Whether the pleafure we feel in contem- plating beautiful objeds may have any necelfa- ry connection with the belief of their excel- lence, or whether that pleafure be conjoined with this belief, by the good pleafure only of our Maker, 1 will not determine. The readi- er may fee Dr. Price's fentiments upon this fubje£t, which merit confideration, in the fe- cond chapter of his Review of the Queflions concerning Morals.
Though we may be able to conceive thefe two ingredients of our fenfe of beauty disjoin- ed, this affords no evidence that they have no neceflary connection. It has indeed been maintained, that whatever we can conceive, is poflible: But I endeavoured, in treating of conception, to ffiow, that this opinion, though very common, is a miftake. There may be, and probably are, many neceflary connedions Vol. IL G s of ESSAY VIII.
C H A P of things in nature, which we are too dim- ^^* fighted to difcover.
The emotion produced by beautiful objeds is gay and pleafant. It fweetens and humani- fes the temper, is friendly to every benevo- lent aft'eclion, and tends to allay fuUen and angry paffions. It enlivens the mind, and dif- pofes it to other agreeable emotions, fuch as thofe of love, hope, and joy. It gives a value to the objeft, abftraded from its utility.
In things that may be poffefled as property, beauty greatly enhances the price. A beauti- ful dog or horfe, a beautiful coach or houfe, a beautiful picture or profped, is valued by its owner and by others, not only for its utili- ty, but for its beauty.
If the beautiful objcdl be a perfon, his com- pany and converfation are, on that account, the more agreeable, and we are difpofed to love and cileem him. Even in a perfect Itran- ger, it is a powerful recommendation, and difpofes us to favour and think well of him, if of our own fex, and (till more if of the other.
" There is nothing, fays Mr. Addison, " that makes its way more diredly to the " foul than beauty, which immediately difFu- '* fes a fecret fatisfaction and complacence " through the imagination, and gives a finifh- " ing to any thing that is great and uncom- *' mon. The very fir ft difcovery of it ftrikes " the mind with an inward joy, and fpreads a " chcerfulnefs and delight through all its fa- " culties."
As we afcrlbe beauty, not only to perfons, but to inanimate things, we give the name of love or liking to the emotion, which beauty, in both thelc kinds of objeds, produces. It is OF BEAUTY. 45^ is evident, however, that liking to a perfon is^ H A P, a very different affeftion of mind from liking,11^ to an inanimate thing. The firft always im- plies benevolence; but what is inanimate can- not be the object of benevolence. The two affections, however different, have a refem- blance in fome refpeds; and, on account of that refemblance, have the fame name: And perhaps beauty, in thefe two different kinds ofobjeCls, though it has one name, maybe as different in its nature as the emotions which it produces in us.
Befides the agreeable emotion which beau- tiful objeds produce in the mind of the fpec- tator, they produce alfo an opinion or judg- ment of fome perfection or excellence in the obje£t. This I take to be a fecond ingredient in our fefne of beauty, though it feems not to be admitted by modern Philofophers.
The ingenious Dr. Hutcheson, who per- ceived fome of the defefts of Mr. Locke's fyftem, and made very important improve- ments upon it, feems to have been carried away by it, in his notion of beauty. In his Inquiry concerning Beauty, SeQ:. i. " Let " it be obferved, fays he, that, in the foUow- " ing papers, the word beauty is taken for " the idea raifed in us, and the fenfe of beau- " ty for our power of receiving that idea.'* And again; " Only let it be obferved, that, *' by abfolute or original beauty, is not un- " derftood any quality fuppofed to be in the " objed which (hould, of itfelf, be beautiful, " without relation to any mind which per- " ceives it: For beauty, like other names of " fenfible ideas, properly denotes the percep- " tion of fome mind; fo cold, hot, fweet, G g 2 " bitter, ESSAY Vllf.
CHAP. " bitter, denote the fenfations in our minds,- '^- " to which perhaps there is no refemblance in " the objects which excite thefe ideas in us; *' however, we generally imagine otherwife. " Were there no mind, with a fenfe of beau- " ty, to contemplate objects, I fee not how " they could be called beautiful."
There is no doubt an analogy between the external fenfes of touch and tafte, and the in- ternal fenfe of beauty. This analogy led Dr. HuTCHESoN, and other modern Philofophers, to apply to beauty, what Des Cartes and Locke had taught concerning the fecondary qualities, perceived by the external fenfes.
Mr. LocKE*'s doctrine concerning the fecon- dary qualities of body, is not fo much an er- ror in judgment as an abufe of words. He dillinguifhed very properly between the fenfa- tions we have of heat and cold, and that qua- lity or ftructure in the body which is adapted by Nature to produce thofe fenfations in us. He obferved very juftly, that there can be no fimilitude between one of thefe and the other. They have the relation of an effect to its caufe, but no fimilitude. This was a very juft and proper correftion of the dodrine of the Peri- patetics, who taught, that all our fenfations are the very form and image of the quality in the object by which they are produced.
What remained to be determined was, whe- ther the words, heat and cold, in common language, fignify the fenfations we feel, or the cualities of the objeft which are the caufe of thefe fenfations. Mr. Locke made heat and cold to fignify only the fenfations we feel, and not the qualities which are the caufe of them. And in this, I apprehend, lay his miftake.
take. For it is evident, from the ufe of lan-C HAP. guage, that hot and cold, fweet and bitter, ^^• are attributes of external objects, and not of ^"^ — ^^ '' the perfon who perceives them. Hence, it appears a monitrous paradox to fay, there is no heat in the tire, no fweetnefs in fugar: But, when explained according to Mr. Locke's meaning, it is on.ly, like moft other paradoxes, an abufe of words.
The fenfe of beauty may be analyfed in a manner very fimilar, to the fenfe of fweetnefs. It is an agreeable feeling or emotion, accom- panied with an opinion or judgment of fome excellence in th^ objeft, which is fitted by Nature to produce that feeling.
The feeling is, no doubt, in the mind, and fo alfo is the judgment we form of the objed: But this judgment, like all others, mull be true or falfe. If it be a true judgment, there is fome real excellence in the objed. And the ufe of all languages fhows, that the name of beauty belongs to this excellence of the objed, and not to the feelings of the fpeda- tor.
To fay that there is in reality no beauty in thofe obje£ls in which all men perceive beauty, is to attribute to man fallacious fenfes. But w^e have no ground to think fo difrefpedfuUy of the Author of our being; the faculties he hath given us are not fallacious; nor is that beauty, which he hath fo liberally diffufed over all the works of his hands, a mere fancy in us, but a real excellence in his works, which exprefs the perfedion of their Divine Author.
We have reafon to believe, not only that the beauties we fee in nature are real, and not fanciful.
ESSAY vin.
CHAP. " bitter, denote the fenfations in our minds,- I^- " to which perhaps there is no refemblance in " the objects which excite thefe ideas in us; " however, we generally imagine otherwife. *' Were there no mind, with a fenfe of beau- *' ty, to contemplate objeds, I fee not how " they could be called beautiful."
There is no doubt an analogy between the external fenfes of touch and taile, and the in- ternal fenfe of beauty. This analogy led Dr. HuTCHESON, and other modern Philofophers, to apply to beauty, what Des Cartes and Locke had taught concerning the fecondary qualities, perceived by the external fenfes* Mr. Locker's doftrine concerning the fecon- dary qualities of body, is not fo much an er- ror in judgment as an abufe of words. He dillinguiflied very properly between the fenfa- tions we have of heat and cold, and that qua- lity or ftrufture in the body which is adapted by Nature to produce thofe fenfations in us. He obferved very juftly, that there can be no fimilitude between one of thefe and the other. They have the relation of an effed to its caufe, but no fimilitude. This was a very juft and proper correction of the dodrine of the Peri- patetics, who taught, that all our fenfations are the very form and image of the quality in- the objeft by which they are produced.
What remained to be determined was, whe- ther the words, heat and cold, in common language, fignify the fenfations we feel, or the cualities of the objed which are the caufe of thefe fenfations. Mr. Locke made heat and cold to fignify only the fenfations we feel, and not the qualities which are the caufe of them. And in this, I apprehend, lay his miftake.
OF BEAUTY, 453 take. For it is evident, from the ufe of lan-C HAP. guage, that hot and cold, fweet and bitter, ^^• are attributes of external objects, and not of ^"""""^ '' the perfon who perceives them. Hence, it appears a monftrous paradox to fay, there is no heat in the tire, no fweetnefs in fugar: But, when explained according to Mr. Locke's meaning, it is on.ly, like moft other paradoxes, an abufe of words.
The fenfe of beauty may be analyfed in a manner very fimilar, to the fenfe of fweetnefs. It is an agreeable feeling or emotion, accom- panied with an opinion or judgment of fome excellence in the objed, which is fitted by Nature to produce that feeling.
The feeling is, no doubt, in the mind, and fo alfo is the judgment we form of the object: But this judgment, like all others, mult be true or falfe. If it be a true judgment, there is fome real excellence in the objed. And the ufe of all languages fhows, that the name of beauty belongs to this excellence of the object, and not to the feelings of the fpeda- tor.
To fay that there is in reality no beauty in thofe objefts in which all men perceive beauty, is to attribute to man fallacious fen.fes. But we have no ground to think fo difrefpeftfully of the Author of our being; the faculties he hath given us are not fallacious; nor is that beauty, which he hath fo liberally diffufed over all the works of his hands, a mere fancy in us, but a real excellence in his works, which exprefs the perfedion of their Divine Author.
We have reafon to believe, not only that the beauties we fee in nature are real, and not fanciful.
ESSAY VIII.
CHAP, fanciful, but that there are thoufands which ^^' our facuhies are too dull to perceive. We fee many beauties, both of human and divine art, which the brute animals are incapable of per- ceiving; and fuperior beings may excel us as far in their difcernment of true beauty as we excel the brutes.
The man who is fkilled in painting or fta- tuary, fees more of the beauty of a fine pic- ture or ftatue than a common fpecl:ator. The fame thing holds in all the fine arts. The mod perfed works of art have a beauty that ftrikes even the rude and ignorant; bu-t they fee only a fmall part of that beauty which is feen in fuch works by thofe who underftand them per- fectly, and can produce them.
This may be applied with no lefs juftice to the works of Nature. They have a beauty that ftrikes even the ignorant and inattentive. But the more we difcover of their ftrudure, of their mutual relations, and of the laws by which they are governed, the greater beauty, and the more delightful marks of art, wifdom and goodnefs, we difcern.
Thus the expert Anatomift fees numberlcfs beautiful contrivances in the ftrudure of the human body, which are unknown to the igno- rant.
Although the vulgar eye fees much beauty in the face of the heavens, and in the various motions and changes of the heavenly bodies, the expert Aftronomer, who knows their or- der and diftances, their periods, the orbits they defcribe in the vaft regions of fpace, and the fimple and beautiful laws by which their motions are governed, and all the appearances of their ftations, progreflions, and retrogradations, i dations, their eclipfes, occultations, and tran-C HAP. fits are produced, fees a beauty, order, and ^^'• harmony reign through the whole planetary ""^ *""— "^ fyftem, which delights the mind. The eclipfes of the fun and moon, and the blazing tails of comets, which flrike terror into barbarous na- tions, furnifh the moft pleafmg entertainment to his eye, and a feafl: to his underftanding.
In every part of Nature's works, there are numberlefs beauties, which, on account of our ignorance, we are unable to perceive. Superior beings may fee more than we; but he only who made them, and, upon a review, pronounced them all to be very good, can fee all their beauty.
Our determinations with regard to the beau- ty of objects, may, I think, be diftinguiihed into two kinds; the firfl we may call inftinctive, the other rational.
Some objeds ftrike us at once, and appear beautiful at firft fight, without any reflection, without our being able to fay why we call them beautiful, or being able to fpecify any perfec- tion which juflifies our judgment. Something of this kind there feems to be in brute ani- mals, and in children before the ufe of reafon; nor does it end with infancy, but continues through life.
In the plumage of birds, and of butterflies, in the colours and form of flowers, of Ihells, and of many other objedls, we perceive a beauty that delights; but cannot fay what it is in the object that fnould produce that emotion.
The beauty of the object may in fuch cafes be called an occult quality. We know well how it aftefts our fenfes; bat what it is in itfelf we know not. But this, as well as other oc- cult CHAP, cult qualities, is a proper fubjeQ: of philofophi- • cal difquifition; and, by a careful examination ^'^ of the objects to which Nature hath given this amiable quality, we may perhaps difcover fome real excellence in the objeO:, or, at leaft, fome valuable purpofe that is ferved by the fffect which it produces upon us.
This inrtinclive fenfe of beauty, in different fpecies of animals, may differ as much as the external fenfe of tafte, and in each fpecies be adapted to its manner of life. By this per- haps the various tribes are led to alfociate with their kind, to dwell among certain objects ra- ther than others, and to conflruct their habi- tation in a particular manner.
There feem likewife to be varieties in the fenfe of beauty in the individuals of the fame fpecies, by which they are directed in the choice of a mate, and in the love and care of their offspring.
" We fee," fays Mr. Addison, "that every " different fpecies of fenfible creatures has its " different notions of beauty, and that each " of them is moil affected with the beauties " of its own kind. This is no where more " remarkable than in birds of the fame fhape " and proportion, where we often fee the mate " determined in his courtfhip by the fmgle " grain or tincture of a feather, and never " difcovering any charms but in the colour of '' its own foecies."
A " Scit thalamofervarefidem, fan6tafque veretur " Connubii leges; non ilium in pectore candor *' Sollicitat niveus; neque pravum accendit " amorem ^' Splendida lanugo, vel honefla inverticecrifla; " Purpureufve ^^ Purpureufve nitor pennarum; aft agmina late CHAP. " Foeminea explorat cautus, maculafque re- ^^'• " quirit " Cognatas, paribufque interlita corpora guttis: " Ni faceret, pidis fylvam circum undique " monftris " Confufamafpiceresvulgo, partufque biformes, " Et genus ambiguum, et veneris monumenta " nefandse.
" Hinc merula in nigro fe obledat nigra " marito; " Hinc focium lafciva petit philomela canorum, " Agnofcitquc pares ibnitus; hinc noctua te- " tram " Canitiem alarum, et glaucos miratur ocellos. *' Nempe fibi femper conftat, crefcitque quo- " tannis " Lucida progenies, caftos confefla parentes: " Vere novo exultat, plumafque decora ju- " ventus " Explicatadfolem, patriifquecoloribus ardet."
In the human kind there are varieties in the tafte of beauty, of which we can no more af- fign a reafon than of the variety of their fea- tures, though it is eafy to perceive that very important ends are anfwered by both. Thefe varieties are moft obfervable in the judgments we form of the features of the other fex; and in this the intention of Nature is moft appa- rent.
As far as our determinations of the compa- rative beauty of objefts are inftinctive, they are no fubjed: of reafoning or of criticifm; they are purely the gift of Nature, and we have CHAP, have no flandard by which they may be mea- But there are judgments of beauty that may be called rational, being grounded on fome agreeable quality of the object which is diftincc- ly conceived, and may be fpecified.
This diuinflion between a rational judgment of beauty and that which is inftinclive, may be illuftrated by an inflance.
In a heap of pebbles, one that is remarkable for brilliancy of colour and regularity of figure, will be picked out of the heap by a child. He perceives a beauty in it, puts a value upon it, and is fond of the property of it. For this preference, no reafon can be given, but that children are, by their conflitution, fond of brilliant colours, and of regular figures.
Suppofe again that an expert mechanic views a well conftrucled machine. He fees all its parts to be made of the fitted materials, and of the mod proper form; nothing fuperfluous, nothing deficient; every part adapted to its ufe, and the whole fitted in the mod perfect manner to the end for which it is intended. He pronounces it to be a beautiful machine. He views it with the fame agreeable emotion as the child viewed the pebble; but he can give a reafon for his judgment, and point out the particular perfedions of the objeft on which it is grounded.
x^lthouoh the indindlve and the rational o fenfe of beauty may be perfeftly didinguifhed in fpeculation, yet, in paiiing judgment upon particular objects, they are often fo mixed and confounded, that it is difficult to affign to each its own province. Nay, it may often happen, that a judgment of the beauty of an objed, I objeft, which was at firil merely infl:In6i:ive,C H A P. fliall afterwards become rational, when we dif- ''^• cover fome latent pcrfcdion of which that beauty in the object is a fign.
As the fenfe of beauty may be difhinguifhed into inftindive and rational; lb I think beauty itfelf may be dillinguifhed into original and derived.
As fome objects fliine by their own light, and many more by light that is borrowed and reflected; fo I conceive the luftre of beauty in fome objects is inherent and original, and in many others is borrowed and reflected.
There is nothing more common in the fen- timents of all mankind, and in the language of all nations, than vdiat may be called a com- munication of attributes; that is, transferring an attribute, from the fubjett to which it pro- perly belongs, to fome related or refembling fubje6t.
The various objects which Nature prefents to our view, even thofe that arc moft different in kind, have innumerable fimilitudes, rela- tions, and analogies, which we contemplate with pleafure, and which lead us naturally to borrow words and attributes from one objed: to exprefs what belongs to another. The greateil part of every language under heaven is made up of words borrowed from one thing, and applied to fomething fuppofed to have fome relation or analogy to their firft fignifi- cation.
The attributes of body we afcribe to mind, and the attributes of mind to material objects. To inanimate things we afcribe life, and even intelledual and moral qualities. And although the qualities that are thus made common belong 46o ESSAY VIII.
CHAP, belong to one of the fubje£ls in the proper ^^' fenie, and to the other metaphorically, thefe dliFerent fenfes are often fo mixed in our ima- gination, as to produce the fame fentiment with regard to both.
It is therefore natural, arid agreeable to the flrain of human fentiments and of human language, that in many cafes the beauty which originally and properly is in the thing fignified, fliould be transferred to the fign; that which is in the caufe to the effeft; that which is in the end to the means; and that which is in the agent to the inflrument.
If what was faid in -the lad chapter of the diftinclion between the grandeur which we af- cribe to qualities of mind, and that which we afcribe to material objetls, be well founded, this diflinftion of the beauty of objeds will eafily be admitted as perfectly analogous to it. I ihall therefore only illuftrate it by an example.
There is nothing in the exterior of a man more lovely and more attradive than perfect good breeding. But what is this good breed- ing? It confiits of all the external figns of due refpeft to our fuperiors, condefcenfion to our inferiors, politenefs to all with whom we converfe or have to do, joined in the fair fex with that delicacy of outward behaviour which becomes them. And how comes it to have fuch charms in the eyes of all manicind? For this reafon only, as I apprehend, that it is a natural fign of that temper, and thofe affec- tions and fentiments with regard to others, and with regard to ourfelves, which are in themfelves truly amiable and beautiful.
This This is the original, of which good breed- C H A P. ing is the pidure; and it is the beauty of the ^^• original that is refleded to our fenfe by the* pidure. The beauty of good breeding, there- fore, is not originally in the external behaviour in which it confifts, but is derived from the qualities of mind which it exprefles. And though there may be good breeding without the amiable qualities of mind, its beauty is ftill derived from what it naturally exprefles.
Having explained thefe diftinclions of our fenfe of beauty into inftinclive and rational, and of beauty itfelf into original and derived, I would now proceed to give a general view of thofe qualities in objeds, to which we may juftly and rationally afcribe beauty, whether original or derived.
But here fome embarraffment arifes from the vague meaning of the word beauty, which I had occafion before to obferve.
Sometimes it it extended, fo as to include every thing that pleafes a good tafte, and fo comprehends grandeur and novelty, as well as what in a more reilricled fenfe is called beauty. At other times, it is even by good writers confined to the obje£ls of fight, when they are either feen, or remembered,, or ima- gined. Yet it is admitted by all men, that there are beauties in mufic; that there is beauty as well as fublimity in compofition, both in verfe and in profe; that there is beau- ty in characters, in affections, and in adions. Thefe are not objects of fight; and a man may be a good judge of beauty of various kinds, who has not the faculty of fight.
To give a determinate meaning to a word fo varioufly extended and reftrided, I know no better C H A P. better wav than what is fuggefted by the coin- ^^- mon divifion of the objects of tafte into novel- ' - ty, grandeur, and beauty. Novelty, it is plain, is no quahty of the new objecl, but merely a relation which it has to the knowledge of the perfon to whom it is new. Therefore, if this general divifion be jull, every quality in an objecl that pleafes a good tafte, muft, in one degree or another, have either grandeur or beauty. It mav flill be difficult to fix the precife limit betwixt grandeur and beauty; but they muft together comprehend every thing fitted by its nature to pleafe a good tafte, that is, every real perfeclion and excellence in the objects we contemplate.
In a poem, in a picture, in a piece of mu- fic, it is real excellence that pleafes a good tafte. In a perfon, every perfeclion of the mine, moral or intellectual, and every perfec- tion of the body, gives pleafure to the fpecta- tor as well as to the owner, when there is no envy nor malignity to deftroy that pleafure.
It is therefore in the fcale of perfection and real excellence that we muft look for what is either grand or beautiful in objects. What is the proper object of admiration is grand, and what is the proper object ot love and ef- teem is beautiful.
This, I think, is the only notion of beauty that correfponds with the divifion of the ob- jects of tafte which has been generally receiv- ed by Fhilofophers. And this connection of beauty, with real perfection, was a capital doCtrine of the Socratic fchool. It is often afcribedto Socrates in the dialogues of Pla- to and of Xenophon.
We OF BEAUTY. 46^ We may therefore take a view, firft, ofCHAP thole qualities of mind to which we may juflly ^ " • and rationally afcribe beauty, and then of the "— -'^^"'•-' beauty we perceive in the objefts of fenie. We ihall fmd, if I miftake not, that, in the tirft, original beauty is to be found, and that the beauties of the fecond clafs are derived from fome relation they bear to mind, as the figns or expreliions of fome amiable mental quality, or as the effetls of defign, art, and wife contrivance.
As grandeur naturally produces admiration, beauty naturally produces love. We may therefore juflly afcribe beauty to thofe qualities which are the natural objctls of love and kind affection.
Of this kind chiefly are fome of the moral virtues, which in a peculiar manner conllitute a lovely character. Innocence, gentlenefj, condefcenfion, humanity, natural atfedion, public fpirit, and the v/hole train of the foft and gentle virtues. Thefe qualities are ami- able from their very nature, and on account of their intrinfic worth.
There are other virtues that raife admiration, and are therefore grand; fuch as magnanimity, fortitude, felf-command, fuperiority to pain and labour, fuperiority to pleafure, and to the fmiies of fortune as well as to her frowns.
Thefe awful virtues conflitute what is mod grand in the human character; the gentle vir- tues, what is moft beautiful and lovely. As they are virtues, they draw the approbation of our moral faculty; as they are becoming and amiable, they affect our fenfe of beauty.
Next to the amiable moral virtues, there are many intelleftual talents which have an intrinfic value.
464 ESSAY VIII.
CHAP, value, and draw our love and efteem to thofe IV^ who poflefs them. Such are, knowledge, 'good fenfe, wit, humour, cheerfulnefs, good tafte, excellence in any of the fine arts, in eloquence, in dramatic action; and we may add, excellence in every art of peace or war that is ufeful in fociety.
There are likewife talents which we refer to the body, which have an original beauty and comelinefs; fuch as health, flrength, and agi- lity, the ufual attendants of youth; fkill in bodily exercifes, and fkill in the mechanic arts. Thefe are real perfections of the man, as they increafe his power, and render the body a fit inflrument for the mind.
I apprehend, therefore, that it is In the mo- ral and intelleftual perfections of mind, and in its active powers, that beauty originally dwells; and that from this as the fountain, all the beauty which we perceive in the vifible world is derived.
This, I think, was the opinion of the anci- ent Philofophers before named; and it has been adopted by Lord Shaftesbury and Dr. Akenside among the moderns.
" Mind, mind alone! bear witnefs earth and " heav'n, " The living fountains in itfelf contains " Of beauteous and fublime. Here hand in " hand " Sit paramount the graces. Here enthron'd, " Celeflial Venus, with divined airs, " Invites the foul to never-fading joy.** AKENdlDE.
But neither mind, nor any of its qualities or powers, is an imi^ediate object of perception ta to man. We are, indeed, immediately con- CHAP, fcious of the operations of our own mind; ^^• and every degree of perfection in them gives the pureft pleafure, with a proportional degree of felf-efteem, fo flattering to felf-love, that the great difficulty is to keep it within juft bounds, fo that we may not think of ourfelves above what we ought to think.
Other minds we perceive only through the medium of material objects, on which their fignatures are imprcfled. It is through this medium that we perceive life, activity, wif- dom, and every moral and intellectual quality in other beings. The figns of thofe qualities are immediately perceived by the fenfes; by them the qualifies themfelves are reflected to our underftanding; and we are very apt to attri- bute to the fign the beauty or the grandeur, which is properly and originally in the things fignified.
The invifible Creator, the Fountain of all perfection, hath (tamped upon all his works fignatures of his divine wifdom, power, and benignity, which are vifible to all men. The works of men in fcience, in the arts of tafte, and in the mechanical arts, bear the fignatures of thofe qualities of mind which were employ- ed in their production. Their external beha- viour and conduct in life expreifes the good or bad qualities of their mind.
In every fpecies of animals, v/e perceive by vifible figns their inltincts, their appetites, their affettions, their fagacity. Even in the inanimate world there are many things analo- gous to the qualities of mind; fo that there is hardly any thing belonging to mind which may not be reprefented by images taken from the Vol. II. H h objects CHAP. In harmony, the very names of concord ^J- and difcord are metaphorical, and fuppofe iome analo8;y between the relations of found, to which they are figuratively applied, and the relations of minds and affedions, which they originally and properly fignify.
As far as 1 can judge by my ear. when two or more perfons of a good voice and ear, con- verfe together in amity and friend fliip, the tones of their different voices are concordant, but become diicordant when they give vent to angry pallions; fo that, without hearing w^hat is faid, one may know by the tones of the dif- ferent voices, whether they quarrel or converfe amicably. This, indeed, is not fo eafily per- ceived in thofe who have been taught, by good- breeding, to fupprefs any tones of voice, even when they are angry, as in the loweft rank, who exprefs their angry pafTions without any reilraint.
When difcord arifes occafionally in conver- fation, but foon terminates in perfect amity, we receive more pleafure than from perfect uianimity. In hke manner, in the harmony of mufic, difccrdant founds are occafionally introduced, but it is always in order to give a relifn to the moil perfect concord that follow^s. Whether thefe analogies, between the har- mony of a piece of mufic, and harmony in the intercouri'e of minds, be merely fanciful, or have any real foundation in fad, I fubmit to thofe who have a nicer ear, and have applied it to obfervations of this kind. If they have any juil foundation, as they feem to me to have, they ferve lo account for the metaphori- cal application of the names of concord and difcord to the relations of founds 5 to account for OF BEAUTY. 469 for the pleafure we have from harmony in mu-C HAP. fic; and to Ihow, that the beauty of harmony ^^• is derived from the relation it has to agreeable '-""^^'^ affeftions of mind.