PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN TH!£ UNIVERSITY OT CI.ASGOW* fV/io hath put luifdom in the invjard parts P Job.
VOL. II.
M,DCC,I,XXXVI, CONTENT S, VOL. II.
ESSAY IV. OF CONCEPTION.
Fage Chap. i. X)/ conception, or Jimple apprehenjion in general, i 3. Mijiakes concerning conception, — 47 ■11 4. Of the train of thought in the mind, 59 ESSAY V. OF ABSTRACTION.
Chap. i. Of general ivords, — — 19 ■i 3. Of general conceptions formed by analyfng objeds, — — 106 » 4. Of general conceptions formed By combination, 1x9 — — 5. Obfer'vations concerning the names gifven to our general notions, — 137 I 6. Opinion of Philofophers about univerfals, 143 ESSAY VI. OF JUDGMENT.
Chap. i. Of judgment in general, — 168 I 3. Sentiment of Philofophers concermng judgment, 211 4. Of firfi principles in general, — 23S 5. Uhefjrji principles of contingent truths, 262 • 7. Opinions ancient and modern abont firfl prin- 8. Of prejudices, the caufes of err or, 351 ESSAY VII. OF REASONING.
Chap. i. Of reafoning in general, andof demonflratlon, 373 2. Whether m9rality be capable of demmjiration, 382 Chap, vr CONTENTS.
Page. Ckap. 3. Of probable reafoningy — 394...■ 4. Of Mr. Hume's fcepticifm "joith regard to ESSAY Vm. OF TASTE.
> 2. Of the objeds of tajle, and firji of novelty^ 430 ESSAYS INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN.
ESSAY IV. OF CONCEPTION.
CHAP. L Of Conception^ or ftmple Apprehefifion in General.
CONCEIVING, imagining, apprehend-C H A P. ing, underftanding, having a notion of a thing, are common words ufed to exprefs that ' operation of the underftanding, which the Lo- gicians (:2l\\ ftmple apprehenfion. The having an idea of a thing, is in common language ufed in the fame fenfe, chiefly I think fmce Mr. Lo-cke's time.
Logicians define fimple apprehenfion to be ttie bare conception of a thing without any judgment or belief about it. If this were in- tended for a ftridly logical definition, it might be a juft objection to it, that conception and Vol. II. B appre- CHAP, apprehenfion are only fynonymous words; and ^-. that we may as wdl define conception by ap- prehenfion^ as apprehenfion by conception; but it oaght to be remembered, that the moll fimple operations of the mind cannot be logically defined. To have a diflinO: no- tion of them, we muft attend to them as we feel them in our own minds. He that would have a diilin^: notion of a fcarlet colour, will never attain it by a definition; he muft fet it before his eye, attend to it, compare it with the colours that come nearefi: to it, and ob- ferve the fpecific difference, which he will in vain attempt to define.
Every man is confcious that he can conceive a thoufand things, of which he believes nothing at all; as a horfe with wings, a mountain of gold; but although conception may be with- out any degree of belief, even the fmalleft be- lief cannot be without conception. He that believes, muft have fome conception of what he believes.
Without attempting a definition of this ope- ration of the mind, I ihall endeavour to ex- plain fome of its properties; confider the theo- ries about it; and take notice of fome mif- takes of Philofophers concerning it.
1. It may be obferved, that conception en- ters as an insjredient in every operation of the mind: Our fenfes cannot give us the belief of any object, without giving fome conception of it at the fame time: No man can either re- member or reafon about things of which he hath no conception: When we will to exert any of our adlive powers, there muft be fome conception of what we will to do: There can be no defire nor averfion, love nor hatred, with- . out fome conception of the objed: We cannot feel Of Simple Apprehension in General. 3 feel pain without conceiving It, though we can CHAP, conceive it without feeling it. Thefe things are felf-evident.
In every operation of the mind therefore, in every thing we call thought there muft be con- ception: When we analyfe the various ope- rations either of the underftanding or of the will, we fhall always find this at the bottom, like the caput mortuum of the Chemiils, or the materia prima of the Peripatetics; but though there is no operation of mind without concep- tion, yet it may be found naked, detached from all others, and then it is called fimple apprehenfion, or the bare conception of a thing.
As all the operations of our mind are ex- prefled by language, every one knows, that it is one thing to underftand what is faid, to con- ceive or apprehend its meaning, whether it be a word, a fentence, or a difcourfe \ it is ano- ther thing to judge of it, to aflent or diffent, to be perfuaded or moved. The firfl is fimple apprehenfion, and may be without the laft, but the lalt cannot be without the firft.
2. In bare conception there can neither be truth nor falfehood, becaufe it neither affirms nor denies. Every judgment, and every pro- pofition by which judgment is exprelTed, muft be true or falfe; and the qualities of true and falfe, in their proper fenfe, can belong to no- thing but to judgments, or to propofitions which exprefs judgment. In the bare concep- tion of a thing there is no judgment, opinion, or belief included, and therefore it cannot be either true or falfe.
But it may be faid. Is there any thing more certain than that men may have true or falfe B 2 conceptions, CHAP, conceptions, true or falfe apprehenfions, of ^ things? I anfwer, that fuch M^ays of fpeaking are indeed fo common, and fo well authorifed by cufiom, the arbiter of language, that it would be prcfumption to cenfure them. It is hardly poflible to avoid ufmg them. But we ought to be upon our guard that we be not milled by them, to confound things, which, though often expreifed by the fame words, are really ditferent. V\ c muft therefore remember what v/as before obferved, Effay I. chap. i. That all the words, by which we Signify the bare conception of a thing, are likewife ufed to fignify our opinions, when we wilh to exprefs them with modefty and diffidence. And we (hall always find, that, when we fpeak of true or falfe conceptions, we mean true or falfe opinions. An opinion, though ever fo waver- ing, or ever fo modeftly expreifed, muft be ei- ther true or falfe; but a bare conception, which expreffcs no opinion or judgment,, can be neither.
If we analyfe thofe fpeeches, in which men attribute truth or falfchood to our conceptions of things, we Ihail find in every cafe, that there is fome opinion or judgment implied in what they call conception. A child conceives the moon to be fiat, and a foot or two broad; that is, this is his opinion: And when we fay it is a fal!'e notion, or a falfe conception, we mean that it is a falfe opinion. He conceives the city of London to be like his country village; that is, he believes it to be fo, till he is better inftruifted. He conceives a lion to have horns; that IS, he believes that the animal which men call a lion, has horns. Such opinions language authoriies us to call conceptions; and they may Of Simple Apprehension in General. 5 may be true or falfe. But bare conception, C H A P. or what the Logicians call fimple apprehenfion, ^• implies no opinion, however flight, and there- fore can neither be true nor falfe.
What Mr. Locke fays of ideas (by which word he very often means nothing but concep- tions) is very jufl, when the word idea is fo un- derftood, book 2. chap. 31. § i. " Though *' truth and falfehood, belong in propriety of " fpeech only to propofitions, yet ideas are " often termed true or falfe (as what words are " there that are not ufed with great latitude, '* and with fome deviation from their ftrict and " proper fignification); though I think, that " when ideas themfelves are termed true or ** falfe, there is Hill fome fecret or tacit propo- " fition, which is the foundation of that deno- " mination; as we fhall fee, if we examine " the particular occafions wherein they come " to be called true or falfe; in all v.'hich we " fhall find fome kind of affirmation or nega- " tion, which is the reafon of that denomina- " tion: For our ideas being nothing but bare " appearances, or perceptions in our minds, " cannot properly and fimply in themfelves be " faid to be true or falfe, no more than a fim- *' pic name of any thing can be faid to be " true or falfe."
It may be here obferved by the way, that in this paffage, as in many others, Mr. Locke ufes the word perception, as well as the word idea, to fignify what I call conception, or fim- ple apprehenfion. And in his chapter upon perception, book 2. chap. 9. he ufes it in the fame fenfc. Perception, he fays, " as it is the " firfl faculty of the mind, exercifed about " our CHAP." our Ideas; fo it is the firft and fimpleft idea ^- " we have from refleftion, and is by fome ' "^ ' " called thinking in general. It feems to be " that which puts the diflinclion betwixt the " animal kingdom and the inferior parts of " nature. It is the firft operation of all our " faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge " into our minds."
Mr. Locke has followed the example given by Des Cartes, Gassendi, and other Car- tcfians, in giving the name of perception to the bare conception of things: And he has been followed in this by Bifliop Berkeley, Mr. Hume, and many late Philofophers, when they treat of ideas. They have probably been led into this impropriety, by the common doctrine concerning ideas, which teaches us, that conception, perception by the fenfes, and memory, are only different ways of perceiving ideas in our own minds. If that theory be well founded, it will indeed be very difficult to find any fpecific diflinclion between conception and perception. But there is reafon to diftruft any philofophical theory, when it leads men to corrupt iangu;\ge, and to confound, under one name, operations of the mind, which common fenfe and common language teach them to diilinguiih.
I grant that there are fome flates of the mind, wherein a man may confound his con- ceptions with what he perceives or remembers, and miftake the one for the other; as, in the delirium of a fever, in fome cafes of lunacy and of madnefs, in dreaming, and perhaps in fome momentary tranfports of devotion, or of other ftrong emotions, which cloud his intel- lectual X)f Simple AppreheInsion in General. 7 Icdual faculties, and for a time carry a man^ HAP. out of himfelf, as we ufually exprefs it. ^^-^i^ Even in a fober and found fhate of mind, the memory of a thing may be fo very weak, that we may be in doubt whether v/e only dreamed or imagined it.
It may be doubted, whether children, when their imagination firfl begins to work, can diftinguifh what they barely conceive from what they remember. I have been told by a man of knowledge and obfervation, that one of his fons, when he began to fpeak, very of- ten told lies with great affurance, without any intention, as far as appeared, or any con^ fcioufnefs of guilt. From which the father concluded, that it is natural to fome children to lie. I am rather inclined to think, that the child had no intention to deceive, but miftook the rovings of his own fancy, for things which he remembered. This, however, I take to be very uncommon, after children can commu- nicate their fentiments by language, though perhaps not fo in a more early period.
Granting all this,, if any man will affirm, that they whofe intelledual faculties are found, and fober, and ripe, cannot with certainty diflinguifli what they perceive or remember, from what they barely conceive, when thofe operations have any degree of flrength and diftinftnefs, he may enjoy his opinion; I know not how to reafon with him. Why fhould Philofophers confound thofe operations in treating of ideas, when they would be afhamed to do it on other occafions? To dif- tinguifh the various powers of our minds^ a certain degree of underflanding is neceifary: And if fome, through a defe<ft of underfland- C H A P-ing, natural or accidental, or from unrlpenefs ^- of underftanding, may be apt to confound '""'^''^ difi'ercnt powers, will it follow that others cannot clearly diftinguifti them?
To return from this digreffion, into which the abufe of the word perception, by Philofo- phers, has led me, it appears evident, that the bare conception of an obje;£t, which in- cludes no opinion or judgment, cajfl neither be true nor falfe. Thofe qualities, in their proper fenfe, are altogether inapplicable to this operation of the mind.
3. Of all the analogies between th^ operatir ons of body and thofe of the mind, the^e is none fo flrong and fo obvious to aU mankind as that which there is between painting, of other plaflic arts, and the power of conceiving objeds in the mind. Hence in all languages, the words, by which this power of the mind and its various modifications are expreffed, arc analogical, and borrowed from thofe arts., We confider this power of the mind as a plaf- tic power, by which we form to ourfelves ima- ges of the objefts cf thought.
In vain fhould we attempt to avoid this ana- logical language, for we have no other lan- guage upon the fubjeft; yet it is dangerous, and apt to miflead. All analogical and figu- rative words have a double meaning; and, if we are not very much upon our guard, we Aide infenfibly from the borrowed and figura- tive meaning into the primitive. We are prone to carry the parallel between the things compared farther than it will hold, and thus v-ery naturally to fall into error.
To avoid this as far as poffible in the prefent fubje<^, it is proper to attend to the dilfimilitude Of Simple Apprehension in General. 9 tude between conceiving a thing in the niind,^ HAP. and painting ir to the eye, as wvU as to their y^^,^^ fimilitude. The fimilitude Itrikes and gives pleafure. The diflimilitude we are lefs difpo- led to obferve. But the Philofopher ought to attend to it, and to carry it always in mind, in his reafonings on this fubjeft, as a moni* tor, to warn him againft the errors into which the analogical language is apt to draw him.
When a man paints, there is fome work done, which remains when his hand is taken off, and continues to exift, though he ihould think no more of it. Every ftroke of his pen- cil produces an effect, and this effect is diffe- rent from his aQion in making it; for it re-^ mains and continues to exift when the adion ceafes. The action of painting is one thing, the picture produced is another thing. The firft is the caufe, the fecond is the effedt.
Let us next confider what is done when he only conceive? this picture. He muft have conceived it before he painted it: For this is a maxim univerfally admitted, that every work of art muft firft be conceived in the mind of the operator. What is this conception? It is an aft of the mind, a kind of thought. This cannot be denied. But does it produce any effect befides the aft itfelf? Surely com- mon fenfe anfwers this queftion in the negar live: For every one knows, that it is one thing to conceive, another thing to bring forth into effeft. It is one thing to projeft, another to execute. A man may think for a long time what he is to do, and after all do nothing. Conceiving as well as projefting or refolving, are what the fchoolmen called hiwianent afts of the mind, which produce nothing beyond themfelves.
lo ESSAY IV.
CHAP, themfelves. But painting is a tranfitive a6b, _ which produces an effect diftin£t from the ope- ration, and this effefl: is the pifture. Let this therefore be always remembered, that what is commonly called the image of a thing in the mind, is no more than the act or operation of the mind in conceiving it.
That this is the common fenfe of men who are untutored by philofophy, appears from their language. If one ignorant of the lan- guage fhould afl^. What is meant by conceiv- ing a thing? we fhould very naturally anfwer. That it is having an image of it in the mind; and perhaps we could not explain the word better. This fliows, that conception, and the image of a thing in the mind, are fynonymous expreffions. The image in the mind, there- fore, is not the objed of conception, nor is it any effeft produced by conception as a caufe. It is conception itfelf. That very mode of thinking, which we call conception, is by another name called an image in the mind.
Nothing more readily gives the conception of a thing than the feeing an image of it. Hence, by a figure common in language, conception is called an image of the thino- conceived. But to fhow that it is not a real but a metaphorical image, it is called an image in the mind. We know nothing that is properly in the mind but thought; and when any thing elfe is faid to be in the mind, the expreilion muft be figurative, and fignify fome kind of thought.
I know that Philofophers very unanimoufly maintain, that in conception there is a real image in the mind, which is the immediate ob- ject of conception, and diflind: from the ad of* conceiving it. I beg the reader's indulgence to 0/" Simple Apprehension in General. ii to defer what may be faid for or againfl: this CHAP, philofophical opinion to the next chapter; in- ^• tending in this only to explain what appears to me to belong to this operation of mind, w ith- out confidering the theories about it. I think it appears from what has been faid, that the common language of thofe who have not im- bibed any philofophical opinion upon this fub- jedl, authorifes us to underfiand the conception of a things and an image of it in the mind^ not as two different things, but as two different expreflions, to fignify one and the fame thing; and I wifii to ufe common words in their com- mon acceptation.
4. Taking along with us what is faid in the laft article, to guard us againfl the fedu£lion of the analogical language ufed on this fubje6t, we may obferve a very ftrong analogy, not only between conceiving and painting in ge- neral, but between the different kinds of our conceptions, and the different works of the painter. He either makes fancy pidures, or he copies from the painting of others, or he paints from the life; that is, from real objeds of art or nature which he has feen. I think our conceptions admit of a divifion very fimi- lar.
Firft^ There are conceptions which may be called fancy pictures. They are commonly called creatures of fancy, or of imagination. They are not the copies of any original that exifts, but are originals themfelves. Such was the conception which Swift formed of the if- land of Laputa and of the country of the Lil- liputians; Cervantes of Don Quixote and his Squire; Harrington of the government of Oceana \ and Sir Thomas More of that of of CHAP, of Utopia. We can give names to fuch crea- tures of imagination, conceive them diftin£tly, ^^^^ and reafon confequentially concerning them, though they never had an exiftence. They were conceived by their creators, and may be conceived by others, but they never exifted. We do not afcribe the qualities of true or falfe to them, becaufe they are not accompanied with any belief, nor do they imply any affir- mation or negation.
Setting afide thofe creatures of imagination, there are other conceptions, which may be called copies, becaufe they have an original or archetype to which they refer, and with which they are believed to agree; and we call them true or falfe conceptions, according as they / agree or difagree with the ftandard to which they are referred. Thefe are of two kinds, which have different flandards or originals.
The jirjl kind is analogous to pictures taken from the life. We have conceptions of indivi- dual things that really exift, fuch as the city of London, or the government of Venice. Here the things conceived are the originals; and our conceptions are called true when they agree with the thing conceived. Thus, my con- ception of the city of London is true when I conceive it to be vvhat it really is.
Individual things which really exift, being the creatures of God, (though fome of them may receive their outward form from man,) he only who made them knows their whole na- ture; we know them but in part, and there- fore our conceptions of them mufl in all cafes be.imperfedl and inadequate; yet they may be true, aad juft, as far as they reach.
The Of Simple Apprkhension in General. 13 The fecond kind is analogous to the copiesC HAP. which the painter makes from pidures done ^• before. Such I think are the conceptions vve^" have of ^^hac the ancients called univtrfals; that is, of things which belong or may belong to many individuals. Thefe are kinds and fpe- ctes of things; fuch as, man or elephant, which are fpecies of fubflances; wifdom or courage, which are fpecies of qualities; equali- ty or fimilitudc, which are fpecies of relations. It may be aflced. From what original are thefe conceptions formed ^. And when are they faid to be true or falfe?
It appears to me, that the original from which they are copied, that is, the thing con- ceived, is the conception or meaning which other men w^ho underfland the language affix to the fame words.
Things are parcelled into kinds and forts, not by nature, but by men. The individual things we are conneded with, are fo many, that to give a proper name to every individual would be impolTible. We could never attain the knowledge of them that is neceifary, nor converfe nor reafon about them, without fort- mg them according to their different attributes. Thofe that agree in certain attributes are thrown into one parcel, and have a general name given them, which belongs equally to every indivi- dual in that parcel. This common name mull therefore fignify thofe attributes which have been obferved to be common to every individual in that parcel, and nothing elfe.
That fuch general words may anfwer their intention, all that is neceffary is, that thofe who ufe them fhould affix the fame meaning: or notion, that rs, the lame conception to them.
The H ESSAY IV.
The H ESSAY IV.
C H A P.The common meaning is the ftandard by which I- fuch conceptions are formed, and they are faid ^^'^^^^ to be true or falfe, according as they agree or difagree with it. Thus, my conception of fe- lony is true and juft, when it agrees with the meaning of that word in the laws relating to it, and in authors who underfland the law. The meaning of the word is the thing conceiv- ed; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by thofe who bed underfland the language. An individual is expreffed in language either by a proper name, or by a general word joined to fach circumftances as diilinguifh that indi- vidual from all others; if it is unknown, it may, when an object of fenfe and within reach, be pointed out to the fenfes; when beyond the reach of the fenfes, it may be afcertained by a defcription, which, though very imperfect, may be true and fufficient to diftinguifli it from every other individual. Hence it is, that, in fpeaking of individuals, we are very little in danger of miflaking the objed, or taking one individual for another.
Yet, as was before obferved, our conception of them is alv/ays inadequate and lame. They are the creatures of God, and there are many things belonging to them v/hich we know not, and which cannot be deduced by reafoning from what we know: Ihey have a real eflence, or conflltution of nature, from which all their qualities flow; but this effence our faculties do not com.prehcnd: They are therefore inca- pable of definition; for a definition ought to comprehend the whole nature or eifence of the thing defined.
Thus, Weflminfter bridge is an individual objed; though I had never feen or heard of it before, 0/" Simple Apprehension in General. 15 before, if I am only made to conceive that itC H A P. is a bridge from Weflminfter over the Thames, this conception, however imperfeft, is true, and is fufficient to niLike me diftinguifh it, when it is mentioned, from every other obje£t that exifts. Ihe archite<5t may have an adequate conception of its ftruiflure, which is the work of man; but of the materials which are the work of God, no man has an adequate con- ception; and therefore, though the objed may be defcribed, it cannot be defined.
Univerfals are always exprefTed by general words; and all the words of language, ex- cepting proper names, are general words; they are the figns of general conceptions, or of fome circumftance relating to them. Thefe general conceptions are formed for the purpofe of lan- guage and reafoning; and the objecl from which they are taken, and to which they are intended to agree, is the conception which other men join to the fame words; they may therefore be adequate, and perfectly agree with the thing conceived. This implies no more than that men who fpeak the fame language may perfectly agree in the meaning of many general words.
Thus Mathematicians have conceived what they call a plane triangle: They have defined it accurately; and when 1 conceive it to be a plane furface, bounded by three right hues, I have both a true and an adequate conception of it. There is nothing belonging to a plane triangle which is not comprehended in this con- ception of it, or deducible from it by juft rea- foning. This definition expreffes the whole cflence of the thing defined, as every jufl de- finition ought to do; but this effence is only what Mr. Locke very properly calls a nominal effence; CH A P. effence; it is a general conception formed by the mind, and joined to a general word as its fign.
If all the general words of a language had a precife meaning, and were perfectly under- ftood, as mathematical terms are, all verbal difputes would be at an end, and men would never feem to differ in opinion, but when they differ in reality; but this is far from being the cafe. The meaning of mofl general words is not learned like that of mathematical terms, by an accurate definition, but by the experience we happen to have, by hearing them ufed in converfation. From fuch experience we col- lect their meaning by a kind of induction; and as this indu£lion is for the mofl part lame and imperfect, it happens that different perfons join different conceptions to the fame general word; and though we intend to give them the mean- ing which ufe, the arbiter of language, has put upon them, this is difficult to find, and apt to be miftaken, even by the candid and at- tentive. Hence, in innumerable difputes, men do not really differ in their judgments, but in the way of expreffmg them.
Our conceptions, therefore, appear to be of three kinds: They are either the conceptions of individual things, the creatures of God; or they are conceptions of the meaning of ge- neral words; or they are the creatures of our own imagination; and thefe different kinds have different properties which we have endea- voured to defcribe.
5. Our conception of things may be flrong and lively, or it may be faint and languid in all degrees. Thefe are qualities which proper- ly belong to our conceptions, though we have no Of Simple Apprehension in General. 17 no names for them but fuch as are analoErical.^ HAP. Every man is confcious of fach a difference in '• his conceptions, and finds his Hvely conceptions' n^— ** moft agreeable, when the objed is not of fuch a nature as to give pain.
Thofe who have lively conceptions, common- ly cxprefs them in a lively manner, that is, in fuch a manner as to raife lively conceptions and. emotions in others. Such perfons are the moft agreeable companions in converfation, and the moft acceptable in their writings.
The livelinefs of our conceptions proceeds from different caufes. Some objeds from their own nature, or from accidental affbciationj?, are apt to raife ftrong emotions in the mind. Joy and hope, ambition, zeal, and refentment, tend to enliven our conceptions: Difappoint- ment, difgrace, grief, and envy, tend rather to flatten them. Men of keen paflions are commonly lively and agreeable in converfation; and difpallionate men often make dull compa- nions: There is in fome men a natural ftrcngth and vigour of mind, which gives ftrength to their conceptions on all fubjefts, and in all the occafional variations of temper.
It feems eafier to form a lively conception of objects that are familiar, than of thofe that are not; our conceptions of vifible objedls are commonly the moft lively, when other circum- ftances are equal: Hence Poets not only delight in the defcription of vifible objects, but find means by metaphor, analogy, and allufion, to clothe every object they defcribe with vifible qualities: The lively conception of thefe makes the object appear, as it were, before our eyes. Lord Kaimes, in his Elements cf Critjcifm, has fhewn of what importance it is in works ^ Vol. II. C of Vol. II. C of C H A P. of tafte, to give to objects defcribed, what he ^ calls ideal prefence. To produce this in the ^^ — "^ ' mind, is indeed the capital aim of poetical and rhetorical defcription. It carries the man, as it were, out of himfelf, and makes him a fpectator of the fcene defcribed. This ideal prefence feems to me to be nothing elfe but a lively conception of the appearance which the object would make if really prefent to the eye.
Abflracl and general conceptions are never lively, though they may be diflincl; and there- fore, however neceflary in philofophy, feldom enter into poetical defcription, without being particularifed or clothed in fome vifible drefs.
It may be obferved, however, that our con- ceptions of vifible objedls become more lively by giving them motion, and more flill by giv- ing them life, and intelledtual qualities. Hence in poetry, the whole creation is animated, and endowed with fenfe and reflection.