But there is a deprefiion of mind which is the oppofite to mag- nanimity, which debilitates the fprings of adlion, and fi-eezes every fentimeut that ihould lead to any noble exertion or enter- prife.
Suppofe a man to have no belief of a good adminiftration of the world, no conception of the dignity of virtue, no hope of happinefs in another fi^ate. Suppofe hiin, at the fame time, in a ftate of extreme poverty and dependence, and that he has no higher aim than to fupply his bodily wants, or to minifter to the pleafure, or flatter the pride of fome being as worthlefs as him- felf. Is not the foul of fuch a man deprefled as much as his body body or bis fortune? And, if fortune fliould fnillc upon him CHAP. vii. while he retains the fame fentiments, lie is only the ll.ive of for- tune. His mind is deprefled to the ftate of a hrute; and his human faculties ferve only to make him feel that deprellion.
Depreillon of mind may be owing to melancholy, a diftempcr of mind ^vhich jiroceeds from the Hate of the body, which throws a difmal gloom upon every objed of thought, cuts all the hnews of action, and often gives rife to ftrange and abfurd opinions in religion, or in other intcrefling matters. Yet, where there is real worth at bottom, fome rays of iu will break forth even in this deprefled ftate of mind.
A remarkable inflance of this was exhibited in Mr Simon Broun, a difl'enting clergyman in England, who, by melancho- ly, was led into the belief that his rational foul had gradually decayed within him, and at laft was totally extind:. From this belief he gave up his miniflerial fundlion, and would not even join with others in any act of v/orlhip, conceiving it to be a pro- fanation to worlliip God without a foul.
Tn this difmal ftate of mind, he wrote an excellent defence of the Chriftian religion, againlt Tindal's Chr'ijl'iamty as old as the Creation. To the book he prefixed an epiftle dedicatory to Qiieen Caroline, wherein he mentions, " That he was once a *' man, but, by the immediate hand of God, for his fins, his '' very thinking fubfiancc has, for more than feven years, been " continually wafting away, till it is wholly perilhed out of " him, if it be not utterly come to nothing.'' And, having heard of her M;ijefty's eminent piety, he begs the aid of her prayers.
The book was publiflied after his death without tlic dedica- tion, which, however, having been preferved in manufcrij^t, was afterwards printed in the Adventurer, No. 88.
Thus CHAP. VII. Thus this good man, when he believed that he had no foul, fhewed a mod: generous and difmterefted concern for thole who had fouls.
As depreffioa of mind may produce flrange opinions, efpeci- ally in the cafe of melancholy, fo our opinions may have a very confidei-able influence, either to elevate or to deprefs the mind, even where there is no melancholy.
Suppofe, on one hand, a man who believes that he is deflin- ed to an eternal exiflcnce; that he who made, and who governs the world, maketh account of him, and hath furnifhed him with the means of attaining a high degree of perfection and glory. With this man compare, on the other hand, the man who be- lieves nothing at all, or who believes that his exiftence is only the play of atoms, and that, after he hath been tofled about by blind fortune for a few years, he fhall again return to nothing: Can it be doubted, that the former opinion leads to elevation and greatnefs of mind, the latter to meannefs and depreffion?
CHAP. VIII. Of Opinion.
WHEN we come to explain the rational principles of ac- tion, it will appear, that opinion is an eflential ingredi- ent in them. Here we are only to confider its influence upon the animal principles. Some of thofe I have ranked in that clafs cannot, I think, exift in the human mind without it.
Gratitude fuppofes the opinion of a favour done or intended j refentment the opinion of an injury; efteem the opinion of me- rit; the paflion of love fuppofes the opinion of uncommon me- rit and perfedion in its objed.
Although Altliough natural atredion to parents, children, and near rela- CHAP.vilf. tions, is not grounded on the opinion of their merit, it is much increafed by that eonfideration. So is every benevolent affec- tion. On the contrary, real malevolence can hardly exifl with- out the opinion of demerit in the objed.
There is no natural defire or averfion, which may not be re- trained by opinion. Thus, if a man were athirfl, and had a ftrong" defire to drink, the opinion that there was poifon in the cup would make him forbear.
It is evident, that hope and fear, which every natural defire or affection may create, depend upon the opinion of future good or ill.
Thus it appears, that our palllons, our difpofitions, and our opinions, have great influence upon our animal principles, to- flrengthen or weaken, to excite or reftrain them; and, by that means, have great influence upon human adions and charaders.
That brute-animals have both pailions and difpofitions fimilar, in many refpeds, to thofe of men, cannot be doubted. Whe- ther they have oj)inions, is not fo clear. I thiiik they have not, in the proper fenfe of the word. But, waving all difpute upon this point, it will be granted, that opinion in men has a much wider field than in brutes. No man will fay, that they have fyftems of theology, morals, jurifprudence or politics; or that they can reafon from the laws of nature, in mechanics, medii- cine, or agriculture.
They feel the evils or enjoyments that are prcfent j probably they imagine thofe which experience has aflbciated with what they feel. But they can take no large profped cither of the pad or of the future, nor fee through a train of confequences.
ESSAY III.
CHAP. VIII. A dog may be deterred from eating what is before him, by the fear of immediate punilhment, which he has felt on Hke occa- fions; but he is never deterred by the confideration of health, or of any diftant good.
I have been credibly informed, that a monkey, having once been intoxicated with ftrong drink, in confequence of which it burnt its foot in the fire, and had a fevere fit of ficknefs, could never after be induced to drink any thing but pure water. 1 be- lieve this is the utmoft pitch which the faculties of brutes can reach.
From the influence of ■ opinion upon the condud: of mankind we may learn, tbnr it is one of the chief inflruments to be ufed In the difciplii e and government of men.
All men, in the early part of life, mufl; be under the difci- pline and government of parents and tutors. Men, who live in fociety, muft be under the government of laws and magiflrates, through life. The government of men is undoubtedly one of the nobleft exertions of human power. And it is of great im- portance, that thofe who have any fliare, either in domeftic or civil government, fhould know the nature of man, and how he is to be trained and governed.
Of all inflruments of government, opinion is the fweeteft, and the mofl agreeable to the nature of man. Obedience that flows from opinion, is real freedom, which every man defires. That which is extorted by fear of punifliment, is flavery; a yoke which is always galling, and which every man will fliake off when it is in his power.
The opinions of the bulk of mankind have always been, and vill always be, what they are taught by thofe whom they efteem to to be wife and good; and, therefore, in a confidcrablo degree, chap. v ill, are in the power of thofe who govern them.
Man, uncorrupted by bad habits and bad opinions, is of all animals the moll: tractable; corrupted by thefe, he is of all animals the mofl untradlable.
I apprehend, therefore, that, if ever civil government Hiall be brought to perfedion, it muft be the principal care of the '' ftate to make good citi^^ens by proper education, and proper in- ftruction and dilcipline.
The mofl ufcful part of medicine is that which ftrcngthens the conrtitution, and prevents difeafes by good regimen; the reft is fomewhat like propping a ruinous fabric at great expence, and to little purpofe. The art of government is the medicine of the mind, and the moft ufeful part of it is that which pre- vents crimes and bad habits, and trains men to virtue and good habits, by proper education and difcipline.
The end of government is to make the fociety happy, which can only be done by making it good and virtuous.
That men in general will be good or bad members of focietv, according to the education and difcipline by whicli they have been trained, experience may convince us.
The prefent age has made great advances in the art of train- ing men to military duty. It will not be faid, that thofe who enter into that fervice are more tradable than their fcllow-fub- jeds of other profcfTions. And I know not why it iliould be thought impolFible to train men to equal pcrfedion in the other duties of good citizens.
What an immenfe dilTerence is there, for the purpofe of war, C c between CHAP. VIII between an army properly trained, and a militia haflily drawn out of the multitude? What fnould hinder us from thinking, that, for every purpofe of civil government, there may be a like difference between a civil fociety properly trained to virtue, good habits and right fentiments, and thofe civil focieties which we now behold? But 1 fear 1 flaall be thought to digrefs from xny fubjed: into Utopian fpeculation.
To make an end of what I have to fay upon the animal prin- ciples of adtion, we may take a complex view of tb.eir eirtcl in life, by fuppofing a being at!tuated by principles of no higher order, to have no confcience or fenfe of duty, only let us allow him that fuperiority of underflanding, and that power of felf- government which man adually has. Let us fpeculate a little upon this imaginary being, and conlider what condud and tenor of adion might be expeded from him.
It is evident he would be a very different animal from a brute, and perhaps not very different, in appearance, from what a great part of mankind is» He would be capable of confidering the diftant confequences of his adions, and of reftraining or indulging his appetites, de- fires and affcdions, from the confideration of diftant good or evil.
He would be capable of chufing fome main end of his life, and planning fuch a rule of condud as appeared moft fubfervi- ent to it. Of this we have reafon to think no brute is capable.
We can perhaps conceive fuch a balance of the animal prin- ciples of adion, as, with very little felf-government, might make a man to be a good member of fociety, a good companion, and to have many amiable qualities.
The OF OPINION. 203 The balance of our animal principles, 1 think, conftitntcs CHAP.vni. what we call a man's natural temper; which may be good or bad, without regard to his virtue.
A man in whom the benevolent aflecftions, the dcfire of efteem and good humour are naturally prevalent, who is of a calm and difpalllonate nature, who has the good fortune to live with good men, and allbciate with good companions, may be- have properly with little eflbrt.
His natural temper leads him, in mod cafes, to do what virtue requires. And if he happens not to be expofed to thofc trying fituations, in which virtue crolTes the natural bent of his tem- per, he has no great temptation to adl amils.
But perhaps a happy natural temper, joined with fuch a happy fituation, is moie ideal than real, though no doubt fome men make nearer approaches to it than others.
The temper and the fituation of men is commonly fuch, that the animal principles alone, without felf-governincnt, would never produce any regular and confillent train of condudl.
One principle croffes another. Without felf-government, that which is ftrongeft at the time will prevail. And that which is weakeft at one time may, from pallion, from a change of difpo- fition or of fortune, become rtrongeft at another time.
Every natural appetite, defire and affedion, has its own prc- fent gratification only in view. A man, therefore, who has no other leader than thefe, would be like a Ihip in the ocean with- out hands, which cannot be faid to be deflined to any port. He would have no charader at all, but be benevolent or fpiteful, pleafant or morofe, honed or dillionefl, as the prefcnt wind of pallion or tide of humour moved him.
C c ^ Every C c ^ Every CHAP. VIII. Every man who purfues an end, be it good ox* bad, muft be adlive when he is difpofed to be indolent; he muft rein every pafllon and appetite that would lead him out of his road.
Mortification and felf-denial are found not in the path of vir- tue only, they are common to every road that leads to an end, be it ambition, or avarice, or even pleafure itfelf. Every man who maintains an uniform and confiftent charadler, muft fweat and toil, and often ftruggle with his prefent inclination.
Yet thofe who fteadily purfue fome end in life, though they muft often reftrain their ftrongeft defires, and praclife much felf-denial, have, upon the whole, more enjoyment than thofe who have no end at all, but to gratify the prefent prevailing in- clination.
A dog that is made for the chafe, cannot enjoy the happinefs of a dog without that exercife. Keep him within doors, feed him with the moft delicious fare, give him all the pleafures his nature is capable of, he foon becomes a dull, torpid, unhappy animal. No enjoyment can fupply the want of that employ- ment which nature has made his chief good. Let him hunt, and neither pain nor hunger nor fatigue feem to be evils. De- prived of this exercife, he can relifh nothing. Life itfelf be- comes burdcnfome.
It is no difparagement to the human kind to fay, that man, as well as the dog, is made for hunting, and cannot be happy but in fome vigorous purfuit. He has indeed nobler game to purfue than the dog, but he muft have fome purfuit, otherwife life ftagnates, all the faculties are benumbed, the fpirits flag, and his exiftence becomes an unfupportable burden.
Even the mere foxhunter, who has no higher purfuit than his dogs, has more enjoyment than he who has no purfuit at all.
He He has an end in view, and this invigorates his fpirits, makes CHAV.vni. him defpife pleafiire, and hear cold, hunger and fatigue, as if they were no evils.
Manet fub Jove frigido Venator, tenerae conjugis immemor, Sen vifa eft catulis cerva fidclibus Seu rupit teretes marfus aper plagas.
ESSAY III. PART III.
Of the Rational Principles of Adion.
There are Rational Principles of A6lion in Man.
MECHANICAL principles of adion produce their efTedl with- out any will or intention on our part. We may, by a voluntary effort, hinder the effecl:; but if it be not hindered by will and effort, it is produced without them.
Animal principles of action require intention and will in their operation, but not judgment. They are, by ancient mo- ralifts, very properly called caca cupidincs, blind defires.
Having treated of thefe two clafles, I proceed to the third, the rational principles of atflion in man,; wiiich have that name, becaufe they can have no exiftcnce in beings not endowed with reafon, and, in all their exertions, require, not only intention .and will, but judgment or rcafou.
That CHAP. I. That talent which we call reafon, by which men that are adult and of a found mind, are diftinguifhed from brutes, idiots, and infants, has, in all ages, among the learned and unlearned, been conceived to have two offices, to regulate our belief, and to re- gulate our adlions and condudt.
Whatever we believe, we think agreeable to reafon, and, on that account, yield our afTent to it. Whatever we difbelieve, we think contrary to reafon, and, on that account, diffent from it. Rea- fon therefore is allowed to be the principle by which our belief and opinions ought to be regulated.
But reafon has been no lefs univerfally conceived to be a prin- ciple, by which our adlions ought to be regulated.
To ad reafonably, is a plirafe no lefs common in all languages, than to judge reafonably. We immediately approve of a man's condud, when it appears that he had good reafon for what he did. And every adion we difapprove, we think unreafonable, or con- trary to reafon.
A way of fpeaking fo univerfal among men, common to the learned and the unlearned in all nations, and in all languages, muft have a meaning. To fuppofe it to be words without mean- ing, is to treat, with undue contempt, the common fenfe of man- kind.
Suppofing this phrafe to have a meaning, we may confider in what way reafon may ferve to regulate human conduct, fo that fome adions of men are to be denominated reafonable, and o- thers unreafonable.
I take it for granted, that there can be no exercife of reafon without judgment, nor, on the other hand, any judgment of things, abftract and general, without fome degree of reafon.
If RATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF ACTION IN MAN. 207 If, therefore, there be any principles of adion in the hiimnn CHAP. r. conllitution, which, in their nature, nccefllirily imply ftich judjr. "^ ' ment, they are the principles which we may call rational, to di- ftinguifh them from animal principles, which hnply clefirc and will, but not judgment.
Every deliberate human adlion muft be done either as the means, or as an end; as the means to fome end, to which it is fubfervlt-nt, or as an end, for its own fake, and without regard ■ to any thing beyond it.
That it is a part of the office of reafon to determine, what are the proper means to any end which we defire, no man ever denied. But fome Philolbphers, particularly Mr Hume, think that it is no part of the oflice of reafon to determine the ends we ought to purfuc, or the preference due to one end above ano- ther. This, he thinks, is not the otlice of reafon, but of tafte or feeling.
If this be fo, reafon cannot, with any propriety, be called a principle of a(fkion. Its office can only be to minifter to the principles of adion, by difcovering the means of their gratifica- tion. Accordingly Mr Hume maintains, that reafon is no prin- ciple of adlion; but that it is, and ought to be, the fervant of the paflions.
I iliall endeavour to fhew, that, among the various ends of human adions, there are fome, of which, without reafon, we could not even form a conception; and that, as foon as they are conceived, a regard to them is, by our conflitution, not only a principle of acflion, but a leading and governing principle, to which all our animal principles are fubordlnate, and to which they ought to be fubjed.
Thefe 1 fliall call rational principles > becaufe they can exift only 2o8 ESSAY III, CHAP. I.^ only in beings endowed with reafon, and becaufe, to adl from thefe principles, is what has always been meant by adling accord- ing to reafon.
The ends of human adions I have in view, are two, to wit, What is good for us upon the whole, and what appears to be our duty. They are very ftridliy conne(5ted, lead to the fame courfe of condudt, and co-operate with each other; and, on that account, have commonly been comprehended under one name, that of reafon. But as they may be disjoined, and are really diftindt principles of adiion, I fhall confider them feparately.
Of Regard to our Good on the Whole.
IT will not be denied that man, when he comes to years of underftanding, is led by his rational nature, to form the con- ception of what is good for him upon the whole.
How early in life this general notion of good enters into the mind, I cannot pretend to determine. It is one of the mod ge- neral and abftradl notions we form.
Whatever makes a man more happy, or more perfedl, is good, and is an object of defire as foon as we are capable of forming the conception of it. The contrary is ill, and is an objed of averflon.
In the firft part of life we have many enjoyments of various kinds; but very fimilar to thofe of brute-animals.
They confift in the exercife of our fenfes and powers of mo- tion.
OF REGARD TO OUR GOOD ON THE WHOLE. 209.
tion, the gratification of our appetites, and the exertions of our CHAP. U. kind affedions. Thcfe are chequered with many evils of pain, and fear, and cUfapiJointnient, and fympathy with the fufll-rings of others.
But the goods and evils of this period of life are of (hort du- ration, and foon forgot. The mind being regardlefs of the part, and unconcerned about the future, we have then no other inea- fure of good but tlie prefent delirej no other meafure of evil but the prefent avcrfion.
Every animal defire has fome particular and prefent objedl, and looks not beyond that objedt to its confequences, or to the *- connexions it may have with other things.
The prefent objed, which is moft attrad;ive, or excites the flrongeft; defire, determines the choice, whatever be its confe- quences. The prefent evil that prefles moft, is avoided, though it fliould be the road to a greater good to come, or tlie only way to efcape a greater evil. This is the way in which brutes adt, and the way in which men rauft adl:, till they come to the ufe of reafon.
As we grow up to underftanding, we extend our view both forward and backward. We refle(fl: upon what is part, and, by the lampof experience, difcern what will probably happen in time to come. We find that many things which we eagerly defired, were too dearly purchafed, and that things grievous for the pre- fent, like naufeous medicines, may be falutary in the ilTue.
We leam to obferve the conne<flions of things, and the con- fequences of our actions j and, taking an extended view of our exillence, pad, prefent, and future, we correCl our firrt notions of good and ill, and form the conception of what is good or ill upon the whole; which muft be elUmated, not from the prefent D d feeling, D d feeling, CHAP. IL feeling, or from the prefent animal defire or averfion, but from a due confideration of its confequences, certain or probable, during the whole of our exiftence.
That which, taken with all its difcoverable connections and confequences, brings more good than ill, I call good upon the whole.
That brute-animals have any conception of this good, I fee no reafon to believe. And it is evident, that man cannot have the conception of it, till reafon is fo far advanced, that he can ferioufly refleft upon the paft, and take a profpedt of the future part of his exiftence.
It appears therefore, that the very conception of what is good or ill for us upon the whole, is the offspring of reafon, and can be only In beings endowed with reafon. And if this concep- tion give rife to any principle of adiion in man, which he had not before, that principle may very properly be called a rational principle of a6tion.
I pretend not in this to fay any thing that is new, but what reafon fuggefted to thofe who firft turned their attention tothephi- lofophy of morals. I beg leave to quote one paffage from Cicero,.. in his nrft book of Offices; wherein, with his ufual elegance, he expreffes the fubftance of what I have fald. And there is good reafon to think that Cicero borrowed it from Pan^tius, a Greek Philofopher, whofe books of Offices are lofl.
" Sed Inter homlnem et belluam hoc maxime Interefl, quod " haec tantum quantum fenfu movetur, ad id folum quod adefl, " quodque praefens eft fe accommodat, paululum admodum ^tn- ", tiens prasteritum aut futurum: Homo autem quoniam rationis " eft partlceps, per quam confequentia cernit, caufas rerum videt, *' earumque praegreflus et quafi antecefliones non ignorat; fimi- *' litudines comparat, et rebus praefentibus adjungit atque an- " nedit OF REGARD TO OUR GOOD ON THE WHOLE. 211 " nedit futuras; facile totius vitx curfum viJct ad eamque de- chap. ii. '* gendam preparat res neceflarias.''
I obferve, in the next place. That as foon as we have the con- ception of what is good or ill for us upon the wliole, we are led, by our conrtitution, to feek the good and avoid the ill; and this beoomes not only a principle of adion, but a leading or governing principle, to which all our animal principles ought to be fubordinate.
I am very apt to think, with Dr Price, tliat, in intelligent beings, the deilre of what is good, and averfion to what is ill, is neceflarily conneded with the intelligent nature; and that it is a contradidion to fuppofe fuch a being to have the notion of good without the defire of it, or the notion of ill without aver- fion to it. Perhaps there may be other necefTfiry connedions between underftanding and the bell principles of adion, which our faculties arc too weak to difcern. That they are neceflari- ly conneded in him who is perfed in underflanding, we have good rcafon to believe.
To prefer a greater good, though diftant, to a Icfs that is pre- fent; to chufe a prefent evil, in order to avoid a greater evil, or to obtain a greater good, is, in the judgment of all men, wife and reafonable condud; and, when a man acts the contrary part, all men will acknowledge, that he ads foolilhly and unrea- fonably. Nor will it be denied, that, in innumerable cafes in common life, our animal principles draw us one way, while a re- gard to what is good on the whole, draws us the contrary wav. Thus the flefh lurteth againrt the fpirit, and the ijiirit againft the flcih, and thefe two are contrary. That in every conflid of this kind the rational principle ought to prevail, and the animal to be fubordinate, is too evident to need, or to admit of proof.
Thus, I think, it appears, that to purfue what is good up- ESSAY III.
CHAP. II. on the whole, and to avoid what is ill upon the whole, is a rational principle of adion, grounded upon our conftitution as reafonable creatures.
It appears that It Is not without juft caufe, that this principle of action has in all ages been called reafon^ in oppolition to our animal principles, which in common language are called by the general name of the pajftons.
The firft not only operates in a calm and cool manner, like reafon, but implies real judgment in all its operations. The fe- cond, to wit, the paflions, are blind defires of fome particular obje(5l, without any judgment or confideration, whether it be good for us upon the whole, or ill.
It appears alfo, that the fundamental maxim of prudence, and of all good morals, That the paflions ought, in all cafes, to be under the dominion of reafon, is not only felf-evident, when rightly underftood, but is exprefled according to the common ufe and propriety of language.
The contrary maxim maintained by Mr Hume, can only be defended by agrofs and palpable abufe of words. For, in order to defend it, he muft include under the pajjions, that very principle which has always, in all languages, been called reafon, and never was, in any language, called a pajfton. And from the meaning of the word reafon he mufl exclude the mod important part of it, by which we are able to difcern and to purfue what appears to be good upon the whole. And thus, including the mofl important part of reafon under pailion, and making the leafl important part of reafon to be the whole, he defends his favourite para- dox, That reafon is, and ought to be, the fervant of the paf^ fions.
To judge of what is true or falfe in fpeculative points, is the office OF REGARD TO OUR GOOD ON THE WHOLE.
office of fpcculntive rcafon; and to judge of what is good or ill CHAP. ii. for us upon the whole, is the office of practical rcafon. Of true and falfe there are no degrees; but of good and ill there are many degrees, and niajiy kinds; and men are very apt to form erroneous opinions concerning them j miflcd by their pafTions, by the authority of the multitude, and by other caufes.
Wife men, in all ages, have reckoned it a chief point of wif- do:ii, to make a right cftimate of the goods and evils of life. They have laboured to difcover the errors of the multitude on this important point, and to warn others againft them.
The ancient moraliits, though divided into feds, all agreed in this, That opinion has a mighty influence upon what we com- monly account the goods and ills of life, to alleviate or to ag- gravate them.
The Stoics carried this fo far, as to conclude that they all de- pend on opinion. n«'>T« 'TTroXn^if was a f^ivourite maxim with them.
We fee, indeed, that the fame ftation or condition of life, which makes one man happy, makes another miferable, and to a third is perfedly indifferent. We fee men miferable through life, from vain fears, and anxious defires, grounded folely upon wrong opinions. \\'e fee men wear thcmfelves out with toil- fome days, and fleeplefs nights, in purfuit of fome objecft which they never attain; or which, when attained, gives little fatisfac- tion, perhaps real difguft.
The evils of life, which every man mufl feel, have a very dif- ferent efTecil upon different men. What finks one into defpair and abfolute mifery, roufes the virtue and magnanimity of ano- ther, who bears it as the lot of humanity, and as the difcipliuc of CHAP. II. Qf r^ ^yjfg aj^(j merciful father in heaven. He rife s fuperior to adverfity, and is made wifer and better by it, and confequently happier.
It is therefore of the lafl importance, in the conduct of life, to have juft opinions with refpedl to good and evil; and furely it is the province of reafon to corredl wrong opinions, and to lead us into thofe that are juft and true.
It is true indeed, that men's paffions and appetites, too often, draw them to a6l contrary to their cool judgment and opinion of what is beft for them. Video tneUora proboque, deteriorafequor, is the cafe in every wilful deviation from our true intereft and our duty.
When this is the ca(e, the man is felf-condemned, he fees that ' he a6led the part of a brute, when he ought to have adled the part of a man. He is convinced that reafon ought to have re- ftrained his paflion, and not to have given the rein to it.
When he feels the bad effeds of his condutfl, he imputes them to himfelf, and would be flung with remorfe for his folly, though he had no account to make to a fuperior being. He has finned, againft himfelf, and brought upon his own head the punifhment which his folly deferved.
From this we may fee, that this rational principle of a regard to our good upon the whole, gives us the conception of a right: and a wrong in human condud, at lead of a wife and ^ fooU/I}. It produces a kind of felf-approbatlon, when the paffions and appetites are kept in their due fubjedion to it; and a kind of re- morfe and compundion, when it yields to them.
In thefe refpeds, this principle is fo fimilar to the moral prin-.
ciple, OF REGARD TO OUR GOOD ON THE WHOLE. 21^ ciple, or confciencc, and fo interwoven with it, that both are chap. iir. commonly coinprcheiuled under the name of r^^//. This fimi- larity led many of the ancient Philofophers, and fome among the moderns, to refolve confcience, or a CtinCc of duty, entirely into a regard to what is good for us upon the whole.