
If others fhould think that any, or all, the afFedions I have named, are acquired by education, or by habits and aflbciations grounded on felf-love, and are not original parts of our conftitu- tion; this is a point upon which, indeed, there has been much fabtile difputation in ancient and modern times, and which, I believe, muft be determiined from what a man, by careful re- fledlion, may feel in himfelf, rather than from what he obferves in others. But I decline entering into this difpute, till I fhall have explained that principle of action which we commonly call felf-love.
I fhall conclude this fubjed with fome reflections upon the benevolent affedions.
The 7?/)? is, That all of them, in as far as they are benevo- lent, in which view only I consider them,.agree very much in the condud they difpofe us to, with regard to their objedls.
They difpofe us to do them good as far as we have power and opportunity ), to wifli them well, when we can do them no good j to judge favourably, and often partially, of them; to fympa- thife with them in their afflidions and calamities; and to rejoice with them in their happineis and good fortune.
It is Impoflible that there can be benevolent affedlion without fympathy, both with the good and bad fortune of the objed; and it appears to be impoflible that there can be fympathy with- out benevolent afFedlion. Men do not fyrapathife with one whom they hate; nor even with one to whofe good or ill they are perfedtly indifferent..
We may fympathife with a perfcd flranger, or even with an enemy OF PARTICULAR BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS. 163 enemy whom vvc fee In diflrefs; but this is the effed of pity; Cfl\?.iv\ and if \vc did not pity him, \vc fhould not fympathife with him.
1 take notice of this the rather, becaufe a very ingenious au- thor in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, gives a very (hfferent ac- count of the origin of fympathy. It appears to me to be the efrccH: of benevolent afFedUon, and to be infeparable from it.
K ftcond reflecftion is, That the coiiftitution of our nature very powerfully invites us to cheriih and cultivate in our mintls the benevolent alTedions.
The agreeable feeling which always attends them as a prefent reward, appears to be intended by nature for this purpofc.
Benevolence, from its nature, compofes the mind, warms the heart, enlivens the whole frame, and brightens every feature of the countenance. It may juftly be faid to be medicinal both to foul and body. We are bound to it by duty; w-e are invited to it by intereft; and becaufe both thefe cords are often feeble, we have natural kind affedions to aid them in their operation, and fup- ply their defeds; and thefe affedlions are joined with a manly pleafure in their exertion, A third refledion is. That the natural benevolent affcdions fumllh the mofl irrefiftible proof, that the Author of our na- ture intencled that we fliould live in fociety, and do good to our fellow-men as we have opportunity; fince this great and im- portant part of the human conftitution has a manifefl relation to fociety, and can have no exercife nor ufe in a folitary flate.
The Iq/i refledion is. That the different principles of ad:ion have different degrees of dignity, and rife one above another in our eftimation, when we make them objeds of contempla- tion.
i54 ESSAY III.
pH^P-^; We afcribe no dignity to inftlnds or to habits. They lead us only to admire the wifdom of the Creator, in adapting them fo perfedtly to the manner of life of the different animals in which they are found. Mach the fame may be faid of appe- tites. They ferve rather for ufe than ornament.
The defires of knowledge, of power, and of efteem, rife high- er in our eftimation, and we confider them as giving dignity and ornament to man. The adlions proceeding from them, though not properly virtuous, are manly and refpedtable, and claim a jufl fuperiority over thofe that proceed merely from ap- petite. This I think is the uniform judgment of mankind.
If we apply the fime kind of judgment to our benevolent affedlions, they appear not only manly and refpectable, but ami- able in a high degree.
They are amiable even in brute-animals. We love the meek^^ nefs of the lamb, the gentlenefs of the dove, the affedion of a dog to his mafter. We cannot, without pleafure, obferve the ti'- mid ewe, v/ho never fhewed the leafl degree of courage in her own defence, become valiant and intrepid in defence of her lamb, and boldly aflault thofe enemies, the very fight of whom was wont to put her to flight.
How pleafant is it to lee the family economy of a pair of little birds in rearing their tender offspring; the conjugal affec- tion and fidelity of the parents; their cheerful toil and induftry in providing food to their family j their fagacity in concealing their habitation; the arts they ufe, often at the peril of their own lives, to decoy hawks, and other enemies, from their dwel- ling-place, and the afflicSlion they feel when fome unlucky boy has robbed them of the dear pledges of their affedlion, and frur illrated all their hopes of their riling family?
If OF PARTICULAR BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS. 165 If kind afTedion be amiable in brutes, it is not lefs Co in our CTIAP. Tv.^ own fpccics. Even the external figns of it have a powerful charm.
Every one knows that a perfon of accompliflied good breed- ing, channs every one he converfes with. And what is this good breeding? If we analyze it, we fhall find it to be made up of looks, geflurcs and fpeeches, which are the natural ligns of be- nevolence and good ufTecftion. He who has got the habit of ufing thefe figns with propriety, and without meannefs, is a ■well-bred and a polite man.
What is that beauty in the features of the face, particularly of the fair fex, which all men love and admire? I believe it con- fifts chiefly in the features which indicate good affedlions. Eve- ry indication of meeknefs, gentlenefs, and benignity, is a beauty. On the contrary, every feature that indicates pride, pafllon, envy, and malignity, is a deformity.
Kind affecftions, therefore, are amiable in brutes. Even the figns and ftiadows of them are highly attradtive in our own fpe- cies. Indeed tliey are the joy and the comfort of human life, not to good men only, but even to the vicious and dilfolutc.
Without fociety, and the intercourfe of kind affeclion, man is a gloomy, melancholy and joylefs being. His mind opprefled with cares and fears, he cannot enjoy the balm of found fleep: in conftant dread of impending danger, he ftarts at the rufiling of a leaf. His ears are continually upon> the ftretch, and every zephyr brings fome found that alarms him.
When he enters into fociety, and feels fecurity in the good af- fedion of friends and neighbours, it is then only that his fear vanifhes.
^S6 ESSAY III.
CHAP. IV. vanirties, and his mind is at eafe. His courage is raifed, his un- ' " ' derftanding is enlightened, and his heart dilates with joy.
Human fociety may be compared to a heap of embers, which when placed afunder, can retain neither their light nor heat, amidfl the furrounding elements; but when brought together they mutually give heat and light to each other; the flame breaks forth, and not only defends itfelf, but fubdues every thing a- roimd it. » The fecurity, the happinefs, and the ftrength of human fociety, fpring folely from the reciprocal benevolent affedions of its members.
The benevolent affedlions, though they be all honourable and lovely, are not all equally fo. There is a fubordination among them J and the honour we pay to them generally correfponds to the extent of their objed.
The good hufband, the good father, the good friend, the good neighbour, we honour as a good man, worthy of our love and af- fedion. But the man in whom thefe more private affedions are fwallowed up in zeal for the good of his country, and of mankind, who goes about doing good, and feeks opportunities of being ufeful to his fpecies, we revere as more than a good man, as a hero, as a good angel.
Of Malevolent AffeElion.
AR E there, in the conftitution of man, any affedions that may be called malevolent f What are they? And what is their ufe and end?
To OF MALEVOLENT AFFECTION. 167 To me there feem to be two, which we may call by that name. CHAP. v. They are einul.ition and rclentincnt. Thefc 1 take to be parts of the human conllitution, given us Ijy our Maker for good ends, and, -when properly dirccled and regulated, of excellent ufe. But, as their excefs or abufe, to which human nature is very prone, is the fource and fpring of all the malevolence that is to be found among men, it is on that account 1 call them male- volent.
If any man thinks that they defcrve a foftcr name, fincc they may be excrcifed according to the intention of nature, without malevolence, to this I have no objeQion.
By emulation, I mean, a defire of fuperiorlty to our rivals in any purfuit, accompanied with an uneafinefs at being fur- pa fled.
Human life has juftly been compared to a race. The prize is fuperiority in one kind or another. But the fpecies or forms (if I may ufe the exprtllion) of fuperiority among men are in- finitely diverfirted.
There is no man fo contemptible In his own eyes, as to hin- der him from entering the lills in one form or another; and he ^\l\ always fmd competitors to rival him in his own way.
We fee emulation among brute-animals. Dogs and horfes contend each with his kind in the race. Many animals of the gregarious kind contend for fuperiority in their flock or herd, and fhew manifefi: figns of jealoufy when others pretend to ri- val them.
The emulation of tlie brute-animals is moHly confined to fwiftnefs, or ftrength, or favour witli their fen)alcs. But the emulation of the human kind has a much wider field.
In i68 ESSAY III.
CHAP.v. In every profeflion, and in every accompHfliment of body or mind, real or imaginary, there are rivalfliips. Literary men rival one another in literary abilities. Artifts in their feveral arts. The fair fex in their beauty and attractions, and in the refpedl paid them by the other fex.
In every political fociety, from a petty corporation up to the national adminillration, there is a rivalfhip for power and in- fluence.
Men have a natural defire of power without refpedl to the power of others. This we call ambition. But the defire of fu- periority, either in power, or in any thing we think worthy of eftimation, has a relpe(5t to rivals, and is what we properly call eviulation.
The flronger the defire is, the more pungent will be the un- •eafinefs of being found behind, and the mind will be the more hurt by this humiliating view.
Emulation has a manifefl tendency to improvement. With- out it life would ftagnate, and the difcoveries of art and genius would be at a ftand. This principle produces a conftant fer- mentation in fociety, by which, though dregs may be produced, the better part is purified and exalted to a perfe(Sion, which it could not otherwife attain.
We have not fufficient data for a comparifon of the good and bad effed:s which this principle adually produces in fociety; but there is ground to think of this, as of other natural princi- ples, that the good overbalances the ill. As far as it is under the dominion of reafon and virtue, its effeds are always good ', when left to be guided by palliou and folly, they are often very bad.
Reafon Reafon OF MALEVOLENT AFFECTION. t6^ Reafon direds us to ftrive for fuperiority, only in tliinj^s that CHAP, v.^ have real excellence, otlierwife we fpend our labour for that which profiteth not. To value ourfelves for fuperiority in things that have no real worth, or none compared with what they coft, is to be vain of our own folly; and to be uneafy at the fuperiority of others in fuch things, is no lefs ridiculous.
Reafon diredls us to flrive for fuperiority only in things in our power, and attainable by our exertion, otherwife we fliall be like the frog in the fable, who fwelled herfelf till (he burft, in order to equal the ox in magnitude.
To check all defire of things not attainable, and every uneafy thought in the want of them, is an obvious dictate of prudence, as well as of virtue and religion.
If emulation be regulated by fuch maxims of reafon, and all undue partiality to ourfelves be laid afide, it will be a powerful principle of our improvement, without hurt to any other perfon. It will give ftrength to the nerves, and vigour to the mind, in eve- ry noble and manly purfuit.
But dlfmal are its effedls, when it is no*: under thedirecftionof reafon and virtue. It has often the moft malignant influence on mens opinions, on their affedtions, and on their adions.
It Is an old obfervation, that affedion follows opinion; and it is undoubtedly true in many cafes. A man cannot be grateful without the opinion of a favour done him. He cannot have de- liberate refentment without the opinion of an injury; nor efteem without the opinion of fome elUmable quality; nor compaliion without the opinion of fuffering.
But it is no lefs true, that opln-on fometimes follows afTcdion, not that it ought, but that it adually does fo, by giving a faife Y bias lyo ESSAY III.
CHAP, v.^ ijjas to our judgment. We are apt to be partial to our friends, and flill more to onrfelves.
Hence the defire of fuperiorlty leads men to put an undue efllmation upon thofe things wherein they excel, or think they excel. And, by this means, pride may feed itlelf upon the very dregs of human nature.
The fame defire of fuperiority may lead men to undervalue thofe things wherein they either defpair of excelling, or care not to make the exertion neceflary for that end. The grapes are four, faid the fox, when he faw them beyond his reach. The fame principle leads men to detract from the merit of others, and to impute their brighteft adions to mean or bad motives.
He who runs a race feels uneafinefs at feeing another out- ftrip him. This is uncorrupted nature, and the work of God within him. But this uneafinefs may produce either of two ve- ry different effeds. It may incite him to make more vigorous exertions, and to flrain every nerve to get before his rival. This is fair and honefl emulation. This is the effecft it is in-- tended to produce. But if he has not fairnefs and candour of heart, he will look with an evil eye upon his competitor, and will endeavour to trip him, or to throw a ftumbling-block in his way. This is pure envy, the moft malignant paflion that can lodge In the human breaft j which devours, as its natural food, the fame and the happinefs of thofe who are moft deferving of our efleem.
If there be, in feme men, a pronenefs to detrad from the charadler, even of perfons unknown, or indifferent, in others an avidity to hear and to propagate fcandal, to v,'hat principle in human nature muft we afcribe thefe qualities? The failings of others furely add nothing to our worth, nor are they, in them- felves, a pleafant fubjed of thought or of difcourfe. But they flatter OF MALEVOLENT AFFECTION. 171 flatter pride, by giving an opinion of our fuperiority to thofe p^^^J- ^; from whom we detracit.
Is it not poflible, that the fame defire of fuperiority may liave fome fecret influence upon thofe „who love to difplay their elo- quence in declaiming upon the corruption of human nature, and the wickednefs, fraud and infincerity of mankind in gene- ral? It ought always to be taken for granted, that the declaimer is an exception to the general rule, otherwife he would rather chuie, even for his own fake, to draw a veil over the nakednefs of his fpecies. But, hoping that his audience will be fo civil as not to include him In the black defcription, he rifes fuperior by the deprefllon of the fpecies, and (lands alone, like Noah in the antediluvian world. This looks like envy agalnft the human race.
It would be endlefs, and no ways agreeable, to enumerate all the evils and all the vices which paflion and folly beget upon emulation. Here, as in mofl cafes, the corruption of the bed things is the worft. In brute-animals, emulation has little matter to work upon, and its effeds, good or bad, are few. It may pro- duce battles of cocks and battles of bulls, and little elfe that is obfervablc. But in mankind, It has an infinity of matter to work upon, and its good or bad effects, according as it is well or ill regulated and directed, multiply in proportion.
The conclufion to be drawn from what has been faid upon this principle is. That emulation, as far as it is a part of our conftitution, is highly ufeful and important in fociety; that in the wife and good, it produces the bcft effedls without any harm; but in the foolifh and vicious, it is the parent of a great part of the evils of life, and of the moft malignant vices that ftain human nature.
We are next to confider refentmcnt.
Y a Nature ESSAY HI.
CHAP. V. Nature difpofes US, when we are hurt, to refift and retaliate, Befides the bodily pain occafioned by the hurt, the mind Is ruffled, and a defire raifed to retaliate upon the author of the hurt or injury. This, in general, is what we call anger or refent- ment.
A very important diftindlion is made by Bifhop Butler "be- tween fudden refentment, which is a blind impulfe arifing from our conilitution, and that which is deliberate. The firfl may be raifed by hurt of any kind 5 but the laft can only be raiftd by injury real or conceived.
The fame diftindlion is made by Lord Kames in his Elements of Critic'ifm. What Butler calls fudden, he calls infmnive.
We have not, in common language, different names for thefe different kinds of refentment; but the diftindlion is very necef- fary, in order to our having jufl notions of this part of the hu- man conftitution. It correfponds perfedly with the diilinction I have made between the animal and rational principles of ac- tion. For this fudden or inftindlive refentment, is an animal principle common to us with brute-animals. But that refent- ment which the authors I have named call deliberate, muft fall under the clafs of rational principles.
It is to be obferved, however, that, by referring it to that clafs, I do not mean, that it is always kept within the bounds that rea- fon prefcribes, but only that it is proper to man as a reafonable being, capable, by his rational faculties,, of diftinguifliing be- tween hurt and injury.; a dillin<5lion which no brute-animal can make.
Both thefe kinds of refentment are raifed, whether the hurt or injury be done to ourlelves, or to thole we are interefted in.
Wherever OF MALEVOLENT AFFECTIONS 173 Wherever there Is any hencvolent aflcdion towards others, chap. v. we relent their wrongs, hi proportion to the rtrength of our af- fedion. Pity and lynipatliy with the fufTcrer, produce rcfent- mcnt againh the author of the fuffcring, as naturally as concern for ourfelves produces rcfentment of our own wrongs.
I fliall full confider that rcfentment which I call animal, which BuTL£R calls fudJai, and Lord Kames injlin^ive.
In every animal to which nature hath given the power oF hurting its enemy, we fee an endeavour to retaliate the ill that is done to it. Even a moufe will bite when it cannot run away.
Perhaps there may be fome animals to whom nature hath given no offenfive weapon. To fuch, anger and refentmenc ■would be of no ufe; and I believe we fliall find, that they never Ihew any fign of it. But there are few of this kind.
Some of the more fagacious animals can be provoked to fierce anger, and retain it long. Many of them fhcw great animofity in defending their young, who hardly ftiew any in defending themfelves. Others refift every aflault made upon the flock or herd to which they belong. Bees defend their hive, wild beafls their den, and birds their nelL This fudden rcfentment operates In a fimilar manner in men and in brutes, and appears to be given by nature to both for the fame end, namely, for defence, even in cafes where there is no time for deliberation. It may be compared to that natural \\\- ftind, by which a man, who has loft his balance and begins to fall, makes a fudden and violent effort to recover hiuifclf, with- out uny intention or deliberation.
In. fuch efforts, men. often exert a degree of mufcular flrength beyond ^'-^^^- '^i beyond what they are able to exert by a cahn determination of the will, and thereby fave themfelves from many a dangerous fail.
By a like violent and fudden impulfe, nature prompts us to re- pel hurt upon the caufe of it, whether it be man or beaft. The inflindl before mentioned is folely defenfive, and is prompted by fear. This fudden refentment is offenlive, and is prompted by anger, but with a view to defence.
Man, in his prefent ftate, is furrounded with fo many dangers from his own fpecies, from brute-animals, from every thing around him, that he has need of fome defenfive armour that fhall always be ready in the moment of danger. His reafon is of great ufe for this purpofe, when there is time to apply it. But, in many cafes, the mifchief would be done before reafon could think of the means of preventing it.
The wifdom of nature hath provided two means to fupply this defedl of our reafon. One of thefe is the inftindl before men- tioned, by which the body, upon the appearance of danger, is inflantly, and without thought or intention, put in that pofture •which is proper for preventing the danger, orleflening it. Thus, we wink hard when our eyes are threatened; we bend the body to avoid a ftroke j we make a fudden effort to recover our ba- lance, when in danger of falling. By fuch means we are guard- ed from many dangers which our reafon would come too late to prevent.
But as offenfive arms are often the fureft means of defence, by deterring the enemy from an alTault, nature hath alfo pro- vided man, and other animals, with this kind of defence, by that fudden refentment of which we now fpeak, which outruns the quickeft determinations of reafon, and takes fire in an infl:ant, threatening the enemy with retaliation.
The OF iMALEVOLENT AFFECTION. 175 .: The firft of thefe principles operates upon the defender only; CHAP. v. but this operates both upon the defender and the affailant, in- f|)iring the former with courage and animofity, and ftriking ter- ror into the latter. It proclaims to all alT^ilants, what our ancient Scottifh kings did upon their coins, by the emblem of a thilllc, with this motto, Nemo me impune lacejfet. By this, in innume- rable cafes, men and hearts are deterred from doing hurt, and others thereby fecured from fuffering it.
But as refentment fuppofes an objed on whom we may reta- liate, how comes it to pafs, that in brutes very often, and fome- times in our own fpecies, we fee it wreaked upon inanimate things, which are incapable of furtering by it?
Perhaps it might be a fufficient anfwer to this queftion, That pature ads by general laws, which, in fome particular cafes, may go beyond, or fall (liort of their intention, though they be. ever fo well adapted to it in general.
But I confefs It feems to me impoflible, that there fliould be refentment againll a thing, which at that very moment is con- fidered as inanimate, and confequently incapable either of in- tending hurt, or of being punifhed. For what can be more ab- furd, than to be angry with the knife for cutting me, or with the weight for falling upon my toes? There muft therefore, I conceive, be fome momentary notion or conception that the ob- ject of our refentment is capable of puniihment; and if it be natural, before refledion, to be angry with things inanimate, it feems to be a necelFary confequence, that it is natural to think; that they have life and feeling.
Several phenomena in human nature lead us to conjeclure that, in the earlieft period of life, we are apt to think every object about us to be animated. Judging of them, by ourfelvcs, ■we afcribe to them the feelings we are confcious of in ourlclvcs.
So CHAP. V. So we Tee a little girl judges of her doll and of her 'play-things. And fo we fee rude nations judge of the heavenly bodies, of the elements, and of the fea, rivers, and fountains.
If this be fo, it ought not to be faid, that by reafon and expe- rience, we learn to afcribe life and intelligence to things which we before confidered as inanimate. It ought rather to be faid, That by reafon and experience we learn that certain things are inanimate, to which at firfl; we afcribed life and intelligence.
If this be true, it is lefs furprifing that, before reflexion, wc fliould for a moment relapfe into this prejudice of our early years, and treat things as if they had life, which we once be- lieved to have it.
It does not much affedl our prefent argument, whether this be, or be not the caufe, why a dog purfues and gnafhes at the Hone that hurt him; and why a man in a paffion, for lofing at play, fometimes wreaks his vengeance on the cards or dice.
It is not ftrange that a blind animal impulfe ihould fometimes lofe its proper diredlion. In brutes this has no bad confequence ', in men the leaft ray of refledlion correds it, and fhews its ab- furdity.
It is fufEciently evident, upon the whole, that this ludden, or animal refehtment, is intended by nature for our defence. It prevents mifchief by the fear of punifliment. It is a kind of penal ftatute, promulgated by nature, the execution of which is committed to the fufFerer.
It may be expeifled indeed, that one who judges in his own caufe, will be difpofed to feek more than an equitable redrefs. But this difpofition is checked by the refentment of the other party.
Yet OF MALEVOLENT AFFECTION. 177 Yet, in the ftate of nature, injuries once begun, will often be C"ap^v. reciprocated between the parties, until mortal enmity is produ- ced, and each party thinks himfclf fafe only in the dcllrudion of his enemy.
This right of redrefling and punifliing our own wrongs, fo apt to be abufed, is one of thofe natural rights, which, in political fociety, is given up to the laws, and to the civil magiftratej and this indeed is one of the capital advantages we reap from the political union, that the evils arifing from ungoverned rcfent- ment are in a great degree prevented.
Although deliberate refentment does not properly belong to the clafs of animal principles; yet, as both have the fame name, and are diftinguilhed only by Philofophers, and as in real life they are commonly intermixed, I Ihall here make fome remarks upon it.
A fmall degree of reafoa and refledion teaches a man that in- jury only, and not mere hurt, is a juft objed: of refentment to a rational creature. A man may fuffer grievoufly by the hand of another, not only without injury, but with the moft friendly intention; as in the cafe of a painful chirurgical operation. Eve- ry man of common fenfe fees, that to refent fuch fuffcring, is tiot the part of a man, but of a brute.
Mr Locke mentions a gentleman who, having been cured of raadnefs by a very harfh and offenfive operation, with great fenfe of gratitude, owned the cure as the grcateft obligation he could have received, but could never bear the fight of the ope- rator, becaufe it brought back the idea of that agony which he "had endured from his hands.
In this cafe we fee diftindlly the operation both of the ani- mal, and of the rational princi])le. The firft produced an avt-r- Z iion ESSAY III.