The fame philofophy, when it came to be applied to matters of tafte, difcovered that beauty and deformity are not any thing in the objects, to which men, from the beginning of the world, afcribed them, but certain feelings in the mind of the fpeda- tor.
The next ftep was an eafy confequence from all the prece- ding, that moral approbation and difapprobation are not judg- ments, which muft be true or falfe, but barely, agreeable and un- eafy feelings or fenfations.
Mr Hume made the lafl ftep in this progrefs, and crowned the fyftem by what he calls his hypothefis, to wit. That belief is more properly an adt of the fenfitive, than of the cogitative part of our nature.
Beyond this I think no man can go in this track 5 fenfation or feeling APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 469 feeling is all, and what is left to the cogitative part of our na- chap, vil ture, I am not able to comprehend. "^ I have had occafion to confidcr each of thefe paradoxes, ex- cepting that which relates to morals, in E[fays on the Intel- leBual Powers of Man: and, though they be ftridly conneded with each other, and with the fyllem which has produced them, I have attempted to fliew, that they are inconfiflent with jnft notions of our intelledual powers, no lefs than they are with the common fenfe and common language of mankind. And this, I think, will likewife appear with regard to the conclufion relating to morals, to wit. That moral approbation is only an agree- able feeling, and not a real judgment.
To prevent ambiguity as much as pofllble, let us attend to the meaning of feeling and of judgment. Thefe operations of the mind, perhaps, cannot be logically defined; but they are well underftood, and eafily diftinguilhed, by their properties and ad- jundts.
Feeling, or fenfiation, feems to be the lowed degree of anima- tion we can conceive. We give the name of animal to every being that feels pain or pleafure; and this feems to be the bouu- dary between the inanimate and animal creation.
We know no being of fo low a rank in the creation of God, as to poffefs this animal power only without any other.
We commonly Ax^'m^uih feeling from thinking, becaufe it hard- ly dcferves the name; and though it be, in a more general fenfe, a fpecies of thought, is leaft removed from the pallive and in- ert ftate of things inanimate.
A feeling muft be agreeable, or uncafy, or indillcrent. It may be weak or ftrong. It is exprefled in language either by a fingle word, or by fuch a contexture of words as may be the fubjea CHAP. VII. fubjedl or predicate of a propofition, but fucli as cannot by them- felves make a propofition. For it implies neither affirmation nor negation; and therefore cannot have the qualities of true or falfe, which diftlnguilh propofitions from all other forms of fpeech, and judgments from all other ad;s of the mind.
nat I have fuch a feeling. Is Indeed an affirmative propofition, and exprefles teftlmony grounded upon an intuitive judgment. But the feeling is only one term of this propofition ^ and It can only make a propofition when joined with another term, by a verb affirming or denying.
As feeling dlfl;lnguiflies the animal nature from the Inani- mate J fo judging feeais to diftlngulfli the rational nature from the merely animal.
Though judgment In general Is exprefled by one word In lan- guage, as the moft complex operations of the mind may be; yet a particular judgment can only be exprefi^ed by a fentence, and by that kind of fentence which Logicians call a propofition^ in which there mufl; neceflarily be a verb In the Indicative mood, either exprefled or underftood.
Every judgment mufi; necefl!arily be true or falfe, and the fame may be faid of the propofition which exprefi^es it. It Is a determination of the underftanding, with regard to what is true, or falfe, or dubious.
In judgment, we can diftlngulfli the objedt about which we judge, from the adl of the mind in judging of that objedt. In mere feeling there Is no fuch difl:indion. The objed of judg- ment mufi be exprefl'ed by a propofition j and belief, difiaelief or doubt, always accompanies the judgment we form. If we judge the propofition to be true, we mufi believe it j if we judge It to be falfe, we muft diftDelieve it; and If we be uncei'tain whe- ther It be true or falfe, we muft doubt.
The APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 471 The tootbachy the headachy are words which cxprefs iincafy feel- CHAP. vir. ings J but to lay that they exprefs a judgment would be ridi- culous.
That the fun is greater than the earthy is a propofition, and there- fore the objedt of judgment; and when afl'inned or denied, be- lieved or dilbelieved, or doubted, it exprefles judgment \ but to fay that it expreflls only a feeling in the mind of him that be- lieves it, would be ridiculous.
Thefe two operations of mind, when we confidcr them fcpa- ratcly, are very different, and eafdy diflinguilhed. W'len we feel without judging, or judge without feeling, it is impollible, without very grofs "inattention, to raiftake the one for the other.
But in many operations of the mind, both are infcparably con- joined under one name; and when we are not aware that the operation is complex, we may take one ingredient to be the whole, and overlook the other.
In former ages, that moral power, by which hninan acfl^ions ought to be regulated, was called rejfon, and confidered both by Philofophers, and by the vulgar, as the power of judging what we ought, and what we ought not to do.
This is very fully expreflcd by Mr Hume, in his Treatife of Hu- man Nature, Book II. Part III. § 3. " Nothing is more ufual iu " philofophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the com.- " bat of paflion and reafon, to give the preference to reafon, " and aiTert that men are only fo far virtuous as they conform " themfelves to its didlates. Every rational creature, 'tis laid, ** is obliged to regulate his actions by reafon; and if any other " motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he " ought to oppofe it, till it be entirely fnbdued, or, at ka(t, '* brought to a conformity to that fuperior principle. On this " method CHAP, vir. " method of thinking, the greatefl part of moral philofophy, " ancient and modern, feems to be founded."
That thofe Philofophers attended chiefly to the judging power of our moral faculty, appears from the names they gave to Its operations, and from the whole of their language concern- ing It.
The modern philofophy has led men to attend chiefly to theit fenfatlons and feelings, and thereby to refolve Into mere feel- ing, complex adts of the mind, of which feeling is only one in- gredient.
I had occafion, in the preceding Eflliys, to obferve. That feve- ral operations of the mind, to which we give one name, and con- fider as one a6t, are compounded of more limple ails Infeparably united In our conftitutlon, and that In thefe, fenfatlon or feeling often makes one ingredient.
Thus the appetites of hunger and thirfl: are compounded of an uneafy fenfatlon, and the defire of food or drink. In our benevolent affed^ions, there Is both an agreeable feeling, and a defire of happinefs to the objedt of our affedlion^ and malevo- lent affedions have ingredients of a contrary nature.
In thefe infl:ances, fenfatlon or feeling Is Infeparably conjoin- ed with defire. In other infl:ances, we find fenfatlon Infepa- rably conjoined with judgment or belief, and that In two diffe- rent ways. In fome infliances, the judgment or belief feems to be the confequence of the fenfatlon, and to be regulated by it. In other inftances, the fenfatlon is the confequence of the judg- ment.
When we perceive an external object by our fenfes, we have a fenfatlon conjoined with a firm belief of the exiftence and fenfible •APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 473 fenfible qiuilities of the external objed. Nor has all the Tub- CHAr-.vii. tilty of inecaphyfics been able to disjoin what nature has con- joined in our conllituiio i. Des Cartes a;.'d Locke endeavour- ed, by reafoning, to deduce the exiftcnce of external objects from our fenfations, but in vain. Subfcquent Philofophcrs, finding no reafon for this connedion, endeavoured to throw off the belief of external objects as being unreafonable; but thii attempt is no lefs vain. Nature has doomed us to believe tlic teftimony of our fenfes, whether we can give a good reafon for doing fo or not.
In this inftance, the belief or judgment is the confequence of the fenfation, as the fcnfation is the confequence of the impref- fion made on the organ of fenfe.
But in mod of the operations of mind in which judgment: or belief is combined with feeling, the feeling is the conlequeuce of the judgment, and is regulated by it.
Thus, an account of the good condud of a friend at a di- ftance gives me a very agreeable feeling, and a contrary ac- count would give me a very uneafy feeling; but thefe feelings depend entirely upon my belief of the report.
In hope, there is an agreeable feeling, depending upon the belief or expectation of good to come: Fear is made up of con- trary ingredients; in both, the feeling is regulated by the de- gree of belief.
In the refpecl we bear to the worthy, and in our contempt of the worthlefs, there is both judgment and feeling, aiid the laft depends entirely upon the firlt.
The fame may be laid of gratitude for good offices and re- fcntment of injuries.
O o o Let CHAP. vii. Let me now confider how I am afFefted when I fee a man ex- erting himlelf nobly in a good caufe. I am confcious that the efTect of his condudl on my mind is complex, though it may be called by one name. I look up to his virtue, I approve, I ad- mire it. In doing fo, I have pleafure indeed, or an agreeable feeling; this is granted. But I find myfelf interefted in his fuccefs and in his fame. This is affedion; it is love and efteem, which is more than mere feeling. The man is the objedt of this efteem j but in mere feeling there is no object* I am llkewife confcious, that this agreeable feeling in me, and this efteem of him, depend entirely upon the judgment I form of his condudt. I judge that this conduct merits efteem; and, while 1 thus judge, I cannot but efteem him, and contem- plate his condudt with pleafure. Perfuade me that he was bribed, or that he aded from fome mercenary or bad motive, immediately my efteem and my agreeable feeling vanifli.
In the approbation of a good adion, therefore, there is feel- ing indeed, but there is alfo efteem of the agent; and both the feeling and the efteem depend upon the judgment we form of his condud.
When I exercife my moral faculty about my own adlions or thofe of other men, I am confcious that I judge as well as feel. I accufe and excufe, I acquit and condemn, I aflent and diffent, I believe and difl)elieve, and doubt. Thefe are ads of judgment, and not feelings.
Every determination of the underftanding, with regard to what is true or falfe, is judgment. That I ought not to fteal, or to kill, or to bear falfe witnefs, are propofitions, of the truth of which I am as well convinced as of any propofition in Euclid. 1 am confcious that I judge them to be true propofitions; and ray APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT.
my confciournefs makes all other arguments unneccITary, with CHAP. vii. regard to the operations of my own mind.
That other men judge, as well as feel, in fuch cafes, I am convinced, becaufe they underfland me when I exprefs my mo- ral judgment, and exprefs theirs by the fame terms and phrafes.
Suppofe that, in a cafe well known to both, my friend fays, Such a man did well and wortbUy, his condu& Is highly approvable. This fpeech, according to all rules of interpretation, exprefles my friend's judgment of the man's condudl. This judgment may be true or falfe, and I may agree in opinion with him, or I may diiTent from him without olfence, as we may dilTer in other matters of judgment.
Suppofe, again, that, in relation to the fame cafe, my friend fays, 'The man s conduct gave me a very agreeable feeling.
This fpeech, if approbation be nothing but an agreeable feel- ing, mufl have the very fame meaning with the firft, and exprefs neither more nor lefs. But this cannot be, for two realons.
Firji^ Becaufe there is no rule in grammar or rhetoric, nor any ufage in language, by which thefe two fpeeches can be con- ilrued, fo as to have the fame meaning. The firjl exprciles plainly an opinion or judgment of the conduct of the man, but fays nothing of the fpeaker. The fecond only teftifies afa(5t con- cerning the fpeaker, to wit, that he had fuch a feeling.
Another reafon why thefe two fpeeches cannot mean the fame thing is, that the firft may be contradicled without any ground of offence, fuch contradiclion being only a difference of opinion, which, to a reafonable man, gives no offence. But the IccunJ fpeech cannot be contradicled without an affront; for, as cvr.iy O o o 2 man 476 E S S A Y V.
CHAP. VII. jD^xi muft know his own feelings, to deny that a man had a feel- ing which he affirms he had, is to charge him with falfehood.
If moral approbation be a real judgment, which produces an agreeable feeling in the mind of him who judges, both fpeeches are perfedliy intelligible, in the moft obvious and literal fenfe. Their meaning is different, but they are related, fo that the one may be inferred from the other, as we infer the effedl from the caufe, or the caufe from the effedl. I know, that what a man judges to be a very worthy action, he contemplates with plea- fure; and what he contemplates with pleafure muft, in his judg- ment, have worth. But the judgment and the feeling are diffe- rent adls of his mind, though connected as caufe and effe<5t. He can exprefs either the one or the other with perfedl pro- priety; but the fpeech which exprefles his feeling is altogether improper and inept to exprefs his judgment, for this evident reafon, that judgment and feeling, though in fome cafes con- neded, are things in their nature different.
If we fuppofe, on the other hand, that moral approbation is nothing more than an agreeable feeling, occafioned by the con- templation of an adlion, the fecond fpeech above mentioned has a diftind meaning, and expreffes all that is meant by moral ap- probation. But the firft fpeech either means the very fame thing, (which cannot be, for the reafons already mentioned) or it has no meaning.
Now, we may appeal to the Reader, whether, in converfation upon human characters, fuch fpeeches as the firft are not as fre- quent, as familiar, and as well underftood, as any thing in lan- guage; and whether they have not been common in all ages that we can trace, and in all languages?
This dodrine, therefore, That moral approbation is merely a feeling without judgment, necellkrily carries along with it this confequeuce, APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 477 confequence, that a form of fpeech, upon one of the mod com- CHAP. vil. mon topics of difcoiirfe, which either has no meaning, or a ireaning irreconcilable to all rules of grammar or rhetoric, is found to be common and familiar in all languages and in all ages of the world, while every man knows how to cxprefs the meaning, if it have^any, in plain and proper language.
Such a confequence I think fufficient to fink any philofophical opinion on which it hangs.
A particular language may have fome oddity, or even ab- furdity, introduced by fome man of eminence, from caprice or wrong! judgment, ^"'■' *^'>''"^'ed, by fervile imitators, for a time, till it be deteded, and, of confequence, difcountenanced and dropt; but that the fame abfurdity fhould pervade all languages, through all ages, and that, after being detected and expofed, it fhould flill keep its countenance and its place in language as much as before, this can never be while men have uuderrtand-. ing.
It maybe obferved by the way, that the fame argument may be applied, with equal force, agalnft thofe other paradoxical opinions of modern philofophy, which we before mentioned as conneded with this, fuch as, that beauty and deformity are not at all in the objeds to which language univerfally afcribes them, but are merely feelings in the mindof the fpedlator; that the fecondary qualities are not in external objeds, but are merely feelings or fenfations in him that perceives them; and, in gene- ral, that our external and internal fenfes are faculties by which we have fenfations or feelings only, but by which we do not judge.
That every form of fpeech, which language a/Tords tf) exprefs our judgments, fhould, in all ages, and in all languages, be ufcd to exprefs what is no judgment j and that feelings, which arc eafjiy CHAP. VII. eafily exprefled In proper language, fliould as univerfally be ex- prefled by language altogether improper and abfurd, I cannot believe; and therefore muft conclude, that if language be the expreflion of thought, men judge of the primary and fecondary qualities of body by their external fenfes, of beauty and defor- mity by their tafte, and of virtue and vice hy their moral fa- culty.
A truth fo evident as this Is, can hardly be obfcured and brought Into doubt, but by the abufe of w^ords. And much abufe of words there has been upon this fubjeft. To avoid this, as much as poffible, I have ufed the word Judgment, on one fide, and Jen/ation ox feeling, upon the other; becaufe thefe words have been leaft liable to abufe or ambiguity. But it may be proper to make fome obfervations upon other words that have been ufed In this controverfy.
Mr Hume, in his Treatife of Human Nature, has employed two fedions upon it, the titles of which are, Moral DiJilnSlions not derived from Reafon, and Moral DiJlinSliom derived from a Moral Senfe, When he is not, by cuftom, led unawares to fpeak of reafon like other men, he limits that word to fignify only the power of judging in matters merely fpeculative. Hence he concludes, That reafon of itfelf is inadive and perfedly inert." That adtions may be laudable or blameable, but cannot be reafon- able or unreafonable." That " it Is not contrary to reafon, to prefer the deftrucftlon of the whole world to the fcratch- ing of my finger." That " it is not contrary to reafon, for me to chufe my total ruin to prevent the leafi; uneafinefs of an Indian, or of a perfon wholly unknown to me." That reafon is, and ought only to be, the flave of the paflions, and can never pretend to any other ofEce, than to ferve and obey '' them."
If APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 479 If we take the word reafon to mean what common ufe, both of f^'^Ai'. vir. Pliilofophers, and of the vulgar, hath made it to mean, thefe maxims are not only falfe, but licentious. It is only his abufe of the words reafon and pajfiott, that can ju(tify thcn\ from this cenfure.
The meaning of a common word is not to be afcertained by philofophical theory, but by common ufage j and if a man will take the liberty of limiting or extending the meaning of com- mon words at his pleafure, he may, like Mandeville, infinuate the moft licentious paradoxes with the appearance of plaufibi- lity. I have before made fome obfervations upon the meaning of this word, Eflay II. chap. 2. and Ellay III. part j. chap. i. to which the Reader is referred.
When Mr Hume derives moral diftin(5lions from amoral fenfe, I agree with him in words, but we differ about the meaning of the word fenfe. Every power to which the name of a fenfe has been given, is a power of judging of the objects of that (tnk^ and has been accounted fuch in all ages; the moral fenfe there- fore is the power of judging in morals. But Mr Hume will have the moral fenfe to be only a power of feeling, without judging: This 1 take to be an abufe of a word.
Authors who place moral approbAtion in feeling only, very often ufe the wordfen/imenl, to exprefs feeling without judgment. This I take likewife to be an abufe of a word. Our moral de- terminations may, with propriety, be called moral fenliments. For the \vovi.\fent'tment^ in the Euglifh language, never, as I conceive, fignifies mere feeling, but judgment accompanied with feeling. It was wont to fignify opinion or judgment of any kind, but, of late, is appropriated to fignify an opinion or judgment, that ftilkes, and produces fome agreeable or uneafy emotion. So we fpeak of fcntiments of refjiedt, of efteem, of gratitude. But I never heard the pain of the gout, or any other mere feeling, called a lentimeut.
Even ^!ill^llli' Even the word judgment has been ufed by Mr Hume to ck- prefs what he maintains to be only a feeling. Treatilc of Hu- man Nature, part.3. page 3. " The term perception is no lefs ap- *' plicable to \.ho(Q judgments by which we diftinguifh moral good' " and evil, than to every other opei'ation of the mind." Per- haps he ufed this word inadvertently; for I think there cannot be a greater abufe of words, than to put judgment for what he held to be mere feeling.
All the words moft commonly ufed, both by Phllofophers and by the vulgar, to exprefs the operations of our moral faculty, fuch as, decijion, determination, fentence^ approbation^ difapprobation, applaufe, cenfure, praife, blame^ neceffarily imply judgment in their meaning. When, therefore, they are ufed by Mr Hume, and others who hold his opinion, to fignify feelings only, this is an abufe of words. If thefe Philofophers wifh to fpeak plain- ly and properly, they muft, in difcourfing of morals, difcard thefe words altogether, becaufe their eflablifhed fignification in the language, is contrary to what they would exprefs by them.
They muft likewife difcard from morals the words ougJot and ought not, which very properly exprefs judgment, but cannot be applied to mere feelings. Upon thefe words Mr Hume has made a particular obfervation in the conclufion of his firft fec- tion above mentioned. I fhall give it in his own words, and make fome remarks upon it.
" I cannot forbear adding to thefe reafonings, an obfervation " which may, perhaps, be found of fome importance. In eve- " ry fyftem of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have " always remarked, that the Author proceeds for fome time in " the ordinary way of reafoning, and eftabliflies the being of a " God, or makes obferyatlons concerning human affairs; when, " of a fudden, I am furprifed to find, that, inftead of the ufual " copulations of propofitions, is, and is not, I meet with no pro- *' pofition that is not conneded with an ought, or an ought not.
" This <c APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. « 481 " This chane;e is imperceptible, but is, however, of the laft con- CIIAP. vw. " fequence. For as this ought or ought not exprefles fome new relation or affirmation, 'tis necefTary that it fhould l)c obferved " and explained; and, at the fame time, that a reafon fhould be *' given for what feems altogether inconceivable j how this " new relation can be a declu(ftion from others which are cn- " tirely different from it. But as Authors do not commonly ufe " this precaution, I (liall prefume to recommend it to the Read- " ers J and am perfuaded, that this fmall attention would fub- " vert all the vulgar fyftems of morality, and let us fee, thai " the diftindion of vice and virtue, is not founded merely on " the relations of objedls, nor is perceived by reafon."
We may here obferve, that it is acknowledged, that the words ought and ought not exprefs fome relation or affirmation; but a re- lation or affirmation which Mr Hume thought inexplicable, or, at leafl, inconfiftent with his fyftem of morals. He mufl, there- fore, have thought, that they ought not to be ufed in treating of that fubjed.
He likewife makes two demands, and, taking it for granted that they cannot be fatisfied, is perfuaded, that an attention to this is fufficient to fubvert all the vulgar fyftems of morals.
The firjl demand is, that ought and ought not be explained.
To a man that underftands Englifli, there are furely no words that require explanation lefs. Are not all men taught, from their early years, that they ought not to lie, nor ftcal, nor fwear falfely? But Mr Hume thinks, that men never underftood what thefe precepts mean, or rather that they are unintelligible. M this be fo, I think indeed it will follow, that all the vulgar fyftems of morals are fubverted.
P p p Dr CHAP. VII. Dr Johnson, in his Didlonary, explains the word ought to lignify, being obliged by duty; and I know no better explica- tion that can be given of it. The Reader will fee what 1 thought neceflary to fay concerning the moral relation exprelfed by this word, in Elfay III. part 3. chap. 5.
The fecond demand is, That a reafon fhould be given why this relation fliould be a dedudion from others which are entirely different from it.
This is to demand a reafon for what does not exift. The firft principles of morals are not deductions. They are felf-evident j and their truth, like that of other axioms, is perceived without reafoning or dedudion. And moral truths that are not felf- evident, are deduced, not from relations quite different from them, but from the firfl principles of morals.
In a matter fo interefling to mankind, and fo frequently the fubjed of converfation among the learned and the unlearned as morals is, it may furely be expeded, that men will exprefs both their judgments and their feelings with propriety, and con- fiflently with the rules of language. An opinion, therefore, which makes the language of all ages and nations, upon this fub- jed, to be improper, contrary to all rules of language, and fit to be difcarded, needs no other refutation.
As mankind have, in all ages, underflood reafon to mean the power by which not only our fpeculative opinions, but our ac- tions ought to be regulated, we may fay, with perfed propriety, that all vice is contrary to reafon; that, by reafon, we are to judge of what we ought to do, as well as of what we ought to believe.
But though all vice be contrary to reafon, I conceive that it would APPROBATION IMPLIES JUDGMENT. 483 would not be a proper dclinlcion of vice to C^y, that it is a con- CHAT. vir. dudl contrary to reafon, becaufc this dcfuiition would apply equally to folly, which all men diftinguifh from vice.
There are other phrafes which have been ufctl on the fume fide of the quellion, which I fee no reafon for adopting, fuch as, a^ifig contrary to the relations of things^ contrary to the rcofon of things t to the fitnefs of things, to the truth of things, to abfolute fitncfs. Thefe phrafes have not the authority of common w^^^ which, in matters of language, is great. They feem to have been invent- ed by fome authors, with a view to explain the nature of vice; but I do not think they aufwer that end. If intended as defi- nitions of vice, they are improper; becaufe, in the moft favour- able fenfe they can bear, they extend to every kind of foolifli and abfurd condudl, as well as to that which is vicious.
I fhall conclude this chapter with fome obfervations upon the five arguments which Mr Hume has offered upon this point in his Enquiry.
The firji is. That it is impofllble that the hypothefis he op- pofes, can, in any particular inftance, be fo much as rendered intelligible, whatever fpecious figure it may make in general dif- courfe. " Examine, fays he, the crime of ingratitude, anato- " mize all its circumftances, and examine, by your reafon " alone, in what confifts the demerit or blame, you will never " come to any ilfue or conclufion."
I think it unneceffary to follow him through all the accounts of ingratitude which he conceives may be given by thofe whom he oppofes, becaufe I agree with him in that which he liimfelf adopts, to wit, " That this crime arifes from a complication of " circumftances, which, being prefented to the fpeclator, excites CHAP^il. " (}-jg fentlment of blame by the particular (Irudure and fabric " of his mind."
This he thought a true and intelligible account of the crimi- nality of ingratitude. So do I. And therefore 1 think the hy- pothefis he oppofes is intelligible, when applied to a particular inflance.
Mr Hume, no doubt, thought, that the account he gives of ingratitude is inconfiftent with the hypothefis he oppofes, and could not be adopted by thofe who hold that hypothefis. He could be led to think fo, only by taking for granted one of thefe two things. Either, Jlrji^ That the fentiment of blame is a feeling- only, without judgment }, or, fecondly, That whatever is excited by the particular fabric and ftrufture of the mind mufl be feel- ing only, and not judgment. But I cannot grant either the one or the other.
For, as to thefirj}, it feems evident to me, that both fentiment and blame imply judgment j and, therefore, that the fentiment of blame is a judgment accompanied with feeling, and not mere feeling without judgment.
The fecond can as little be granted; for no operation of mind, whether judgment or feeling, can be excited but by that parti- cular flrucSure and fabric of the mind which makes us capable of that operation.