This may leave fome doubt, whether wc be in the flridteft fenfe, the efficient caufe of the voluntary motions of our own body. But it can produce no doubt with regard to the moral cftimation of our adions.
The man who knows that fuch an event depends upon his will, and who deliberately wills to produce it, is, in the ftridefl moral fenfe, the caufe of the event; and it is juftly imputed to him, whatever phyfical caufes may have concurred in its pro- duction.
Thus, he who malicioufly intends to Hioot his neighbour dead, and voluntarily does it, is undoubtedly the caufe of his death, though he did no more to occafion it than draw the trigger of the gim. He neither gave to the ball its velocity, nor to the powder its expanfive force, nor to the flint and fteel the power to ftrike fire; but he knew that what he did muff be followed by the man's death, and did it with that intention; and therefore he is juftly chargeable with the murder.
Philofophers may therefore difputc innocently, whether we 5a ESSAY I.
CHAP. vn. be the proper efficient caufes of the voluntary motions of our own body J or whether we be only, as Malebranche thmks, the occafional caufes. The determination of this queftion, if it can be determined, can have no efFed on human condudt.
The other branch of what is immediately in our power, is to give a certain dlr^dion to our own thoughts. This, as well as the firft branch, is limited in various ways. It is greater in fome perfons than in others, and in the fame perfon is very different, accord- ing to the health of his body, and the ftate of his mind. But that men, when free from difeafe of body and of mind, have a confiderable degree of power of this kind, and that it may be greatly increafed by pradice and habit, is fufficiently evident- from experience, and from the natural convidion of all man- kind.
Were we to examine minutely into the connedion between, our volitions, and the diredion of our thoughts which obeys, thefe volitions; were we to confider how we are able to give attention to an objed for a certain time, and turn our attention to another when we chufe, we might perhaps find it difficult tO' determine, whether the mind itfelf be the fole efficient caufe of- the voluntary changes in the diredion of our thoughts, or whe- ther it requires the aid of other efficient caufes.
I fee no good reafon why the difpute about efficient and oc- cafional caufes, may not be applied to the power of direding- our thoughts, as well as to the power of moving our bodies. In both cafes, I apprehend the difpute is endlefs, and, if it could be: brought to an ilTue, would be fruitlefs.
Nothing appears more evident to our reafon, than that there- mull be an efficient caufe of every change that happens in na- ture. But when I attempt to comprehend the manner in which an efficient caufe operates, either upon body or upon mind, there OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN POWER. S3 there Is a darknefs which my faculties arc not able to pene- chap^vi'. tratc.
However finall the immediate effefts of human power feem to be, its more remote effcdls are very confiderablc.
In this refpedl, the power of man may be compared to the Nile, the Ganges, and other great rivers, which make a figure upon the globe of the earth, and, travcrfing vafl; regions, bring fomctimes great benefit, at other times great mifchief to many, nations; yet, when we trace tliofc rivers to their fource, we fmd them to rife from inconfiderable fountains and rills.
The command of a mighty prince, what is it, but the found of his breatli, modified by his organs of fpeech? But it may have great confequences; it may raife armies, equip fleets, and fpread war and defolation over a great part of the earth.
The meaneft of mankind has confiderablc power to do good, and more to hurt himfelf and others.
From this I think we may conclude, that, although the dege- neracy of mankind be great, and juftly to be lamented, yet men, in general, are more difpofed to employ their power in doing good, than in doing hurt to their fellow-men. The lafl is much more in their power than tlic firft; and, if they were as much difpofed to it, human fociety could not fubfift, and the fpecies mud foon perifli from the eaith.
We may firll confider the efTecls which may be produced by human power upon the material fyflem.
It is confined indeed to the planet which we inhabit; we can- not remove to another j nor can we produce any change in the annual or diunial motions of our own.
But, 54 ESSAY I.
CHAP. vli. gut:^ by human power, great changes may be made upon tlie face of the earth; and thofe treafures of metals and minerals that are florcd up in its bowels, may be difcovered and brought forth.
The Supreme Being could, no doubt, have made the earth to fiipply the wants of man, without any cultivation by human la- bour. Many inferior animals, who neither plant, nor fow, nor fpin, are provided for by the bounty of Heaven. But this is not the cafe with man.
He has adive powers and ingenuity given him, by which he can do much for fupplying his wants ', and his labour is made ne- cellary for that purpofe.
His wants are more than thofe of any other animal that inha- bits this globe; and his refources are proportioned to them, and put within the fphere of his power.
The earth Is left by nature in fuch a flate as to require culti- vation for the accommodation of man.
It is capable of cultivation, in moft places, to fuch a degree, that, by human labour, it may afford fubfiftence to an hundred times the number of men it could in its natural ftate.
Every tribe of men, in evei'y climate, muft labour for their fubfiftence and accommodation; and their fupply is more or lefs comfortable, in proportion to the labour properly employed for that purpofe.
It is evidently the intention of Nature, that man fliould be la- borious, and that he fhould exert his powers of body and mind for his own, and for the common good. And, by his power properly applied, he may make great improvement upon the fer- tility OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN POWER. 55 tllity of the earth, and a great addition to his o-Mvn accommoda- cha?. vir. tion and comfortable ftate.
By clearing, tilling and manuring tlic ground, by planting and fowing, by building cities and harbours, draining marfhes and lakes, making rivers navigable, and joining them by canals, by manufaduring the rude materials which the earth, duly culti- vated, produces in abundance, by the mutual exchange of com- modities and of labour, he may make the bai'ren wildernefs the habitation of rich and populous ftates.
If \vc compare the city of Venice, the province of Holland, the empire of China, with thofe places of the earth which ne- ver felt the hand of induflry, we may form foinc conception of the extent of human power upon the material fyftcm, in changing the face of the eartli, and furnilhing the accommoda- tions of human life.
But, in order to produce thofe happy changes, man himfclf inuft be improved.
His animal faculties are fufiicient for the prcfervation of the fj)ecies; they grow up of themfelves, like the trees of the foreft, which require only the force of nature and the influences of Heaven.
His rational and moral faculties, like the earth itfelf, arc rude and barren by nature, but capable of a high degree of culture; ami this culture he muft receive from parents, from inflru<ftors, from thofe with whom he lives in fociety, joined with his own indurtry.
If wc confider the changes that may be produced by man upon his own mind, and upon the minds of others, they appear to be great.
Upon CHAP.viT. Upon his ovm mind he may make great improvement, In ac- quiring the treafures of ufeful knowledge, the habits of flcill in arts, the habits of wifdom, prudence, felf-command, and every other virtue. It is the conftitution of nature, that fuch qualities as exalt and dignify human nature are to be acquired by proper exertions; and, by a contrary condud, fuch qualities as debafe it below the condition of brutes.
Even upon the minds of others, great efFed:s may be produced by means within the compafs of human power; by means of good education, of proper inflrudlion, of perfuafion, of good example, and by the difcipline of laws and government.
That thefe have often had great and good effeds on the civili- zation and improvement of individuals, and of nations, cannot be doubted. But what happy efFeds they might have, if applied univerfally with the fkill and addrefs that is within the reach of human wifdom and power, is not eafily conceived, or to what pitch the happinefs of human fociety, and the improvement of the fpecies, might be carried.
What a noble, what a divine employment of human power is here afligned us? How ought it to roufe the ambition of pa- rents, of inftrudtors, of lawgivers, of magiftrates, of every man in his ftation, to contribute his part towards the accomplifhment of fo glorious an end?
The power of man over his own and other minds, when we trace it to its origin, is involved in darknefs, no lefs than his power to move his own and other bodies.
How far we are properly efficient caufes, how far occafional ■caufes, I cannot pretend to determine.
We know that habit produces great changes in the mind 5 but how OF TUT. EXTENT OF HUMAN POWER. 57 how it docs fo, v,c know not. ^Vc know, that example has a CHAP. vir» powerful, anil, in the early period of life, ahnofl: an irrtfiftihle elYcti; but we know not how it produces this elTcdl. The com- munication of thonj^ht, fcntiment and palllon, from one mind to another, has foraethinj^ in it as myfterious as the communication of motion from one body to another.
We perceive one event to follow another, according to efta- blillied laws of nature, and we are accuftomed to call the firil the caufe, and the lafl the effect, without knowing what is the bond that unites them. In order to produce a certain event, we ufe means which, by laws of nature, are connedcd with that event; and we call ourfelves the caufe of that event, though other eilicient caufes may have had the chief hand in its pro- dudion.
Upon the whole, human power, in its exigence, in Its extent, and in its exertions, is entirely dependent upon God, and upon the laws of nature which he has eftabliilied. This ought to banilh pride and arrogance from the moft mighty of the fons of men. At the fame time, that degree of power which we have received from the bounty of Heaven, is one of the noblefl; gifts of God to man; of which we ought not to be infenfible, that we may not be ungrateful, and that we may be excited to make the proper ufe of it.
The extent of human power is pcrfei^ly fm'ted to the ftate of man, as a (late of improvement and difcipline. It is fufPicient to animate us to the noblefl exertions. By the proper exercifc of this gift of God, human nature, in individuals and in Ibcicties, may be exalted to a high degree of dignity and felicity, and the earth become a paradifc. On the contrary, its perverfion and nbufe is the caufe of moft of the evils that afHi<5t human life.
H ESSAY ESSAY ir.
OF THE WILL.
Obfcrvai'iom concerning the WilL EVERY man is confcious of a power to determine, in things whicli he conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of w/V/y and, as it is ufual, in the operations of the mind, to give tlie fame name to the power and to the ad of that power, the term iv'tll is often put to figni- fy the adt of determining, which more properly is called voli- tion.
Volition, tliereforc, fignifies the acft of willing and determin- ing, and will is put indifferently to lignify cither the power of willing or the ad.
But the term leill has ^'ery often, efpccially In the writings of Philofophers, a more e.xtenfive meaning, which we muft careful- ly dirtinguifla from that which we have. now given.
In the general divifion of our faculties into underflandhig and will, our pafllons, appetites and affedions arc comprehended under the will; and lb it is m.ade to figiiify, not only our de- termination to ad or not to ad, but cverv motive:'.nd incite- ment to ndion.
CHAP. J. It Is this, probably, that has led fome Philofophers to reprefent defire, averfion, hope, fear, joy, forrow, all our appetites, paf- fions and alTedions, as different modifications of the will, which, I think, tends to confound things which are very different in their nature.
The advice given to a man, and his determination cohfequent to that advice, are things fo different in their nature, that it would be improper to call them modifications of one and the fame thing. In like manner, the motives to adion, and the de- termination to ad or not to ad, are things that have no com- mon nature, and therefore ought not to be confounded under one name, or reprefented as different modifications of the fame thing.
For this reafon, in fpeaking of the will in this Effay, I do not comprehend under that term any of the incitements or motives which may have an influence upon our determinations, but fole- ly the determination itfelf, and the power to determine.
Mr Locke has confidered this operation of the mind more at- tentively, and diftinguifhed it more accurately, than fome very ingenious authors w^ho wrote after him.
He defines volition to be, " An ad of the mind knowingly " exerting that dominion it takes Itfelf to have over any part " of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any " particular adion."
It may more briefly be defined. The determination of the mind to do, or not to do fomething which we conceive to be in our power.
If this were given as a flridly logical definition, It would be liable to this objedion, that the determination of the mind is only OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE WILL. 6r CHily another term for volition. But it ought to be obferved, CIIAP. i. that the niort limple ads of the mind do not admit of a logical defniition. The way to form a clear notion of theni is, to re- fled attentively upon them as we feel them in ourfelves. With- out this relleclion, no definition can give us a diftintl conception of them.
For this rcafon, rather than fift any definition of the will, I fliall make fome obfervations upon it, whicli may lead us to re- fled upon it, and to dillinguilh it from other ads of mind, which, from the ambiguity of words, are apt to be confounded with it.
FirJ}, Every ad of will muft have an objed. He that wills muft will fomething; and that which he wills is called the ob- jcd of his volition. As a man cannot think without thinking of ibmething, nor remember without remembering fomething, fo neither can he will without willing fomething. Every ad of will, therefore, muft have an objcd; and the perfon who wills muft have fome conception, more or lefs diftind, of what he wills.
By this, things done voluntarily arc diftingulflied from things done merely from inftind, or merely from habit.
A healthy child, fome hours after its birth, feels the fenfatioa of hunger, and, if applied to the breaft, fucks and fwallows Its food very perfedly. We have no reafon to think, that, be- fore it ever fucked, it has any conception of that complex opera- tion, or how it is performed. It cannot, therefore, with pro- priety, be faid, that it wills to fuck.
Numberlefs inftances might be given of things done by animals without any previous conception of what they are to do; without the intention of doing it. They ad by fome inward blind iinpulfe.
CH-AP. I. pulfe, of which the efficient caufe is hid from us; and though "^ ' there is an end evidently intended by the action, this intention is not in the animal, but in its Maker.
Other things are done by habit, which cannot properly be called voluntary. We fhut our eyes feveral times every minute while we are awake 3 no man is confcious of willing this every time he does it.
A fecond obfcrvation is, That the immediate objed of will muft be fome adion of our own.
By this, will is diftinguiflied from two adls of the mind, which fometimes take its name, and thereby are apt to be con- founded with it p thefe are defire and command.
The diftindlion between will and defire has been well explain- ed by Mr Locke; yet many later writers have overlooked it, and have reprefented defire as a modification of will.
Defire and will agree in this, that both mufl have an objed, of which w^e mufi: have fome conception j and therefore both muflr be accompanied with fome degree of underftanding. But' they differ in feveral things.
The objed of defire may be any thing which appetite, pafilon or affedion, leads us' to purfue; it may be any event which we think good for us, or for thofe to whom we are well affeded. 1 may defire meat, or drink, or eafe from pain: But to fay that I will meat, or will drink, or will eafe from pain, is not Englifh.. There is therefore a difiindion in common language between defire and will. And the dillindion is, That v/hat we willmufl be an adion, and our own adion;, what we defire may not be our own adion, it may be no adion at all.
A OBSERVATIONS CONTCERNING THE WILL. 63 A man tlellres that his children maybe happy, and tliat they CIIAP. i. may bcliavc well. Their being happy is no udion at all 3 their behaving well is not his adion but theirs.
With regard to our own adions, we may defire what we do not will, and will what we do not defire ^ nay, what we have a great avcrfion to.
A man a-thirfl has a (Irong defire to drink, but, for fome par- ticular reafon, he determines not to gratify his defire. A judge, from a regard to juftlce, and to the duty of his office, dooms a criminal to die, while, from humanity or particular affedion, he defires that he ihould live. A man for health may take a nau- feous draught, for which he has no defire but a great avcrfion. Defire therefore, even when its objed is fome action of our own, is only an incitement to will, but it is not volition. The deter- mination of the mind may be, not to do what we defire to do. But as defire is often accompanied by will, we are apt to over- look the diftindion between them.
The command of a perfon is fomctimes called his will, fome- timcs his defire; but when thefe words are ufed properly, they fignify three dilTerent ads of the mind.
The immediate objed of will is fome adion of our own; the objcd of a command is fome adion of another peribn, over whom we claim authority ^ the objed of defire may be no adion .at all.
In giving a command all thefe ads concur 3 and as they go together, it is not uncommon in language, to give to one the name which properly belongs to another.
A command being a voluntary adion, there muft be a will to give CHAP, i.^ g|yg j-}jg command: Some defire is commonly the motive to that ad; of will, and the command is the effect of it.
Perhaps it may be thought that a command is only a defire exprefied by language, that the thing commanded fliould be done. But it is not fo. For a defire may be expreOed by language ■when there is no command j and there may poflibly be a com- mand without any defire that the thing commanded fliould be done. There have been inftances of tyrants who have laid grie- vous commands upon their fubjeds, in order to reap the penalty of their difobedience, or to fumifh a pretence for their puniih- ment.
We might farther obfer\^e, that a command is a fecial a(5t of the mind. It can have no exiftence but by a communication of thought to fome intelligent being; and therefore implies a belief that there is fuch a being, and that we can communicate our thoughts to him.
Defire and will are folitary a6ls, which do not imply any fuch communication or belief.
"^ The immediate object of volition therefore, mufl be fome adlion, and our own action.
A third obfervation is. That the objed: of our volition mufl be fomething which we believe to be in our power, and to de- pend upon our will.
A man may defire to make a vifit to the moon, or to the planet Jupiter, but he cannot will or determine to do it; becaufe he knows it is not in his power. If an infane perfon fhould make an attempt, his infanity muft firft make him believe it to be in his power.
A OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE WILL. 65 A man In his flcep mny be ftrnck witli a pally, which deprives CHAP. I. hiin of tlie power of fpcech; when he awakes, he attempts to f|K-ak, not knowing; that he has loft the power. }5ut when he knows by experience that the power is gone, he ceafes to make the effort.
The fame man, knowing that fome perfons have recovered the power of fijecch after they had loll it by a paralytica! ftroke, may now and then make an effort. In this effort, iiowever, there is not properly a will to fpcak, but a will to try whether he can fpeak or not.
In like manner, a man may exert his ftrength toraifc a weight which is too heavy for him. liut he always does this, either from the belief that he can raife the weight, or for a trial whe- ther he can or not. It is evident therefore, that what we will niuft be believed to be in our power, and to depend upon our will.
The next obfervation is, That when we will to do a thing im- mediately, the volition is accompanied with an eiforc to execute that which we willed, y If a man wills to raife a great weight from the ground by the llrengih of his arm, he makes an eflfort for that purpofe propor- tioned to the weight he determines to raife. A great weight re- quires a great effort; a fmall weight a Icfs effort. We fay in- deed, thjt to raife a very fmall body requires no effort at all. But this, I ai:)|)rehend, muft be underftood either as a figurative way of fpeaking, by which things very fmall are accounted as nothing; or it is owing to our giving no attention to very final! efforts, and therefore having no name for them.
Great efforts, wlicthcr of body or mind, arc attended with difficulty, and wlien long continued produce laflltude, which re- I quires CHAP. I. quires that they fliould be intermitted. This leads us to refled " upon them and to give them a name. The name effort is commonly appropriated to them; and thole that are made with eafe, and leave no fenfible efted, pafs without obfervation and with- out a name, though they be of the fame kind, and differ only in degree from thofe to which the name is given.
This effort we are confcious of, if we will but give attention to it; and there is nothing in which we are in a more flrid fenfe adive.
The laji obfervation is. That in all determinations of the mind that are of any importance, there mufl be fomething in the pre- ceding flate of the mind that difpofes or inclines us to that de- termination.
If the mind were always in a flate of perfect indifference, without any incitement, motive, or reafon, to adt, or not to ad:, to ad one way rather than another, our adive power, having no end to purfue, no rule to dired its exertions, would be given in vain. We fliould either be altogether inadive, and never will to do any thing, or our volitions would be perfedly unmeaning and. futile, being neither wife nor foolilh, virtuous nor vicious.
We have reafon therefore to think, that to every being to whom God hath given any degree of adive power, he hath alfo given fome principles of adion, for the diredion of that power to the end for which it was intended.
It is evident that, in the conftitution of man, there are various principles of adion fuited to our flate and fituation. A particu- lar confideration of thefe is the iubjed of the next effay; in this we are only to confider them in general, with a view to ex- amine the relation they bear to volition, and how it is influ- enced by them.
CHAP, OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE WILL. 67 CHAT. II.
Of the Influence of Incitements and Motives upon the Will.
WE come into the world ignorant of every thing, yet we muft do many things in order to our fubfirtence and well-being. A new-born child may be carried in arms, and kept warm by his nurfe \ but he muil fuck and fwallow his food for himfelf. And this muft be done before he has any concep- tion of fucking or fwallowing, or of the manner in which they are to be performed. He is led by nature to do thefe adions without knowing for what end, or what he is about. This we call tnftiuEl.
In many cafes there Is no time for voluntary determination. The motions muft; go on fo rapitlly, that the conception and vo- lition of every movement cannot keep pace with them. In fome cafes of this kind, inftind, iu others habit, comes in to our aid.
When a man ftumblcs and lofes his balance, the motion ne- ceftarv to prevent his fall would come too late, if it were the confcquence of thinking what is fit to be done, and making a voluntary efiort for that purpofe. He does this inftindively.
When a man beats a drum or plays a tune, he has not time to dired every particular beat or ftop, by a voluntary determina- tion; but the habit which may be acquired by exercifc, anfwers the purpofe as well.
By inftind therefore, and by habit, we do many things with- out any exercife either of judgment or will.
In other adions the will Is exerted, but without judgment.
1 2 Suppofe CHAP. II. Suppofe a man to know that, in order to live, he mufl: eat. What (hall he eat? How much? And how often? His reafon can anfwer none of thefe queftions j and therefore can give no diredion how he fhould determine. Here again nature, as an in- dulgent parent, fupplies the defedls of his reafon; giving him ap- petite, which fhews him when he is to eat, how often, and how much J and tafle, which informs him what he is, and what he Is not to eat. And by thefe principles he is much better direded than he could be without them, by all the knowledge he can ac- quire.
As the Author of nature has given us fome principles of adlon- to fupply the defeds of our knowledge, he has given others to^ lupply the defeds of our wifdom and virtue..
The natural delires, affedions and paflions, which are common to the wife and to the foolifli, to the virtuous and to the vicious, and even to the more fagacious brutes, ferve very often to dired the courfe of human adions. By thefe principles men may perform the moft laborious duties of life, without any regard to duty 5 and do what is proper to be done, without regard to propriety; like a veflel that is carried on In her proper courfe by a pro- fperous gale, without the (kill or judgment of thofe that are a- board.
Appetite, a(Iedion, or pallibn, give an Impulfe to a certain adion. In this impulfe there is no judgment implied. It may- be weak or ftrong; we can even conceive It Irrefiftible. In the cafe of madnefs it Is fo. Madmen have their appetites and paf^ lions y but they want the power of felf-government; and there- fore we do not Impute their adions to the man but to the dif- eafe.
In adions that proceed from app*etlte or paffion, we are pa(^" iive In part, and only In part adive. They are therefore part- INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES UPON THE WILL. ^9 ly imputed to the pafllon; and If it is fnppofcd to be irrcfiftiblc, ^ wc do not impute them to the man at all.
Even an American favagc judg;es in this manner: When in a fit of drunkcnnefs he kills his friend: As foon as he comes to himfclf, he is very forry for what he has done j but pleads that drink, and not he, was the caufe.
We conceive brute-animals to have no fuperior principle to control their appetites and palllons. On this account, their ac- tions are not fubjedl to law. Men are in a like ftate in infancy, in madnefs, and in the delirium of a fever. They have appe- tites and palTlons, but they want that which makes them moral agents, accountable for their condu<fl, and objedts of moral ap- probation or of blame.
In fome cafes, a flronger Impulfe of appetite or pafllon may oppofe a weaker. Here alfo there may be determination and' adion without judgment.
Suppofe a foldier ordered to inount a breach, and cenain of prefent death if he retreats, this man needs not courage to go on, fear is fufficient. The certainty of prefent death if he retreats, is an overbalance to the probability of being killed if he goes on. Tlie man is pufhed by contrary forces, and it re- quires neither judgment nor exertion to yield to the ItrongelK A hungry dog adts by the fame principle, if meat is fet before him, with a threatening to beat him if he touch it. Hunger pufties him forward, fear pufhes him back with more force, and the ftrongeft force prevails.
Thus we fee, that, in many even of our voluntary aclions, we may acl from the impulfe of appetite, affedion, or jnilion, without CHAP. ir.
70 ESSAY II.
CHAP. IL -without any exerclfe of judgment, and much in the fame man« ner as brute-animals feem to a.&..
Sometimes, however, there is a calm in the mind from the gales of pafllon or appetite, and the man is left to work his way, in the voyage of Life, without thofe impulfes which they give. Then he calmly weighs goods and evils, which are at too great a diftance to excite any pafllon. He judges what is befl; upon the whole, without feeling any bias drawing him to one fide. He judges for himfelf as he would do for another in his fituation; and the determination is wholly imputable to the man, and not in any degree to his pafllon.
Every man come to years of underftanding, who has given any attention to his own condudt, and to that of others, has, in his mind, a fcale or meafure of goods and evils, more or lefs exadt. He makes an efl:imate of the value of health, of repu- tation, of riches, of pleafure, of virtue, of felf-approbation, and of the approbation of his Maker. Thefe things, and their con- traries, have a comparative importance in his cool and delibe- xate judgment.