Neither did he allow that there are any necef- ' " fary truths, but mahitained, that the truths which are commonly fo called, depend upon the will of God. And we find his followers, w^ho may be fuppofed to underdand his princi- ples, agree in maintaining, that the knowledge of our own exidence is the firft and funda- mental principle from which all knowledge mud be deduced by one who proceeds regularly in philofophy.
There is, no doubt, a beauty in raifing a large fabric of knowledge upon a few firll principles. The (lately fabric of mathematical knowledge, raifed upon the foundation of a few axioms and definitions, charms every be- holder. Des Cartes, who was well acquaint- ed with this beauty in the mathematical fci- ences, feems to have been ambitious to give the fame beautiful fimplicity to his fyftem of philofophy; and therefore fought only one firft principle as the foundation of all our knowledge, at lead of contingent truths.
And fo far has his authority prevailed, that thofe who came after him have almod univer- fally followed him in this track. This, there- fore, may be confidered as the fpirit of modern philofophy, to allow of no fird principles of contingent truths but this one, that the thoughts and operations of our own minds, of which we are confcious, are felf-evidently real and true; but that every thing elfe that is contin- gent is to be proved by argument.
The exidence of a material world, and of what we perceive by our fenfcs, is not felf-evi- dent, according to this philofophy. Des Car- tes ESSAY VI.
TEs founded it upon this argument, That God, who hath given us our fenfes, and all our fa- culties, is no deceiver, and therefore they are not fallacious.
I endeavoured to fhow, that if it be not ad- mitted as a firft principle, that our faculties are not fallacious, nothing elfe can be admit- ted; and that it is impoffible to prove this by argument, unlefs God fliould give us new faculties to fit in judgment upon the old.
Father Malebranche agreed with Des Cartes, that the exiflence of a material world requires proof; but being diifatisfied with Des Cartes's argument from the perfection of the Deity, thought that the only folid proof is from divine revelation.
Arnauld, who was engaged in controverfy with Malebranche, approves of his antago- nift in offering an argument to prove the exifl- ence of the material world, but obje6ts to the folidity of his arguments, and offers other ar- guments of his own.
Mr. Norris, a great admirer of Des Car- tes and of Malebranche, feems to have thought all the arguments offered by them and by Arnauld to be weak, and confeffes that we have at beil only probable evidence of the exigence of the material world.
Mr. Locke acknowledges that the evidence we have of this point is neither intuitive nor demonflrative; yet he thinks it may be called knowledge, and diftinguiflies it by the name of fenfitive knowledge; and, as the ground of this fenfitive knowledge, he offers fome weak arguments, which would rather tempt one to doubt than to believe.
At OPINIONS about firji PRINCIPLES. Z'^^ Kx. laft Bifliop Berkeley and ArthurCHAP. Collier, without any knowledge of each J^^v^ other, as far as appears by their writings, un- dertook to prove that there neither is nor can be a material world. The excellent flyle and elegant compofition of the former have made his writings to be known and read, and this fyflem to be attributed to him only, as if Col- lier had never exifted.
Both, indeed, owe fo much to Male- BRANCHE, that if we take out of his fyflem the peculiarities of our feeing all things in God, and our learning the exiftence of an external world from divine revelation, what remains is jufl the fyflem of Bifliop Berkeley. I make this obfervationbythe way, injuflice to a foreign au- thor, to whom Britifh authors feem not to have allowed all that is due.
Mr, Hume hath adopted Bifhop Berke- ley's arguments againfl the exiflence of mat- ter, and thinks them unanfwerable.
We may obferve, that this great Metaphyfi- cian, though in general he declares in favour of univerfal fcepticifm, and therefore may feem to have no firft principles at all, yet, with Des Cartes, he always acknowledges the reality of thofe thoughts and operations of mind of which we are confcious. So that he yields the antecedent of Des Cartes's enthy- meme cogiio, but denies the conclufion ergo Jum^ the mind being, according to him, no- thing but that train of imprelTions and ideas of which we are confcious.
Thus we fee, that the modern philofophy, of which Des Cartes may juflly be accounted the founder, being built upon the ruins of the Peripatetic, has a fpirit quite oppofite, and Vol. II. Z runs C H A P. runs into a contrarv extreme. The Peripatetic ^ ^^' not only adopted as firll principles thofe which "^^^^^"^"^ mankind have ahvay relied upon in their moft important tranlaftions, but, along with them, many vulgar prejudices; fo that this fyflem was founded upon a wide bottom, but in many- parts unfound. The modern fyftem has nar- rowed the foundation fo much, that every fu- perflruclure raifed upon it appears top-heavy.
From the fmgle principle of the exiftence of our own thoughts, very little, if any thing, can be deduced by juft reafoning, efpecially if we fuppofe that all our other faculties may be fallacious.
Accordingly we find that Mr. Hume was not the firil that: was led into fcepticifm by the want of nrft principles. For foon after Des Cartes there arofe a feet in France called Egoijls^ whp maintained that we have no evidence of the exiftence of any thing but ourfeives.
Whether thefe Egoifls, like Mr. Hume, be- lieved themfelves to be nothing but a train of ideas and impreffions, or to have a more per- manent exiftence, I have not learned, having never feen any of their writings; nor do I know whether any of this fe£l: did write in fup- port of their principles. One would think, they who did not believe that there was any psrfonto read, could have little inducement to write, unlefs they were prompted by that in- ward monitor, which Persius makes to be the fource of genius and the teacher of arts. There can be no doubt, however, of the ex- iftence of fuch a fe£t, as they are mentioned by many Authors, and refuted by fome, par- tlcuhrly by Eui-fier, in his Treatife of firft princdT>les.
Thofc OPINIONS about firji PRINCIPLES. 339 Thofe Egoifts and Mr. Hume feem to me toC HA p. have reafoned more confequentlally from Des Cartes principle than he did himlelf; and in- deed I cannot help thinking, that all who have foiloAved Des Cartes method, of requiring proof by argument of every thing except the exiilence of their own thoughts, have efcapcd the abyfs of fcepticifm by the help of weak reafoning and ftrong faith more than by any other means. And they feem to me to aft more confidently, who having rejected the firft principles on which belief mufl: be grounded, have no belief, than they, who, hke the others, rejefting firft principles, muft yet have a fyftem of belief, without any folid foundation on which it may ftand.
The Philofophers I have hitherto mentioned, after the time of Des Cartes, have all follow- ed his method, in refting upon the truth of their own thoughts as a firft principle, but re- quiring arguments for the proof of every other truth of a contingent nature; but none of them, excepting Mr. Locke, has exprefsly treated of firft principles, or given any opinion of their utility or inutility. We only collect their opinion from their following Des Cartes in requiring proof, or pretending to offer proof of the exiftence of a material world, which furely ought to be received as a firft principle, if any thing be, beyond what we are con- fcious of.
I proceed, therefore, to confider what Mr. Locks has faid on the fubjeO: of firft principles or maxims.
I have not the leaft doubt of this author's candour in what he fomewhere fays, that his effay was moftlyTpun out of his own thoughts.
Z 2 Yet C HA P. Yet it is certain, that, in many of the notions ^ ^^- which we are wont to [afcribe to him, others were before him, particularly, Des Cartes, GASshNDi, and Hobbes. Nor is it at all to be thought ftrange, that ingenious men, when they are got into the fame track, fliould hit upon the fame things.
But, in the definition which he gives of knowledge in general, and in his notions con- cerning axioms or firfl principles, I know none that went before him, though he has been very generally followed in both.
His definition of knowledge, that it confifls folely in rhe perception of the agreement or dif- agreement of our ideas, has been already con- fidered. But fuppofmg it to be jufl, flill it Vvould be true, that fome agreem»ents and dif- agreements of ideas mufl be immediately per- ceived; and fuch agreements or difagreements, when they are exprelfed by affirmative or ne- gative propofitions, are firft principles, becaufe their truth is immediately difcerned* as foon as they are underflood.
This I think is granted by Mr. Locke, book 4. chap. 2. " There is a part of our know- " ledge, fays he, which we may call intuitive. " In this the mind is at no pains of proving or " examining, but perceives the truth as the ** e)'e does light, only by being direfted to- *' ward it. And this kind of knowledge is the *' cleareft and moft certain that human frailty " is capable of. This part of knowledge is ir- " refiffible, and, like bright funfliine, forces *' itfelf immediately to be perceived, as foon *' as ever the mind turns its view thatw^ay."
He He OPINIONS about firjl PRINCIPLES. 341 He farther obferves, "That this intuitiveC H A P. " knowledge is neceffary to conne6t all the ^^^^• *' fteps of a demonftration.'* ' " ^ From this, I think, it neceflarily follows, that, in every branch of knowledge, we muui make ufe of truths that are intuitively knov/n, in order to deduce from them fuch as require proof.
But I cannot reconcile this with what he fays, fedl. 8. of the fame chapter. " The ne- *' ceflity of this intuitive knowledge in every *' ftep of fcientifical or demonftrative reafoning " gave occafion, I imagine, to that miftaken *' axiom, that all reafoning v/as ex pr(Zcognitis *' et pr/xconcejfis ^ which, how far it is miftaken, " I fhall have occafion to fliew more at laree, " when I come to confider proportions, and *' particularly thofe propofitions which are call- *' ed maxims, and to iliew, that it is by a raif- " take that they are fuppofed to be the foun- " dation of all our knowledge and reafonings."
I have carefully confidered the chapter on maxims, which Mr. Locke, here refers to; and though one would expect, from the quotation lafl: made, that it fhould run contrary to what I have before delivered concerning firft princi- ples, I find only two or three fentences in it, and thofe chiefly incidental, to which I do not affent; and I am always happy in agreeing -with a Philofopher whom I fo highly refpeft.
He.endeavours to (how, that axioms or in- tuitive truths are not innate.
To this I agree. I maintain only, that when the underftanding is ripe, and when we dif- tinclly apprehend fuch truths, we immediately aifent to them.
CHAP, He obferves, that felf-evidence is not pecu- ■ liar to thofe propofitions which pafs under the name of axioms, and have the dignity of axi- oms afcribed to them.
I grant that there are innumerable felf-tvident proportions, which have neither dignity nor utilitv, and therefore deferve not the name of axioms, as that name is commonly underftood to imply not only felf-evidence, but fome de- gree of dignity or utiHty. That a man is a man, and that a man is not a horfe, are felf- evident propofitions; but they are, as Mr. Locke veryjuftly calls them, trifling propofiti- ons. TiLLOTsoN very wittily fays of fuch pro- pofitions, that they are fo furfeited with truth, that they are good for nothing; and as they deferve not the name of axioms, fo neither do they deferve the name of knowledge.
He obferves, that fuch trifling felf-evident propofitions as we have named are not derived from axioms, and therefore that ail our know- ledge is not derived from axioms.
1 grant that they are not derived from axi- oms, becaufe they are themfelves felf-evident. But it is an abufe of words to call them know- ledge, as it is, to call them axioms; for no man can be faid to be the wifer or more knowing for having millions of them in florc.
lie obferves, that the particular propofitions contained under a general axiom are no lefs felf-evident than the general axiom, and that they are fooner known and underftood. Thus it is as evident, that my hand is lefs than my body, as that a part is lefs than the whole; and I know the truth of the particular propoution, iooner than that of the general.
This OPINIONS about firjl PRINCIPLES. 343 This is true. A man cannot perceive tlie^ ^^ '*• truth of a general axiom, fuch as, that a part is lefs than the whole, until he has the general notions of a part and a whole formed in his mind; and before he has thefe general notions, he may perceive that his hand is lefs than his body.
A great part of this chapter on maxims is levelled againfl a notion, which, it feems, fome have entertained, that all our knowledge is de- rived from thefe two maxims, to wit, whate- ver is, is; and it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be.
This I take to be a ridiculous notion, juftly deferving the treatment which Mr. Locke has given it, if it at all merited his notice. Tiiefe are identical propofitions; they are trilling, and furfeited with truth: No knowledge can be derived from them.
Having mentioned how far I agree v^^ith Mr. Locke concerning maxims or fird principles,, I fhall next take notice of tvv^o or three things, wherein I cannot agree with him.
In the feventh fe6tion of this chapter, he fays, That concerning the real exigence of all other beings, belides ourfelves, and a firfl caufe, there are no maxims.
I have endeavoured to iliov/ that there are maxims or firft principles with regard to other cxiftences. Mr. Locke acknowledges that we have a knowledge of fuch exiftences, which, he fays, is neither intuitive nor demonilrative, and which therefore he calls fenfitive know- ledge« It is demonftrable, and was long ago demonftrated by Aristotle, that every pro- pofition to which we give a rational affent, mufl either have its evidence in itfelf, or derive it from from CHAP, from fome antecedent propofition. And the ^^^- fame thing ma)'- be faid of the antecedent pro- ^'pofition. As therefore we cannot go back to antecedent proportions without end, the evi- dence muft at lafl reft upon propofitions, one or more, which have their evidence in them- felves, that is, upon firft principles.
As to the evidence of our own exiftence, and of the exiftence of a firft caufe, Mr. Locke does not fay whether it refts upon firft princi- ples or not. But it is manifeft, from what he has faid upon both, that it does.
With regard to our own exiftence, fays he, ■we perceive it fo plainly, and fo certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. This is as much as to fay, that our own exift- ence is a firft principle; for it is applying to this truth the very definition of a firft principle.
He adds, that if I doubt, that very doubt makes me perceive my own exiftence, and will not fufFer me to doubt of that. If I feel pain, I have as certain perception of my exiftence as of the pain I feel.
Here we have tikvo firft principles plainly im- plied: Firj}^ That my feeHng pain, or being confcious of pain, is a certain evidence of the real exiftence of that pain. And, fecondly., That pain cannot exift without a mind, or be- ing that is pained. That thefe are firft princi- ples, and incapable of proof, Mr. Locke ac- knowledges. And it Is certain, that if they are not true, we can have no evidence of our ov/n exiftence. For if we may feel pain when no pain really exifts, or if pain may exift with- out any being that is pained, then it is certain that our feeUng pain can give us no evidence of our exiftence.
Thus OPINIONS about firjl PRINCIPLES. 345 Thus it appears, that the evidence of ourC HAP. own exiftence, according to the view that Mr. Locke gives of it, is grounded upon two of ^ ' thofe firft principles which we had occafion to mention.
If we confider the argument he has given for the exiftence of a firft intelUgent caufe, it is no lefs evident that it is grounded upon other tv/o of them. The firft, That what begins to exift muft have a caufe of its exiftence; and the fe- cond, That an unintelligent and unthinking being, cannot be the caufe of beings that are thinking and intelligent. LIpon thefe two prin- ciples, he argues very convincingly for the ex- iftence of a firft intelligent caufe of things. And, if thefe principles are not true, we can have no proof of the exiftence of a firft caufe, either from our own exiftence, or from the ex- iftence of other things that fall within our view.
Another thing advanced by Mr. Locke upon this fubjed:, is, that no fcience is, or hath been built upon maxims.
Surely Mr. Locke was not ignorant of geo- metry, which hath been built upon maxims prefixed to the elements, as far back as we are able to trace it. But though they had not been prefixed, which was a matter of utility rather than neceftity, yet it muft be granted, that every demonftration in geometry is grounded, cither upon propofitions formerly demonftrated, or upon felf-evident principles.
Mr. Locke farther fays, that maxims are not of ufe to help men forward in the advance- ment of the fciences, or new difcoveries of yet unknown truths: That Newton, in the dif- coveries he has made in his never enough to be admired book, has not been aflifted by the general C H A P. general maxims, whatever is, is; or the whole .;^^s greater than a part, or the like.
I anlwer, the firft of thefe is, as was before obferved, an identical trifling proportion, of no ufe in mathematics, or in any other fcience. The fecond is often ufed by Newton, and by all Mathematicians, and many demonftrations reft upon it. In general, Newton, as well as all other Mathematicians, grounds his demon- ftrations of mathematical propofitions upon the axioms laid down by Euclid, or upon propo- fitions which have been before demonftrated by help of thofe axioms.
But it deferves to be particularly obferved, that Nbwton, intending in the third book of his Principia, to give a more fcientific form to the phyfical part of aftronomy, which he had at firft compofed in a popular form, thought proper to follow the example of Euclid, and to lay down firft, in what he calls, Regida; Philofo- phandi^ and in his Phanomena^ the firft princi- ples which he aflumes in his reafonlng.
Nothing, therefore, could have been more unluckily adduced by Mr. Locke to fupport his averfion to firft principles, than the exam- ple of Sir Isaac Nevxton, who, by laying down the firft principles upon which he reafons in thofe parts of natural philofophy which he cultivated, has given a ftability to that fcience which it never had before, and which it will retain to the end of the world.
I am now to give fome account of a Philo- fopher, who wrote exprefsly on the fubject of firft principles, after Mr. Locke.
Pere Buffier, a French Jefuit, firft pub- liftied his Traite des proniers Veritez, et dc la foiirce de nosjugementSj in 8vo, if I miftakc not, in OPINIONS about firjl PRINCIPLES. 347 \\\ the year 1 724. It was afterwards publifned CHAP, in folio, as a part of his Coirrs des ftknccs. ^' • Paris, iyT^2.
He defines firfl principles to be propofitions fo clear, that they can neither be proved, nor combated by thofe that are more clear.
The firfl fource of firfi principle? he men- tions, is, that intimate conviftion which every man has of his own exiftence, and of what paifes in his own mind. Some Philofophers, he obferves, admitted thefe as firfl; principles, who were unwilling to admit any others; and he ihows the ftrange confequences that follow from this fyflem.
A fecond fource of firfi: principles he makes to be common fenfe; which, he obferves, Philofophers have not been wont to confider. He defines it to be, the difpofition which Na- ture has planted in all men, or the far greater part, which leads them, when they come to the ufe of reafon, to form a common and uni- form judgment upon obje£ts which are not objcfts of confcioufnefs, nor are founded on any antecedent judgment.
He mentions, not as a full enumeration, but as a fpecimen, the following principles of common fenfe.
1. That there are other beings, and other men in the univerfe, befides myfelf.
2. That there is in them fomething that is called truth, wifdom, prudence, and that thefe things are not purely arbitrary.
3. That there is fomething in me which I call intelligence, and fomething which is not that intelligence, which I call my body, and that thefe things have different properties.
4. That CHAP. ^. That all men are not in a confplracy to ): deceive me and impofe upon my credulity.
5. That what has not intelligence cannot produce the effeds of intelligence, nor can pieces of matter thrown together by chance form any regular work, fuch as a clock or "watch.
He explains very particularly the feveral parts of his definition of common fenfe, and ihews how the dictates of common fenfe may be diftinguifhed from common prejudices; and then enters into a particular confideration of the primary truths that concern being in ge- neral; the truths that concern thinking beings; thofe that concern body; and thofe on which the various branches of human knowledge are grounded.
I fhall not enter into a detail of his fenti- ments on thefe fubjedis. I think there is more which I take to be original in this treatife, than in moft books of the metaphyfical kind I have met with; that many of his notions are folid; and that others, which I cannot altoge- ther approve, are ingenious.
The other writers I have mentioned, after Des Cartes, may, I think, without impro- priety, be called Cartefians: For though they differ from Des Cartes in fome things, and contradict him in others, yet they fet out from the fame principles, and follow the fame me- thod, admitting no other firft principle with regard to the exiflence of things but their own exiilence, and the exiflence of thofe operati- ons of mind of which they are confcious, and re- quiring that the exiftence of a material world, and the exiflence of other men and things, fhould be proved by argument.
This OPINIONS about firji PRINCIPLES. 349 This method of philofophifmg is common to C H A P. Des Cartes, Malebranche, Arnauld, ^^^• Locke, Norris, Collier, Berkeley, and Hume; and, as it was introduced by Des Cartes, I call it the Cartefian fyftem, and thofe who follow it Cartefians, not intending any difrefpeft by this term, but to fignify a particular method of philofophifmg common to them all, and begun by Des Cartes.
Some of thefe have gone the utmofl length in fcepticifm, leaving no exiftence in Nature but that of ideas and imprelTions. Some have endeavoured to throw off the belief of a mate- rial world only, and to leave us ideas and fpi- rits. All of them have fallen into very grofs paradoxes, which can never fit eafy upon the human underftanding, and which, though adopted in the clofet, men find themfelves un- der a neceflity of throwing off and difclaiming when they enter into fociety.
Indeed, in my judgment, thofe who have reafoned mod acutely and confequentially up- on this fyftem, are they that have gone decpeft into fcepticifm.
Father Buffier, however, is no Cartefian in this fenfe. He feems to have perceived the defeats of the Cartefian fyftem while it was in the meridian of its glory, and to have been aware that a ridiculous fcepticifm is the natu- ral iffue of it, and therefore nobly attempted to lay a broader foundation for human knowledge, and has the honour of being the firft, as far as I know, after Aristotle, who has given the world a juft treatife upon firft principles.
Some late writers, particularly Dr. Oswald, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Campbell, have been led into a way of thinking fpmewhat fimilar to that sy ESSAY VI.
CHAP, that of BuFFiER; the two former, as I have * reafon to believe, without any mtercourfe wfrh one another, or any knowledge of what BuFFiER had wrote on the fubjeft. Indeed, a man who thinks, and who is acquainted with the philofophy of Mr. Hume, will very naturally be led to apprehend, that, to fupport the fabric of human knowledge, fome other principles are neceffary thanthofe of Des Car- tes and Mr. Locke. Buffier muft be ac- knowledged to have the merit of having dif- covered this, before the confequences of the Cartefian fyftem were fo fully difplayed as they have been by Mr. Hume. But I am apt to think, that the man who docs not fee this now^, nmll: have but a fuperficial knowledge of thefe fubjefts.
The three writers above mentioned have my high efleem and affection as men; but I in- tend to fay nothing of them as writers upon this fubjedt, that I may not incur the cenfure of partiality. Two of them have been joined fo clofely with me in the animadverfions of a celebrated writer, that we may be thought too near of kin to give our teflimony of one ano- ther.
CHAP.
CHAP.
Of PREJUDICES, the Caufes of ERROR. 35* CHAP.
vm.
CHAP. VIII. Of Prejudices, the Caufes of Error.
OU R intelleftual powers are wifely fitted by the Author of our nature for the dif- covery of truth, as far as fuits oUr prefent ftate. Error is not their natural iflue, any more than difeafe is of the natural ftru6lure of the body. Yet, as we are liable to various difeafes of body from accidental caufes, exter- nal and internal; fo we are, from like caufes, liable to wrong judgments.
Medical writers have endeavoured to enu- merate the difeafes of the body, and to reduce them to a fyftem, under the name of nofology; and it were to be wifhed that we had alfo a nofology of the human underftanding.
When we know a diforder of the body, we are often at a lofs to find the proper remedy; but in mofl cafes the diforders of the under- ftanding point out their remedies fo plainly, that he who knows the one muft know the other.
Many authors have furnifhed ufeful materi- als for this purpofe, and fome have endeavour- ed to reduce them to a fyflem. I like befl the general divifion given of them by Lord Bacon in his fifth book De augmentis fcientiarum, and more fully treated in his Novwn Organum. He divides them into four claifes, idola tribus^ idola fpccus, idola fori., and idola theairi. The names are perhaps fanciful; but I think the divifion judicious, like mod of the produ6li- ons of that wonderful genius. And as this di- vifion was firft made by him, he may be in- dulged ZS^ ESSAY VI.
CHAP, dalged the privilege of giving names to its fe* viii. ygj-^^j ni embers.
I propofe in this chapter to explain the feve- ral members of this divifion, according to the meaning of the author, and to give inftances of each, without confining myfelf to thofe which Lord "Bacon has given, and without pretending to complete enumeration.
To every bias of the underflanding, by which a man may be milled in judging, or drawn into error, Lord Bacon gives the name of an idol. The underftanding, in its natural and bed flate, pays its homage to truth only. The caufes of error are confidered by him as fo many falfe deities, who receive the homage which is due only to truth.
The firft clafs are the idola tribus. Thefe are fuch as befet the whole human fpecies; fo that every man is in danger from them. They arife from principles of the human conftitution, which are highly ufeful and necelfary in our prefent flate; but, by their excefs or defect, or wrong diredion, may lead us into error.
As the a£live principles of the human frame are wifely contrived by the Author of our be- ing for the diredion of our actions, and yet, without proper regulation and reflraint, are apt to lead us wrong; fo it is alfo with regard to thofe parts of our conftitution that have in- fluence upon our opinions. Of this we may take the following inftances: I. FirJ}^ Men are prone to be led too much by authority in their opinions.
In the firft part of life we have no other guide; and without a difpofition to receive im- plicitly what we are taught, we fhould be in- capable Of PREJUDICES, the Caufes of ERROR. o^^^ capable of inftruclion, and incapable of im-CHAP, VTIT provement. ^ ^^^• When judgment is ripe, there are many- things in which we are incompetent judges. In fuch matters, it is mod reafonable to rely upon the judgment of thofe whom we believe to be competent and difinterefled. The highefl court of judicature in the nation relies upon the authority of lawyers and phyficians in mat- ters belonging to their refpedive profeffions.
Even in matters which we have accefs to know, authority always will have, and ought to have more or lefs weight, in proportion to the evidence on which our own judgment refts, and the opinion we have of the judgment and candour of thofe who differ from us, or agree with us. The modeft man, confcious of his own faUibility in judging, is in danger of giv- ing too much to authority; the arrogant of giv- ing too little.