CHA P. V. fion to the operator, which reafon was not able to overcome; and probably in a weak mind, might have produced lafting re- fentment and hatred. But, in this gentleman, reafon lb far pre- vailed, as to make him fenfible that gratitude, and not refent- ment, was due.
Suffering may give a bias to the judgment, and make us ap- prehend injury where no injury is done. But, I think, without an apprehenlion of injury, there can be no deliberate refent- nient.
Hence, among enlightened nations, hoftile armies fight with- out anger or refentment. The vanquilhed are not treated as of- fenders, but as brave men who have fought for their country unfuccefsfuUy, and who are entitled to every office of humanity confiflent with the fafety of the conquerors.
If we analyze that deliberate refentment which is proper to rational creatures, we fhall find that though it agrees with that which is merely animal in fome refpecls, it differs in others. Both are accompanied with an uneafy fenfation, which diflurbs the peace of the mind. Both prompt us to feek redrefs of our fufferlngs, and fecurity from harm. But, in deliberate refent- ment, there muft be an opinion of injury done or intended. And an opinion of injury implies an idea of iuftice, and confe- quently a moral faculty.
The very notion of an injury is, that it is lefs than we may juflly claim J as, on the contrary, the notion of a favour is, that it is more than we can jullly claim. Whence it is evident, that juflice is the flandard, by which both a favoui', and an injury, are to be weighed and ellimated. Their very nature and definition con- fift in their exceeding or falling fhort of this ffandard. No man therefore, can have the idea either of a favour or of an injury, who has not the idea of juflice.
That OF MALEVOLENT AFFECTION. 179 That vci-y idea of juftice which enters into cool and delibe- chap, v.^ rate refcntment, tends to rcftrain its excelTcs. For as there is injuftice in doing an injury, Co there is injuflice in punifliing it beyond meafure.
To a man of candour and refledion, conrclournefs of the frail- ty of human nature, and that he has often flood in need of for- givenefs himlelf, the plcafure of renewing good underftanding, after it has been interrupted, the inward approbation of a gene- rous and forgiving difpofition, and even the irkfomenefs and un- eafjnefs of a mind rullled by refentment, plead ftrongly agaiuft its excelTes.
Upon the whole, when we confider. That, on the one hand, every benevolent affedtion is pleafant in its nature, is health to the foul, and a cordial to the fpirits j That nature has made even the outward exprellion of benevolent affedtions in the counte- nance, pleafant to every beholder, and the chief ingredient of beauty in the human Jace divine ', That, on the other hand, every malevolent affection, not only in its faulty excefles, but in its moderate degrees, is vexation and difquiet to the mind, and even gives deformity to the countenance, it is evident that, by thefe fignals, nature loudly admonifhes us to ufe the former as our daily bread, both for health and pleafure, but to confider the latter as a naufeous medicine, which is never to be taken with- out neceffity j and even then in no greater quantity than the neccflity requires.
Z 2 CHAP.
ESSAY III.
Of Fajfion.
BEFORE I proceed to confider the rational principles of ad ion, it is proper to obferve, that there are fome things belonging to the mind, which have great influence upon human condudl, by exciting or allaying, inflaming or cooling the ani- mal principles we have mentioned.
Three of this kind deferve particular confideration. I {hall call them by the names of pajfton, difpofttmi, and opinion.
The meaning of the word pajfton is not precifely afcertained, either in common difcourfe, or^in the writings of Philofophers.
I think it is commonly put to fignify fome agitation of mind, which is oppofed to that ftate of tranquillity and compofure, in which a man is moll mafter of himfelf.
The word iraflej, which anfwers to it in the Greek language, is, by Cicero, rendered by the \} ord perturbatio.
It has always been conceived to bear analogy to a florm at fea, or to a tempeft in the air. It does not therefore fignify any thing in the mind that is conftant and permanent, but fomething that is occaflonal, and has a limited duration, like a ftorm or tempell.
Palfion commonly produces fenfible effeds even upon the bo- dy. It changes the voice, the features, and the gefture. The ex- ternal figns of paflion have, in fome cafes, a great refemblance to thofe of madnefs; in others, to thofe of melancholy. It gives of- ten ten a deo^ree of mufcular force and agility to the body, far be- CHAP. VI. yond what it poUcHls in cahn moments.
The effeds of pafTIon upon the mind are not lefs remarkable. It turns the thoughts involuntarily to the ohjedts related to it, fo that a man can hardly think of any thing elie. It gives often , a ftrange bias to the judgment, making a man quickfighted in every thing that tends to inflame his pafllon, and to juftify It, but blind to every thing that tends to moderate and allay it. Like a magic lanthorn, it raifes up fpeclres and apparitions that have no reality, and throws falfe colours upon every objed. It can turn deformity into beauty, vice Into virtue, and virtue into vice.
The fentlments of a man under its influeiice will appear ab- furd and ridiculous, not only to other men, but even to himfelf when the ftorm is fpent and is fucceeded by a calm. Pafllon often gives a violent impulfe to the will, and makes a man do what he knows he fliall repent as long as he lives.
That fuch are the effedls of pafllon, I think all men agree. They have been defcribcd in lively colours by poets, orators and moralifts, in all ages. But men have given more attention to the effeds of pafllon than to its nature; and while they have co- pioufly and elegantly defcribed the former, they have not pre- cifely defined the latter.
The controvcrfy between the ancient Peripatetics and the Stoics, with regard to the pafllons, was probably owing to their affixing diftcrent meanings to the word. The one feci maintain- ed, that the pafllons are good, and ufeful parts of our onft u- tion, while they are held under the government of reafon. The other fed, conceiving that nothing Is to be called palFion which does not, In fome degree, cloud and darken the underftanding, con- fidered all paliion as hortile to reafon, and therefore maintained, that, CHAP. VI. tjiat, in the wife man, paflion fliould have no exigence, but be utterly exterminated.
If both feds had agreed about the definition of paflion, they would probably have had no difference. But while one con- fidered paflion only as the caufe of thofe bad effedls which it often produces, and the other confidered it as fitted by nature to produce good effeds, while it is under fubjedion to reafon, it does not appear that what one fedt jufl:ified, was the fame thing which the other condemned. Both allowed that no didlate of paflion ought to be followed in oppofition to reafon. Their dif- ference therefore was verbal more than real, and was owing to their giving different meanings to the fame word.
The precife meaning of this word feems not to be more clear- ly afcertained among modern Philofophers.
Mr Hume gives the name oipajftonto every principle of adion in the human mind ^ and, in confequence of this maintains, that every man is, and ought to be led by his paflions, and that the ufe of reafon is to be fubfervient to the paflions.
Dr Hutch EsoN, confidering all the principles of adlion as fo many determinations or motions of the will, divides them into the calm and the turbulent. The turbulent, he lays, are our ap- petites and our paflions. Of the paflions, as well as of the calm determinations, he fays, that " fome are benevolent, others are " felfifti; that anger, envy, indignation, and fome others, may " be either felfifli or benevolent, according as they arife from *' fome oppofition to our own interefts, or to thofe of our friends, *' or perfons beloved or efl:eemed."
It appears, therefore, that this excellent author gives the name of pajfions, not to every principle of adion, but to fome, and to thofe thofe only wlien they are turbulent and vehement, not wlicn CHAP. Vl. they are cahn and deliberate.
Our natural dcfircs and affediions may be fo calm as to leave room for refledlion, ib that we find no difliculty in deliberating coolly, whether, in Inch a particular inftance, they ought ta be gratified or not. On other occafions, they may be fo importu- nate as to make deliberation very difficult, urging us, by a kind of violence, to their immediate gratification.
Thus, a man may be fenfible of an injury without being in- flamed. He judges coolly of the injury, and of the proper means of redrefs. This is refentment without paJlion. It leaves to the man the entire command of himfelf.
On another occafion, the fame principle of refentment rifes into a flame. His blood boils within himj his looks, his voice and his gefture are changed; he can think of nothing but imme- diate revenge, and feels a flrong impulfe, without regard to con- fequences, to fay and do things which his cool reafon cannot juftify. This is the paflion of refentment.
What has been fald of refentment may eafily be applied to other natural defires and affections. When they are fo calm as neither to produce any fenfible effedts upon the body, nor to darken the undcrfl:anding and weaken the power of felf-com- mand, they are not called paflions. But the fame principle, when it becomes fo violent as to produce thefe effeds upon the body and upon the mind, is a pallion, or, as Cicero very pro- perly calls it, a perturbation.
It is evident, that this meaning of the word pajfion accords much better with its common ufe in language, than that which Mr Hume gives it.
When CHAP^. When he fays, that men ought to be governed by their paf- fions only, and that the ufe of reafon is to be fubfervient to the paffiohs, this, at firft hearing, appears a (hocking paradox, re- pugnant to good morals and to common fenfe; but, like moft other paradoxes, when explained according to his meaning, it is nothing but an abufe of words.
For if we give the name oi pajfton to every principle of adlion, in every degree, and give the name of reafon folely to the power ■ of difcerning the fitnefs of means to ends, it will be true, that the ufe of reafon is to be fubfervient to the paflions.
As I wifh to ufe words as agreeably as poffible to their com- mon ufe in language, I fhall, by the word pajfion mean, not any principle of adion dittind: from thofe defires and affedions be- fore explained, but fuch a degree of vehemence in them, or in any of them, as is apt to produce thofe efFeds upon the body or upon the mind which have been above defcribed.
Our appetites, even when vehement, are not, I think, very commonly called paflions, yet they are capable of being in- flamed to rage, and in that cafe their effedts are very fimilar to thofe of the paflions; and what is faid of one may be applied to both.
Having explained what I mean by paflions, I think it unne- ceflary to enter into any enumeration of them, fince they diffei*, not in kind, but rather in degree, from the principles already enumerated.
The common divifion of the paflions into defire and averfion, hope and fear, joy and grief, has been mentioned almofl: by eve- ry author who has treated of them, and needs no explic tion. But we may obferve, that thefe are ingredients or modifications, not not of tlie paflions only, but of every principle of adion, ani- CHAP. VI mal and rational.
All of them imply the defire of fome objedl j and the dcfire of an obje(5l cannot l)e without averfion to its contrary; and, according as the oBjedt is prefent or abfent, dcfirc and averfion will be varioufly modified into joy or grief, hope or fear. It is evident, that defire and averfion, joy and grief, hojoe and fear, may be either calm and fedate, or vehement and pallionate.
Pafllng thefe, therefore, as common to all principles of adlion, whether calm or vehement, I fliall only make fome obfervations on paffion in general, which tend to fliew its influence on hu- man condud.
Firjl, It is paflion that makes us liable to ftrong temptations. Indeed, if we had no paflions, we fliould hardly be under any temptation to wrong condu<ft. For, when we view things calmly, and free from any of the falfe colours which paflion throws upon them, we can hardly fail to fee the right and the wrong, and to fee that the firfl is more eligible than the laft.
I believe a cool and deliberate preference of ill to good is never the firfl: ftep into vice.
*' When the woman faw that the tree was good for food, and " that it was pleafant to the eyes, and a tree to be defired to " make one wife, flie took of the fruit thereof and did eat, and " gave alfo to her hufljand with her and he did eat; and the " eyes of them both were opened." Inflamed defire had blind- ed the eyes of their underflanding.
Fix'd on the fruit flie gaz'd, which to behold Might tempt alone; and in her cars the found A a Yet CHAP. vr. Yet rung of his perfuafive words impregn'd With reafon to her feemhig, and with truth.
Fair to the eye, inviting to the tafte, Of virtue to make wife, what hinders then To reach and feed at once both body and mind. Milton.
Thus our firfl parents were tempted to difobey their Maker, and all their poflerity are liable to temptation from the fame caufe. Paffion, or violent appetite, firfl blinds the underfland- ing, and then perverts the will.
It is paflion, therefoi'e, and the vehement motions of appe- tite, that makes us liable, in our prefent flate, to flrong tempta- tions to deviate from our duty. This is the lot of human na- ture in the prefent period of our exiftence.
Human virtue mufl gather flrength by ftruggle and effort. As infants, before they can walk wi,thout Humbling, mufl be ex- pofed to many a fall and bruife; as wrefllers acquire their flrength and agility by many a combat and violent exertion j fb it is in the noblefl powers of human nature, as well as the mean- eft, and even in virtue itfelf.
It is not only made manifell by temptation and trial, but by thefe means it acquires its flrength and vigour.
Men muft acquire patience by fuffering, and fortitude by be- ing expofed to danger, and every other virtue by fituations that put it to trial and exercife.
This, for any thing we know, may be neceffary in the nature of things. It is certainly a law of nature with regard to man.
Whether there may be orders of intelligent and moral crea- tures who never were fubjedl to any temptation, nor had their virtue virtue put to any trial, we cannot without prefumption deter- CHAP.vi. mine. But it is evident, that this neither is, nor ever was the lot of man, not even in the (late of innocence.
Sad, indeed, would be the condition of man, if the tempta- tions to which, by the conftitution of his nature, and by his cir- cumftances, he is liable, were irrefiftible. Such a flate would not at all be a flate of trial and difcipline.
Our condition here is fuch, that, on the one hand, pafHon often tempts and folicits us to do wrong j on the other hand, reafon and confcience oppofe the didates of pafTion. The flefli lufteth againft the fpirit, and the fpirit againft the flefh. And upon the iflue of this conflid:, the charadler of the man and his fate de- pend.
If reafon be vidorious, his virtue is (Irengthened; he has the inward fatisfadion of having fought a good fight in behalf of his duty, and the peace of his mind is preferved.
If, on the other hand, paflion prevails againft the fen{e of du- ty, the man is confcious of having done what he ought not, and might not have done. His own heart condemns him, and he is guilty to himfelf.
This conflict between the paflions of our animal nature and the calm didatcs of reafon and confcience, is not a theory in- vented to folve the phaenomena of human condud, it is a fad, of which every man who attends to his own condud is con- fcious.
In the moft ancient philofophy, of which we have any ac- count, I mean that of the Pythagorean fchool, the mind of man was compared to a ftate, or commonwealth, in which there are A a 2 variouc CHAP. VI. various powers, fome that ought to govern, and others that ought to be fubordinate. ' The good of the whole, which is the fupreme law in this, as in every commonweakh, requires that this fubordination be pre- ferved, and that the governing powers have always the afcendant over the appetites and paflions. All wife and good condud: con- fifts in this. All folly and vice in the prevalence of pallion over the dictates of reafon.
This philofophy was adopted by Plato j and it is fo agree- able to what every man feels in himfelf, that it muft always pre- vail with men who think without bias to a fyflem.
The governing powers, of which thefe ancient Philofophers fpeak, are the fame which I call the rational principles of adion, and which I fhall have occafion to explain. I only mention them here, becaufe, without a regard to them, the influence of the paflions, and their rank in our conftitution, cannot be di- flinctly underfl:ood.
A fecond obfervation is, That the impulfe of pafllon is not al- ways to what is bad, but very often to what is good, and what our reafon approves. There are fome paflions, as Dr Hutc he- son obferves, that are benevolent, as well as others that are felfifli.
The aflfedions of refentment and emulation, with thofe that fpring from them, from their very nature, difturb and difquiet the mind, though they be not carried beyond the bounds which reafon prefcribes; and therefore they are commonly called paf- fions, even in their moderate degrees. From a fimilar caufe, the benevolent affedlions, which are placid in their nature, and are rarely carried beyond the bounds of reafon, are very feldom called paflions. We do not give the name of pafllon to bene- volence, volcnce, gratitude, or fVIcndfliip. Yet wc mnft except from this CHAP. vi. gciu nil rule, love between the fexts, which, as it commonly dif- conipofes the mind, and is not eafily kept within reafonable bounds, is always called a paflion.
All our natural defires and affedions are good and neceffary parts of our conftitution; and paflion, being only a certain de- gree of vehemence in thefe, its natural tendency is to good, and it is by accident that it leads us wrong.
Paflion is very properly faid to be blind. It looks not beyond the prefent gratification. It belongs to reafon to attend to the accidental circumfl;ances which may fometimes make that grati- fication impropiex or hurtful. When there is no impropriety in it, much more when it is our duty, paflion aids reafon, and gives additional force to its didates.
Sympathy with the diflrefl'ed may bring them a charitable re- lief, when a calm fenfe of duty would be too weak to produce the effed.
Objeds, either good or ill, conceived to be very diflant, when they are confidered coolly, have not that influence upon men which In reafon they ought to have. Imagination, like the eye, diminiflieth its objeds in proportion to their diftance. The paflions of hope and fear muft be raifed, in order to give fuch objeds their due magnitude in the imagination, and their due influence upon our condud.
The dread of difgrace and of the civil maglflrate, and the ap- prehenfion of future punifliment, prevent many crimes, which bad men, without thefe reflralnts, would commit, and contribute greatly to the peace and good order of fociety.
There is no bad adion which fome paflion may not prevent; nor I90 ESSAY III.
CHAP, vr. jjQj. jg there any external good action, of which fome paflion may not be the main fpring; and, it is very probable, that even the paflions of men, upon the whole, do more good to fociety than hurt.
The ill that is done draws our attention more, and is imputed folely to human paflions. The good may have better motives, and charity leads us to think that it has; but, as we fee not the heart, it is impoflible to determine what ihare men's paflions may have in its produdlion.
The lajl obfervation is. That if we diflinguifli, in the effedts of our paflions, thofe which are altogether involuntary, and without the fphere of our power, from the effeds which may be prevented by an exertion, perhaps a great exertion, of felf- government; we fliall find the firfl: to be good and highly ufeful, and the laft only to be bad.
Not to fpeak of the effedls of moderate paflions upon the health of the body, to which fome agitation of this kind feems to be no lefs ufeful than ftorms and tempefl:s to the falubrity of the air; every paflion naturally draws our attention to its obje<S, and interefts us in it.
The -mind of man is naturally defultory, and when it has no interefting obje6t in view, roves from one to another, without fixing its attention upon any one. A tranfient and carelefs glance is all that we beftow upon objeds in which we take no concern. It requires a ftrong degree of curiofity, or fome more important paflion, to give us that interefl: in an object which is necefl^ary to our giving attention to it. And, without attention, we can form no true and ft;able judgment of any objedt.
Take away the paflions, and it is not eafy to fay how great a OF PASSION.
a part of mankind would refemble thofe frivolous tnortals, who CHAP, vi. never had a thought that engaged them in good earncft.
It is not mere judgment or intelle<ftual ability that enables a man to excel in any art or fcience. He mufl: have a love and admiration of it bordering upon enthufiafm, or a pafllonate de-. fire of the fame, or of fome other advantage to be got by that excellence. Without this, he would not undergo the labour and fatigue of his faculties, which it requires. So that, I think, we may with juftice allow no fmall merit to the paflions, even in the difcoveries and improvements of the arts and fciences.
If the pafllons for fame and diftindion were extinguifhed, it would be difficult to find men ready to undertake the cares and toils of government; and few perhaps would make the exer- tion neceffary to raite themfelves above the ignoble vulgar.
The involuntary figns of the paffions and difpofitions of the mind, in the voice, features, and a<flion, are a part of the human conftitution which deferves admiration. The fignification of thofe figns is known to all men by nature, and previous to all expe- rience.
They are fo many openings into the fouls of our fellow-men, by which their fentiments become vifible to the eye. They are a natural language common to mankind, without which it would have been impoilible to have invented any artificial language.
It is from the natural figns of the pafllons and difpofitions of the mind, that the human form derives its beauty; that paint- ing, poetry, and mufic, derive their expreffion; that eloquence derives it greateft force, and converfation its greatefl charm.
The paffions, when kept within their proper bounds, give life and vigour to the whole man. Without them man would be a flng:.
We CHAP. VI. We fee what pollfli and animation the paffion of love, when ho- nourable and not unfuccefsful, gives to both fexes.
The paffion for military glory raifes the brave commander, in the day of battle, far above himfelf, making his countenance to fhine, and his eyes to fparkle. The glory of old England warms the heart even of the Britifh tar, and makes him defpife every danger.
As to the bad effedls of paffion, it muft be acknowledged that it often gives a ftrong impulfe to what is bad, and what a man condemns himfelf for, as foon as it is done. But he muft be confcious that the impulfe, though ftrong, was not irrefiftible, otherwife he could not condemn himfelf.
We allow that a fudden and violent paffion, into which a man is furprifed, alleviates a bad adlion; but if it was irrefiflible, it would not only alleviate, but totally exculpate, which it never does, either in the judgment of the man himfelf,- or of others.
To fum up all, paffion furnifhes a very ftrong inftance of the truth of the common maxim, That the corruption of the beft things is worft.
0/ D'tfpofition, BY difpofit'ton I mean a ftateof mind which, while it lafts, gives a tendency, or pronenefs, to be moved by certain animal principles, rather than by others; while, at another time, ano- ther ftate of mind, in the fame perfon, may give the afcendant to other animal principles.
It OF DISPOSITION.
It was before obfervecl, that it Is a property of oar appetites CTfAP. vii. to be periodical, cealing for a time, when fated by their objcds, and returning reguhirly after certain periods.
Even thofe principles which are not periodical, l^ave their ebbs and flows occalionally, according to the prefcnt difpofition of the mind.
Among fome of the principles of adion there is a natural affi- nity, lb that one of the tribe naturally difpofes to thofe which are allied to it.
Such an affinity has been obferved by many good authors to be among all the benevolent affedtions. The exercife of one be- nevolent affedtion gives a pronenefs to the exercife of others.
There is a certain placid and agreeable tone of mind which in common to them all, which feems to be the bond of that con- nedllon and affinity they have with one another.
The malevolent affedions have alfo an affinity, and mutually difpofe to each other, by means, perhaps, of that difagreeable feeling common to them all, which makes the mind fore and uneafy.
As far as we can trace the caufes of the dlflerent difpofitions of the mind, they fcem to be in fome cafes owing to thofe aflb- ciating powers of the principles of action, which have a natural affinity, and are prone to keep company with one another; fome- times to accidents of good or bad fortune, and fometimes, no doubt, the ftate of the body may have Influence upon the difpo- fition of the mind.
At one time the (late of the mind, like a ferenc unclouded iky, fhews every thing in the moft agreeable light. Then a man B b is X94 ESSAY III.
CHAP, VII. is prone to benevolence, compalHon, and every kind afFedion; unfufpicious, not eafily provoked.
The Poets have obferved that men have their mol/ia tempora fundi, when they are averfe from faying or doing a harfli thing; and artful men watch thefe occafions, and know how to improve them to promote their ends.
This difpofition, I think, we commonly call good humour^ of which, in the fair fex, INlr Pope fays, Good humour only teaches charms to laft, Still makes new conquefts, and maintains the paft.
There is no difpofition more comfortable to the perfon him- felf, or more agreeable to others, than good humour. It is to the mind, what good health is to the body, putting a man in the capacity of enjoying every thing that is agreeable in life, and of ufmg every faculty without clog or impediment. It dif- pofes to contentment with our lot, to benevolence to all men, to fyttipathy with the diflrefled. It prefents every objed in the moft favourable light, and difpofes us to -avoid giving or taking offence.
This happy difpofition feems to be the natural fruit of a good confcience, and a firm belief that the world is under a wife and benevolent adminiflration j and, when it fprings from this root, it is an habitual fentiment of piety.
Good humour is likewife apt to be produced by happy fuccefs, or unexpeded good fortune. Joy and hope are favourable to itj. vexation and difappointment are unfavourable.
The only danger of this difpofition feems to be. That if we are not upon our guard, it may degenerate into levity, and indifpofe OF DISPOSITION. 195 indifpofe us to a proper degree of caution, and of attention to the chap, vii. future coiifequences of our adions.
There is a difpofition oppofitc to good humour which \vc call b^d humour, of which the tendency is diredlly contrary, and therefore its influence is as malignant, as that of the other is falutary.
Bad humour alone is fufficient to make a man unhappy; it tin- ges every ohjert with its own difmal colour; and, like a part that is galled, is hurt by every thing that touches it. It takes oflence where none was meant, and difpofes to dilcontcnt, jea- loufy, envy, and, in general, to malevolence.
Another couple of oppofite difpofitions arc elatiou of mind, on the one hand, and deprejjioti, on the other.
Thefe contrary difpofitions are both of an ambiguous nature; their influence may be good or bad, according as they are grounded on true or falfe opinion, and according as they are regulated.
That elation of mind which arifes from a juft fenfe of the dignity of our nature, and of the powers and faculties with which God hath endowed us, is true magnanimity, and difpofes a man to the noblefl: virtues, and the mofl: heroic a<5lions and enterprifes.
There is alfo an elation of mind, which arifes from a confci- oufnefs of our worth and integrity, fuch as Job felt, when he faid, " Till 1 die, I will not remove my integrity from ine. '' My righteoufncfs 1 hold faft, and will not let it go; my heart " fliall not reproach me while I live." This may be called the pride of virtue \ but it is a noble pride. It makes a man dif- B b 2 dain CHAP VII. d-^in to do what is bafe or mean. This is the true fenfe of honour.
B;it tbere is an elation of mind arifing from a vain opinion of our having talents, or worth, which we have not; or from putting an undue value upon any of our endowments of mind, body, or fortune. This is pride, the parent of many odious vices; fach as arrogance, undue contempt of others, felf-par- tiality, and vicious felf-Iove.
The oppofite difpofition to elation of mind, is deprellion, which alfo has good or bad efFecT:s, according as it is grounded upon true or falfe opinion.
A jufl fenfe of the weaknefs and imperfedlions of human na- ture, and of our own perfonal faults and defeds, is true humi- lity. It is not to think of ourfelves above what ive ought to think; a moft falutary and amiable difpofition; of great price in the fight of God and man. Nor is it inconfifl:ent with real magna- nimity and greatnefs of foul. They may dwell together with great advantage and ornament to both, and be faithful monitors againll; the extremes to which each has the greatefl tendency.