Though a man knew that his life muft be fupported by eating, reafon could not direcl: liim when to eat, or what; how much, or how often. In all thefe things, apj^etite is a much better guide than our reafon. Were reafon only to direcfl us in this matter, its calm voice would often be drowned in the hurry of bufinefs, or the charms of amulement. But the voice of appe- CL 2 titc J ESSAY III.
CHAP. r. tjte rifes gradually, and, at laft, becomes loud enough to call of? our attention from any other employment.
Every man muft be convinced, that, without our appetites, even fuppofing mankind inipired with all the knowledge requi- iite for anfwering their ends, the race of men mufl have periflied long ago; but, by their means, the race is continued from one generation to another, whether men be favage or civilized, knowing or ignorant, virtuous or vicious.
By the fame means, every tribe of brute-animals, from the whale that ranges the ocean to the lead microfcopic infed:, has been continued from the beginning of the world to this day j nor has good evidence been found, that any one fpecies which God made has perifhed.
Nature has given to every animal, not only an appetite for its food, but tafte and fmell, by which it diftinguilhes the food proper for it.
It is pleafant to fee a caterpillar, which nature intended to live upon the leaf of one fpecies of plant, travel over a hundred leaves of other kinds without tafting one, till it comes to that which is its natural food, which it immediately falls on, and de- vours greedily.
Mofl; caterpillars feed only upon the leaf of one fpecies of plant, and nature fuits the feafon of their produdion to the food that is intended to nourifh them. Many infedls and ani- mals have a greater variety of food; but, of all animals, man has the greatell variety, being able to fubfill; upon almoft every kind of vegetable or animal food, from the bark of trees to the oil of whales.
I believe our natural appetites may be made more violent by excellive excefllve indulgence, and that, on the other hand, they may be chai\l weakened by flarvlng. The firfl is often the efie<fl of a perni- cious hixury, the hift may fometinies be the effe(f\ of want, fonietinics of fuperftition. I apprehend that nature has given to our appetites that degree of ftrength which is mod proper for us j and that whatever ahers tlieir natural tone, either in excefs or in defetY, does not mend the work of nature, but may mar and pervert it.
A man may eat from appetite only. So the brutes common- ly do. He may eat to pleafe his tafte when he has no call of appetite. I believe a brute may do this alfo. He may eat for the fake of health, when neither ajipetite nor tafte invites. This, as far as I am able to judge, brutes never do.
From fo many different principles, and from many more, the fame adion may be done; and this may be faid of moft human adions. From this, it appears, that very different and contrary theories may ferve to account for the adlions of men. The caufes affigned may be fufhcient to produce the effecfb, and yet not be the true caufes.
To acH: merely from appetite is neither good nor ill in a mo- ral view. It is neither an object of praife nor of blame. No man claims any praife becaufe he eats when he is hungry, or refts when he is weary. On the other hand, he is no objedl of blame, if he obeys the call of appetite when there is no reafon to hinder him. In this, he ads agreeably to his nature.
From this we may obferve, that the definition of virtuous ac- tions, given by the ancient Stoics, and adopted by fome modera authors, is imperfed. They defined virtuous adions to be fuch as are according to nature. What is done according to the animal part of our nature, which is common to us with the brute-ani- raals, is in itfelf neither virtuous nor vicious, but perfedly in- different.
CHAP. I. diiTerent. Then only it becomes vicious, when it is done in op- poiition to Ibme principle of iuperior importance and authority. And it may be virtuous, if done for fome important or worthy tnd.
Appetites, considered in themfelves, are neither focial princi- ples of adion, nor felfifh. They cannot be called focial, be- caufe they imply no concern for the good of others. Nor can they juflly be called felfiili, though they be commonly referred to that clafs. An appetite draws us to a certain object, without regard to its being good for us, or ill. There is no felf-love im- plied in it any more than benevolence. We fee, that, in many cafes, appetite may lead a man to what he knows will be to his hurt. To call this adling from felf-love, is to pervert the mean- ing of words. It is evident, that, in every cafe of this kind, felf-love is fncrificed to appetite.
There are fome principles of the human frame very like to our appetites, though they do not commonly get that name.
Men are made for labour either of body or mind. Yet ex- ceflive labour hurts the powers of both. To prevent this hurt, nature "hath given to men, and other animals, an uncafy fenfa- tion, which always attends excellive labour, and which we call fatigue, -wearinefs, lajjitudc. This uneafy fenfation is conjoined •with the defire of relt, or intermlffion of our labour. And thus nature calls us to reft when we are weary, in the fame manner as to eat when we are hungry.
In both cafes there is a defire of a certain obje<fl, and an un- eafy fenfation accompanying that defire. In both cafes the de- fire is fatiated by its objed, and returns after certain intervals. In this only they differ, that in the appetites firft mentioned, the uneafy fenfation arifes at intervals without adion, and leads to to a certain adion: In wearincfs, tlie uncafy fcnfation arifcs CHAP. L from adion too long continued, and leads to relh But nature Intended that we Ihould be adive, and we need fome principle to incite us to adlion, when we happen not to be invited by any appetite or pallion.
For this end, when rtrength and fpirits are recruited by reft, nature has made total inadion as uneafy as excelfive labour.
We may call this the principle of a^ivi/y. It is mofl confpl- cuous in children, who cannot be fuppofed to know how ufeful and necefTary It is for their improvement to be conflantly em- ployed. Their conftant activity therefore aj^pcars not to pro- ceed from their having fome end conftantly in view, but rather from this, that they defire to be always doing fomething, and feel uneafinefs in total inadion.
Nor Is this principle confined to childhood 3 it has great ef- fedls in advanced life.
When a man has neither hope, nor fear, nor defire, nor pro- ject, nor employment, of body or mind, one might be apt to think him the happicfl mortal upon earth, having nothing to do but to enjoy himfelf: but we find him, in fad, the moft un- happy.
He is more weary of inadlon than ever he was of exceflive labour. He is weary of the world, and of his own exillence j and is more miferable than the failor wreftling with a florin, or the foldier mounting a breach.
This difmal ftate is commonly the lot of the man who has neither exercife of body nor employment of mind. For the mind.
^^HAP^ mind, like water, corrupts and putrifies by ftagnation, but by running purifies and refines.
Befides the appetites which nature hath given us for ufeful and necefiliry purpofes, we may create appetites which nature never gave.
The frequent ufe of things which flimulate the nervous fyftem, produces a languor when their effeil is gone off, and a defire to repeat them. By this means a defire of a certain objedt is created, accompanied by an uneafy fenfation. Both are remo- ved for a time by the objedl defired j but they return after a certain interval. This differs from natural appetite, only in being acquired by cuflom. Such are the appetites which fome men acquire for the ufe of tobacco, for opiates, and for intoxi-^ eating liqours.
Thefe are commonly called habits, and juftly. But there are different kinds of habits, even of the adive fort, which ought to be difflnguifhed. Some habits produce only a facility of doing a thing, without any inclination to do it. All arts are habits of this kind, but they cannot be called principles of adllon. Other habjts produce a pronenefs to do an adlion, without thought or intention. Thefe we confidered before as mechanical prin- ciples of adlion. There are other habits which produce a de- lire of a certain objeft, and an uneafy fenfation, till it is obtain- ed. It is this lafl kind only that I call acquired appetites.
As It is befl to preferve our natural appetites, in that tone and degree of flrength which nature gives them, fo we ought to be- ware of acquiring appetites which nature never gave. They are always ufelefs, and very often hurtful.
Although, as was before obferved, there be neither virtue nor vice vice in riding- from appetite, there may be much of either in the ^^^- ^- management of our appetites.
When appetite h oppofed by fome principle drawing a con- trary way, there muft be a determination of the will, which fliall prevail, and this determination may be, in a moral fenfe, right or wrong.
Appetite, even in a brute-animal, may be reftrained by a ilronger principle oppofed to it. A dog, when he is hungry and has meat fet before him, may be kept from touching it by the fear of immediate punilhment. In this cafe his fear ope- rates more ftrongly than his defire.
Do we attribute any virtue to the dog on this account? I think not. Nor fhould we afcribe any virtue to a man in a like cafe. The animal is carried by the ftrongeft moving force. This requires no exertion, no felf-government, but paffively to yield to the ftrongeft impulfe. This, I think, brutes always do j there- fore we attribute to them, neither virtue nor vice. We confider them as being neither objeQs of moral approbation, nor difap- probation.
But it may happen, that, when appetite draws one way, it may be oppofed, not by any appetite or pafiion, but by fome cool principle of adlion, which has authority without any impulfive force: For example, by fome intereft, which is too diftant to raife any pafllon or emotion j or by fome confideration of decency, or of duty.
In cafes of this kind, the man is convinced that he ought not to yield to appetite, yet there is not an equal or a greater im- pulfe to oppofe it. There are circumftances, indeed, that con- vince the judgment, but thefe are not fiifficient to determine the will agaiufl a ftrong appetite, without felf-govcmment.
R I ESSAY III.
CHAP. I. I apprehend that brute-animals have no power of felf-govern- ment. From their conftitution, they muft be led by the appe- tite or paflion which is itrongell for the time.
On this account they have, in all ages, and among all nations, been thought incapable of being governed by laws, though fonie of them may be fubjeds of difcipline.
The fame would be the condition of man, if he had no pow- er to reftrain appetite, but by a ftronger contrary appetite or paffion. It would be to no purpofe to prefcribe laws to him for the government of his adions. You might as well forbid the wind to blow, as forbid him to follow whatever happens to give the flrongefl prefent impulfe.
Every one knows, that when appetite draws one way, duty, decency, or even interefl, may draw the contrary way j and that appetite may give a ftronger impulfe than any one of thefe, or even all of them conjoined. Yet it is certain, that, in every cafe of this kind, appetite ought to yield to any of thefe princi- ples when it ftands oppofed to them. It is in fuch cafes that felf-government is neceflary.
The man who fuffers himfelf to be led by appetite to do w hat he knows he ought not to do, has an immediate and natural convidtion that he did wrong, and might have done otherwife;, and therefore he condemns himfelf, and confefles that he yield- ed to an appetite which ought to have been under his com- mand.
Thus it appears, that though our natural appetites have in themfelves neither virtue nor vice, though the ading merely from appetite, when there is no principle of greater authority to oppofe it, be a matter indifferent; yet there may be a great deal of virtue or of vice in the management of our appetites; and and that ihc power of fclf-govcrnmciit is nccclTary for their re- CH'^P- "• pulation.
Of Befires, A NOT HER clafs of animal principles of aclion in man, 1 Ihall, for want of a better fpecific name, call dcftres.
They are diflingiiiflied from appetites by this: That there is not an uneafy fcnfation proper to each, and always accompany- ing it J and that they are not periodical, but conllant, not being fated with their objects for a time, as appetites are.
The defires I have in view, are chiefly thefe three, tlie defire of power, the defire of efleem, and the defire of knowledge.
We may, I think, perceive fome degree of thefe principles in brute-animals of the more fagacious kind j but in man they are much more confpicuous, and have a larger fphere.
In a herd of black cattle there is a rank and fubordination. When a ftranger is introduced into the herd, he mud fight every one till his rank is fettled. Then he yields to the ftronger and alTumes authority over the weaker. The cafe is much the fame in the crew of a (hip of war.
As foon as men alTociate together, the defire of fuperiority difcovers itfelf. In barbarous tribes, as well as among the gre- garious kinds of animals, rank is determined by flrength, cou- rage, fwiftnefs, or fuch other qualities. Among civili/ed na- tions, many things of a different kind give power and rank; R 2 places ^HAP^ places in government, titles of honour, riches, ■wifdom, elo- quence, virtue, and even the reputation of thefe. All thefe are either different fpecies of power, or means of acquiring it; and •when they are fought for that end, mufl be confidered as inftan- ces of the defire of power.
The defire of efteem Is not peculiar to man. A dog exults In the approbation and applaufe of his mafter, and is humbled by his difpleafure. But in man this defire is much more conlpi- cuous, and operates In a thoufand different ways.
Hence it Is that fo very few are proof agalnfl flattery, when it Is not very grofs. We wifli to be well In the opinion of o- thers, and therefore are prone to interpret in our own favour, the figns of their good opinion, even when they are ambiguous.
There are few Injuries that are not more eafy to be born than contempt.
We cannot always avoid feeing, In the condudl of others, things that move contempt; but, in all polite circles, the figns of It muft be fuppreffed, otherwife men could not converfe to- gether.
As there Is no quality, common to good and bad men, more efteemed than courage, nor any thing In a man more the ob- je6i: of contempt than cowardice; hence every man defires to be thought a man of courage; and the reputation of cowardice Is worfe than death. How many have died to avoid being thought cowards? How many, for the fame reafon, have done Vvhat made them unhappy to the end of their lives.
I believe many a tragical event. If traced to Its fource In hu- man nature, might be referred to the defire of eflieem, or the dread of contempt.
In In brute-animals there is fo little that can be called know- chap, ii.^ ledge, that the dcfirc of it can make no confiderable figure in them. Yet I have fccn a cat, when brought into a new habita- tion, examine with care every corner of it, and anxious to know every lurking place, and the avenues to it. And I believe the fame thing may be obferved in many other fpecies, efpeci- ally in thofe that are liable to be hunted by man, or by other animals.
But the defire of knowledge in the human fpecies, is a prin- - ciple that cannot efcape our obfervation.
The curiofity of children is the principle that occupies mofl of their time while they are awake. What they can handle they examine on all fides, and often break in pieces, in order to difcover what is within.
When men grow up their curiofity does not ceafe, but is em- ployed upon other objedls. Novelty is confidered as one great fource of the pleafures of tafte, and indeed is neceflary, in one degree or other, to give a relifh to them all.
When we fpeak of the defire of knowledge as a principle of adlion in man, we muft not confine it to the purfuits of the Phi- lofopher, or of the literary man. The defire of knowledge dif- covers itfelf, in one perfon, by an avidity to know the fcandal of the village, and who makes love, and to whom; in another, to know the economy of the next family j in another, to know what the poll brings, and, in another, to trace the path of a new comet.
When men ihew an anxiety, and take pains to know what is of no moment, and can be of no ufe to thcmfelves or to others, this is trifling, and vain curiofity. It is a culpable weaknefs and folly 3 but flill it is the wrong dIre«flion of a natural principle; and and ESSAY III.
CHAP. II. a^-id fliews the force of that principle, more than when it is di- redied to matters worthy to be known.
I think it unneceflary to ufe arguments to fliow, that the de- Hres of power, of efteem, and of knowledge, are natural prin- ciples in the conftitution of man. Thofe who are not convinced •of this by refleAing upon their own feelings and fentiments, will not eafily be convinced by arguments.
Power, efteera and knowledge, are fo ufeful for many purpofes, that it is eafy to refolve the defire of them into other principles. Thofe who do fo muft maintain, that we never defire thefe ob- jeds for their own fakes, but as means only of procuring plea- fure, or fomething which is a natural object of defire. This, indeed, was the dod:rine of Epicurus; and it has had its vota- ries in modern times. But it has been obferved, that men de- fire poflhumous fame, which can procure no pleafure.
Epicurus himfelf, though he believed that he fhould have no €xiflence after death, was fo defirous to be remembered with effeem, that, by his lafl will, he appointed his heirs to comme- morate his birth annually, and to give a monthly feafl to his difciples, upon the twentieth day of the moon. What pleafure could this give to Epicurus when he had no exiflence? On this account, Cicero juflly obferves, that his dodirine was re- futed by his own practice.
Innumerable inflances occur in life, of men who facrifice eafe, pleafure, and every thing elfe, to the lufl of power, of fame, or even of knowledge. It is abfurd to fuppofe, that men fliould facrifice the end to what they defire only as the means of promoting that end.
The natural defires I have mentioned are, in themfelves, nei- ther virtuous nor vicious. They are parts of our conftitution, ' and and ought to be regulated and rcftrained, when they ftand in chap, il competition with more important principles. But to eradicate them if it were poOiblc, (and I believe it is not) would only be like cutting oft' a leg or an arm, that is, making ourfelves other creatures than God has made us.
They cannot, with propriety, be called rehifli. principles, though they have commonly been accounted fuch.
"When power is defired for its own fake, and not as the means in order to obtain fomething elfe, this deli re is neither felfifh nor focial. When a man defires power as the means of doing good to others, this is benevolence. When he defires it only as the means of promoting his own good, thisisfelf-love. But when he defires it for its own fake, this only can properly be called the defire of power; and it implies neither felf-lovc nor benevo- lence. The fame thing may be applied to the defires of efleein and of knowledge.
The wife intention of nature in giving us thefe defires, is na lefs evident than in giving our natural appetites.
Without the natural appetites, reafon, as was before obferved, would be infufficient, either for the prefervation of the indivi- dual, or the continuation of the fpecies j and without the natu- ral defires we have mentioned, human virtue would be infuffi- cient to influence mankind to a tolerable condutl: in fociety.
To thefe natural defires, common to good and to bad men, it is owing, that a man, who has little or no regard to virtue, • may notwithftanding be a good member of fociety. It is true, indeed, that perfedl virtue, joined with perfect knowledge, would make both our appetites and defires unneceflary incum- brances of our nature; but as human knowledge and human virtue CHAP. 11,^ virtue are both very imperfedl, thefe appetites and defires are necellary fupplements to our imperfe<5lions.
Society, among men, could not fubfifl without a certain de- gree of that regularity of condudl which virtue prefcribes. To this regularity of conduft, men who have no virtue are induced by a regard to charaiSler, fometimes by a regard to intereft.
Even in thofe who are not deditute of virtue, a regard to cha- rader is often an ufeful auxiliary to it, when both principles concur in their diredion.
The purfuits of power, of fame, and of knowledge, require a felf-command no lefs than virtue does. In our behaviour towards our fellow-creatures, they generally lead to that very condu6t which virtue requires. I fay generally, for this, no doubt, ad- mits of exceptions, efpecially in the cafe of ambition, or the defire of power., The evils which ambition has produced in the world are a common topic of declamation. But it ought to be obferved, that where it has led to one adlion hurtful to fociety, it has led to ten thoufand that are beneficial to it. And we juftly look upon the want of ambition as one of the mofl unfavourable fymptoms in a man's temper.
The defires of efteem and of knowledge are jhighly ufeful to fociety, as well as the defire of power, and, at the fame time, are lefs dangerous in their exceflTes.
Although adlions proceeding merely from the love of power, of reputation, or of knowledge, cannot be accounted virtuous, or be entitled to moral approbation; yet we allow them to be manly, ingenuous, and fuited to the dignity of human nature; and OFDESIRES.,37 and therefore they are entitled to a degree of eftimation, fupc- ctiap. 11. rlor to ihofe which proceed from mere appetite.
Alexander the Great deferved that epithet in the early part of his life, when cafe and pleafure, and every appetite, were facrificed to the love of glory and power. Bat when we view him conquered hy oriental luxury, and ufing his power to grati- fy his paflions and apjietitcs, he finks in our efteein, and feenu to forfeit the title which he had acquired.
Sardanapalus, who is faid to have purfued pleafure as ea- gerly as Alexander purfued glory, never obtained from man- kind the appellation of the Great.
Appetite is the principle of moft of the adions of brutes, and we account it brutal in a man to employ himfelf chiefly in the gratification of his appetites. The dcfires of power, of efleem, and of knowledge, are capital parts in the conftituti-on of man • '' and the adions proceeding from them, though not properly vir- tuous, are human and manly; and they claim a jufl: fuperiority over thofe that proceed from appetite. This, I think, is the uni- verfal and unbiafled judgment of mankind. Upon what ground this judgment is founded, may deferve to be confidered in its proper place.
The defires we have mentioned arc not only highly ufeful in fociety, and in their nature more noble than our appetites, they are likewife the moft proper engines that can be ufed in the edu- cation and difcipliue of men.
In training brute-animals to fuch habits as they are capable of, the fear of punilhment is the chief inllrument to be ufed. But in training men of ingenuous difpofition, ambition to excel, and the love of efteem, are much nobler and more powerful S engines, S engines, ^CHAF. II. engines, by which they may be led to worthy conduct, and trained to good habits.
To this we may add, that the defires we have mentioned are very friendly to real virtue, and make it more eafy to be ac- quired.
A man that is not quite abandoned mufl behave Co in fociety as to preferve forae degree of reputation. This every man de- fires to do, and the greater part adually do it. In order to this, he mufl acquire the habit of rellraining his appetites and paf- fions within the bounds which common decency requires, and fo as to make himfelf a tolerable member of fociety, if not an ufeful and agreeable one.
It cannot be doubted that many, from a regard to charadler and to the opinion of others, are led to make themfelves both ufeful and agreeable members of fociety, in whom a fenfe of duty has but a fmall influence.
Thus men, living in fociety, efpecially in poliihed fociety, are tamed and civilized by the principles that are common to good and bad men. They are taught to bring their appetites and paf- fions under due reftraint before the eyes of men, which makes it more eafy to bring them under the rein of virtue.
As a horfe that is broken is more eafily managed than an un- broken colt, fo the man who has undergone the difcipline of focie- ty is more tractable, and is in an excellent ftate of preparation for the difcipline of virtue; and that felf-command, which is ne- celFary in the race of ambition and honour, is an attainment of no fmall importance in the courfe of virtue.
For this reafon, I apprehend, they err very grofsly who con- ceive the life of a hermit to be favourable to a courfe of virtue.
The OF DESIRES, The hermit, no doubt, is free from fome temptations to vice, chap. ii. but he is deprived of many ftrong inducements to felf-govcrn- nient, as well as of every opportunity of cxercifing the focial virtues.
A very ingenious author has refolved our moral fcntiments refpeding the virtues of felf-government, into a regard to the opinion of men. This I think is giving a great deal too much to the love of iefleem, and putting the iliadow of virtue in place of the fubftance; but that a regard to the opinion of others is, in mofl: inftanccs of our external behaviour, a great inducement to good condud, cannot be doubted. For, whatever men may pradice themfelves, they will always approve of that in others which they think right.
It was before obferved, that, befides the appetites which na ture has given us, we may acquire appetites which, by indul- gence, become as importunate as the natural. The fame thing may be applied to defires.
One of the moft remarkable acquired defires Is that of mo- ney, which, in commercial ftates, will be found in mofl men, in one degree or other, and, in fome men, fwallows up every other defire, appetite and pallion.
The defire of money can then only be accounted a principle of adion, when it is defired for its own fake, and not merely as the means of procuring fomething clfe.
It feems evident, that there is in mifers fuch a defire of mo- ney; and, I fuppofe, no man will fay that it is natural, or a part of our original confiitution. It feems to be the ef^'ed of habit.
In commercial nations, money is an infli-ument by which al- moft every thing may be procured that is defired. Being uleful S a for ESSAY III.
CHAP. IJ. for many different purpofes as the means, fome men lofe fight of the end, and terminate their defire upon the means. Money is alfo a fpecies of power, putting a man in condition to do many things which he could not do without it; and power is a natural objed: of defire, even when it is not exercifed.
In like manner, a man may acquire the defire of a title of honour, of an equipage, of an efiate.
Although our natural defires are highly beneficial to (bciety, and even aiding to virtue, yet acquired defires are not only ufe- lefs, but hurtful and even difgraceful.
No man is afhamed to own, that he loves power, that he loves efteem, that he loves knowledge, for their own fake. There may be an excefs in the love of thefe things, which is a ble- milh; but there is a degree of it, which is natural, and Is no blemifli. To love money, titles or equipage, on any other ac- count than as they are ufeful or ornamental, is allowed by all to be weaknefs and folly.
The natural defires I have been confidering, though they cannot be called facial principles of adlion in the common fenfe of that word, fince it is not their objed: to procure any good or benefit to others, yet they have fuch a relation to fociety, as to ftiew moft evidently the Intention of nature to be, that man Ihould live in fociety.
The defire of knowledge is not more natural than is the de- fire of communicating our knowledge. Even power would be lefs valued if there were no opportunity of Ihewing it to others. It derives half its value from that circumflance. And as to the defire of elleem, it can have no pofiTible gratification but in fo- ciety.
Thefe OF BENEVOLENT AFFECTION IN GENERAL. 141 Thefe parts of our conltitiition, therefore, are evidently in- chap. iir. tended for focial life; and it is not more evident that birds were made for flying and fiHies for fwimming, than^hat mm, endow- ed with a natural defire of power, of efteem, and of knowledge, is made, not for the fiivage and folitary Hate, but for living in fociety.
w Of Benevolent Jlffcdlion in generol.
E have fcen how, by inftind and habit, a kind of me- chanical principles, man, without any expence of thought, without deliberation or will, is led to many anions, necellary for his prefervation and well-being, which, without thofe principles, all his fkill and wifdom would not have been able to accomplifli.
It may perhaps be thought, that his deliberate and voluntary actions are to be guided by his reafon.
But it ought to be obftrved, that he is a voluntary agent long before he has the ufe of reafon. Reafon and virtue, the prero- gatives of man, are of the laieft growth. They come to matu- rity by flow degrees, and are too weak, in the greater part of the fpecies, to fecure the prefervation of individuals and of com- munities, and to produce that varied fcene of human life, in which they are to be exercifed and improved.
Therefore the wife Author of our being haili imnlanted in human nature many inferior principles of ad^tion, which, with little or no aid of reafon or virtue, preferve the fpecies, and pro- duce the various exertions, and the various changes and revolu- tions which we oLfcrve upon the theatre of life.
In ESSAY III.
CHAP. III. In this bufy fcene, reafon and virtue have accefs to adl their parts, and do often produce great and good efFed:s; but whe- ther they interpofe or not, there are adlors of an inferior order that will carry on the play, and produce a variety of events, good or bad.
Reafon, if It were perfedl, would lead men to ufe the proper means of preferving their own lives, and continuing their kind. But the Author of our being hath not thought fit to leave this taflc to reafon alone, otherwife the race would long ago have been extind. He hath given us, in common with other ani- mals, appetites, by which thofe important purpofes are fecured, whether men be wife or foollfh, virtuous or vicious.
Reafon, if it were perfedl, would lead men neither to lofe the benefit of their adlive powers by inadllvlty, nor to overfirain them by excellive labour. But nature hath given a powerful afliflant to reafon, by making inadlvlty a grievous punifhment to Itfelf; and by annexing the pain of lallitude to exceffive labour.
Reafon, If It were perfed, would lead us to defire power, know- ledge, and the efteem and affection of our fellow-men, as means of promoting our own happlnefs, and of being ufeful to others. Here again, nature, to fupply the defeds of reafon, hath given us a ftrong natural defire of thofe objeds, which leads us to pur- fue them without regard to their utility.
Thefe principles we have already confidered; and, we may obferve, that all of them have things, not perfons, for their ob- jedt. They neither imply any good nor 111 affedllon towards any other perfon, nor even towards ourfelves. They cannot therefore, with propriety, be called either felfi/h ox foetal. But there are various principles of adion in man, which have per- fons for their immediate objed, and imply, in their very nature, our OF BENEVOLENT AFFECTION IN GENERAL. 143 our being well or ill affedled to fome peilbn, or, at leaft, to fome CHA? ill. animated being.
Such principles I lluill call by the general name of affc6lions; Nvhether they difpofe us to do good or hurt to others.