Is not this the man whom we flaould call a juft man? We confider the moral virtues as inherent in the mind of a good man, even when there is no opportunity of exercifing them. And what is it in the mind which we can call the virtue of ju- flice, when it is not exercifed? It can be nothing but a fixed purpofe, or determination, to acft according to the rules of ju- ftice, when there is opportunity.
The 88 CHAP. HI. The Roman law defined jufllce, A Jleady and perpetual will to (rive to every man his due. When the opportunity of doing juftice is not prefent, this can mean nothing ehe than a fteady parpofe, which is very properly called will. Such a purpofe, if it is ftea- dy, will infallibly produce jufl conduct; for every known tranf- crellion of juftice demonftrates a change of purpofe, at leafl for that time.
What has been fald of juftice, may be fo eafily applied to every other moral virtue, that it is unneceflary to give inftances. They are all fixed purpofes of ading according to a certain rule.
By this, the virtues may be eafily diftinguiflied, in thought at leaft, from natural affedtions that bear the fame name. Thus, benevolence is a capital virtue, which, though not fo neceflliry to the being of fociety, is entitled to a higher degree of appro- bation than even juftice. But there is a natural affedtion of be- nevolence, common to good and bad men, to the virtuous and to the vicious. How fliall thefe be diftinguiflied?
In practice, indeed, we cannot diftinguifli them in other men, and with difficulty in ourfelves; but in theory, nothing is more eafy. The virtue of benevolence is a fixed purpofe or refolution to do good when we have opportunity, from a convidtion that it is right, and is our duty. The affedtion of benevolence is a propenfity to do good, from natural conftitution or habit, with- out regard to reditude or duty.
There are good tempers and bad, which are a part of the conftitution of the man, and ai'e really involuntary, though they often lead to voluntary adions. A good natural temper is not virtue, nor is a bad one vice. Hard would it be indeed to think, that a man fliould be born under a decree of reprobation, be- caufe he has the misfortune of a bad natural temper.
The OF VOLUNTARY OPERATIONS. 89 The Phyfiog-nomifl; faw, in the features of Socrates, the f^g- chap. iir. natures of many bad difpofitlons, which that good man acknow- ledged he feh within him; but the triumph of his virtue was the greater in having conquered them.
In men who have no fixed rules of condu(fl, no felf-govern- ment, the natural temper is variable by numberlefs accidents. The man who is full of affedion and benevolence this hour, when a crofs accident happens to ruffle him, or perhaps when an eafterly wind blows, feels a flrange revolution in his temper. The kind and benevolent affedlions give place to the jealous and malignant, which are as readily indulged in their turn, and for the fame reafon, becaufe he feels a propenfity to indulge them.
We may obferve, that men who have exercifed their rational powers, are generally governed in their opinions by fixed prin- ciples of belief; and men who have made the greateft advance m felf-government, are governed, in their pradlice, by general fixed purpofes. Without the former, there would be no fleadi- nefs and confiftence in our belief j nor without the latter, in our condud;.
When a man is come to years of underdanding, from his edu- cation, from his company, or from his ftudy, he forms to him- felf a fet of general principles, a creed, which governs his judg- ment in particular points that occur.
If new evidence is laid before him which tends to overthrow any of his received principles, it requires in him a great degree of candour and love of truth, to give it an impartial examination, and to form a new judgment. Moil men, when they are fixed in their principles, upon what they account fufficient evidence, can hardly be drawn into a new and ferious examination of them, M They 90 ESSAY II.
CHAP. ]n. They get a habit of believing them, which Is flrengthened by repeated ads, and remains Immoveable, even when the evidence upon which their belief was at firfl grounded, is forgot.
It is this that makes converfions, either from religious or political principles, fo difficult.
A mere prejudice of education ftlcks faft, as a propofitlon of Euclid does with a man who hath long ago forgot the proof. Both Indeed are upon a fimllar footing. We reft in both, be- caufe we have long done fo, and think we received them at firll upon good evidence, though that evidence be quite forgot.
When we know a man*s principles, we judge by them, rather than by the degree of his underftanding, how he will determine in any point which is connedied with them.
Thus, the judgment of moft men who judge for themfelves Is governed by fixed principles; and, I apprehend, that the con- dudl of moft men who have any felf-government, and any con- fiftency of conduct, Is governed by fixed purpofes.
A man of breeding may, m his natural temper, be proud, pat fionate, revengeful, and In his morals a very bad man; yet, in good company, he can ftlfle every pafllon that is inconfiftent with good breeding, and be humane, modeft, complaifant, even to thofe whom In his heart he defpifes or hates. Why is this man, who can command all his pallions before company, a Have to them in private? The reafon is plain: He has a fixed refolu- tion to be a man of breeding, but hath no fuch refolution to be a man of virtue. He hath combated his moft violent pafllons a thoufand times before he became mafter of them In company. The fame refolution and perfeverance would have given him the eGirunand of them when alone, A OF VOLUNTARY OPERATIONS. 91 A fixed rcfolution retains its influence upon the condu(fl, even CHAP. ii». \vhen the motives to it are not in view, in the fame manner as a fixed principle retains its influence upon the belief, when the evidence of it is forgot. The former may be called a habit of the w/7/, the latter a habit of the underjiandlng. By fuch habits chiefly, men are governed in their opinions and in their prac- tice.
A man who has no general fixed purpofes,may be fiiid, as Pope fays of moft: women, (I hope imjuftly) to have no charadler at all. He will be honefl; or diflionclt, benevolent or malicious, compaflionate or cruel, as the tide of his paflions and affections drives him. This, however, I believe, is the cafe of but a few in advanced life, and thefe, with regard to condud:, the wcakefl: and moft contemptible of the fpecies.
A man of fome conftancy may change his general purpofes once or twice in life, feldom more. From the purfuit of plea- fure in early life, he may change to that of ambition, and from ambition to avarice. But every man who ufes his reafon in the conduct of life, will have fome end, to which he gives a pre- ference above all others. To this he fteers his courfe; his pro- je(fls and his actions will be regulated by it. Without this, there would be no confiftency in his condud;. He would be like a ftiip in the ocean, which is bound to no port, under no govern- ment, but left to the mercy of winds and tides.
We obferved before, that there are moral rules refpeding the attention we ought to give to objeds and refpeding our delibe- rations, which are no lefs evident than mathematical axioms. The fame thing may be obferved with refpedl to our fixed pur- pofes, whether particular or general.
Is it not felf-cvident, that, after due deliberation, we oughc to refolve upon that condud, or that courfe of condud, which, JM 2 to 9* CHAP. IV. to our fober judgment, appears to be befl and mofl approvable? That we ought to be firm and fteady in adhering to fuch refo- lutions, while we are perfuaded that they are right; but open to conviction, and ready to change our courfe, when we have good evidence that it is wrong?
Ficklenefs, inconftancy, facility, on the one band, wilfulnefs, inflexibility, and obllinacy, on the other, are moral qualities, refpedlng our purpofes, which every one fees to be wrong. A manly firmnefs, grounded upon rational convldlion, is the pro- per mean which every man approves and reveres.
Corollaries.
FROM what has been faid concerning the will, it appears, frj, That, as fome ads of the will are tranfient and mo- mentary, fo others are permanent, and may continue for a long, time, or even through the whole courfe of our rational life.
When T will to ftretch out my hand, that will is at an end as- foon as the adion is done. It is an adt of the will which be- sfins and ends in a moment. But when I will to attend to a mathematical propofition, to examine the demonflratlon, and the confequences that may be drawn from it, this will may con- tinue for hours. It mufl continue as long as my attention con- tinues; for no man attends to a mathematical propofitipn longer than he wills.
The fame thing may be faid of deliberation, with regard,, (either to any point of couuud:, or with regard to any general courfe COROLLARIES. ^ courfe of condud. We will to deliberate as long as. we do dc- CHAP. iv. liberate > and that may be for days or for weeks.
A purpofc or refolution, which we have fliewn to be an act of the will, may continue for a great part of life, or for the whole, after we are of age to form a refolution.
Thus, a merchant may refolve, that, after he has made fuch a fortune by traffic, he will give it up, and retire to a country life. He may continue this refolution for thirty or forty years, and execute it at laft; but he continues it no longer than he wills, for he may at ^ny time change his refolution.
There are therefore a6ls of the will which are not tranfient and momentary, which may continue long, and grow into a habit. This deferves the more to be obiei-ved, becaufe a very eminent Philofopher has advanced a contrary principle, to wit. That all the ads of the will are tranfient and momentary; and from that principle has drawn very important conclufions, with regard to what conftltutes the moral charader of man.
hfeconi corollary is. That nothing in a man, wherein the will is not concerned, can juftly be accounted either virtuous or im- moral.
That no blame can be imputed to a man for what is altoge- ther involuntary, is fo evident in itfelf, that no arguments can make it more evident. The pradice of all criminal courts, in all enlightened nations, is founded upon it.
If it fliould be thought an objedion to this maxim, that, by the laws of all nations, children often fuffer for the crimes of parents, in which they had no hand, the anfwer is eafy.
Yor,JirJ}, Such is the connedion between parents and children, that CHAP. IV. that the punllhment of a parent miift hurt his children whether the law will or not. If a man is fined, or imprifoned; If he lofes life, or limb, or eftate, or reputation, by the hand of juftice, his children fuffer by neceflary confequence. Secondly When laws intend to appoint any punidmient of innocent children for the father's crime, fuch laws are either unjuft, or they are to be confidered as adts of police, and not of jurifprudence, and are intended as an expedient to deter parents more effectually from the commlffion of the crime. The innocent children, in this cafe, are facrlficed to the public good, in like manner, as, to prevent the fpreading of the plague, the found are fliut up with the infeded in a houfe or fhip, that has the infed;ion.
By the law of England, if a man is killed by an ox goring him, or a cart running over him, though there be no fault or negledl in the owner, the ox or the cart is a deodand, and is confif- cated to the Church. The Legiflature furely did not intend to punifli 'the ox as a criminal, far lefs the cart. The intention evidently was, to inlplre the people with a facred regard to the life of man.
When the Parliament of Paris, with a fimilar intention, or- dained the houfe in which RavIUiac was born, to be razed to the ground, and never to be rebuilt, it would be great weaknefs to conclude, that the wife judlcatui'e intended to punlfh the houfe.
If any judicature fhould. In any inftance, find a man guilty, and an obje6l of punllhment, for what they allowed to be alto- gether involuntary, all the world would condemn them as men who knew nothing of the firft and mofl fundamental rules of jullice.
I have endeavoured to fliew, that, in our attention to objeds, in order to form a right judgment of them; in our deliberation about particular adions, or about general rules of condud; In our COROLLARIES.
95 our purpofcs and refolutions, as well as in the execution of them, chap. iv. the will has a j)rincii'al fliare. If any man could be found, who, in the whole courfc of his life, had given due attention to things that concern him, had deliberated duly and impartially about his coiidudl, had formed his refolutions, and executed them ac- cording to his befl: judgment and capacity, furely fuch a man might hold up his face before God and man, and plead inno- cence. He muft be acquitted by the impartial Judge, whatever his natural temper was, whatever his pallions and affedions, as far as they were involuntary.
A tlj'ird corollary is. That all virtuous habits, when we diftin- guilh them from virtuous actions, confift in fixed purpofes of adling according to the rules of virtue, as often as we have op- portunity.
We can conceive in a man a greater or a lefs degree of fleadi- nefs to his purpofes or refolutions; but that the general tenor of his condutl: fhould be contrary to them, is impollible.
The man who has a determined refolution to do his duty in every inftance, and who adheres fteadily to his refolution, is a perfedl man. The man who has a determined purpofe of car- rying on a courfe of adlion which he knows to be wrong, is a. hardened offender. Between thefe extremes there are many in- termediate degrees of virtue and vice.
ESSAY ESSAY JII.
OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.
Of the Mechanical Principles of AEl'ion.
Of the Principles of AElion in general.
IN the ftrid phllofophical fenfe, nothing can be called the aftion of a man, but what he previoufly conceived and willed or de- termined to do. In morals we commonly employ the word in this fenfe, and never impute any thing to a man as his doing, in which his will was not interpofed. But when moral imputation is not concerned, we call many things adions of the man, which he neither previoufly conceived nor willed. Hence the adions of men have been diftinguilbed into three claffes, the voluntary, the involuntary, and the mixed. By the lafl: are meant fuch adions as are \mdcr the command of the will, but are commonly per- formed without any interpofition of will.
We cannot avoid ufing the word aElion in this popular fenfe, without deviating too much from the common ufe of language 5 and it is in this fenfe we ufe it when we enquire into the prin- ciples of adion in the human mind.
V>y principles of adion, I undcrftand every thing that incites us to ad.
N If CHAP. I, If there were no incitements to adiion, adive power would be given us in vain. Having no motive to dired: our adlive ex- ertions, the mind would, in all cafes, be in a ftate of perfed in- difference, to do this or that, or nothing at all. The adive power would either not be exerted at all," or its exertions would be perfedly unmeaning and frivolous, neither wife nor foolifh, neither good nor bad. To every adion that is of the fmalleft importance, there muft be fome incitement, fome motive, fome reafon.
It is therefore a moft important part of the philofophy of the human mind, to have a diflind and juft view of the various prin- ciples of adion, which the Author of our being hath planted in our nature, to arrange them properly, and to affign to every one its rank.
By this it is, that we may difcover the end of our being, and the part which is affigned us upon the theatre of life. In this part of the human conllitution the noblefl work of God that falls within our notice, we may difcern moft clearly the cha- rader of him who made us, and how he would have us to em- ploy that adive power which he hath given us.
I cannot without great diffidence enter upon this fubjed, ob- ferving that almoft every author of reputation, who has given at:- tention to it, has a fyftem of his own; and that no man has been fo happy as to give general fatisfadion to thofe who came after him.
There is a branch of knowledge much valued, and very juftly, which we call knowledge of the world, knowledge of mankind, knowledge of human nature: This, I think, confifts in knowing from what principles men generally ad; and it is commonly the fruit of natural fagacity joined with experience.
A OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. 99 A man of fagacity, who has had occafion to deal in mtercftlng chap, i. matters, with a great variety of perfons of diflcrent age, fcx, rank and profclTion, learns to judge what may be expeded from men in given circinnftances; and how they may be mofl; efFec- tually induced to ad the part which he defircs. To know this is of fo great importance to men in adlive life, that it is called knowing men, and knowing human nature.
This knowledge may be of confiderable ufe to a man who would fpeculate upon the fubjedt we have propofed, but is not, by itfelf, futPicient for that purpofe.
The man of the world conjedlures, perhaps with great proba- bility, how a man will adl in certain given circumllances; and this is all he wants to know. To enter into a detail of the va- rious principles which influence the adtions of men, to give them diftind names, to define them, and to afcertain their different provinces, is the bufmefs of a philofoplier, and not of a man of the world; and, indeed, it is a matter attended with great diffi- culty from various caufes.
Firji, On account of the great number of adive principles that influence the adions of men.
Man has, not without reafon, been called an epitome of the univerfe. His body, by which his mind is greatly affeded, being a part of the material fyftem, is fubjed to all the laws of inani- mate matter. During fome part of his exiftence, his flate is very like that of a vegetable. He rifes, by imperceptible degrees, to the animal, and, at lafl, to the rational life, and has the prin- ciples that belong to all.
Another caufe of the difficulty of tracing the various principles of adion in man, is, That the fame adion, nay, the fame courfc and train of adiou may proceed from very different principles.
N a Men loo ESSAY III.
CHAP. I. Men who are fond of a hypothefis, commonly feek no other proof of US truth, but that it ferves to account for the ap- pearances which it is brought to explain. This is a very flip- pery kind of proof in every part of philofophy, and never to be truiled ', but leafl of all, when the appearances to be accounted for are. human adtions.
Moft actions proceed from a variety of principles concurring in their diredlon; and according as we are difpofed to judge favourably or unfavourably of the perfon, or of human nature in general, we impute them wholly to the befl, or wholly to the ■worft, overlooking others which had no fniall Ihare in them.
The principles from which men afb can be difcovered only in thefe two ways; by attention to the condud: of other men^ or by attention to our own condu<ft, and to what we feel in our- felves. There is much uncertainty in the former, and much difficulty in the latter.
Men differ much In their charad^ers; and we can obferve the condudl of a few only of the fpecles. Men differ not only from other men, but from themfelves at different times, and on dif- ferent occalions; according as they are in the company of their fuperiors, inferiors, or equals j according as they are in the eye of flrangers, or of their familiars only, or in the view of no hu- man eye j according as they are in good or bad fortune, or in good or bad humour. We fee but a fmall part of the adlions of our mofl familiar acquaintance; and what we fee may lead us to a probable conjedture, but can give no certain knowledge of the principles from which they acl.
A man may, no doubt, know with certainty the principles from which he himfelf ad:s, becaufe he is confcious of them. But this knowledge requires an attentive refledlion upon the operations of his own mind, which is very rarely to be found.
It OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION. ici It is perhaps more eafy to find a man who has formed a jufl notion CHAP. I. of the cliarader of man in general, or of thofc of his familiar acquaintance, than one who has a jufl notion of Ins own cha- racter.
Moll men, through pride and felf-flattery, are apt to think themfelves better than they really are; and fome, perhaps from melancholy, or from falfe principles of religion, arc led to think themfelves worfe than they really are.
It requires, therefore, a very accurate and impartial examina- tion of a man's own heart, to be able to form a diftind notion of the various principles which influence his conduct:. That this is a matter of great difliculty, we may judge from the very different and contradidory fyftems of Philofophers upon this fubjedt, from the earliefl ages to this day.
During the age of Greek Philofophy, the Platonifl, the Peri- patetic, the Stoic, the Epicurean, had each his own fyftem. In the dark ages, the Schoolmen and the MylHcs had fyftems dia- metrically oppofite; and, fince the revival of learning, no con- troverfy hath been more keenly agitated, efpecially among Bri- tifli Philofophers, than that about the principles of adion in the human conftitution- They have determined, to the fatisfadion of the learned, the forces by which the planets and comets traverfe the boundlefs regions of fpace; but have not been able to determine, with any degree of unanimity, the forces which every man is confcious of m himfelf, and by which his condud is directed.
Some admit no principle but felf-love; others refolve all into love of the pleafures of fenfe, varioufly modified by the aflocia- tion of ideas; others admit difinterefled benevolence along with feLf-love; others reduce all to realon and pallion; others to piCfion JD2 ESSAY III.
CHAP.i. fion alone J nor is there lefs variety about the number and dif- tribution of the paffions.
The names we give to the various principles of adlion, have fo little precifion, even in the befl and pureft writers in every language, that, on this account, there is no fmall difEculty in giving them names, and arranging them properly.
The words appetite, pojfion^ offeEl'iotiy iuterejl, reafon^ cannot be faid to have one definite fignification. They are taken fome- times in a larger, and fometimes in a more limited fenfe. The fame principle is fometimes called by one of thofe names, fome- times by another; and principles of a very different nature are often called by the fame name.
To remedy this confufion of names, it might perhaps feem proper to invent new ones. But there are fo few entitled to this privilege, that I ihall not lay claim to it; but fhall endeavour to clafs the various principles of human adlion as diftindlly as I am able, and to point out their fpecific differences j giving them fuch names as may deviate from the common ufe of the words as little as poflible.
There are fome principles of adtlon which require no atten- tion, no deliberation, no will. Thefe, for diflindlion's fake, we fliall call mechanical. Another clafs we may call animal, as they feem common to man with other animals. A third clafs we may call rational, being proper to man as a rational creature.
CHAP, T INSTINCT.
hiJlhiEl.
H E mechanical principles of adion may, I think, be re- duced to two fpecies, inJlinEls and babUs.
By Inflindl, I mean a natural blind impulfe to certain adlions, without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do.
Thus a man breathes while he Is alive, by the alternate con- traction and relaxation of certain mufcles, by which the chef!:, and of confcquence the lungs, are contracted and dilated. There is no reafon to think, that an infant new-born, knows that breathing is neceflary to life in its new ftate, that he knows how it muft be performed, or even that he has any thought or conception of that operation; yet he breathes as foon as he is born with perfedl regularity, as if he had been taught, and got the habit by long pradlice.
By the fame kind of principle, a new-born child, when its ftomach is emptied, and nature has brought milk into the mo- ther's breaft, fucks and fwallows its food as perfedly as if it. knew the principles of that operation, and had got the habit of working according to them.
Sucking and fwallowing are very complex operations. Ana- tomifts defcribe about thirty pairs of mufcles that muft be em- ployed in every draught. Of thofe mufcles, every one muft be ferved by its proper nerve, and can make no exertion but by fomc influence communicated by the nerve. The exertion of all thofc mufcles and nerves is not fimultaneous. They muft fucceed CH\P. II.
ESSAY III.
CHAP. II. fucceed each other in a certain order, and their order is no lefs necellliry than the exertion itfelf.
This regular train of operations is carried on according to the niceft rules of art, by the infant, who has neither art, nor fcience, nor experience, nor habit.
That the infant feels the uneafy fenfation of hunger, I admit; and that it 'fucks no longer than till this fenfation be removed. But who informed it that this uneafy fenfation might be re- moved, or by what means? That it knows nothing of this is evident; for it will as readily fuck a finger, or a bit of ilick, as the nipple.
By a like principle it is, that infants cry when they are pain- ed or hurt; that they are afraid when left alone, efpecially in the dark; that they ftart when in danger of falling; that they are terrified by an angry countenance, or an angry tone of voice, and are foothed and comforted by a placid countenance, and by foft and gentle tones of voice.
In the animals we are befl acquainted with, and which we look upon as the more perfect of the brute-creation, we fee much the fame inflinds as in the human kind, or very fimilar ones, fuited to the particular date and manner of life of the animal.
Befides thefe, there are in brute-animals inflinds peculiar to each tribe, by which they are fitted for defence, for offence, or for providing for themfelves, and for their offspring.
It is not more certain, that nature hath furniflied various animals with various weapons of ofience and defence, than that the fame nature hath taught them how to ufe them; the bull and the ram to butt, the horfe to kick, the dog to bite, the lion INSTINCT. IC5 lion to life his paws, tlie boar his tuHcs, the fcrpent his fangs, CHAP.ir. and the bee and wafp their fting.
The manufadlures of animals, If we may call them by that name, prefent us with a wonderful variety of inflinds, belong- ing to particular fpecies, whether of the focial or of the folitary kind; the nefls of birds, fo fimilar in their fituation and archi- tedure ii the fame kind, fo various in different kinds; the webs of fpiders, and of other fpinning animals; the ball of the filk- worm i the ncfts of ants and other mining animals; the combs of wafps, hornets and bees j the dams and houfes of beavers.
The inftind of animals is one of the moft delightful and in- ftrudive parts of a moft pleafant ftudy, that of natural hiftory; and deferves to be more cultivated than it has yet been.
Every manufacturing art among men was invented by fome man, improved by others, and brought to perfedion by time and experience. Men learn to work in it by long pradice, which i-roduces a habit. The arts of men vary in every age, and in every nation, and are found only in thofe who have been taught them.
The manufactures of animals differ from thofe of men in many flriking particulars.
No animal of the fpecies can claim the invention. No ani- mal ever introduced any new improvement, or any variation from the former pradice. Every one of the fpecies has equal (kill from the beginning, without teaching, without experience or habit. Every one has its art by a kind of infpiration. I do not mean that it is infpired witk the principles or niles of the art, but with the ability and inclination of working in it to per- fedion, without any knowledge of its principles, rules or end.
O The io6 ESSAY III.
CHAP. II. The more fagacious animals may be taught to do many things which they do not by inftincl. What they are taught to do, they do with more or lefs fklll, according to their fagacity and their training. But, in their own arts, they need no teaching nor training, nor Is the art ever improved or loft. Bees gather their honey and their wax, they fabricate their combs and rear their young at this day, neither better nor worfe than they did when Virgil fo fweetly fung their works.
The work of every animal is Indeed like the works of nature,, perfedl in Its kind, and can bear the moft critical examination of the mechanic or the mathematician. One example from the animal laft mentioned may ferve to Illuftrate this.
Bees, It Is well known, conftru(5t their combs with fmall cells on both fides, fit both for holding their ftore of honey, and for rearing their young. There are only three poffible figures of the cells, which can make them all equal and fimilar, without any ufelefs nterftlces. Thefe are the equilateral triangle, thefquare, and the regular hexagon.
It Is well known to mathematicians, that there is not a fourth way poffible. In which a plane may be cut Into little fpaces that fhall be equal, fimilar and regular, without leaving any Inter- ftices. Of tlie three, the hexagon is the moft proper, both for convenlency and ftrength. Bees, as if they knew this, make their cells regular hexagons.