From the courfe of events in the natural world, we have fuf- ficient reafon to conclude the exiftence of an eternal intelligent Firft Caufe. But whether he adls immediately in the production of thofe events, or by fubordinate intelligent agents, or by in- ftruments that are unintelligent, and what the number, the na- ture, and the different offices of thofe agents or inftruments may be; thefe I apprehend to be myfteries placed beyond the limits of human knowledge. We fee an eftablifhed order in the fucceflion of natural events, but we fee not the bond that con- nedts them together.
Since we derive fo little light, v/ith regard to efficient cau(es and their ad:ive power, from attention to the natural world, let us next attend to the moral, I mean, to human actions and con- dud.
Mr Locke obferves very juftly, " That, from the obferva- '• tion of the operation of bodies by our fenfes, we have but a " very imperfect obfcure idea of adlive power, fince they afford us " not any idea in themfelves of the power to begin any adion, " either of motion or thought." He adds, " That we find in " ourfelves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end feveral " adlions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a " thought OF BEINCIS THAT HAVE NO UNDERSTANDING. 35 " thouglit or preference of the mind, ordering, or, as it were, CHAP, v.^ " coumianding the doing or not doing fuch a particuhir adtion.
" This power which the mind has tlius to order the confidera- " tion of any idea, or the forbearing to confider it, or to pre- " fer the motion of any part of the body to its I'eft, and -y/Vdr ver- " fa, in any particnhir inftance, is that which we call the ivill.
" The adiiai exercife of that power, by diredling any particular " adion, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or " willing^ "^Yv^ According to Mr Locke, therefore, the only clear notion or idea we have of active power, is taken from the power which we fmd in ourfelves to give certain motions to our bodies, or a certain direction to our thoughts; and this power in ourfelves can be brought into adlion only by willing or volition.
From this, I think, it follows, that, if we had not will, and that degree of underftanding which will neceflarily im- plies, we could exert no adive power, and confequently could have none: For power that cannot be exerted is no power. It follows alfo, that the adlive power, of which only we can have any diftindl conception, can be only in beings that have under- ftanding and will.
^^^ Power to produce any effedl implies power not to produce it. We can conceive no way in which power may be deter- mined to one of thefe rather than the other, in a being that has no will.
Whatever is the effed of adive power muft be fomething that is contingent. Contingent exiftence is that which depended upon the power and will of its caufe. Oppofed to this, is necef- fary exiltcnce, which we afcribe to the Supreme Being, becaufe his exiftence is not owing to the power of any being. The fmic diftindion there is between contingent and neceflary truth.
E 2 That E 2 That CHAP. V. That the planets of our fyftem go round the fun from weft to eaft, is a continofent truth; becaufe it depended upon the power and will of him who made the planetary fyftem, and gave motion to it. That a circle and a right line can cut one another only in two points, is a truth which depends upon no power nor will, and therefore is called neceftary and immutable. Contingency, therefore, has a relation to adlive power, as all ad:ive power is exerted in contingent events; and as fuch events can have no exiftence, but by the exertion of adlive power.
When I obferve a plant growing from its feed to maturity, I know that there muft be a caufe that has power to produce this effed:. But I fee neither the caufe nor the manner of its ope- ration.
/ But in certain motions of my body and diredllons of my thought, I know, not only that there muft be a caufe that has power to produce thefe effeds, but that I am that caufe; and I am confcious of what 1 do in order to the production of them.
From the confcioufnefs of our own adlivity, feems to be de- rived, not only the cleareft, but the only conception we can form of adivity, or the exertion of adlive power.
As I ain unable to form a notion of any intelledlual power different in kind from thofe I poflefs, the fame holds with re- fped to adlive power. If all men had been blind, we ftiould have had no conception of the power of feeing, nor any name for it in language. If man had not the powers of abftradlion and reafoning, we could not have had any conception of thefe operations. In like manner, if he had not fome degree of ac- tive power, and if he were not confcious of the exertion of it in his voluntary adlions, it is probable he could have no con- ception of adlivity, or of acSlive power.
A OF BEINGS THAT HAVE NO UNDERSTANDING. 37 A train of events following one another ever fo regularly, 'xll^^LZ^ .could never lead us to the notion of a caufe, if we had not, from our conftitution, a convidion of the necelTity of a caufe to eve- ry event.
And of the manner in which a caufe may exert its adive power, we can have no conception, but from confcioufnefs of the manner in which our own adlive power is exerted.
With regard to the operations of nature, it is fufficient for us to know, that, whatever the agents may be, whatever the manner of their operation, or the extent of their power, they depend upon the firft caufe, and are under his control; and this indeed is all that we know; beyond this we are left in darknefs. But, in what regards human adions, we have a more immediate concern.
It is of the highefl importance to us, as moral and account- able creatures, to know what adions are in our own power, be- caufe it is for thefe only that we can be accountable to our Ma- ker, or to our fellow-men in fociety; by thefe only we can me- rit praife or blame; in thefe only all our prudence, wifdom and virtue muft be employed 3 and, therefore, with regard to them, the wife Author of nature has not left us in the dark.
Every man is led by nature to attribute to himfelf the free de- terminations of his own will, and to believe thofe events to be in his power which depend upon his will. On the other hand, it is felf-evident, that nothiug is in our power that is not fubjedt to our will.
We grow from childhood to manhood, we digeft our food, our blood circulates, our heart and arteries beat, we are fome- times fick and fomttimi s in health; all thefe things muft be done by the power of fomc agent 3 but they are not done by our CHAP. V. om- power. How do we know this? Becaufe they are not fubjedt to our will. This is the infallible "criterion by which we diftinguifh what is our doing from what is not; what is in our power from what is not.
Human power, therefore, can only be exerted by will, and we are unable to conceive any active power to be exerted without will. Every man knows infallibly that what is done by his con- fcious will and intention, is to be imputed to him, as the agent or caufe; and that whatever is done without his will and inten- tion, cannot be imputed to him with truth.
We judge of the adions and condud: of other men by the fame rule as we judge of our own. In morals, it is felf-evi- dent that no man can be the objedl either of approbation or of blame for what he did not. But how fhall we know whether it is his doing or not?ij[f the adlion depended upon his will, and if he intended and willed it, it is his adlion in the judgment of all mankind. But if it was done without his knowledge, or without his will and intention, it is as certain that he did It not, and that it ought not to be imputed to him as the agent.
When there is any doubt to whom a particular adtion ought to be imputed, the doubt arifes only from our ignorance of fadls J when the fads relating to it are known, no man of un- derflanding has any doubt to whom the adtion ought to be im- puted.
The general rules of imputation are felf-evident. They have been the fame in all ages, and among all civilized nations. No man blames another for being black or fair, for having a fever or the falling licknefs; becaufe thefe things are believed not to be in his power; and they are believed not to be in his power, becaufe they depend not upon his will. We can never conceive that OF BEINGS THAT HAVE NO UNDERSTANDING. 39 that a man's duty goes beyond his power, or that his power goes CHAP, v.^ beyond what depends upon his will.
Reafon leads us to afcribe unlimited power to the Supreme Being. But what do we mean by unlimited power? It is power to do whatfoever he wills. To fuppofe him to do what he does not will to do, is abfurd.
The only diftincfl conception I can form of adlive power is, that is is an attribute in a being by which he can do certain things if he wills. This, after all, is only a relative conception. It is relative to the effed, and to the will of producing it. Take away thefe, and the conception vaniflies. They are the handles by which the mind takes hold of it. When they are taken away, our hold is gone. The fame is the cafe with regard to other relative conceptions. Thus velocity is a real flate of a body, about which Philofophers reafon with the force of demon- ftration; but our conception of it is relative to fpace and time. What is velocity in a body? It is a flate in which it pafles through a certain fpace in a certain time. Space and time are very different from velocity; but we cannot conceive it but by its relation to them. The effect produced, and the will to pro- duce it, are things different from acftive power, but we can have no conception of it, but by its relation to them.
Whether the conception of an efficient caufc, and of real ac- tivity, could ever have entered into the mind of man, if we had not had the experience of a(^ivity in ourfelves, I am not able to determine with certainty. The origin of many of our concep- tions, and even of many of our judgments, is not fo eafily traced as Philofophers have generally conceived. No man can recol- \e6t the time when he firfl got the conception of an efficient caufe, or the time when he firfl got the belief that an cflicient caufe is nccelfary to every change in nature. The conception of an efficient caufe may very probably be derived from the ex- perience CHAP. V.^ perlence we have had in very early life of our own power to produce certain effefts. But the belief, that no event can hap- pen without an efficient caufe, cannot be derived from expe- rience. We may learn from experience what is, or what was, but no experience can teach us what neceflarily mufl be.
In like manner, we probably derive the conception of pain from the experience we have had of it in ourfelves; but our be- lief that pain can only exifl in a being that hath life, cannot be got by experience, becaufe it is a neceflary truth; and no ne- cefTary truth can have its attellation from experience.
If it be fo that the conception of an efficient caufe enters in- to the mind, only from the early conviction we have that we are the efficients of our own voluntary adlions, (which 1 think is moft probable) the notion of efficiency will be reduced to this. That it is a relation between the caufe and the efFed, fimilar to that which is between us and our voluntary adions. This is furely the moft diftindl notion, and, 1 think, the only notion we can form of real efficiency.
Now It is evident, that, to conftitute the relation between me and my action, my conception of the adion, and will to do it, are eflential. For what I never conceived, nor willed, I never did.
If any man, therefore, affirms, that a being may be the effi- cient caufe of an adion, and have power to produce it, which that being can neither conceive nor will, he fpeaks a language which I do not underfland. If he has a meaning, his notion of power and efficiency muft be eflentially different from mine; and, until he conveys his notion of efficiency to my underftand- ing, I can no more aflent to his opinion, than if hefliould affirm, that a being without life may feel pain.
It OF THE PHiENOMENA OF NATURE.
It fecms, therefore, to me mod probable, that fuch beings only as have fome degree of underftanding and will, can pofTefs ac- tive power; and that inanimate beings mufl be merely paflive, and have no real adivity. Nothing we perceive without us af- fords any good ground for afcribing aflive power to any inani- mate being; and every thing we can difcover in our own con- flitution, leads us to think, that adive power cannot be exerted without will and intelligence.
Of the efficient Catifes of the Phanomena of Nature.
IF adlive power, in its proper meaning, requires a fubjedl en- dowed with will and intelligence, what Ihall we fay of thofe adive powers which Philofophers teach us to afcribe to matter; the powers of corpufcular attradlion, magnetifm, eledlricity, gravitation, and others? Is it not univerfally allowed, that hea- vy bodies defcend to the earth by the power of gravity; that, by the fame power, the moon, and all the planets and comets, are retained in their orbits? Have the moft eminent natural Philofophers been impofuig upon us, and giving us words in- flcad of real caufes?
In anfwcr to this, I apprehend, that the principles of natural philofophy have, in modern times, been built upon a foundation that cannot be Ihaken, and that they can be culled in quertiou only by thofe who do not undcrftand the evidence on which they (land. But the ambiguity of the words caufe, agency^ aElivc power, and the other words related to thefe, has led many to un- derftand them, when ufed in natural philofuphy, in a wrong fenfe, and in a fcnfe which is neither ncccflary for eftablifliing F the CHAP. VI. the true principles of natural phllofophy, nor was ever meant by the mofl enlightened in that fcience.
To be convinced of this, we may obferve, that thofe very Phi- lofophers who attribute to matter the power of gravitation, and other active powers, teach us, at the fame time, that matter is a fubftance altogether inert, and merely paffive; that gravitation, and the other attra6live or repulfive powers which they afcribe to it, are not inherent in its nature, but imprefled upon it by fome external caufe, which they do not pretend to know, or to explain. Now, when we find wife men afcribing action and ac- tive power to a fubftance which they exprefsly teach us to con- fider as merely paflive and afted upon by fome unknown caufe, we muft conclude, that the adtion and adive power afcribed to it are not to be underftood ftridily, but in fome popular fenfe.
It ought llkewife to be obfei'ved, that although Philofophers, for the fake of being underftood, muft fpeak the language of the vulgar, as when they fay, the fun rifes and fets, and goes through all the figns of the zodiac, yet they often think diffe- rently from the vulgar. Let us hear what the greateft of natu- ral Philofophers fays, ia the 8th definition prefixed to his Pr'inci- pia, " Voces autem attradionis, impulfus, vel propenfionis cu- '• jufcunque in centrum, indifferenter et pro fe mutuo promlfcue " ufurpo; has voces non phyfice fed mathematice confixlerando. " Unde caveat ledtor, ne per hujus modi voces cogitet me fpe- " ciem vel modum adtionis, caufamve aut rationem j^yficam, " alicubi definire; vel centris (quae funt punda mathematica) " vires vere et phyfice tribuere, fi forte centra trahere, aut vires " centrorum eft'e, dixero."
In all languages, adion is attributed to many things which all men of common underftanding believe to be merely paflive j thus we fay, the wind blows, the rivers flow, the fea rages, the fire burns, bodies move, and impel other bodies.
Every OF THE PHENOMENA OF NATURE. 43 Every objedl which undergoes any change, mufl be either ac- CHAP, vr. tive or palTive in that change. This is felf-evident to all men from the firrt dawn of reafon; and therefore the change is al- ways exprefTed in language, either by an active or a pallive verb. Nor do I know any verb, exprelFive of a change, which does not imply either a<flion or palllon. The thing either changes, or it is changed. But it is remarkable in language, that when an external caufe of the change is not obvious, the change is al- ways imputed to the thing changed, as if it were animated, and had adlive power to produce the change in itfelf. So we fav, the moon clianges, the fun rifes and goes down.
Thus acllve verbs arc very often applied, and adlive power imputed to things, which a little advance in knowledge and ex- perience teaches us to be merely pailive. This proj^erty, com- ' mon to all languages, I endeavoured to account for in the fe- cond chapter of this Eflay, to which the reader is referred.
A like irregularity may be obferved in the ufe of the word figmfying can/e, in all languages, and of the words related to it.
Our knowledge of caufes is very fcanty In the moft advanced ftate of fociety, much more is it fo in that early period in which language is formed. A ftrong defire to know the caufes of things, is common to all men in every Hate; but the experience of all ages fhews, that this keen appetite, rather than go empty, will feed upon the hulks of real knowledge where the fruit can- not be found.
While we are very much in the dark with regard to the real agents or caufes which produce the phxnomena of nature, and have, at the fame time, an avidity to know them, ingenious men frame conjcdures, which thofe of weaker underflanding take for truth. The fare is coarfe, but appetite makes it go down.
F 2 Thus.
ESSAY I.
V.
CHAP. VI. Thus, In a very ancient fyftem, love and ftrife were made the caufes of things. Plato made the caufes of tilings to be mat- ter, ideas, and an efEcient archited. Aristotle, matter, form, and privation. Des Cartes thought matter, and a certain quan- tity of motion given it by the Almighty at firft, to be all that is neceffiu-y to make the material world. Leibnitz conceived the whole univerfe, even the material part of it, to be made up of monodes, each of which is active and intelligent, and produces in itfelf, by its own active power, all the changes it undergoes frpm the beginning of its exiftence to eternity.
In common language, we give the name of a caufe to a reafon, a motive, an end, to any circumflance which is connedled with the efFed, and goes before it.
Aristotle, and the fchoolmen after him, diftinguiflied four kinds of caufes, the efficient, the material, the formal, and the final. This, like many of Aristotle's diftindlions, is only a di- ftindion of the various meanings of an ambiguous word j for the efficient, the matter, the form and the end, have nothing common in their nature, by which they may be accounted fpe- cies of the fame genus; but the Greek word which Ve tranflate cavfe, had thefe four different meanings in Aristotle's days, and we have added other meanings. We do not indeed call the matter or the fonn of a thing its caufe; but we have final caufes, inflrumental caufes, occafional caufes, and 1 know not how many others.
Thus the word caufe has been fo hackneyed, and made to hare lb many different meanings in the writings of Philofophers, and in the difcourfe of the vulgar, that its original and proper mean- ina; is loft in the crowd.
With regard to the pha:nomena of nature, the important end of knowing their caufes, befides gratifying our curiofity, is, that OF THE PHiENOMENA OF NATURE. 45 ihat wc may know when to expedl them, or how to bring them CHAP. VI. ubout. This is very often of real importance in life; and tliis jnirpofe is fcrved, by knowing what, by the coiirfe of nature, goes before tlicm and is connedled with them; and this, there- fore, we call the cau/c of fuch a phxnonienon.
If a magnet be brought near to a mariner's compafs, the needle, which was before at reft, immediately begins to move, and bends its courfe towards the magnet, or perhaps the contrary way. If an imlearned failor is afked the caufe of this motion of the needle, he is at no lofs for an anfwer. He tells you it is the magnet j and the proof is clear ', for, remove the magnet, and the elTed ccafes; bring it near, and the cffed: is again pro- duced. It is, therefore, evident to fenfe, that die magnet is the caufe of this effect.
A Cartefian Philofopher enteVs deeper into the caufe of this phasnomenon. He obferves, that the magnet does not touch the needle, and therefore can give it no impulfe. He pities the ig- norance of the failor. The effect is produced, fays he, by mag- netic clTluvia, or fubtile matter, which paflcs from the magiiet to the needle, and forces it from its place. He can even fliew you, in a figure, where thefe magnetic effluvia iflue from the magnet, what round they take, and what way they return home again. And thus he thinks he comprehends perfedly how, and by what caufe, the motion of the needle is produced.
A Newtonian Philofopher enquires what proof can be offered for the exiftcnce of magnetic effluvia, and can find none. He therefore holds it as a fidion, a hypothefis; and he has learned that hypothefes ought to have no place in the pliilofophy of na- ture. He confelles his ignorance of the real caufe of this motion, and thinks, that his bullnefs, as a Philofopher, is onlv to find from experiment the laws by which it is regulated in aP cafes.
Thefe Thefe CHAP. VI. Thefe three perfons difFer much in their fentiments with re- gard to the real caufe of this phaenomenon; and the man who knows moft is he who is fenfible that he knows nothing of the matter. Yet all the three fpeak the fame language, and acknow- ledge, that the caufe of this motion is the attradive or repulfive power of the magnet.
What has been faid of this, may be applied to every phaeno- menon that falls within the compafs of natural philofophy. We deceive ourfelves, if we conceive, that we can point out the real efficient caufe of any one of them.
The grandefl difcovery ever made in natural philofophy, was that of the law of gravitation, which opens fuch a view of our planetary fyftem, that it looks like fomething divine. But the author of this difcovery was perfectly aware, that he difcovered no real caufe, but only the law or rule, according to which the unknown caufe operates.
Natural Philofophers, w^io think accurately, have a precife meaning to the terms they ufe in the fcience; and when they pretend to fhew the caufe of any phaenomenon of nature, they mean by the caufe, a law of nature of which that phaenomenon is a necelFary confequence.
The whole objed of natural philofophy, as Newton exprefsly teaches, is reducible to thefe two heads j firft, by jufl: indudion from experiment and obfervation, to difcover the laws of nature, and then to apply thofe laws to the folution of the phenomena of nature. This was all that this great Philofopher attempted, and all that he thought attainable. And this indeed he attained in a great meafure, with regard to the motions of our planetary fyllem, and with regard to the rays of light.
But fuppofing that all the phsenomena that fall within the reach OF THE PIIiENOMENA OF NATURE. 47 reach of our fcnfcs, were accoiintccl for from general laws of na- CiiAP. vi. ture, jiiflly deduced from experience; that is, fuppofmg natu- ral philofophy brought: to its utmoft perfedion, it does not dif- cover the efficient caufe of any one phaenomenon in nature.
The laws of nature are the rules according to which the ef- fe£ls are produced; but there muft be a caufe which operates according to thefe rules. The rules of navigation never navi- gated a fliip. The rules of architedure never built a houfe.
Natural philofophers, by great attention to the courfe of na- ture, have difcovered many of her laws, and have very happily applied them to account for many phasnomena; but they have never difcovered the efFicient caufe of any one phenomenon; nor do thofe who have diltinct notions of the principles of the fcience, make any fuch pretence.
Upon the theatre ofnature we lee Innumerable effects, which-' require an agent endowed with active 'power j but the agent is behind the fcene. Whether it be the Supreme Caufe alone, or a fubordinate caufe or caufes; and if fubordinate caufes be em- ployed by the Almighty, what their nature, their number, and ■ their different offices may be, are things hid, for wife reafous without doubt, from the human eye.
It is only in human adions, that may be imputed for praife or blame, that it is neceflfary for us to know who is the agent; and in this, nature has given us all the light that is necefTary for our condutl.
CHAP.
ESSAY I.
CHAP. VII.
Of the Extent of Human Power.
EVERY thing laudable and praife-worthy in man, muft con- lift in the proper exercife of that power which is given him by his Maker. This is the talent which he is required to occupy, and of which he muft give an account to him who com- mitted it to his truft.
To fome perfons more power is given than to others; and to the fame perfon more at one time and lefs at another. Its ex- iftence, its extent, and its continuance, depend folely upon the pleafure of the Almighty j but every man that is accountable muft have more or lefs of it. For, to call a perfon to account, to approve or difapprove of his condudt, who had no power to do good or ill, is abfurd. No axiom of Euclid appears more evi- dent than this.
As power is a valuable gift, to under-rate it is ingratitude to the giver; to over-rate it, begets pride and prefumption, and leads to unfuccefsful attempts. It is therefore, in every man, a point of wifdom to make a juft eftimate of his own power. ^Idferre recufent, quid valeant humeri.
We can only fpeak of the power of man in general; and as our notion of power is relative to its effedis, we can eftimate its extent only by the effects which it is able to produce.
It would be wrong to eftimate the extent of human power by the effedls which it has adlually produced. For every man had power to do many things which he did not, and not to do many things OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN POWER.
49 things wliich he did; othcrwife he could not be an ohiecft either CHAP. V'ir. of approbation or of difapprobation, to any rational being.
The efleds of human power are either immediate, or they are more remote.
The immediate eficcfts, I think, are reducible to two heads. We can give certain motions to our own bodies; and we can give a certain direction to our own thoughts.
Whatever we can do beyond this, muft be done by one of thefe means, or both.
We can 'produce no motion in any body in the univerfe, but by moving firft our own body as an inftrument. Nor can we produce thought in any other perfon, but by thought and mo- tion in ourfelves.
Our power to move our own body, is not only limited in its extent, but in its nature is fubjed to mechanical laws. It may be compared to a fpring endowed with the power of contra<5ling or expanding itfelf, but which cannot contradl without drawing equally at both ends, nor expand without pufhing equally at both ends; fo that every adion of the fpring is always accompanied with an equal readtion in a contrary diretflion.
We can conceive a man to have power to move his whole bo- dy in any diredtion, without the aid of any other body, or a power to move one part of his body without the aid of any other part. But philofophy teaches us that man has no fuch power.
If he carries his whole body in any direction with a certain quantity of motion, this he can do only by pufliing the earth, or fome other body, with an equal quantity of motion in the con- G trary CHAP. VI!. trary direaion. If he but ftretch out his arm in one diredion, * — " ' the reft of his body is pufhed with an equal quantity of mo- tion in the contrary diredlion.
This is the cafe with regard to all animal and voluntary mo- tions, which come within the reach of our fenfes. They are perfonned by the contraction of certain mufcles; and a mufcle, when it is contracted, draws equally at both ends. As to the motions antecedent to the contra6tion of the mufcle, and confe- quent upon the volition of the animal, we know nothing, and can fay nothing about them.
We know not even how thofe immediate effedls of our power are produced by our willing them. We perceive not any necef- fary connedion between the volition and exertion on our part, and the m.otion of our body that follows them.
Anatomifts inform us, that every voluntary motion of the body is performed by tlae contradlion of certain mufcles, and that the mufcles are contraded by fome influence derived from the nerves. But, without thinking in the leaft, either of muf- cles or nerves, we will only the external efTedl, and the inter- nal machinery, without our call, immediately produces that effed.
This is one of the wonders of our frame, which we have rea- fon to admire; but to account for it, is beyond the reach of our underflanding.
That there is an eftabliflied hannony between our willing cer- tain motions of our bodies, and the operation of the nerves and mufcles which produces thofe motions, is a fad known by expe- rience. This volition is an ad of th^ mind. But whether this ad of the~TTuii^~Tiave^~any phyfical effed upon the nerves and mufcles 5 or whether it be only an occafion of their being aded upon OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN POWER. ^r upon by fome other efficient, accordinc^ to the eftublifhed laws CITAP. viL of nature, is hid froin us. So dark is our conception of our own power when wc trace it to its origin.
We have good rcafon to believe, that matter had its origin from mind, as well as all its motions; but how, or in what man- ner, ic is moved by mind, we know as little as how it was created.
It is pofTible therefore, for any thing we know, that what we call the immediate effeds of our power, may not be fo in the Uridcrt fenfe. Between the will to produce the efl'edt, and the produdion of it, there may be agents or inftruments of which we are ignorant.